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| Routledge Cold War HistoryOnline ISSN 1743-7962 Print ISSN 1468-2745 Cold War History is based in the Cold War Studies Centre at the London School of Economics. It aims to make available to the general public the results of recent research on the origins and development of the Cold War and its impact on nations, alliances and regions at various levels of statecraft, as well as in areas such as the military and intelligence, the economy, and social and intellectual developments. The new history of the Cold War is a fascinating example of how experts -- often working across national and disciplinary boundaries -- are able to use newly available information to refine, or in some cases destroy, old images and interpretations. Cold War History aims at publishing the best of this emerging scholarship, from a perspective that attempts to de-centre the era through paying special attention to the role of Europe and the Third World. The journal welcomes contributions from historians and representatives of other disciplines on all aspects of the global Cold War and its present repercussions. Four issues a year. ‘Don't Mention the Soviets!’ An overview of the short films produced by the NATO Information Service between 1949 and 1969
This paper offers an examination of the short movies produced by the NATO Information Service (NATIS) between 1949 and 1969. It demonstrates that the material reflected NATO's changing priorities and strategic scope. Moving away from the strictly defined military themes of the early 1950s, the death of Stalin and the following climate of detente led NATIS to explore new themes, including economic and political cooperation, and to address new audiences. Volume 9 - Issue 4 - 2009 - pp. 501-512 ‘The Maltz Affair’ revisited: How the American Communist Party relinquished its cultural influence at the dawn of the Cold War
In 1946, Albert Maltz – Communist, screenwriter, novelist and future member of the Hollywood Ten – penned a controversial article in which he made a plea for artistic freedom. The article drew the condemnation of many of Maltz's peers, and the incident has been invoked as an example of Communist thought control since Maltz, under pressure, quickly recanted his views. This article argues, however, that the controversy was significant because it heralded the decline of Communist cultural strength. For by reigning in Albert Maltz, the Party rejected its earlier, more accommodating approach to popular culture, and in doing so, unwittingly forfeited a large measure of its cultural influence. Volume 9 - Issue 4 - 2009 - pp. 489-500 The destruction of New York City: A recurrent nightmare of American Cold War cinema
This article examines the repeated appearance of scenes showing the partial or complete destruction of New York City in American cinema of the Cold War. While this theme goes across genres, it has been especially prevalent in science fiction films which are the focus of this study. It begins by showing the particular reasons for this morbid fascination and the history of such imagery in nineteenth and early twentieth century literature and cinema. The paper then analyses the changing presentations of destruction from the 1950s to the 1980s and relates them to the dominant fears and anxieties of each period. It concludes by taking a brief look at the continuation of the theme in the post-Cold War period. 513-524 Volume 9 - Issue 4 - 2009 - pp. ‘Declaration of Love on Celluloid’: The depiction of the Berlin Wall in a GDR film, 1961–62
The construction of the Berlin Wall posed a double challenge to the East German state monopoly film industry, the DEFA. Not only was it difficult for many of its employees to get to the DEFA's Babelsberg studios to the south-west of sealed-off West Berlin – they lived either in East Berlin and henceforth had to circumnavigate it, or actually in West Berlin itself. They also found it a challenge politically to explain the Wall to the GDR's population. The first feature film produced on the subject, …und deine Liebe auch, was only a partial success. Deliberately international both in its artistic inspiration and aspects of its content, it struck a highly poetic note, without fully achieving its aim of making its central figure, who failed to flee the GDR because of the Wall, appear either foolish or criminal. The lack of popular success of this film is symptomatic of the moral and philosophical dilemmas in which the GDR's intelligentsia found itself on account of the construction of the ‘anti-fascist rampart’. Volume 9 - Issue 4 - 2009 - pp. 469-487 Meeting on the Elbe (Vstrecha na El'be): A visual representation of the incipient Cold War from a Soviet perspective
The article explores the most important Soviet film covering the incipient Cold War, Meeting on the Elbe. The production involved prominent Soviet filmmakers and actors. By juxtaposing the occupation policies of both superpowers in post-war Germany, the film makes crucial assumptions concerning the Soviet self and the US-American other. It attributes the full responsibility for the outbreak of the Cold War to the US-American political and military elites and argues the USSR has won the trust and support of the Germans due to its superior ‘soft power’. Volume 9 - Issue 4 - 2009 - pp. 455-467 Managing a conflict between allies: United States policy towards Greece and Turkey in relation to the Aegean dispute, 1974–76 -- Cold War in the Aegean
The central argument of this article is that although national interests, as perceived in Greece and Turkey in the 1970s, took priority over loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance, Cold War considerations retained a certain degree of validity in their strategic thinking. Although participation in NATO did not prevent the outbreak of crises between the two allies, the US and NATO connections actually functioned as a useful framework for the prevention of escalation of this controversy to war and the establishment of a sort of equilibrium in the determination and crystallization of which Washington was able to play a crucial role. Volume 9 - Issue 3 - 2009 - pp. 367-387 Andropov's Hungarian Complex -- Andropov and the Lessons of History
Despite his prominent positions in the Soviet Union's hierarchy, the history of Yuri Andropov's crisis decision-making is patchy. Several historians claim Andropov's response to crises was influenced by his experience in 1956 Budapest. Some attribute to him a ‘Hungarian Complex’ – a conviction that only armed force could save states at risk from internal dissent. This paper examines the legend by assessing Andropov's advice during crises in Czechoslovakia (1968), Afghanistan (1979) and Poland (1980–81). The documentary record shows Andropov did not instinctively favour the use of armed force. Instead, when faced with crises in fraternal states, he first sought an internal solution before advocating armed force. Volume 9 - Issue 3 - 2009 - pp. 427-439 The meaning of hostile bipolarization: Interpreting the origins of the Cold War
The origins of the Cold War have been the subject of numerous debates among international historians. On different occasions, historians have looked at International Relations Theory for insights and concepts to help understanding why and how the Cold War originated. While the postrevisionist paradigm was inspired by realism, for the last decade and a half, running parallel with broader theoretical developments in IR, large parts of the debate on the origins of the Cold War have focused on the role of ideas, ideology, and culture. However, the imported innovations had the effect of fragmenting our theoretical understanding of the origins of the Cold War, rather than offering a workable, coherent synthesis. Moreover, these accounts do not always sufficiently address problems of agency and causality. The debate on the origins of the Cold War, therefore, is in need of coherent theoretical frameworks which are capable of remedying these problems. This article argues that a possible way of generating such a framework is taking a closer look at hermeneutics and constructivism. Volume 9 - Issue 3 - 2009 - pp. 301-319 Favouritism in NATO's Southeastern flank: The case of the Greek Colonels, 1967–74 -- Cold War in the Aegean
