A coherent narrative political history of
early-modern Europe could be constructed around disputes over the right
of succession to sovereign thrones. The very nomenclature of the history
of armed conflict during this period underscores the importance of succession
in a society in which the family stood at the centre of power-holding.
The War of the Palatine Succession in 1685 was followed by the Nine Years
War--sometimes interpreted as the War of the British Succession--then
the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of the Polish Succession, the
War of the Austrian Succession and, as late as 1778, not far from the
end of the ancien régime, the War of the Bavarian Succession. Earlier
in the seventeenth century, the death of Duke Vincenzo II Gonzaga in 1627
led to the War of the Mantuan Succession which provided an Italian theatre
for the Thirty Years War, a conflict the immediate cause of which was
a dispute over the Bohemian succession. Here, not unlike the English in
1688-89, a dominant Protestant nobility attempted to protect its confessional
interests by electing a king in accord with its own religious views, the
Calvinist Friedrich V, Elector Palatine, and to reject the claims of the
Habsburg Ferdinand II, whose family had exercised a monopoly upon the
Bohemian crown for nearly a century. The victory of the House of Austria
led to the imposition of a new Catholic nobility and to the transformation
of Bohemia from an elective to an hereditary monarchy, thus demonstrating
how succession disputes could alter the demographic composition of what
we must still call 'the political nation' and the constitution of a sovereignty.
Howard Nenner's deeply impressive and tightly argued The Right to
be King addresses itself to the problems of the succession to the
English throne in the seventeenth century and, by extension, to the nature
of the Stuart monarchy in England; the nature of the Stuart monarchy in
Scotland is touched upon only fleetingly. The conflicts between a strictly
hereditary monarchy and an elective monarchy establish two of the poles
between which the lines of political debate were conducted; other means
of succession--by nomination or by conquest, the latter closely tied to
right by prescription--are also investigated by Nenner. It is one of the
signal strengths of Nenner's work that he perceives and defines a typology
for sovereign successions. At the risk of brushing in too broadly a description
of Nenner's very meticulously-explored arguments, a model is proposed
in which James Vl and I adhered tenaciously to the concept of an indefeasible
hereditary succession in England, and the first Act of Parliament of his
reign clearly proclaimed this. James insisted that he was king by right
of blood, not by legislation, nor by the nomination of his predecessor--Elizabeth
I was particularly careful to avoid this technique for the transfer of
power--still less by conquest. Henry VIII's attempts to impose a succession
law by means of his various wills, the last of which excluded the Stuarts,
were swept aside; consanguinity displaced nomination. Indefeasible hereditary
right became a canonical element of Stuart political thinking, confirmed
by the seamless transfer of the crown to Charles I (1625) and strongly
re-iterated by the rhetoric of the Restoration of 1660: the reign of Charles
ll. began at the moment his father's head was severed from his body in
January 1649 on the scaffold outside the Banqueting House, Whitehall.
From that moment he had the possession of sovereignty; it was only
in 1660 that he acquired the exercise of sovereign power.
Nenner continues, convincingly, that the strength of indefeasibility
was such that it survived the dynastic crises of Charles II's reign: the
sterility of the king's marriage placing his Catholic brother, James,
Duke of York, immediately next in line to the throne; the failure of the
subsequent Exclusion Bills of the late 1670s and early 1680s; and Monmouth's
challenge to James II on Charles II's death in 1685. It was only another
event of supreme dynastic importance, the totally unexpected birth of
a Prince of Wales in 1688, that the unwelcome question of the succession
was reopened. Nenner appreciates entirely the weight of such 'family matters',
such accidents to which the dynastic system was definitionally prone,
for at this point the prospect of England ruled, not for one reign alone,
but for the foreseeable future by a Catholic monarch presented itself.
The success in defending hereditary indefeasibility as the key principle
of the English succession, seemingly clinched during the battle over confessional
exclusion, crumbled with breath-taking speed once the sovereign sired
a healthy Catholic heir, who, given the accepted succession custom
would take precedence over his older Protestant half-sisters. A system
to combine the hereditary principle with a formula to produce a sovereign
acceptable to the political nation--a means I would be inclined to call
'restrictive election'--was concocted for the elevation of William III
and Mary II. A law for the succession remained unarticulated apart from
the practical provisions for the immediate future, the heirs of Mary's
body (by William or by a subsequent husband), followed by the heirs of
Princess Anne's body and then by any heirs of William's body, should Mary
predecease him (as was the case) and he re-marry (as was not the case).
This seemed a plausible solution for, at last, Anne had produced, in
1689, a child (by this stage, the birth of one of either gender was warmly
greeted) in the form of William Henry, Duke of Gloucester ( a shrewd combination
of Orange and Tudor nomenclatural imagery), who, despite persistent rumours
of delicate health, seemed to evince a greater chance of survival than
any of Anne's other children. As long as Gloucester lived, the definition
of a succession law could be deferred, despite agitations, dating as early
as 1689, from the courts of Hannover and Torino that their residual rights
should receive some form of recognition. The arrangements of 1689 were
sufficient for the moment. This moment lasted until 1700, when Gloucester
died, and the widowed, childless William III was compelled to contemplate
the succession to his equally childless sister-in-law, now the only heiress
to his British titles. The Act of Settlement of 1701 fused the elements
of hereditary and elective monarchy with the guarantee of a succession
acceptable to the political nation, and, finally, after a century of turbulent
theoretical and religious debate, England--although not yet Scotland--had
a juridically established law of succession.
