Frank Cass Publishers

Contemporary Security Policy
ISSN: 1352-3260

The end of the Cold War has radically altered the ways in which security is perceived and pursued. Contemporary Security Policy provides a forum for discussion of the broadening spectrum of security issues emerging in the post-Cold War world. Its aim is not only to examine the technical and political issues of arms control and disarmament but also to discuss the security implications of ethnic conflict, nationalism, economic decline and underdevelopment, environmental degradation, mass migration of refugees and drug trafficking. A refereed journal, Contemporary Security Policy has an important role in the debate over security and security agreements in contemporary international relations.

Three issues per year: April, August, December

The South African Defence Review and the Redefinition - The Parameters of the National Defence Debate: Towards a Post-Modern Military?
Dr (Col) R M Williams

South African defence planning has undergone dramatic changes in the past five years. Hitherto the preserve of a small cadre of military technocrats, it is now managed in an inclusive and transparent manner including a plethora of role-players ranging from legislators to members of civil society. This consensual mode of policy formulation has immensely enriched the defence debate and has introduced a range of concepts and strategies into the South African discourse that were hitherto excluded from consideration. Yet, notwithstanding these developments, many of the key concepts underpinning South African defence planning, force design and weapons acquisition are increasingly inappropriate to the country's defence needs. The key organizing principle in South African defence planning remains the focus on the primary function as the major force design and budgetary driver. This perspective is critiqued from an historical, political and practical perspective. It is suggested, in this article, that notwithstanding the immense strides made in opening the defence debate to a wide range of hitherto marginalized role-players, a new conceptual architecture needs to be developed to enable South African defence planners in particular, and defence planners in developing countries in general, to design forces that are more appropriate to their strategic environment and less of a 'mirror' of the armed forces of the developed world.

Issue 21.1

The United States and Humanitarian Demining in Eritrea: Training the Trainer, 1995-1997, focuses on efforts by US Special Operations Command for Central Command (SOCCENT) to develop an Eritrean capability to safely locate and remove land mines. In 1991, after a 30-year civil war with Ethiopia, Eritrea gained its independence. The conflict, marked by trench warfare and the prolific use of land mines, left Eritrea with a daunting landmine problem which threatened social and economic recovery. Compounding this dismal situation was the scarcity of skilled manpower, training, equipment, and funds to conduct demining. Starting in 1994 SOCCENT undertook a military assistance programme to develop Eritrean capabilities to conduct demining. Over three years SOCCENT supported a humanitarian demining programme which created an indigenous Eritrean capability to locate and neutralize land mines. Assessments are made on whether SOCCENT's training programme was an appropriate response given the severe constraints on resources and the difficulty in the post-Cold War era of conducting military operations in countries emerging from decades of war.

Issue 21.1

The proposals for security sector reform (SSR) contained within the new military mission of defence diplomacy suggest that important elements in the mission are probably flawed. Defence diplomacy is a laudable aim, but current proposals for SSR suggest it represents an over-extension of existing military business. Three general dangers are identified. First, by being based on a partial understanding of the linkages between security and other aspects of British government policy, defence and security policy may become the subject of an experiment in inter-departmental co-operation. Second, the nature of the security sector in the developing world may be misjudged. Third, lessons learned from earlier relevant British and American experience may be undervalued.

Issue 21.1

A European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) still remains more an aspiration than a concrete achievement of the European Union (EU). We argue that the emergence of an effective ESDI is contingent upon the ability of the Western European Union (WEU) to act as a hinge between NATO and the EU. In this article, we identify five themes defining the problem of institutional expansion in the European security space; review the main organisational developments of NATO, EU, and ESDI; and explore how a geographical expansion by both NATO and EU will affect the final form and content of ESDI. We conclude that an effective ESDI faces any number of barriers, the most important of which include simmering tensions over the degree of ESDI autonomy, European complaints about American leadership and dominance in NATO, a renewed American focus on burden- and risk-sharing, and deep-seated disagreements over the end-station of a common European defence.