The aim of this paper is to analyse the effect of the Cold War era on a historic event with serious consequences for Greece, namely the Greek Colonels' regime, which lasted between April 1967 and July 1974. Greece, due to its strategic position, served as guarantor of stability in NATO's southeastern flank, a benefit that the alliance considered indispensable to its strength, therefore impossible to compromise. In the light of this consideration, NATO tolerated, to put it mildly, the dictatorial, albeit pro-NATO regime that the Greek Colonels imposed on Greece on 21 April 1967. This paper will attempt to account for NATO's reactions to the Greek regime and the factors dictating them – a small, albeit indicative, peripheral segment of the puzzle of the global antagonism between the West and the East during the Cold War era. Volume 9 - Issue 3 - 2009 - pp. 347-366 Fu Bingchang, Chiang Kai-shek and Yalta -- From Chiang Kai-shek to Mao
Fu Binchang, the last ambassador General Chiang Kai-shek sent to Soviet Russia was stationed in Moscow from 1943 to 1949. During his more than six-year residency in Moscow, Fu recorded the details of his political and operational dealings as a full and active participant of the diplomatic corps on the very doorstep of the Kremlin. This paper analyses Fu's role in the gathering of intelligence and timing of information leaked to the Chinese embassy about the Far Eastern Agreement – a secret agreement concluded by China's Big Three allies at the Crimea Conference of 1945. Volume 9 - Issue 3 - 2009 - pp. 389-409 The origins of proletarian diplomacy: The Chinese attack on the American Embassy in the Soviet Union, 4 March 1965 -- From Chiang Kai-shek to Mao
The attack by several thousand, mostly East Asian, students on the American embassy in the Soviet Union on 4 March 1965 was one of the most violent assaults on a diplomatic mission in the 1960s. It occurred in the wake of the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, the US escalation of the Vietnam War, and massive Soviet aid offers to North Vietnam. The attack was very likely organized and supported by the Chinese authorities and designed to damage the international reputation of the Soviet Union while deflecting from Chinese government attempts to limit and obstruct Soviet military aid to North Vietnam. It also set a precedent for the subsequent violence against foreign missions in China during the Cultural Revolution. Volume 9 - Issue 3 - 2009 - pp. 411-426 Strategic imperatives, Democratic rhetoric: The United States and Turkey, 1945–52 -- Cold War in the Aegean
This study states that Turkish President Ismet Inönü did not use democracy merely as a tool to bring his country into the US-led Western alliance at the onset of the Cold War. Instead, Inönü was inspired by a true sense of mission to fulfil Atatürk's legacy to bring democracy to Turkey. Admittedly, the Truman administration used democracy as rhetoric in order to realize its strategic goals in, and secure congressional aid for, Turkey, and yet Washington did not put pressure on Turkey to democratize faster or more thoroughly. There is no causal link between Turkey's democratization and either the Truman Doctrine or Turkey's admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. Volume 9 - Issue 3 - 2009 - pp. 321-345 The Marshall Plan and oil
The Marshall Plan was the most effective US foreign policy initiative in the post-war period and a turning point in the Cold War. This paper highlights a very important and commonly neglected aspect of the Marshall Plan - the influence of oil. Oil played a key role in the origins, operations, and impact of the Marshall Plan. Marshall Plan aid for oil preserved markets for US oil companies and shaped Western Europe's energy use patterns and its relations with the United States and the oil-producing nations, especially those in the Middle East. In contrast, the Soviet Union was unable to use oil as an instrument of power and influence in this period. Examination of the role of oil in the Marshall Plan provides important insights into the origins of the Cold War and the factors that shaped the post-war world. Volume 9 - Issue 2 - 2009 - pp. 159-175 ‘A mustard seed grew into a bushy tree’: The Finnish CSCE initiative of 5 May 1969 Ending the Cold War in Europe
On 5 May 1969 Finland launched its famous initiative, which led to the opening of multilateral negotiations for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) three years later. To date there is widespread reasoning that the Finnish initiative was mainly an idea inspired by the Soviets. Based on new archival materials and interviews with contemporary witnesses, this article shows, however, that the Finns had their own good reasons to launch their appeal. The initiative was primarily designed to ease Soviet pressure on Finnish neutrality and to deal with the pending question of recognition of the two German states. The conference itself was for a long time not the main ambition of Finnish foreign policy. Offering Helsinki as a host to the talks and thereby making neutrality an indispensable condition for convening the security conference became the crown jewel in Finland's strategy towards the Soviet Union in the years 1969 to 1972. Volume 9 - Issue 2 - 2009 - pp. 177-201 Eastern Europe and the early prospects for EC/EU and NATO membership Ending the Cold War in Europe
The successful eastward enlargement of the European Union was preconditioned by developments rooted in the period between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In these developments, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe initially played a key role as a model, only to be superseded by NATO as a more viable framework for the integration of the former member states of the Warsaw Pact. Ultimately, however, it was the progress and transformation of the European Community during the critical period that supplied the institutional and procedural tools, later to be used to make Eastern Europeans qualify as members of a democratic, prosperous, and secure Europe. Volume 9 - Issue 2 - 2009 - pp. 203-221 Globalising Ostpolitik
Traditional cold war narratives cast Ostpolitik as a policy for dealing with the German question and deacutetente in Europe. Only recently have scholars begun exploring Ostpolitik's broader consequences. This article discusses the transformation of North-South relations prompted by Willy Brandt's foreign policy. On the basis of new evidence from West German archives, I argue that between 1966 and 1972 the Social-democratic leadership, within the broader context of Ostpolitik, took a different approach to North-South relations. I suggest that this change was inspired at first by the United States and by the climate of dissatisfaction with the result of aid, but that it then took special engagement by Willy Brandt to inaugurate the new course in development policy of the Federal Republic. The article also addresses the connection between the awakening of civil society at the end of the 1960s and the content of the Social-democratic reform in development assistance. The article points to the impact of Brandt and his minister Erhard Eppler in transforming aid into a way to regain the consensus of the 1968 rebelling youth. Volume 9 - Issue 2 - 2009 - pp. 223-242 Swedish Vietnam criticism reconsidered: Social Democratic Vietnam policy a manifestation of Swedish Ostpolitik?