Nenner views the absence of such an articulated law of succession--insofar
as an 'absence' can be a 'presence'--as the key element in the debates
surrounding the nature of the seventeenth-century Stuart monarchy in England.
Nenner is very disinclined to cast his scholarly eye across the Channel.
It is churlish for any reviewer to chide an author for not having written
the book he had never intended to write, but by placing the problems of
the English succession within a continental context, the density of Nenner's
arguments acquires even greater resonance, for it is immediately apparent
that the English situation was anything but unique; it was part of a larger
European phenomenon. Very few sovereignties in seventeenth century Europe
possessed a clear hereditary succession law. One of the few and one of
the earliest to have one was Denmark. The 'Kongelov' of 1665 endowed Frederik
III with sweeping legislative and juridical powers, but it also pronounced
the transformation of Denmark from an elective monarchy, albeit one in
which the king's eldest son was habitually 'elected', into an hereditary
monarchy. The drafters of this law obviously felt that a clearly and precisely
enunciated succession law was crucial to the newly-assumed hereditary
status of the Danish throne and they spelt out in meticulous detail the
order in which princes and princesses (Denmark accepted the principle
of female succession) were to be called to the crown. While the practicalities
of the Danish Kongelov were implemented, its text remained hidden amongst
the crown jewels, unpublished and unproclaimed. The republic of letters
rapidly learned its fundamental details through unofficial newspapers,
the seventeenth-century parallel of the samizdat, but the hesitancy
to declare it publicly could well point to the perceived dangers accompanying
such a novelty as a published law of succession. As late as the mid-eighteenth
century, the court of Versailles pretended to ignorance of the exact status
of the court of Copenhagen--elective or hereditary?--and expressed this
feigned confusion by letters addressed from the King of France to the
King of Denmark with the inferior 'mon cousin' rather than the superior
(and equivalent) 'mon frère'. Given the dynastic proximity of the House
of Stuart and the House of Oldenbourg (James Vl and l's consort was Anne
of Denmark, sister of Kristian IV, who actually visited his sister's court;
while her homonym, the future Queen Anne, married Prince George of Denmark),
it is unlikely that such constitutional questions, which found expression
in the seemingly trivial external expressions of etiquette, did not make
some impact upon Stuart thinking.
France itself, that over-stated and inflated model of centralising and
'absolute' monarchy, had anything but a clearly-pronounced succession
law. It was not until a late phase in the sixteenth-century Wars of Religion
that the question of the nature of the royal succession became paramount;
by the assassination of Henri III in 1589 the seemingly factional and
confessional sequence of 'civil wars' had transformed themselves into
yet another 'succession war'. Henri IV's conversion and coronation at
Chartres (1594--Reims was still in the hands of the Catholic Ligue), followed
by a sequence of reconciliations with the Guise family, established the
fundamental 'succession law': the sovereign of France had to be male and
the Salic Law, sharply questioned during the Hundred Years War with England
and during the Wars of Religion, was accepted; he was called to the crown
in the order of strict primogeniture and, as a result, he had to be the
next in line by direct male descent from a sovereign, even if that meant,
as was the case with Henri IV, stretching back to a cousin in the nineteenth-degree
of kinship to his predecessor; and he had to be Catholic. The problem
was not, however, entirely resolved. During the seventeenth century two
other loosely-defined elements of succession law remained, the questions
of legitimacy and of renunciation.
The pressure by the legitimised Longueville family for inclusion in the
succession, the Treaty of Montmartre, which proposed to incorporate the
Lorraine dynasty into the succession in return for the transfer to France
of their patrimonial duchy, a strategic sovereignty on France's borders,
and Louis XlV's panicked attempt to insert his two illegitimate sons,
the duc de Maine and the comte de Toulouse, into the succession all suggest
the lack of clarity of definition of a succession law in France. The Regency's
refusal to accept the novelty of a potential bastard succession to the
crown merely drove the argument back to the Orléans's own uncertain position
in the succession: the competition between Felipe V of Spain (the young
king's uncle) and the duc d'Orléans (the young king's cousin) for the
French succession, on the assumption of Louis XV's death without a son.
Felipe V had been compelled against his will to renounce his rights to
the French throne for himself and his heirs as the price for retaining
those parts of the Spanish crowns salvaged for the House of Bourbon at
the Utrecht peace settlement (1713). As the King of Spain and his faction
at Versailles never entirely accepted the validity of such an imposed
renunciation, the juridical questions of whether a prince could abdicate
for himself, and at the same time renounce the rights to a succession
for his descendants, both born and unborn, re-emerged in European political
debate. These, surely, had profound implications for those devoted to
the cause of James III. While James II might have been decreed by the
Convention to have 'abdicated', could he, as well, legally have renounced
the rights of his only legitimate son? The confusion over the French succession,
pitting two branches of the Bourbon dynasty against one another, was not
settled until the birth (1751) of the first of the many sons of Louis
XV's Dauphin; a constitutional issue was thus resolved by the more direct
ways of sexual procreation, not by a debate over succession laws. Demographic
accident served here as a means to a de facto stabilisation, rather
than, as it so frequently did, as the impetus to political crisis. Although
the tensions between the court of Madrid and the Orléans establishment
had, superficially, been resolved by distancing both of their claims,
the Orléans branch of the family retained its keen interest in the French
succession, as evinced by its policies during the Revolution and in 1830.
The point must be made that the supposedly most dirigiste monarchy in
Europe had a law of succession which was dictated by custom not by law,
one which seemed open, during moments of dynastic uncertainty, to re-interpretations
and interventions on the part of the reigning monarch and his kinsmen.