Issue 21.1

The conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 is considered one of the crowning achievements of post-Cold War nuclear non-proliferation. On the other hand, the open test of nuclear weapons in 1998, first by India and then Pakistan, is, perhaps, the nadir of non-proliferation efforts. This article argues that, ironically, these two outcomes are intimately interconnected. During the Cold War, nuclear testing was framed a disarmament issue. Since the Gulf War of 1991, issues of nuclear testing have come to be reframed as part of broad agenda of proliferation control. This reframing created the conditions in which it was possible in 1996 for the CTBT to be agreed. However, producing a CTBT as part of the proliferation control agenda, in turn, created the conditions in which it was possible for India openly to test nuclear weapons, after more than 20 years of restraint.

Issue 21.1

The debate over nuclear proliferation has been characterized by two complementary, but sometimes competing, policies: one resides in the implementation of unilateral initiatives designed to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their related technologies; the other involves international cooperative attempts to create a nuclear non-proliferation regime. This piece seeks to trace the development of these two policies, particularly over the last two decades, and assess the way the focus of this debate has moved between different regions, states and functional issues. In this context, it also addresses totally unanticipated proliferation problems, such as the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Finally, an attempt is made to project the debate over nuclear proliferation policies into the future and, especially, to assess the potential impact of new military technologies on this debate.

Issue 20.3

Moving from a dominating super power competition to the fractiousness of multi-state conflicts, the past 20 years have provided a watershed for the development and the global perception of the implications of new military technologies. In the middle of the period, one super power imploded politically without nuclear or conventional war while an undeclared war in a periphery state (Iraq 1991) provided at first blush an early exemplar of new warfare based on computerized knowledge. Today computers are increasingly seen to be coming close to solving the age-old military problem of not knowing enough when decisively engaged in battle. While most militaries remain today largely conventional forces, beliefs in the promises of computerized military technologies are spreading rapidly among the global military community's leaders. Unless the perceptions are tested and shown wanting in war, expectations of war and military needs must change accordingly. This piece reflects upon the evolution of military technology across major nations in terms of how events have changed the perceived rankings of military needs and technological choices. It explains briefly how the old technology triad of guns, bombs and nukes has widened to include 'information' as a destructive, or at least disruptive, weapon. Simultaneously a reweighting of six basic military needs has emerged among leaders of the global military community, from an emphasis on lethality, reach and resupply to one in which a more equal weight given to historically less emphasized needs for accuracy, legitimacy, and speed/timeliness. Finally, Demchak suggests the logically likely endgame of modernizing militaries with networked information technology.

Issue 20.3

Force continues to be used on a regular basis by the West. But major wars between Western industrialized powers are obsolete. When Western states now use force they do so from afar, involving directly only a limited number of representatives - mostly the armed forces of the state - and with minimal risks of escalation. The majority spectate from a safe distance courtesy of the globalized media, empathizing but not experiencing, sympathizing but not suffering. Strategies for the use of force emphasize minimizing costs and risks, most clearly through the coercive use of air power but also through the adoption of manoeuvre-based strategies and an emphasis upon technology (including the promise of a Revolution in Military Affairs). The experience of war for the West has therefore changed over this century from one of total war to one of a spectator sport.

Issue 20.3

Convinced that global security issues have changed in the post-Cold War era but that the shared understanding of them has not necessarily kept pace, the authors address what scholars seem to know, what they do not, and why. They combine personal reflections with what they learned from a workshop with journal editors and analysts as well as from responses to an electronic questionnaire. The five most prominent themes are: the centrality of armed conflicts and the role of inequality and injustice in them; multilateral peace operations; poor understanding of new threats; the difficulties in avoiding a US-centric focus; and the construction of sovereignty. The authors speculate that future security studies scholarship increasingly will: be cross-disciplinary; emphasize both normative and institutional dimensions; focus on a wide range of actors; and take non-military threats seriously.

Issue 20.3

This study examines the impact of the end of the Cold War on national and regional strategies, and on international institutions. It argues that the habits of cooperation instilled during the Cold War have proved very beneficial to Western Europe in its aftermath, that the United States has been raised to a new level, that Africa has suffered through increased marginalization, and that NATO rather than the UN has benefited institutionally the most from the changes. But perhaps most significantly, the article argues that fluidity is the key concept in post-Cold War strategy, and that this has undermined certainty and the willingness to offer prediction.