Between 1965 and 1973, Sweden's Social Democratic government emerged as the most strident West European critic of the American war effort in Indochina. Although the latter's unmatched militancy on the Vietnam question had its origins in Swedish domestic politics, this policy likewise had implications for the country's relations to both superpowers. Given that Swedish Vietnam criticism coincided with the relative decline of American economic and military strength as well as with the Soviets' attainment of nuclear parity, this article asks whether this policy might be interpreted as one component in a broader strategy to secure the Kremlin's good graces at a time when the strategic balance in Europe appeared to be on the verge of shifting in the USSR's favour? It concludes that - regardless of whether or not this policy was, at first, intentionally designed to have this effect - it ultimately served to put Swedish-Soviet relations on a better footing. Volume 9 - Issue 2 - 2009 - pp. 243-266 Averell Harriman has changed his mind: the Seattle speech and the rhetoric of Cold War confrontation
American W. Averell Harriman's many diplomatic activities have received considerable attention from historians. However, one of his most important contributions to the United States' early Cold War policy largely has been overlooked. On 18 August 1947 Harriman delivered a speech in Seattle calling for more confrontational Soviet policies, making a case for the Marshall Plan that successfully appealed to Americans even in 'isolationist' or conservative parts of the country. In the process, Harriman helped Truman overcome the effects of wartime pro-Soviet propaganda and helped mobilise support for active policies at a time when the legacy of the 1930s left some skeptics doubting democracies could mobilise before bombs began raining on them. Volume 9 - Issue 2 - 2009 - pp. 267-286 Helsinki myths: setting the record straight on the Final Act of the CSCE, 1975
This article takes issue with American historians of the Cold War who assert that the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 endorsed the post-war division of Europe, and that its results were accidental or surprising. The article demonstrates that the nine members of the (then) European Community, with important support from neutrals and non-aligned, resisted strong pressure from Moscow and Washington to confirm the status quo. Instead, they ensured that the Final Act became an agenda for change. Volume 9 - Issue 1 - February 2009 - pp. 1 - 22 Ties that bind: John F. Kennedy and the foundations of the American-Israeli alliance
In August 1962, John F. Kennedy became the first American President to sell a major weapon system, the Hawk anti-aircraft missile, to Israel. The Hawk sale was part of a much larger shift in thinking about the role of the bilateral relationship with Israel in achieving America's regional objectives. This article analyses the motives for President Kennedy's decision, which represented a decisive break from the arms control and diplomatic policies pursued by Presidents Truman and, especially, Eisenhower. The article ultimately concludes that President Kennedy's new orientation was driven primarily by his affinity for the Jewish state and his more receptive attitude towards Israel's security needs, whose accommodation he thought necessary to achieve stability in the Middle East. Volume 9 - Issue 1 - February 2009 - pp. 23 - 58 'The Soviets were just an excuse': why Israel did not destroy the Egyptian Third Army
On 23 October 1973, the third week of the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli army cut off all supply routes to the 20,000 strong Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Five days later, however, Israel partly lifted the siege and allowed the first convoy of non-military supplies to reach the Third Army. This decision was explained in Israel as deriving from American pressure, the source of which, according to the Americans, was the threat of Soviet intervention. This paper argues that a Soviet threat was not the main reason for the United States' pressure, but that it derived from an array of American interests in the region. The Israeli leadership, in turn, used American pressure to publicly justify its decision to spare the Third Army, though it had its own reasons for doing so. Volume 9 - Issue 1 - February 2009 - pp. 59 - 78 The last Soviet offensive in the Cold War: emergence and development of the campaign against NATO euromissiles, 1979-1983
Ever since NATO existed, the Kremlin was keen to eliminate it. In 1966-68, there appeared to be a window of opportunity which, however, was closed when the USSR crushed Czechoslovak reform communism. From 1969 onward, Brezhnev sought 'political détente' with the West to initiate a process of 'military détente' intended to allow for a Soviet first strike capability against Western Europe. The campaign designed to promote this policy by generating public pressure in Western countries gained momentum only when NATO decided to counter crucial SS-20 armament. Massive anti-NATO 'peace' opposition resulted, but failed to achieve its purpose. The stage was set for the breakdown of the Soviet empire. Volume 9 - Issue 1 - February 2009 - pp. 79 - 110 When truth is stranger than fiction: the Able Archer incident
In November 1983 a routine NATO nuclear readiness exercise code-named Able Archer could have led to a Soviet nuclear strike against the West. What is remarkable about this possible Soviet strike is that it was perceived by the Soviets as a defensive and pre-emptive strike. Therefore, the Soviets somehow believed that there was an impending Western nuclear attack that they had to pre-empt. American rearmament, NATO missile deployment, and Reaganite rhetoric somehow convinced the Soviets that the nuclear endgame was near. These fears climaxed in November 1983 during a seemingly innocuous nuclear-readiness exercise by the West. Volume 9 - Issue 1 - February 2009 - pp. 111 - 133 Moscow versus Los Angeles: the Nixon White House wages Cold War in the Olympic selection process
In 1970 the Nixon Administration bribed members of the International Olympic Committee in an effort to bring the 1976 summer games to Los Angeles. These actions injected Cold War issues into the process of selecting Olympic host cities. This effort initiated a political confrontation with the Soviet Union, since Moscow was another of the candidate cities. Although weak and vulnerable to political assaults, the International Olympic movement's decentralized organizational nature made it difficult for the Nixon White House to bring the Olympics to Los Angeles. The administration learned from this failure and was more successful in offering more limited support to efforts to host the 1980 Winter Olympics. Volume 9 - Issue 1 - February 2009 - pp. 135 - 157 Researching détente: new opportunities, contested legacy. Introduction
Volume 8 - Issue 4 - 2008 - pp. 419 - 425 The Soviet Union and détente of the 1970s
Détente of the 1970s was a vital stage in global history of the 20th century, when the rise of Soviet communism stopped and the collapse of the Soviet bloc began. Soviet behaviour during détente was not a consistent policy, but rather an extension of Soviet conservative ideological regime under Leonid Brezhnev. Despite some windfall gains, the Soviet Union failed to capitalize on détente as it expected. Soviet overextension in the Third World and growing dependence of Soviet semi-autarchic economy on global trends prepared the ground for Soviet collapse one decade later. Volume 8 - Issue 4 - 2008 - pp. 427 - 447 Joining the conservative brotherhood: Israel, President Nixon, and the political consolidation of the 'special relationship', 1969-73
This article analyzes an important turning point in US-Israeli relations - Nixon's shift in the direction of Israel. The article argues that the standard array of factors employed in the 'special relationship' discourse - namely, strategic partnership, a sense of shared values, and skillful practice of interest-group politics by Israel and its American Jewish champions - does not fully explain Nixon's shift. Another salient factor was Israel's manifest support of Nixon in the contexts he valued most, Vietnam and prevalence over political opposition at home. These Israeli policy choices assuaged Nixon's hitherto lingering suspicion that Israel was under the sway of his perceived domestic enemies. Moreover, these choices had important longer-term consequences, as they contributed to the new bond between Israel and the more conservative (and neo-conservative) segments of American society, a bond still much in evidence today. Volume 8 - Issue 4 - 2008 - pp. 449 - 480 Anatomy of an airlift: United States military assistance to Israel during the 1973 war