For once, France was typical of Europe as a whole: custom, not legislation,
was the key to most European succession patterns. As David Parrott's recent
studies of the Gonzaga successions demonstrate, for as long as the crown
passed directly from father to son or even from brother to brother, there
was little practical need of a juridical succession law, even for those
crowns in the Holy Roman Empire and, like Mantova, in Reichsitalien, which
were subject to some, usually automatic, form of Imperial confirmation.
The Stuart assertion of indefeasible inheritance in 1625 and even in 1685
was easily accepted because the line of descent was clear to a political
nation fully alert to the, at times unspoken, rules of inheritance. Legislation,
carrying the heavy burden of the threat of election, was not necessary
or desirable in such circumstances. While Parrott is absolutely correct
in viewing succession patterns determined by custom as typical of Europe
as a whole, it must be noted that the dynastic 'machine' was especially
prey to the demographic fragility which effected all hereditary systems.
Studies of the French ducal peerage suggest that the average span for
a title to remain in one House was a mere three generations: sterility
or 'daughtering-out' frustrated a long familial durée.
Sovereign dynasties appear to have been rather more durable, although
the House of Austria remained on the Spanish thrones for only five generations,
the Vasa in Sweden for four. Few dynasties could match the (still) unbroken
male descent of the Houses of Savoy or of Lorraine. The family history
of the Houses of Tudor and Stuart was particularly unfortunate in this
respect; unbroken lines of male descent, easily acceptable by the political
nation, were the exception, not the rule. On the continent, problems inevitably
arose when cousins, at some times, as with Henri IV in 1589 or Karl Theodor
of Bavaria in 1777, many degrees removed. succeeded cousins, or when heiresses
were involved. Compromise, compensation for disappointed candidates and
contest and challenge introduced themselves immediately, again, as Nenner
drives home the point for England, because there simply was not an articulated
rule of succession. Demographic fragility was central to hereditary dynastic
thinking: God decided who would have children, whether they would be sons
or daughters and who would survive. To this means of thinking, there was
an elective component to sovereign succession, but one which was represented
by a single, divine elector. For hereditary sovereignties, human intervention,
as embodied normally by parliamentary estates, contradicted the fundamental
definition of sovereignty. It introduced the concept of elective monarchy
with an unacceptably broad electorate, and that menace, as Nenner clearly
demonstrates for the case of England in the seventeenth century, united,
apart from the radical Whigs, the political nation which feared that such
a system would merely become the antechamber to the republican Commonwealth
rejected in 1660.
Nenner is especially trenchant on the traumatic background of the 1649-60
régime in Britain for an understanding of the subsequent determination
to retain the hereditary monarchy and to deny in public the existence
of an elective element. Returning to the continent, we find a much more
mixed structure. The secular head of Christendom, despite the protests
of the King of France, was undeniably the Holy Roman Emperor, and his
position was elective. The constituency was small, the seven electors
stipulated by the Golden Bull of 1356, expanded to eight in 1648 and then
to nine in 1692. The possibility of a future enlargement of the electoral
franchise was strongly present during the eighteenth century, and although
the Imperial crown remained uninterruptedly in the hands of the House
of Austria from 1452 to 1740, the attempts in 1519 by François I and Henry
VIII and throughout the seventeenth century of Kings of France and Bavarian
electors to present their own candidacies underscore the elective nature
of this throne.
The question of elective monarchies--as distinct from elected sovereigns
such as the Doges of Venice and of Genoa--inevitably drives the debate
back to the Baltic crowns. The Danish conversion to a de jure hereditary
monarchy should not obscure the fact that it appeared to be a de facto
hereditary monarchy since 1448, from which point the reigning king's eldest
son was almost invariably elected as his successor during his father's
lifetime. 'Appeared', however, is the operative word, for events in the
early sixteenth century emphasised the strength of the tradition of elective
monarchy. The internal strife in Denmark surrounding the elimination of
Kristian II in 1523 from the political equation--another precedent for
the tumult of 1688-89 in Britain whereby a revolt of the élites forced
a reigning sovereign into exile--altered the recognised line of succession,
shifting it from a nephew to an uncle. The political collapse of Kristian
II is particularly significant as it reinforced the elective nature of
what Ragnhild Hatton defined as the 'Northern Crowns'. The events of 1523
certainly confirmed the elective nature of the Danish crown in the sixteenth
century: a king could be deposed and another king--a close relation, one
of the pool of plausible 'blood candidates'--elected in his place. The
elective nature of the Norwegian monarchy was also specifically articulated
and confirmed at this moment. The Union of Kalmar was broken and Sweden
elected its first Vasa king, Gustaf I, a monarch with no blood
claim to the throne, but one of the few prominent grandees to have escaped
the 'Bloodbath of Stockholm'.
If the three royal Baltic crowns were emphatically 'elective' in the
sixteenth century, this situation changed during the seventeenth century,
not only in Copenhagen but also in Stockholm. Sweden offers other close
parallels to events in seventeenth century England. The deposition of
the Catholic Sigismund in favour of his Lutheran uncle Karl IX provides
yet another example of the means by which the élites rid themselves of
a sovereign who was 'inconvenient' in terms of his view of the constitution,
however that was defined, and his confessional orientation, a similar
conjoncture to that which trapped James Vll and 11 in 1688-89.