Issue 20.3

This essay examines the emergence and development of non-traditional approaches to security over the past twenty years. Seven distinct areas of security studies that are not related to the predominant neo-neo synthesis in international relations are identified and examined. What is important is the connection of security studies to the broader development of the discipline of international relations. That is, without the emergence of non-realist/liberal thought in international relations, security studies would be much narrower today.

Issue 20.3

Over the past 20 years not only have there been a number of enormous changes in the nature of international politics, but there has been substantial development in realist and liberal thought. However, the connection between events and theory has been discouraging. Realism and liberalism have had very little success in predicting world events, and have instead focussed on coming closer together. This tendency to blend realist and liberalist thought is unhelpful, as they examine different issues that might be termed international politics and transnational community politics. It is thus important to keep our concepts clear and, above all, to have more respect for the influence of time.

Issue 20.3

This article is divided into two parts. The first identifies three disquieting outcomes of the security debate since the end of the Cold War: (1) no one paradigm can explain what actors mean by security; (2) no one method is appropriate for the study of security; and (3) no one solution, notably countervailing force and coercive threats, can resolve security dilemmas. The second part poses the question of what security systems are likely to advance world peace as the lodestar for security studies. Placing security within the larger context of governance of what is an emerging world society for the first time in human evolution, the discussion exposes the inherent flaws of prevailing solutions to violence and threats of the nation-state, world markets, and democratization and human rights as responses to the imperatives of global order, welfare, and legitimacy.

Issue 20.3

Nearly 20 years ago in a chapter titled 'Change and Insecurity: A Critique of Strategic Studies', Buzan argued that Strategic Studies suffered from 'hectic empiricism', an underconceptualization of security, and a bias in favour of the status quo powers. Reconsidering that paper, he argues that hectic empiricism has become an even more powerful force, changing not just the day to day subject matter of the field, but redefining the concept of security. Military, materialist Strategic Studies has given way to a wider, methodologically plural Security Studies, and the relative simplicities of the Cold War landscape have been transformed into the complexities of the 'two worlds' one. The essay argues that the shift from a more realist to a more liberal international system has put change at the centre of security, raising a host of awkward questions about the traditional status quo orientation of the field.

Issue 20.3

The notion that past military experiences weigh heavily on current security policy-making in Germany is surely indisputable. The task of actually identifying the impact of history on contemporary policy is, however, not easy. One way of tackling this is by mobilizing the concept of strategic culture which goes some way in assessing the relevance of the past on the present. Crucially an understanding of German strategic culture projects a picture of what 'history qualifies Germany to do'. This article attempts to employ the notion of German strategic culture, seeing it as a vital tool to understanding elements of both continuity and change in German security policy since the ending of the Cold War. What will be argued here is that due to the make-up of West German strategic culture it acts as both a constraining and facilitating force upon policy behaviour.

Issue 20.2

This article examines in detail the Nuclear Suppliers Group's negotiating efforts to address nuclear dual-use technology and full-scope safeguards. In outlining the regime's reform, it argues that the recent NSG successes resulted from sustained US leadership preceding the negotiations, bolstered by post-Gulf War UN inspections in Iraq. However, the new evidence presented here will trace back to the 1970s the US governmental efforts in the creation of these non-proliferation initiatives. Most literature on the subject draws the conclusion that the world responded collectively to Iraq's intransigence almost immediately, within two years of Iraq's military defeat. Whilst true, the genesis of these non-proliferation successes merit closer scrutiny, as several decades of quiet yet consistent American-led policy and technical deliberations laid the foundations for a swift conclusion to the Nuclear Suppliers Group negotiations after the Gulf War.

Issue 20.2

In a so-called post-Cold War international system, North Korea is in danger of systemic collapse, and is mobilizing every possible means to stay alive. Its dilemma cannot be resolved, however, by clinging to anachronistic policies. At some point, Kim Jong-il's rule will be challenged as reformist elites replace weak leadership and envisage serious liberalization and internal reform as an alternative means of survival. In that process, inter-Korean relations will move into a co-operative stage, followed by political reconciliation, arms control, exchange and co-operation. This will be an intermediate stage towards eventual unification. What South Korea needs for final victory in this situation are flexible but coherent policy options toward North Korea, which must be carefully re-examined in the light of the two countries' goals, environment, capabilities and limitations.