During the 1973 war the United States flew 12,000 tons of military equipment to Israel, transferring advanced weaponry that it had hitherto withheld. In fact, Nixon and Kissinger had planned to strictly regulate the supply of arms to Israel, intending both to control its strategy during the fighting and heighten its dependence following the war. Yet the exigency of matching the Soviet Union's massive resupply of Egypt and Syria forced the United States to launch an airlift that greatly accelerated the pace and degree of sophistication of military hardware to its client. This article demonstrates that the determination both to outpace the rival superpower and ensure Israel's post-war cooperation created a process of rearmament that for the United States was an unintended consequence. Volume 8 - Issue 4 - 2008 - pp. 481 - 501 Conservative goals, revolutionary outcomes: the paradox of détente Détente: a three-way discussion
This essay maintains that détente, rather than stabilizing the international situation as many of its architects had hoped for, fundamentally altered the Cold War international system. Détente did not end the Cold War nor provide a clear road map towards 1989 (or 1991). But by bringing about an era of East-West engagement, détente was instrumental in setting in motion the many processes that ultimately caused the collapse of the international system that it was supposed to have stabilized. Volume 8 - Issue 4 - 2008 - pp. 503 - 512 Legacies of détente: a three-way discussion
Participating in this discussion about détente with two respected friends and scholars, both of whom have authored significant books about the subject of my current research, Henry Kissinger, compels me to confess that I have been strongly influenced by their work, and that this discussion threatens to be repetitious and even dangerously in agreement! Nevertheless, having been invited by Noam Kochavi to comment upon and discuss some of the big issues in the historical assessment of détente, I will let fly with the hope that what I have to say does not seem too commonplace or predictable. If nothing else, I promise to take a position on the issues that Kochavi has encouraged us to confront. Volume 8 - Issue 4 - 2008 - pp. 513 - 525 Détente and human rights: American and West European perspectives on international change
Observers of international relations frequently assume that human rights challenge realpolitik. This article shows that in the context of negotiations about European security in the early 1970s, the two went hand-in-hand. Despite significant transatlantic differences, Americans and Europeans conceptualized human rights as products of the Cold War, and principles for assuming more order and stability in the international system. Human rights discussions and agreements were not designed to end the Cold War in the 1970s. This analysis challenges assumptions about the absence of human rights in détente, and the alleged connection between the Helsinki Final Act and the Revolutions of 1989. The anti-Cold War quality of human rights activism in the 1980s was not present a decade earlier. Volume 8 - Issue 4 - 2008 - pp. 527 - 545 Norms as a rhetorical competition: Soviet-American confrontations over Cuba, 1970-85
After going to the brink of nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis, in 1962 President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev resolved the crisis by establishing an ambiguous 'Understanding', the terms of which were never publicly signed or ratified. In the absence of an explicit agreement in 1962, over the next 20 years the United States and the Soviet Union continued to compete over Cuba by seeking to portray revisionist behaviour as consistent or in concordance with the '62 Understanding. I argue that this interaction is indicative of rhetorical-oriented conception of norms. Against constructivist approaches that focus on social identity and contractual institutionalist literature that focuses on focal points and convergent expectations, this approach emphasizes how states use norms to compete under circumscribed conditions. Under this perspective, norms are organic entities, which like the concept of judicial review, evolve in meaning in conjunction with their practical use. Volume 8 - Issue 3 - August 2008 - pp. 299 - 326 Rediscovering uncertainty: early attempts at a pan-European post-war recovery
It is time to re-open the question of the early post-war division of Europe as a problem. In order to move beyond bipolarity and give a fuller representation of the tentative and open character of the immediate post-war years it is furthermore pertinent to include a broader array of actors. By highlighting the aspirations of Internationale Gruppe Demokratischer Sozialisten, a transnational network of social-democratic refugees from Germany and German-occupied countries in Sweden during the war and some of their endeavours after the war the articles explores the relative merits of realist and liberal readings of the outcomes. It is argued that historiography so far has underestimated the nationalistic, anti-German position of French and British socialists at the end of the war, and its wider implications as well as the importance of internal domestic dissensions within the UK and US administrations. Volume 8 - Issue 3 - August 2008 - pp. 327 - 352 'Tough negotiations'. The two Germanys in Syria and Iraq, 1963-74
When the Cold War joined the decolonization process both camps had to answer the major challenges faced by the newly-independent states, that is political independence and economic development. Besides their own priorities in the Arab Middle East, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic offered their own models for modernization as alternatives and connected with a camp-choice. The research points out how Syrian and Iraqi regimes actually neutralized such a linkage and tried to secure their nation-building development through the exploitation of Cold War rivalry. German archives offer a deep insight into the troubled relations between Arab nationalism and Europe in the 1960s and mid-1970s. Volume 8 - Issue 3 - August 2008 - pp. 353 - 380 Old politics, new diplomacy: the Geneva accords and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
While much has been written about the origins of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, little is known about the Soviet effort to disengage. This article sheds new light on the diplomatic efforts under Mikhail Gorbachev to engage the US and secure an 'honourable' withdrawal for Soviet troops. Drawing on declassified Russian and US documents, it also explores the internal Soviet debates as well as Moscow's relationship with its client in Kabul on the eve of withdrawal. Volume 8 - Issue 3 - August 2008 - pp. 381 - 404 Cold War history in Germany
To deal with the development of Cold War history means to summarize a part of international debates. Nevertheless, the (West) German approach originally had much to do with Allied responsibility of the German question, meaning partition in two states and the possibilities of re-unification. This meant that Cold War history in most cases placed the German question in the centre of research. Only since the 1970s a broader approach not only to European and transatlantic aspects emerged, but also to the inclusion of a world wide view. This was accompanied by the reception and advancement of international methodological debates. Volume 8 - Issue 2 - May 2008 - pp. 135-156 Cold War history in Italy