One result of this crisis was the 1604 Norrkopping Pact of Succession
which accepted female succession under restricted conditions. This was
another early attempt to define laws of succession, and it is striking
that it emerged from a dynasty in turmoil, one only recently established
on a throne, one which had implicitly accepted the law of election in
order to advance to royal rank and one which was divided by profound familial
strife. There was the potential for challenge from within Sweden and the
certainty of challenge from without, from Copenhagen and from Warsaw.
It is difficult to avoid the impression that the fragility of the position
of the Vasa in Sweden, and indeed in Europe, drove them to seek protection
in clear-cut and juridically defined patterns of succession rather than
to rely on time-honoured customs upon which they had no sustainable claim.
The Catholic Vasas, established on the elective Polish throne, continued
to contest the title of their Lutheran cousins in the junior line to the
Swedish throne, but the ease with which the six-year-old Kristina, a minor
and a female, succeeded her father, Gustaf II Adolf, in 1632 demonstrated
how smoothly the Pact of Succession could operate, although with the significant
reserve that the queen-mother was distanced from the regency in favour
of Axel Oxenstierna. The succession of another minor in 1660 produced
a similar situation. The rights of Karl Xl to his father's throne were
not questioned, but Karl X Gustaf's will was overturned in order to restrict
the political influence of his widow on the regency council for her underaged
son and to exclude, contrary to the dead king's wishes, his brother from
the council entirely. Although the hereditary principle was accepted as
the functional mode for the transfer of the crown from parent to child,
the power of the dynasty as a whole to participate in the exercise of
power was contained by a grandee caste eager to resist notions of indefeasibility
in future cases when the succession-might be less obvious and clear-cut.
The very fact that Karl X Gustaf left a will--one which was disregarded
as comprehensively as those of successive French kings--created a precedent
for his son, in a much stronger political and financial position than
his father had been, to assert a succession law based upon the right of
nomination by the incumbent, for Karl XI, at his premature death in 1697,
set down precise instructions for the descent of the crown itself, suggesting
that the Swedish succession, in the so-called 'Age of Absolutism', was
testamentarilv bequeathable.
As Karl XI had an only son, his succession posed no immediate problem,
with a son succeeding a father, but on the death in 1718 of Karl XII,
unmarried and childless, the crown passed, approximately but not strictly
following the terms of their father's will, to his younger sister, Ulrike
Eleanore, married to the Landgraf of Hessen-Kassel. Here, during a period
of dynastic crisis, when the royal treasury and royal power within Sweden
had been considerably weakened as a result of the Great Northern War,
a new situation presented itself. The critically important years of 1718-20,
nearly coinciding with the opening of the Hannover dynasty's tenure in
Britain, shed much light on the nature of the Swedish succession. Although
Ulrike Eleanore was next in line to her brother--their elder sister was
dead and her descendants had effectively, if not specifically, been excluded
by Karl XI's testament--it remains uncertain by precisely which right
she succeeded him on the throne: hereditary right?, testamentary right
as laid down in their father's will? The events of 1720 are traditionally
depicted as an abdication on the part of the queen in favour of her husband,
now Frederik I, a transition from being a ruling queen to a queen-consort.
My own research suggests strongly that all Ulrike Eleanore did in 1720
was to accept her husband's elevation to the royal title and to resign
the right of administration to him; I cannot see, at least at this stage
of research, that she, in any sense of the word, 'abdicated' her sovereign
status. If this is so, the 1688-89 model of William and Mary cannot have
been far away. Mary was recognised as sovereign queen of Great Britain
and William as sovereign king, but the governance of their sovereignty--as
Nenner demonstrates quite clearly--was entrusted to William. Yet Mary's
position as the prime hereditary beneficiary was acknowledged by the rather
primitive succession arrangements which were established: had William
died before Mary, she would have remained sovereign queen in her own right,
assumed full administrative governance and transmitted her claims on the
sovereignty to any children from a subsequent marriage. The arrangement
of 1688-89 delicately balanced the notion of hereditary sovereignty--Mary's
paramount family claims, on the assumption that her half-brother had never
been born--and an elective monarchy of a sovereign chosen, for his personal
gifts, but one with his own blood claims on the crown, William III of
Orange being, via his Stuart mother, third in line to the British succession,
two places behind his own wife. William's own dynastic rights in England
were essential for the case of a joint monarchy. Although Nenner does
not discuss the issue, this structure of juridical power-holding opens
questions as to Mary II's governance of Britain during William's absences
on the Continent: was this by virtue of her right as a crowned and anointed
sovereign or by right of delegation, almost a regency, as designated by
her husband? Such niceties of constitutional law rarely altered balances
in the realities of power-holding; but we do need to know what the juridical
structures were, if only to judge how far away from them political practicalities
impelled rulers to move and to what extent they felt obliged to justify
and validate such innovations, however temporary they may have been.