Issue 20.2

This article posits the importance of strategic culture as a tool to understand elements of both continuity and change in contemporary German security policies. German strategic culture was born out of the disasters of the Second World War, the result of what was both demanded of the new Federal Republic and what could be internally offered. This admixture of old and new gave rise to two principle constituents; foundational elements - the basal fabric of the strategic culture of core values, together with regulatory practices - the tangible sets of policies and institutions which performed the task of relating the foundational elements to the external environment. At the close of the Cold War West German strategic culture came in to flux with the international environment, this tension gave rise to a number of policy changes, most notably the expansion of the Bundeswehr's remit together with marked elements of continuity in the practice of conscription. By mobilizing the concept of German strategic culture this article attempts to explain this situation seeing strategic culture in action as both a facilitating and restraining force.

Issue 20.2

With their accession to NATO in March 1999, and within the next decade likely also the EU, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary will have achieved their central strategic goal of integration with the West and overcome their historic position as vulnerable states located in the 'grey zone' between Europe's great powers. As they integrate with NATO and the EU, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are intensifying efforts to build cooperation with their eastern and southern neighbours. Contrary to the warnings of critics, NATO and EU enlargement are helping to promoting cooperation and the resolution of disputes between Central and Eastern European states, not creating new 'dividing lines'. EU enlargement, however, is more likely than NATO enlargement to create 'dividing lines'. There is a strong case for further enlargement of NATO and the EU, but more attention needs to be directed to managing the consequences of EU enlargement.

Issue 20.2

Issue 20.1

Issue 20.1

The post-Cold War era has seen NATO and the WEU/EU expand both their mandates and membership. The justification offered for this expansion is the need for flexibility. Flexibility does have advantages, especially in times of rapid change. However, it also brings dangers, the most serious being uncertainty which generates mistrust. Uncertainty can stem from the mismatch of institutional membership and opt-out provisions. In addition, flexibility can also lead to coalition building and tensions between 'ins ' and 'outs'. These dangers must be carefully managed to counter any erosion of trust or interpretation that these developments are multilateral smokescreens for the pursuit of national interest and free-riding by the privileged few rather than the actions of flexible friends. This can best be done by stressing norms of solidarity and trust.

Issue 20.1

This essay explores the consequences of the unravelling of the Soviet offensive biological weapons programme. It demonstrates that the military and civil components of the biopharmaceutical industry are still inextricably interlinked. Evidence is provided that since the break-up of the USSR there has been a significant increase in the number of countries in possession of technologies required for the development and production of offensive biological weapons. In addition evidence is provided that there is a considerable threat of biological terrorism in the former Soviet Union and a number of cases of unauthorized access to BW facilities are documented. It is also argued that the proliferation of companies based on former BW facilities may present a threat with regard to the proliferation of sensitive technologies. The article concludes that institutional fortification of FSU governments is of crucial importance if conversion and adherence to international treaties is to be transformed from a formal commitment into reality.

Issue 20.1

This article analyses the significance of Article XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention in achieving global acceptance of this treaty. In general, a state's intention to join or to refrain from joining the treaty is dependent upon whether relative or absolute gains are the objective; this issue is context relative, meaning that various factors may be involved, depending both on the region under consideration as well as the particular time in question. Concepts such as the security deficit and the regional security complex are introduced, as well as the notion of functional equivalence. The CWC, as a universal disarmament treaty, must consider the security dynamics on the regional and sub-regional levels which may cause states in certain situations to evaluate their individual positions relative to other states in the region. Defection from the treaty, or a failure by a state to join the treaty, can be motivated by that state's desire to obtain potential relative gains. Thus, the goal of universal adherence to the CWC is a means to discourage the pursuit of potential relative gains a state may anticipate obtaining by defecting from, or not joining, the treaty.

Issue 20.1

The post-Cold War expansion of the definition of security has added the protection of societal values and of way of life, to the traditional concern with the state's physical security and survival. In addition, with the end of the Cold War, transnational issues have moved to the fore of Western security doctrine. A test for security salience of transnational issues is presented, by adding to this definition two criteria developed for defining a phenomenon as one of relevance to security: association with the deliberate, organized and purposeful use (or threat of use) of violence by individuals, organizations, or political entities against a state's government, territory, institutions, nationals and vital interests; or manipulability through the use of military instruments of state power. This test is applied to one transnational issue - the international production and trafficking of narcotics- which is shown to pose a threat to national security, by traditional, restrictive definitions of 'security' as well as by the broader ones prevalent in the wake of the Cold War. The results of the analysis of the case study permit the construction of a rough, preliminary ranking of other transnational issues, by their saliency for national and international security.