The article aims at reviewing the historical production on the Cold War in Italy (both research and teaching activities). Some preliminary remarks deal with the Italian university system and the role some historical disciplines, especially the history of international relations, play in such a context. In Italy, historical studies on the Cold War had their origins in the 1970s mainly as a consequence of both the availability of US records and of the interpretations developed by US revisionist historians. In an early stage, Italian historians' attention focused on Italy's involvement in the Cold War and US policy towards Italy; some interpretations were influenced by the domestic political debate that characterized the 1970s. During the 1980s, owing to the development of Cold War studies in other western European nations and of growing contacts between Italian scholars and foreign historians, Italian historians' attention focused, not only on the Italian case, but also on various aspects of the Cold War history that led to the analyses of wider topics and to extensive research in foreign archives. After the end of the Cold War, there have been relevant changes in the approaches to the study of the Cold War developed by Italian scholars. Some historians went on focusing their attention on wider Cold War themes following the opening of archives; others shifted their attention to topics related to other historical areas, such as the history of the European integration or the history of the international organizations, although the Cold War was regarded as a useful background. The most interesting and innovative results have been offered through more sophisticated and complex analyses and interpretations of Italy's role in the Cold War, that, however, mainly for linguistic reasons, have scant impact on Cold War historiography. In spite of that, historical production on the Cold War seems to experience a positive season that is characterized by new research projects, some interesting contributions and a lively debate that involves historians from different backgrounds. Volume 8 - Issue 2 - May 2008 - pp. 157-187 Under the national paradigm: Cold War studies and Cold War politics in post-Cold War Norden
On a comparative basis this article explores the profile of Cold War University teaching and Cold War research as carried out in the Post-Cold War period in the Nordic countries. A number of overall conclusions are drawn from this exploration. Firstly concerning teaching, that Cold War courses are mainly taught within the setting of History, and that the political aspects of the Cold War conflict are mostly in focus in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway whereas a culture and society approach dominates in Sweden. Secondly concerning research, the article argues that Cold War research during the last 10-15 years has taken a tremendous leap forward, often through government-sponsored research programmes or appointed commissions. All the same, the author is critical of the strict national approach of most research and the complete lack of comparative Nordic studies, but also of the limited attempts to insert Nordic research findings into the international Cold War debate. However, and thirdly, the article is also analyzing and discussing the role of the Cold War in post-1989 politics and debates. It is demonstrated that Cold War issues have continued to play a prominent role in the Post-Cold War period albeit with a varying degree of intensity within the individual Nordic countries with Norway seeing least controversy and Denmark at the other end having experienced a very radical and intense political debate on issues like alliance (dis)loyalty, fellow travelling and police surveillance and control. The article concludes that level of intensity of these debates is mainly defined by the degree to which such Cold War issues are and can be inserted into national controversies of contemporary politics. Volume 8 - Issue 2 - May 2008 - pp. 189-211 A 'special case' between independence and interdependence: Cold War studies and Cold War politics in post-Cold War Switzerland
Switzerland only played a marginal role in the Cold War, even though the small country was situated very close to the central battleground of any potential armed conflict in Europe the 'special role' that Switzerland played in the East-West conflict was closely linked to its policy of strict neutrality. Swiss Cold War historians have focused on the reasons for the emergence of Switzerland's 'special case' in foreign and security policy and on the consequences of this policy for the political, economic, military, and social relations between Switzerland and its international environment. With the launching of the Parallel History Project (PHP) at ETH Zurich in 1998, Switzerland has become the home of one of the major Cold War History networks. As a result, the findings of a new generation of Swiss Cold War historians are increasingly integrated into an emerging international history of the East-West confrontation. Volume 8 - Issue 2 - May 2008 - pp. 213-240 Teaching and research on the Cold War in the United Kingdom
Teaching and research on the Cold War in the United Kingdom developed in three phases. The first phase ran from the emergence of the Cold War in the 1940s up to the 1970s, a period which saw studies produced by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, various polemical works and some attention to the conflict in the memoirs of politicians and officials. These years witnessed some teaching by political scientists but no teaching and very little work by historians. By the 1970s, however, the rise of an interest in contemporary history and releases of documents under the new thirty year rule led to a major growth in courses and publications on the Cold War. This trend continued until the end of the conflict in 1988/1991. Since the demise of the Cold War there has been a continued interest in the topic but the range of approaches has widened from diplomacy and strategy to include propaganda and cultural policies, the impact on everyday life, and the roles of sport and religion. At the same time, new topics have gained prominence: from the Middle East to climate change, from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons to terrorism. Nevertheless, the field remains vibrant with a dedicated journal, a specialist centre at the LSE and an impending three-volume study from Cambridge University Press. Volume 8 - Issue 2 - May 2008 - pp. 241-258 Teaching and scholarship on the Cold War in the United States
This article examines the main centres for the study of the Cold War in the United States, the key repositories of relevant documents, and the main publication outlets and conferences on the Cold War. It also describes the principal texts and approaches to teaching the Cold War and portrays the essential scholarly, public and political debates on the Cold War. The article concludes with a study of the contending and increasingly politicized views of the lessons of the Cold War and the relevance of the Cold War to our world today. Volume 8 - Issue 2 - May 2008 - pp. 259-284 Historiography on the Cold War in Yugoslavia: from ideology to science
The historiography on the 'Cold War', as written by Serbian and Yugoslavian historians, developed through many phases. These were defined by political and social circumstances, accessibility of historical sources, as well as the expertise and sensibility of generations of historians. In general, there was little of sustained and systematic research on the history of the Cold War. The post-Second World War Yugoslav historiography is 'full of blanks'. At the same time, however, it is important to acknowledge that it progressed along the long road from claim, as a form of ideological thought, to knowledge which is never final. Volume 8 - Issue 2 - May 2008 - pp. 285-297 Home and away: immigration and political violence in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-90
This article compares and contrasts the impact of the Cold War upon three immigrant groups in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Spanish, Iranian and Croatian communities. In particular, it focuses on the manner in which relations between political movements within these communities and West German political milieux evolved during this period. Since ideological tension between the American and Soviet blocs had an impact on the homeland states of each of these immigrant communities, the global nature of Cold War conflict helped foster a set of, at times paradoxical, strategic alliances between immigrant political movements and West German state and party-political institutions. The attitude of an immigrant political movement towards Soviet Communism in general, and East Germany in particular, could therefore have a considerable impact on relations between its own ethnic community and the rest of West German society. Volume 8 - Issue 1 - February 2008 - pp. 1 - 21 Bargaining with the bear: Chancellor Erhard's bid to buy German reunification, 1963-64