We cannot yet, however, abandon the court of Stockholm. Like William
and Mary, Frederik and Ulrike Eleanore were childless; the question of
a succession to direct heirs of their bodies simply did not present itself;
and, as again in the case of England, the queen, who had the clearest
hereditary claim, predeceased her husband, who, unlike William, had no
blood right of his own to his throne. As it became obvious that the couple
would have no children--and as with William and Mary perception of the
sterility of the marriage was expressed remarkably early-Ulrike Eleanore
and Frederik pursued diametrically opposed policies to select a successor,
the queen supporting a member of the Zweibrucken branch of her own family
in order to perpetuate a Wittelsbach presence in Sweden, the king the
candidacy of his younger brother as part of the campaign to create a tenth
electorate in favour of the House of Hessen-Kassel. Factions developed
to advance these two possibilities, but it is striking that the Riksdag,
in its elective role, chose instead Adolf Frederik of Holstein-Gottorp,
a cadet from a clan closely attached to the Swedish royal House. In the
midst of all this genealogical detail, some striking structural points
emerge. During periods of monarchical strength, such as the reign of Karl
XI, the disposition of the crown seemed to be in the hands of the incumbent,
by means of his testament; when the power of the Estates, particularly
the magnate class, was in the ascendant, the succession acquired a much
more elective character, although the candidates for election had to belong
to a recognisable pool of princes with some blood claim to it. The candidates
for the succession to Frederik I and Ulrike Eleanore were all related
to the king or the queen in ways which would have made juridical sense
in terms of private law, and I shall return shortly to the definition
of relationships to succession within such a pool, because it sheds light
on a central point of Nenner's thesis for England, the potential problems
posed by contradictions between private succession laws for subjects and
the succession to the sovereignty itself. The conflict between, for lack
of better terms, private and public law, or to be more precise, between
the code governing non-sovereign succession, even at the ducal level,
and sovereign succession plays a fundamental role in Nenner's thesis.
The fusion between hereditary and elective right, so crucial to the 1689
settlement in Britain, is clear in other Baltic sovereignties as well,
notably Poland and Russia. The elective nature of the Polish monarchy,
based on the vast constituency of the szlachta (following Robert Frost,
roughly 70,000 nobles participated in the uncontested election of Wladyslaw
IV in 1632), made it an unique if not widely copied institution of power-holding
in early-modern Europe. The extinction, in 1572, of the Jagellion dynasty,
which had soldered the personal union of the kingdom of Poland and the
grand duchy of Lithuania, initiated a sequence of elections to the monarchical
crown, which after the unsuccessful (1573) flirtation with the Valois
candidacy, directed attention only to princes with a dynastic claim upon
the Jagellionian inheritance, first Stefan Batory, but, subsequently the
Catholic branch of the House of Vasa. It was only with the abdication
(1668) of the last of these, Jan Casimir, that election to the Polish
throne ceased to be predicated upon some, albeit ill-defined, form of
hereditary right. Even so, the successors to the Vasa in Poland, notably
Jan Sobieski and his wife, attempted to introduce a strictly hereditary
system of succession, failing which, a juridical mechanism to elect the
heir during the lifetime of the incumbent.
The uneasy union between the concepts of heredity and election evinced
itself, in different forms, in Russia. In 1722, Peter I assumed the right
to nominate his successor, thus bringing the succession law for the sovereignty
into line with the right conferred in 1714 on the head of each Russian
noble family to control the succession to his lands by naming a chosen
heir, a striking attempt to coordinate 'public' succession law and 'private'
succession law, but one which concentrated considerable power in the hands
of the incumbent. By the time of his death in 1725, however, Peter had
failed to make his choice, and Russian nominative succession became dormant,
although it did not disappear entirely. The uncertainty caused by Peter's
death without a recognised successor opened the door for an elective constituency
but one much smaller than that of the Polish szlachta, for it became,
eventually, the élite guards regiments which determined, by a sequence
of coups d'état, who sat on the Russian throne. This was election by force,
but, yet again, the only plausible candidates were those with some direct
blood or family link to the Romanov dynasty (with the innovation that
wives could succeed husbands). Some form of dynastic validation was essential.
Once established on the throne, those two monsters of eighteenth-century
statecraft, Elisaveta Petrovna and Catherine II, maintained their hold
upon power by securing the 'elective' confidence of the high aristocracy
and the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Catherine attempted to revive Peter's
nominative right with a decree excluding her only (presumably) legitimate
son in favour of her grandson, but this document conveniently disappeared
while the empress was in her death throes. The flea-like agitations of
the Russian succession in the eighteenth century were settled only in
1797 when Emperor Pavel Petrovitch, in a self-conscious act of retrospective
matricide, decreed a succession law which, without specifically barring
female succession, established the descent of the crown in such a juridical
fashion that effectively blocked any woman from reigning in her own right;
any male member of the House, however far removed from the throne in terms
of dynastic blood links, took precedence over the incumbent Tsar's closest
female relation. Russia therefore had a coherent succession law one which,
as Roderick McGrew has pointed out, eliminated 'a condition fertile for
political intrigue...and was an important step towards a regularized political
system', only at the end of the eighteenth century and only after a period
of chaotic 'elections', albeit elections for which only a limited number
of candidates, based upon hereditary affinity, were eligible.
Pavel Petrovitch's succession law points forward to a more rigid juridical
definition of succession legislation, evinced, as well, in the early nineteenth
century by the succession arrangements reached by such recently-established
dynasties as the Sachsen-Coburg in Belgium and the Bernadotte in Sweden.
But these precise pieces of legislation came only after the end of the
ancien régime. As Howard Nenner suggests, the much more 'mixed' structure
of succession agreements, in which 'the best' or 'most accommodating'
or 'most convenient' of the candidates. but only those with plausible
dynastic claims, could be 'elected', or, to use the jargon of the time,
'recognised'--in order to preserve the notion of hereditary descent of-the
crown--installed itself in English succession law from 1688-89 onwards.
It is necessary to remember that the combination of the concepts of elective
choice and dynastic inheritance became well entrenched within northern
Europe at roughly the same time as the Glorious Revolution. In the Baltic
the distinction between indefeasible hereditary monarchy and monarchical
election was less clear cut than Nenner would present it for seventeenth-century
England; in Denmark, Sweden, Poland and Russia both systems, in very different
ways, evolved hand-in-hand.