Issue 20.1

It has been claimed that since 1990 a second 'nuclear age' has emerged. One characteristic of this second 'nuclear age' has been that the concepts and literature on nuclear weaponry generated by the first 'nuclear age' have been undermined by the changed context within which nuclear weapons are situated. As a consequence, a range of thinking has now appeared in the academic, governmental and NGO communities concerning the future of these weapons. This article seeks to describe and categorise this spectrum of ideas, starting with past attempts at categorisation and then offering a classification of the different approaches. Its scope encompasses the literature concerning low salience nuclear worlds, de-alerting, virtual nuclear arsenals and disarmament. The article concludes by arguing that the survey demonstrates that two issues need further examination: first, the linkages between political and perceptual factors and the nuclear arms limitation and elimination process; and, second, what precisely 'elimination' of nuclear weapons means in practice, given both the current levels of nuclear knowledge, technology and materials, and the difficulties of distinguishing in some cases between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states. It also suggests that there is a need to create an international policy consensus on the way forward in this area, otherwise the result may be a global nuclear 'free-for-all'.

Issue 20.1

This article examines Croatia's arms export capabilities and ambitions in the context the politico-military, economic and technological components of its defence industry and against the background of today's global defence industry and arms trade. It provides an overview of the formation of Croatia's defence industry and analyses the country's defence budget, procurement, cross-border military-industrial co-operation and defence products.

Issue 19.3

The remarkable fact about the process of German unification following the 'change' (Wende) in the GDR is that it happened at all, and at such pace. A majority of political actors were opposed to unification. In 1990, three of the four victorious powers who retained responsibility for 'Germany as a whole' had resolved to resist unification. Along with these actors other powers, Poland for instance, also rejected unification. This article examines the diplomatic processes which secured German unification.

Issue 19.3

This article challenges the conventional wisdom about the illogic and incoherence of US recent military interventions. It argues that in contrast to widespread opinion, there is a clear logic to post-Cold War interventions, even if it does not amount to a preconceived and purposive grand strategy. Indeed, the US has followed, whether consciously or not, the realist logic of costs and benefits. Namely, this article shows that the sources of US intervention in regional crises are derived from different combinations of incentives and constraints in different regions. More specifically, the intensity of US interests at stake and the intensity of the regional constraints on intervention (as reflected by the estimated costs of intervention, especially in terms of casualties) best account for the scope of US military interventions in the post-Cold War era.

Issue 19.3

Perhaps 80 to 110 million unexploded landmines are now scattered over 64 countries world-wide. These mines kill or maim as many as 2,000 people a month. A variety of initiatives have been proposed to reduce this toll, the most prominent of which has been an international movement to ban anti-personnel mines. This paper evaluates the merits of such a ban by analyzing its asserted benefits and costs. We find that both the benefits and the costs have often been overestimated. There are important limitations on a ban's ability to limit mine-laying in the developing world, reducing a ban's likely benefits. Conversely, the military effectiveness lost by denying Western armies access to mines will often be smaller than many mine ban opponents assert, reducing a ban's likely costs. Landmine arms control is thus a closer call on the analytical merits than either side in the current debate would suggest.

Issue 19.3

The nature of future wars - mainly intrastate wars - and the erosion of state sovereignty will put increasing and different pressures on the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to find the best way to intervene in these crises. Historically UN agencies and NGOs have formally co-ordinated their activities badly both in the field and in New York, despite some less formal and uneasy co-operation on practical and financial levels for some time. Persistent financial problems at the UN and Secretary-General Kofi Annan's reform proposals of 1997 have yet to improve the structure of humanitarian intervention on the UN side. The NGOs need to define their aims more coherently. The UN - its humanitarian agencies and peacekeeping soldiers - and NGOs should share more information about their training, experiences and motivations. Each side needs the other as they become increasingly intertwined in complex interventions and involved in longer term civil administrative activities and economic development.