This article describes West German Chancellor Erhard's vision of reunification and explores Soviet and American reactions to Bonn's opening gesture to Moscow, in 1964. The main argument is that despite Washington's reluctance, Erhard envisaged offering Khrushchev massive economic aid in exchange for more political liberty in the GDR, and eventually for reunification. Evidence suggests that Erhard's objective corresponded in time with Khrushchev rethinking his relations to the FRG. The Soviet leader secretly encouraged Erhard to present a realistic proposal for a modus vivendi and officially accepted the Chancellor's invitation to visit Bonn. However, due to Khrushchev's removal from power in October 1964, the final goals of his German policy remain uncertain. Volume 8 - Issue 1 - February 2008 - pp. 23 - 53 Sputnik and 'skill thinking' revisited: technological determinism in American responses to the Soviet missile threat
Revisiting popular, political and academic reactions 50 years after the launch of Sputnik, this article seeks to highlight the substantial fear of technological development evident in these reactions. The nature of responses to Sputnik is especially notable, it is argued, in light of the tendency to assume an American love affair with technology across all areas of social and political life. The article examines the manner in which both contemporaneous and subsequent accounts of the launch of Sputnik incorporate a strand of technological determinism that inverts the primary features of the seemingly utopian, 'skill thinking' approach to technology assumed to be characteristic of the American outlook during the Cold War and beyond. Volume 8 - Issue 1 - February 2008 - pp. 55 - 75 Cyberneticizing the American war machine: science and computers in the Cold War
American victory in World War II was perceived to be due in large part to its scientific and technological superiority, best exemplified by the development of the atom bomb. Throughout the Cold War, scientific theories and methodologies were recruited even more extensively to weigh on military and strategic affairs. Cybernetics, along with operations research and systems analysis, sought to impose order and predictability on warfare through the collection, processing, and distribution of information. The emergence of the notion of command-and-control epitomized a centralizing approach which saw military organization purely as a vast techno-social machine to be integrated and directed on the basis of the predictions of mathematical models and the deployment of cybernetic technologies. Preparation for a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union was the primary focus of this conception of warfare but it failed spectacularly the test of Vietnam, thereby dramatically revealing its theoretical and practical bankruptcy. Indeed, cybernetic warfare was deeply flawed in its restrictive assumptions about conflict, its exclusive focus on quantitative elements, its dismissal of any views that did not conform to its norms of scientificity, and its neglect of the risks of information inaccuracy and overload. Volume 8 - Issue 1 - February 2008 - pp. 77 - 102 Mitterrand's France, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification: A Reappraisal
France's role is often overlooked in the abundant literature on the end of the Cold War. In addition, most accounts tell of the country's alleged lack of understanding for the democratic revolutions in the East and of its supposed attempt to block German unification. Yet archival research, now becoming possible, which allows for a thorough reappraisal, categorically invalidates most of this. In spite of concerns over the risk of instability - which were shared by other key players - French diplomacy in fact played an important and constructive role in the events of 1989-91, not least through the relaunch of European integration which led to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. The French case provides a useful reminder that the dominant narrative of these events - with its almost exclusive focus on the superpowers (the US to begin with) and its lack of interest in European actors or factors - needs to be revised. Volume 7 - Issue 4 - November 2007 - pp. 455 - 478 The People's Republic of China and the Warsaw Pact Organization, 1955-63
Communist China's relationship with the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) was dependent on its alliance with the Soviet Union. As the Sino-Soviet pact deteriorated over the late 1950s and early 1960s, Beijing's loose institutional links to the WPO collapsed. In 1955, China committed itself to the aims of the WPO without becoming a full member. Against the background of Mao's domestic radicalization, military and political cooperation between the pact system and the Chinese observer faltered from 1957 to 1961. In an afterlude, the Soviet Union-unsuccessfully-tried to reorient the WPO from Europe to Asia in 1963. Afterwards, China and the WPO did not maintain any formal or informal links. Volume 7 - Issue 4 - November 2007 - pp. 479 - 494 'Taunting the Bear': Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 1963-89
Recently released documents from the Romanian military archives relating to Romania's stance within the Warsaw Pact permit a more refined view of Romania's autonomy within the Pact than has hitherto been possible. They show that the conventional assertion that Nicolae Ceau escu refused to join the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is misleading since he was not invited by the Soviet Union to participate in it. They reveal details of the pressure put on Romania by the Soviet Union after 1968 to toe the Warsaw Pact line, ranging from the imperious comments of General Shtemenko in February 1970 to a senior Romanian officer, to Brezhnev's accusation, levelled at Ceau escu in person, that the latter intended to leave the Pact. Yet it was the direct challenge to Communist domination by Solidarity in Poland in 1981 that, as these documents show, led Ceau escu to see the value of the Pact. By the summer of 1989, he had become the advocate of intervention in Poland in order to preserve Socialist solidarity and the cohesion of the Pact. Volume 7 - Issue 4 - November 2007 - pp. 495 - 507 Constructing 'Peaceful Coexistence': China's Diplomacy toward the Geneva and Bandung Conferences, 1954-55
In the heyday of the Cold War, China remained confrontational toward the United States and other Western powers but at the same time seemed conciliatory toward Asian nations. This was largely reflected in Beijing's diplomacy of 'peaceful coexistence' and 'united front' at the Geneva and Bandung conferences. Based on recently declassified archives and material in China and probing into the insights of China's foreign policy calculations in the mid-1950s, this article argues that, through actively participating in multilateral diplomacy, the Chinese leaders expected to construct an image of a 'normal state' and play a leading role in normalizing international politics in Asia. Volume 7 - Issue 4 - November 2007 - pp. 509 - 528 The Dog That Didn't Bark: The Joint Intelligence Committee and Warning of Aggression
This article introduces and includes the Nicoll Report - a previously classified document written to assess the performance of the British Joint Intelligence Committee in warning about foreign acts of aggression. The Nicoll Report is a hugely significant document for four main reasons: it provides detail on intelligence estimates for case studies which have not yet been released into the archive; it provides an examination of the JIC's failures and in doing so it is far more candid than the 'open' investigations conducted by Lord Franks and Lord Butler; it provides an exploration of how intelligence must be relevant to policy-makers in order for it to be useful; and finally, it identifies general lessons for the future and which are immensely revealing with the benefit of hindsight. Volume 7 - Issue 4 - November 2007 - pp. 529 - 551 Amidst the Heat of the Cold War in Asia: Thailand and the American Secret War in Indochina (1960-74)