Nenner devotes most of his efforts to an investigation of these two seemingly
opposed forms of succession, indefeasible heredity and election, yet right
of nomination and right of conquest continued to play significant roles
in the eighteenth-century validation of sovereign power-holding. Peter
l's 1722 decree drives attention inexorably to the Spanish monarchies,
for throughout the seventeenth century the final testament of the King
of Spain was the determining document upon which the succession to his
crowns was based. The problem here, of course, lies with the very notion
of a coherent 'Spain'. Iberian 'Spain' itself consisted of a number of
crowns, principally Castile and Aragon, but also Granada, Leon, Majorca
and Navarre, and, between 1580 and 1640, the kingdom of Portugal, to which
we shall shortly return. But this was only Iberian Spain, and it neglects
Mediterranean Spain--the kingdoms of Sardinia, Sicily and Naples--and
what can best be termed 'European' Spain, the duchy of Milano, the Franche-Comté
(until 1678) and the Southern Netherlands. All of these units of 'Spain'
had individual and highly idiosyncratic customs, not laws,
of succession, as Louis XIV fully appreciated when he pressed, by means
of the War of the Devolution, for 'recognition' of the rights of his consort,
the Infanta Doha Maria Teresa, to a chunk of the Southern Netherlands.
The King of France, basing himself upon local private law in Flanders,
claimed that his consort, as the only surviving child of Felipe IV's first
bed, was entitled to some compensation in the Southern Netherlands, as
the King of Spain's only son, Carlos II, was the issue of his second
bed, and, as sole male heir, had 'scooped the pool' to the jumbled
Spanish inheritance. Similarly, in the 1777-78 Bavarian succession dispute
the public rights of the multi-branched House of Wittelsbach to the sovereign
succession of the electorate and the private rights of the late and childless
elector's family (related to him through his sister) to extensive allodial
landholdings collided head-on and provoked a European crisis. As we have
seen, Nenner is fully alert to conflicts between 'public' and 'private'
law in his discussion of the English succession, the gaps, the distinctions
and the differences between those customs governing sovereign succession
as distinct from those framing the transmission of the lands and titles
of aristocratic subjects, to repeat, even those at the most elevated ducal
or princely level. The notion of sovereignty is the key here; those with
claims to sovereignty behaved differently from 'mere' grandee subjects.
Carlos II's testament is a key document. For generations heads of the
Spanish branch of the House of Habsburg viewed the aggregate of their
possessions as disposable by their last will and testament. Successive
Kings of 'Spain', during the long periods in which direct male descent
seemed uncertain, promised to detach elements--the Spanish Netherlands
or the duchy of Milano--from their conglomerate at their death or held
out the lure of the entire inheritance--constantly to the House of Savoy--in
the hope of diplomatic advantage. The fundamental point remains that the
right to the succession to the Spanish kingdoms, viewed as a whole, was
nominative; the will of the incumbent was the key factor in the absence
of one obvious male heir. Carlos II's testament, kept secret until his
death late in 1700, named the duc d'Anjou as his heir, on the assumption
that the young prince's elder brother, the duc de Bourgogne, and their
father, the Dauphin, would renounce their claims as they were in direct
line to the French succession. A number of salient points emerge from
this crucially important episode which extended the war of the 1690s into
that of the first two decades of the eighteenth century. Firstly, the
right of nomination could be exercised by the incumbent only in the circumstances
of the king having no sons and no brothers; dispossession of such close
male relations was impossible, although the Don Carlos crisis of Felipe
II's reign suggests that such action was at least contemplated. Secondly,
while succession by nomination retained juridical validity into the eighteenth
century, the successful candidate, as was so frequently the case, had
to belong to the pool of princes perceived by the political nation as
having some blood right to the crown. The Bourbon duc d'Anjou, a member
of Carlos II's family rather than his House, had, despite the renunciations
to the Spanish inheritance of his grandmother on her marriage to Louis
XIV, the best blood claim, one established by earlier Castilian succession
precedents. The third point to be noted is the introduction of a nuanced
form of election into the Spanish succession in 1700, for Carlos II attached
one vitally important condition to the nomination: the chosen prince would
have to accept the Spanish inheritance intact and to guarantee its complete
integrity. If not, the next nominee would be invited to do so and to ascend
the thrones. Louis XIV, who had previously negotiated with William III
for a peaceful partition of Carlos's legacy, effectively had to yield
to the pressure of the specifically Castilian grandees who wanted no diminution
whatsoever of Spanish landholdings and no alienation of extra-lberian
sovereignties in order to purchase the goodwill of disappointed candidates.
In accepting the terms of Carlos II's will on behalf of his grandson,
the King of France secured the essential support of the Castilian élites
but also implicitly acknowledged their role in determining the form of
the succession. The new king, Felipe V, supported by his grandfather,
attempted to ensure that this haphazard and mixed approach to the Spanish
succession could not be repeated and introduced the Salic Law in 1713
into a much more juridically integrated and homogenised Spain, an innovation
repudiated in 1830 as a noxious French import in an eventually successful
attempt to assert that, in the absence of a son, the King of Spain would
be succeeded by his daughter in preference to his brother.
If succession by nomination continued to be exercised in the ancien régime,
so did succession by right of conquest. Nenner is sharply aware, however,
of how problematic this particular form of succession could be in a society
which was centered upon the concept of precedent and which professed distrust
and even hatred of any modification which could be stigmatised as 'innovation'.