Issue 19.3

Issue 19.2

For the last several decades oil has become the main world source of energy. After discussing oil supplies from the North Sea and the Caspian Basin, the study concludes that the Persian Gulf will increase its share of the world production in the near future. This raises the question of security in the region. Three potential sources of threats are analysed: the challenge from Iran and Iraq; border disputes between the six Arab monarchies; and domestic sources of instability (questions of succession and demographics). The main contention is that in the short run the oil supplies from the region are relatively safe. But in the long run much work needs to be done to secure their stability.

Issue 19.2

The World Trade Center bombing in February 1993 had a profound impact on the formation of the foreign policy agenda of the Clinton administration. Elected on a domestic policy platform, the new President was faced with the most significant incident of international terrorism against American interests since the Lockerbie bombing in 1988. In the power vacuum left by dissipating cold-war antagonisms, the fight against international terrorism became a national security priority and a key foreign policy element. The continuing emphasis on terrorism has resulted in the development of a three-track anti-terrorism policy. At what may be perceived as a critical juncture, in the wake of TWA flight 800 disaster and at the onset of a second presidential term, increasing funds were allocated to fight terrorism. Given the growing political and economic significance of this policy area the antiterrorist policy of the Clinton administration clearly merits closer examination.

Issue 19.2

Even before the 1962 coup d'état which brought them to power, Burma's armed forces played a dominant role in the country's economy. Since the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1988, this role has grown and the annual defence expenditure has risen dramatically. Much of this increased expenditure has been devoted to the expansion and modernization of the armed forces and the development of the defence industries. At the same time, the armed forces have consolidated their independent economic base through a range of new business ventures. There are no reliable statistics available, however, and so complex are the armed forces' sources of funding that it is unlikely even the SLORC itself knows the full cost of the country's military sector. The entire country has become a massive resource base on which the armed forces can draw, not only to sustain themselves but also to perpetuate military rule.

Issue 19.2

Issue 19.2

Issue 19.1 - Special Issue

Culture And Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building

Issue 19.1 - Special Issue

Culture And Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building

Issue 19.1 - Special Issue

Culture And Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building

Issue 19.1 - Special Issue

Culture And Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building

Issue 19.1 - Special Issue

Culture And Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building

Issue 19.1 - Special Issue

Culture And Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building

Issue 19.1 - Special Issue

Culture And Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building

Issue 19.1 - Special Issue

Culture And Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building

Issue 18.3

Issue 18.3

Issue 18.3

Issue 18.3

Issue 18.3

Issue 18.3

Issue 18.2 - Special Issue

Arms Control: New Approaches to Theory and Policy

Issue 18.2 - Special Issue

Arms Control: New Approaches to Theory and Policy

Issue 18.2 - Special Issue

Arms Control: New Approaches to Theory and Policy

Issue 18.2 - Special Issue

Arms Control: New Approaches to Theory and Policy

Issue 18.2 - Special Issue

Arms Control: New Approaches to Theory and Policy

Issue 18.2 - Special Issue

Arms Control: New Approaches to Theory and Policy

Issue 18.2 - Special Issue

Arms Control: New Approaches to Theory and Policy

Issue 18.1

Issue 18.1

Issue 18.1

Issue 18.1

Issue 18.1

Issue 17.3

Issue 17.3

Issue 17.3

Issue 17.3

Issue 17.3

Issue 17.2 - Special Issue: Perspectives on National Security

Issue 17.2 - Special Issue: Perspectives on National Security

Issue 17.2 - Special Issue: Perspectives on National Security

Issue 17.2 - Special Issue: Perspectives on National Security

Issue 17.2 - Special Issue: Perspectives on National Security

Issue 17.2 - Special Issue: Perspectives on National Security

Issue 17.1

Issue 17.1

Issue 17.1

Issue 17.1

Issue 17.1

Issue 17.1

Issue 16.3

Issue 16.3

Issue 16.3

Issue 16.3

Issue 16.3

Issue 16.3

Issue 16.3

Issue 16.2

Issue 16.2

Issue 16.2

Issue 16.2

Issue 16.2

Issue 16.2

Issue 16.2

Issue 16.2

Issue 16.2

Issue 16.1

Issue 16.1

Issue 16.1

Issue 16.1

Issue 16.1

Issue 16.1

Issue 16.1

Issue 16.1

Issue 16.1

Issue 16.1

Issue 16.1

Issue 16.1

September 2002