This article is intended to present new findings on covert Thai intervention in Laos, in association with the United States, during the Vietnam War. As it was considered a violation of the Geneva Accords, information on clandestine Thai intervention in Laos has been treated with strict confidentiality by the Thai government. The Thai public have therefore been deprived of information on their countrymen's involvement in Laos for decades. Based on the new release of declassified US official documents and recent interviews with former diplomatic, intelligence and military officers from Laos, Thailand and the United States who were directly involved in the conflicts, striking facts about the Thai intervention in Laos from 1960 to 1974 have been revealed. Volume 7 - Issue 3 - August 2007 - pp. 349 - 371 'High-Spirited Confusion': Brazil, the 1961 Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference, and the Limits of an 'Independent' Foreign Policy during the High Cold War
The article recounts the story, hidden until now, of Brazil's abortive attempt to send an observer to the September 1961 Belgrade conference - the founding gathering of the Non-Aligned Movement, a follow-on to the 1955 Bandung conference of newly-independent, decolonizing nations from Africa and Asia. Using declassified Brazilian as well as US and British sources, the article illustrates Washington's ambivalence toward what it saw as the Brazilian government's flirtation with neutralism, and Rio's difficulties in pursuing what it defined as a more 'independent' foreign policy - notwithstanding membership in a US-led hemispheric collective security bloc epitomized by the 1947 Rio pact and the Organization of American States. The article also touches on NAM's problems in expanding to Latin America, and the irritant to US-Yugoslav (i.e., Tito) ties caused by the issue of Brazilian participation. Volume 7 - Issue 3 - August 2007 - pp. 373 - 388 Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT
During the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union contended both with one another and with the members of their respective alliances in attempting to deal with the issues raised by nuclear proliferation. These negotiations, which covered a number of matters but centred on the conflict between a non-proliferation agreement and NATO plans for nuclear sharing, illustrate in microcosm some of the most important geopolitical trends of the middle Cold War. This episode was in certain diplomatic and conceptual respects an important precursor to détente. It also illuminated the declining ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to manage their respective European alliances, as well as the degree to which Russo-American cooperation further strained these partnerships. Finally, the negotiations and their aftermath showed that, in geostrategic terms, Moscow and Washington had much in common during the 1960s. Volume 7 - Issue 3 - August 2007 - pp. 389 - 423 Soviet Aid to the Gizenga Government in the Former Belgian Congo (1960-61) as Reflected in Russian Archives
Documents obtained by the author in the Russian archives offer new details about the Soviet role in the Congo crisis in the 1960s and particularly its policy toward the pro-Lumumba government in Orientale Province (December 1960-August 1961) headed by Antoine Gizenga. Evidence from archival documents suggest that the Soviet Union supported Gizenga's government, but did not want to take the international risks involved in delivering material aid to the blockaded Oriental Province. It did provide Gizenga with financial aid and made every effort to get its allies to run the blockade and thus assisting Gizenga while avoiding a direct conflict with the West on the issue. Soviet behaviour in this crisis is another example of the complicated and flexible relationship between security and ideological imperatives in Soviet foreign policy. Moscow was motivated not only by its values and ideas but also by factors affecting the national interests of the USSR, its power and prestige. Volume 7 - Issue 3 - August 2007 - pp. 425 - 437 Some Reflections on Archie Brown and the End of the Cold War
This Article does not have an abstract. Volume 7 - Issue 3 - August 2007 - pp. 439 - 445 Clarifying the End of Cold War Debate
This Article does not have an abstract. Volume 7 - Issue 3 - August 2007 - pp. 447 - 454 The Impact of Anti-communism on White Rhodesian Political Culture, ca.1920s-1980
Anti-communism has often been seen as a marginal aspect of white Rhodesian political ideology, designed to manipulate eccentric metropolitan and American opinion. However, it was neither shallow nor peripheral, but integral to it and essential to an understanding of the politics and ideological resilience of White Rhodesia in its closing decades. Many white Rhodesians regarded African disaffection as externally fomented and international, so that there appeared to be no need to address any grievances. The Cold War crucially sealed Rhodesia's political fate, since the successful encouragement of anti-communist sentiment made it difficult for a Rhodesian government to advocate compromise of any kind. Volume 7 - Issue 2 - May 2007 - pp. 169 - 194 Ally or Critic? The United States' Response to South African Nuclear Development, 1949-1980
This article analyzes the role of the United States in and reaction to South African nuclear development from its inception in 1949 to the end of the Carter Administration, within the framework of the Cold War objectives of the United States and the anti-communism of the South African Apartheid Government. As early as 1965, South Africa hinted at developing nuclear weapons; yet the response from the United States remained placid and nuclear cooperation between the two countries continued. Thus, when the Ford Administration at the end of 1976 took the first step in the direction of limiting United States' nuclear cooperation with South Africa, it was already too late to stem South Africa's build-up of a nuclear arsenal. Volume 7 - Issue 2 - May 2007 - pp. 195 - 225 Non-alignment on the Racial Frontier: Zambia and the USA, 1964-68
Careful examination of relations between Zambia and the USA during Lyndon Johnson's presidency, based on archival research in both nations, provides valuable insights into their often very different perspectives in the midst of the Cold War. The Johnson administration at times sympathized with Zambia but dismissed southern Africa as a low priority in the confrontation with communism, whereas Kenneth Kaunda feared for his nation's survival on the racial frontier and desperately needed help, but insisted on a non-aligned foreign policy nonetheless. American officials questioned Zambian policy decisions such as accepting Chinese aid and opposing non-proliferation as naďve or irrational; however, from his perspective, Kaunda was upholding national security and resisting superpower hegemony. Volume 7 - Issue 2 - May 2007 - pp. 227 - 250 Unsung Heroes: The Soviet Military and the Liberation of Southern Africa
The history of military co-operation between the USSR and the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa has still to be written. The same applies to co-operation with Moscow in the post-independence period. So far the attempts to do so have been unsuccessful, not only due to the lack of accessible documents, but also due to an uncritical attitude to the available materials. This paper attempts to present a 'factual version of history'. It addresses in particular the issues of training the African combatants in the USSR, and the activities of the Soviet teams attached to the ANC, SWAPO and ZAPU as well as to the armed forces of the independent African countries. While most of the Russian archives are still 'sealed off', the author has used oral history sources and memoirs as an invaluable means of painting a picture of the Soviet involvement from the early 1960s to 1991. Volume 7 - Issue 2 - May 2007 - pp. 251 - 262 Tropes of the Cold War: Jimmy Carter and Rhodesia
In June 1979 Jimmy Carter chose to defy Congress by declaring the first multiracial Rhodesian elections invalid because the guerrillas fighting the white minority regime in Salisbury had not participated in them. Why was Carter able to transcend the compelling tropes of the Cold War and view the guerrillas - who would have been deemed terrorists had they been in Central America or Iran or Palestine - as freedom fighters? This essay debunks the notion that Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski were always at loggerheads, underlines the importance of an effective diplomatic team, provides an example of unusually close cooperation with Whitehall, and reveals the intersection of race and foreign policy. Volume 7 - Issue 2 - May 2007 - pp. 263 - 283 Cuba and the Independence of Namibia