Succession by conquest opened the possibility of succession by a prince--or,
indeed, anyone-with no blood right or juridical right to a sovereignty.
In 1580, at a moment of dynastic crisis in Lisbon, Felipe II of Spain
invaded Portugal, where he imposed himself as king. He was careful, however,
to assert his blood rights to the throne through his mother and to extract
recognition of his self-declared 'superior' claims from as many of the
other potential candidates as he possibly could. Even so, sixty years
later, in 1640, the descendant of two of these plausible claimants led
a successful revolt against the Spanish authority and established himself
as King Joao IV. The events of 1640 in Lisbon are remarkable: using the
language of 'restoration' and specifically not 'revolution' and brandishing
the cultural weapon of Lusitanism, Joao IV created a de facto Portuguese
succession law, one which countenanced female succession but also succession
in the illegitimate male line-the new king possessed both claims. The
rights of bastards to a sovereign inheritance had found some limited acceptance
in the Italian courts of the Quattrocento and Cinquecento--Ferrara (where
a more experienced illegitimate son actually imposed himself before a
still-untested younger legitimate son), Modena, Florence--but the operating
succession arrangements in Portugal stand out as, at least to my knowledge,
an unique example in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of respect
for the juridical claims of those born out of wedlock.
The Italian peninsula indeed provides a striking--and strikingly late--example
of succession by right of conquest. In 1734, Carlo I, Duke of Parma and
Piacenza, the eldest son of the King of Spain, Felipe V, by his second
wife (there were sons from the first bed), Elisabetta Farnese, conquered
Naples amidst the chaos of the European-wide War of the Polish Succession.
Although Carlo (from 1759, Carlos III of Spain) had convincing claims,
via private, allodial law thanks to his mother's position as one of the
more impressive heiresses of eighteenth-century Europe, to the Farnese
duchies and to the grand duchy of Tuscany as well, he had none to the
kingdom of Naples, assigned to the Austrian Habsburgs as part of the 1713
Treaties of Utrecht. As with Portugal in 1640, the rhetoric of cultural
politics was deployed: the independent sovereignty of Naples was 'restored',
following a gap little short of 250 years. The emblematic definition of
'restoration' looms as importantly as the problem of 'succession' over
early-modern European history, and Carlo and his consort, Maria Amalia
of Saxony, worked assiduously to 'recreate', through a highly sophisticated
form of cultural patronage, a specifically Neapolitan identity. Juridically,
the kingdom of Naples was a papal fief--the lengthy disputes over the
ceremony of the Chinea in Rome, the presentation of a white horse as feudal
tribute to the pontiff, shed important light on this complex relationship--but
the Borbon-Wettin couple simply cut across all this, providing a precedent
for succession to sovereignties without reference to juridical overlords,
mainly the Pope but also the Holy Roman Emperor. The succession of François
Étienne, Duke of Lorraine and Bar, as Grand Duke of Tuscany in 1737, three
years after Carlo VII's conquest of Naples, confirmed that the practical
functioning of laws of succession need not be rooted in family rights,
and, in this way, despite the application of the cosmetics of 'nomination',
the succession in Tuscany was 'massaged' to produce the same result as
in Naples--effectively François-Étienne 'conquered' Florence, but he conquered
it peacefully, without the bellicose stage effects of military invasion.
I would like to suggest--but no more than suggest-- that the disregard,
certainly the dwindling respect, in eighteenth-century Italy for the established
authorities, Imperial and, again, especially, Papal, to control and to
adjudicate transmissions of succession in the absence of an obvious male
heir installed the notion of dynastic 'deals' which were, in effect, conquests.
Realpolitik understandings between the major courts, Vienna (as
Austrian not as Imperial), Versailles and Madrid, aimed to impose succession
settlements on the Italian peninsula without reference to its traditional
overlords, whose power had been self-evident in the seventeenth century,
and, thus, helped to pave the way for the most notable exponent, one saturated
in Italian political Kultur, of the practice of asserting sovereignty
throughout Europe by right of conquest, Napoleon Bonaparte. Bonaparte,
as well, manipulated the cultural norms of the ancien régime--replicating
formalities of court etiquette and employing artists, musicians, scientists
and historians associated with his predecessors--in order to validate
his new system, but that new political system owed much to the willingness
of eighteenth-century powers to marginalise the rights and responsibilities
over succession law emphatically asserted by the Pope and the Holy Roman
Emperor during the seventeenth century. In a tetchy review in the Times
Literary Supplement, Tim Blanning recently questioned why historians
should concern themselves with questions of how one Italian king or duke
grabbed such-and-such a sovereignty in the eighteenth century; one reason
to address ourselves to these questions is that such manoeuvres stand
at the heart not only of European early modern political history, and,
by extension, that of political-historical thought, as justifying claims
to sovereignties through primary documentation drove forward the notion
of evidential history (and the organisation of archives and libraries),
but also of European social history. Exploring these questions can say
as much about early modern definitions of the family as it can about the
history of power-holding. Howard Nenner's focus upon the specific concept
of succession asserts its importance for England; it is clear that the
questions surrounding succession are essential for the study of the rest
of Europe as well. Nenner's re-orientation of seventeenth-century history
towards the concerns and preoccupations of the time-rather than to late
twentieth-century obsessions with 'Large Historical Questions'-is one
of the major achievements of his volume, and, l suspect it moves him closer
to the Annales view of mentalité. although a mentalité
of the élites, indeed that of the pinnacle of society. than he may have
intended.
