Uncovering the Sources of Nuclear Behavior: Historical Dimensions of Nuclear Proliferation

Recent developments in Northeast Asia and the Middle East have once again
 shaken confidence in the stability of the non-proliferation regime. Many observers
 predict the likely occurrence of further ‘horizontal proliferation’ in these regions –
 the nuclearization of states which previously had foresworn possession of the
 ultimate weapon. Fears of such a chain reaction have renewed interest in exploring
 the factors that drive proliferation and in developing empirically grounded theories
 on decision-making of states regarding their nuclear choices.

General Assumptions:

Traditionally, theory building on the causes of nuclear proliferation has been
 dominated by realist thinking. (Neo-)Realist theories of International Relations
 have linked nuclearization to systemic factors, power distribution and the external
 security environment of states. The slow pace of proliferation in spite of an ever
 growing number of nuclear capable states has called into question the one-sided
 concentration on structural aspects and balance-of-power mechanisms. By
 contrast, more recent explanatory frameworks stress sub-systemic and domestic
 determinants of nuclear weapons policies. They focus on the role of nuclear
 bureaucracies, the psychology of individual leaders, domestic political survival or
 questions of prestige.

Many of these competing theoretical approaches to understanding the
 phenomenon of nuclear proliferation (and non-proliferation) use the same case
 studies but often interpret the available historical evidence in profoundly different
 ways. At the very least, this raises the question of the reliability of existing
 historical accounts of state decisions in favor of/or against nuclearization. One
 basic prerequisite in order to overcome deficiencies and predictive weaknesses of
 existing theory-driven approaches to nuclear behavior seems to be a greater
 knowledge and a better understanding of historical instances of proliferation.

Conference Objectives:

The conference aims at bringing together historians and political scientists
 working on the theme of nuclear proliferation. We invite papers on specific cases of
 acquisition or renunciation of nuclear weapons, based on newly declassified
 documents, recently accessible archival evidence or other, previously unavailable
 information. We also welcome proposals dealing with comparative case studies or
 regional studies. Favoring accuracy over parsimony, the conference aims to enlarge
 the knowledge about the main determinants of nuclear behavior, thereby enabling
 a better understanding of the calculus of incentives and disincentives determining
 the nuclear behavior of states.

Timetable:

A selection of the conference papers will be compiled into a volume
edited by Andreas Wenger and Roland Popp.

• Submission of Abstract: 30 September, 2009
• Submission of Workshop Papers: 30 May, 2010
• Conference (Zurich, Switzerland): 18-19 June, 2010
• Submission of Final Papers: 30 September, 2010
• Publication: Spring/Summer 2011

Paper proposals should be submitted as page-long abstract and should be sent to
popp@sipo.gess.ethz.ch. For more information on the CSS or the ETH-Zurich, visit
http://www.css.ethz.ch/index_EN. All submissions will be subject to a peer review
process. Please note that the Editors retain the discretion to accept or reject articles
at all phases of the publication process.
Research Themes:

I. Taking Stock: Contending Theoretical Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons Decisions

• Structural Power and Security Environments:
• «Self Help» and Nuclearization
• Hierarchic/Multipolar Power Distributions and (Non-)Proliferation
• The Influence of Alliances and Security Commitments on Proliferation Decisions
• Diverging Trajectories: Regional Security and Nuclear Weapons Decisions
• The Role of Institutions
• The Non-Proliferation Regime and Nuclear Choices
• Regional Solutions: The Establishment of ‘Nuclear Weapons Free Zones’
• Nuclear Taboos and Nonproliferation: The Influence of Norms
• Domestic Politics and Nuclear Choices:
• Political Survival and Nuclear Policies: «State» vs. «Regime» Security
• Nuclear Bureaucracies and the Quest for Nuclear Weapons
• Political Psychology and State Leaders
• The Internal Constitutions of States and the Sources for Proliferation: Does Regime Type Matter?

II. Historical Realities of Nuclear Proliferation: Building Nuclear Weapons

• Proliferation in Europe during the 1950s and 1960s: Haves (United Kingdom/France) vs. Have-nots (Germany/Italy)
• The Chinese Test of 1964 and Its Consequences
• Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East? The Israeli Weapons Program and Its Strategic Competitors (Israel/Egypt/Libya/Algeria/Syria/Iraq/Iran)
• South Asia: The Nuclearization of the Indo-Pakistani Conflict

III. Historical Realities of Nuclear Proliferation: Foregoing Nuclear Weapons

• Proliferation in Europe during the 1950s and 1960s: Middle Powers, Neutrals and the Temptations of the Bomb (Netherlands/Belgium/Norway/Sweden/Switzerland/Yugoslavia/Romania)
• Aspiring and Abandoning Nuclear Weapons in the Southern Cone: The Nuclear Ambitions of Argentina and Brazil
• Reversing Course: South Africa and the Bomb
• The Absence of Nuclear Dominoes in East Asia during the Cold War (China/Japan/South Korea/North Korea/Taiwan/Indonesia/Australia)

IV. Historical Realities of Nuclear Proliferation: Preventing Nuclear Weapons

• The Influence of Alliances and Security Commitments on Proliferation Decisions
• Patrons and Clients: Historical Lessons in Counterproliferation
• «Nuclear Sharing» and Nuclear Independence
• Cooperative Security and Nuclearization
• Arms Control and the Nonproliferation Treaty
• Post-NPT Adaptations: The Option of Nuclear Hedging
• The Military Card: The Option of Preventive Strikes