This article examines Cuba's contribution to the independence of Namibia. It focuses on the Cuban response to the massacre of Cassinga in 1978 and the successful Cuban offensive against the South African army in southern Angola in 1988. It is based on documents from the closed Cuban archives, on US documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, and on the South African and Namibian press. Volume 7 - Issue 2 - May 2007 - pp. 285 - 303 Perestroika and the End of the Cold War
The author argues, on the basis of a close examination of archival sources (including Politburo minutes) and the numerous memoirs of leading Soviet political actors, that an interdependent mixture of new leadership, new ideas, and long-standing institutional power in the Soviet Union was primarily responsible for the Cold War ending when it did. While acknowledging that the 'Reagan factor' was important in some ways, he rejects the view that the Reagan administration played the decisively important role in ending the Cold War, and he contests various arguments which have been advanced in the attempt to sustain a Realist interpretation of its ending. Volume 7 - Issue 1 - February 2007 - pp. 1 - 17 Confronting Peaceful Co-existence: Psychological Warfare and the Role of Interdoc, 1963-72
Interest in Cold War psychological warfare and propaganda operations by both East and West, and the institutions that have pursued them, has increased among diplomatic historians over the last decade.1 As an addition to the burgeoning literature on the ideological dimension of the conflict, this article examines the foundation and purpose of the International Information and Documentation Center or 'Interdoc'. Founded in 1963 in The Hague, Interdoc was meant to develop a psychological response to the Soviet strategy of 'peaceful coexistence'. Its arrival was the result of discussions between French, German, and Dutch intelligence services, along with individuals from industry and academia, that had taken place over the previous six years. Interdoc's central focus was to increase the level of understanding of communist doctrine and practice by stimulating and making available well-researched information on the policies and realities of the Soviet bloc. By the end of the 1960s Interdoc had expanded into a centre of increasing activity for research, training, conference, and publication programmes. However, at the point when plans were being made to extend its operations by making contacts with the Eastern bloc, Chancellor Brandt's pursuit of Ostpolitik caused a catastrophic withdrawal of German financial support. Volume 7 - Issue 1 - February 2007 - pp. 19 - 43 'Enlightening Public Opinion': A Study of NATO's Information Policies between 1949 and 1959 based on Recently Declassified Documents
Based on recently declassified documents of the NATO archives, this article examines the foundation of the NATO Information Service and of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations and offers an insight into the organization's activity in the fields of counter-propaganda and prevention of subversive activities. This article demonstrates how their intergovernmental nature allowed both agencies to act as forums for the exchange of views on anti-communist propaganda and prevention of subversive activities between the organization's members. The study of their activities thus leads to a more advanced understanding of the western response to communist opposition both at the national and supranational levels. Volume 7 - Issue 1 - February 2007 - pp. 45 - 74 Détente or Integration? EC Response to Soviet Policy Change towards the Common Market, 1970-75
This article examines the European Community's reactions to the Soviet proposal of 1972 to establish formal relations between the EC and COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). By 1975 the EC and COMECON seemed to have achieved the beginnings of cooperation. It was far from promising, however. Most of the EC members wanted to concentrate on further development of the EC rather than détente. France was the exception, believing that, in principle, détente should have priority over EC integration. Still, the French priority of détente policies did not mean their support for consolidation of the Soviet bloc. In the end, the Nine opposed the institutionalization of EC/COMECON relations; European integration and détente thereafter went their separate ways. Volume 7 - Issue 1 - February 2007 - pp. 75 - 94 Go-Between: Belgium and Détente, 1961-73
The case of Belgium shows that in the area of détente, a small country will have more influence if it can cooperate with other small countries. The creation of the Benelux in 1944 and the Belgo-Polish dialogue of the 1960s, which paved the way for the 'Reykjavik signal', are clear examples of this. Moreover, in order to have even a slight influence on the international scene, the personality of the Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister played a key role. Belgium's geographical situation was also an important factor. Finally, a small country, if it wishes to take initiatives, must have the support of larger countries. Without the ongoing support of the United States, Pierre Harmel would have been unable to persuade the Alliance to adopt his report. Volume 7 - Issue 1 - February 2007 - pp. 95 - 116 Response to Painter and Lundestad
This Article does not have an abstract. Volume 7 - Issue 1 - February 2007 - pp. 117 - 120 Another Transatlantic Split? American and European Narratives and the End of the Cold War
t has often been remarked that the victors do not merely harvest the fruits of war, but are then situated by virtue of their position to write the 'real' history of how that war began, who fought it most ethically, and the key part they then played in bringing it to a victorious and just end. This article argues that this pattern of writing the past, and thereby defining it, has been much in evidence in the wider American historiography on the end of the Cold War in Europe. This is not to reduce a complex literature to a single narrative. It is to suggest however that many Americans - politicians, policy-makers and academics alike - have too readily adopted the politically convenient view that it was America (and in some cases America alone) that through dint of effort and skill of diplomacy effectively changed the world by actively 'winning' the Cold War on the continent. As I argue, this not only makes for a one-sided triumphalist history; it has also had the effect of writing others - especially Europeans - out of the events that finally led to the overcoming of Europe's 45-year-old division. I then go on to point to the many important, and sometimes forgotten, ways in which Europe and Europeans helped make their own history. By so doing, I not only seek to redress the intellectual balance, but challenge American writers to reflect more critically on their own ways of viewing what, by any measure, still remains the most important event of the last part of the twentieth century. Volume 7 - Issue 1 - February 2007 - pp. 121 - 146 136 Two, Three, Many Vietnams
Volume 6 - Number 4 - November 2006 - pp. 413 - 424 Saving the Community: The French Response to Britain's Second EEC Application in 1967
Volume 6 - Number 4 - November 2006 - pp. 425 - 454 'A Different 1956': British Responses to the Polish Events, June-November 1956
Volume 6 - Number 4 - November 2006 - pp. 455 - 475 The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality
Volume 6 - Number 4 - November 2006 - pp. 477 - 500 The Search for Legitimacy in Post-Martial Law Poland: The Case of Claude Lanzmann's Shoah
Volume 6 - Number 4 - November 2006 - pp. 501 - 526 A Partial History of the Cold War
Volume 6 - Number 4 - November 2006 - pp. 527 - 534 The Cold War According to John Gaddis
Volume 6 - Number 4 - November 2006 - pp. 535 - 542 Russian Archives: Prospects for Cold War Studies
Volume 6 - Number 4 - November 2006 - pp. 543 - 548 'Germany Will Be a Bourgeois-Democratic Republic': The New Evidence from the Personal File of Georgiy Malenkov
Volume 6 - Number 4 - November 2006 - pp. 549 - 557
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