Finishing, very belatedly, this review in the weeks following the death
of Diana, Princess of Wales and the consequent, unmistakable sharpening
of the debate over the nature of the British--both English and Scottish--monarchies
and the laws governing succession to them, it is impossible for me not
to note the timeliness of Nenner's book. Part of the agenda of what is
presented as 'think-tank' meetings at Balmoral--Elizabeth II's attempt
to salvage the monarchy by presenting a 'reforming' or, to use current
jargon, 'modernising' profile to the media--concerns itself specifically
with the mechanism of succession: the identity of the consort-Anglican
or not?-- of those with blood rights and the order in which they are summoned--date
of birth or gender? The public perception of the links between this late-twentieth-century
constitutional discussion and the world of historical erudition was signaled
when The Times decided, quite consciously, to give front-page prominence
to the recent discovery by Michael Bennett of a document in The British
Library dating from 1376 in which Edward III nominated his heir
and established an English succession law which excluded women; Edward,
at the same time, continued to press his own claims to the French throne
by right of female descent. Although the charter dates from over 600 years
ago, its revelation was considered sufficiently 'Times-worthy' for such
prominence because of the historical background it provides to proposals
for altering the order of the British succession. These proposals also
draw attention implicitly to projects for a reformed House of Lords and
to the suggested anomaly between the laws governing succession to the
British sovereignty and those regulating the descent exclusively in the
male line of the overwhelming majority of English peerages, an aspect
which Nenner discusses with considerable subtlety.
Yet again, a continental framework is essential, and, in exploring modern
comparisons, a number of tropes which have appeared already in this article
represent themselves. As early as 1953, a referendum in Denmark altered
the law of succession in order to enable the king's daughters to succeed
him in preference to his brother, thus breaking the law of exclusively
male sovereignty. This move was subsequently followed by similar legislation
in Sweden, Norway and Belgium, not only to permit female succession but
also to assert that the order of succession was determined solely by the
date of birth, not, preferentially, by gender. In the cases of Sweden
and Belgium, the legislation was applied retrospectively, with younger
princes actually being demoted from the superior positions in the succession
that they had previously held in order to favour their elder sisters.
The constitution (1814-15) of the kingdom of the Netherlands, in itself
another early-nineteenth century novelty, has been changed four times
(1887, 1922, 1963, 1983) in order to re-define the royal succession, the
1983 revision abolishing the precedence of sons over-daughters. Such alterations,
which weaken the notion of the dynastic House, did not always meet with
unqualified enthusiasm in the royal families whose succession they affect.
In Spain, where, as we have seen, female succession was 'restored' in
1830 (while preserving the precedence of male children of the incumbent
over female), King Juan Carlos, working in cooperation with the Cortès,
has, since his accession in 1975, introduced a number of changes defining
the royal family--excluding a first cousin (a protégé of General Franco)
but integrating a more distant Neapolitan cousin--while the Constitution
of 1978 effectively relaxed the laws on marriage so that his two daughters
could wed, one, a member of the middling Castilian aristocracy, and the
other, an Olympic handball champion, without sacrificing their rights
to the crown, as the king's sisters had been obliged to do when marrying
husbands beneath sovereign status. Such shifts are also apparent outside
of Europe: in Thailand where the marital confusions of the Crown Prince
have raised the prospect of the succession of one of his sisters; and
in Japan where the absence of princes in the third generation of the Imperial
House has led to discreet requests for advice from Europe on mechanisms
for allowing female succession and has encouraged historians to look back
to a far distant past of empresses reigning in their own right. Dynastic
crisis still drives scholars back to the archives in the search for precedence
and validation and may, thus, have some scientific, as distinct from political
utility.
Political unsuitability or demographic instability, as in Nenner's seventeenth
century England, can force change in a constitution predicated upon some
form of hereditary authority; it is possible--l would suggest again with
great caution--that succession laws at the sovereign level throughout
Europe have been, during the last fifty years, more flexible and adjustable
than they were during the period between again, very roughly, 1800 and
1950, the high watermark of the nation-state. There may well have been
psychological links between two distinct historical phenomena: the need
to assert, in terms of imagery, the primacy of the nation-state; and the
need to spell-out a succession law, fostering a sense of security and
continuity and endowing innovatory political experiments with an aura
of validatory stability. The Act of Settlement was an early, indeed a
very early, in broader European terms, attempt to deal with a dynastic
and ideological crisis by articulating guidelines for the English succession,
guidelines which, while specifically naming the Electress Sophia and her
descendants as the eventual heirs, were operationally based on the notion
of exclusion, exclusion of the roughly fifty other candidates with better
blood claims than Sophia, for their failure to meet certain criteria,
exclusively confessional, precisely the issue which had confronted James
II while Duke of York and which, seemingly, had been defeated during the
Exclusion Crises in favour of indefeasibility. From 1701, all sovereigns
were required to be in communion with the Church of England (of which
they were head), as the ostensibly Calvinist William III had consented
to do. Indeed, the next English effort at defining the succession, the
Royal Marriages Act of 1772, was also based upon the concept of exclusion,
in this case because of the inferior social status of spouses. As exclusive
legislation, the Act of Settlement was not particularly typical of early-modern-Europe
succession arrangements as a whole. The juridical tightening of the definition
of rights to sovereign succession, despite the examples of England, Denmark
and Spain (later to be reversed), seems to be more a 'modern' than an
'early-modern' phenomenon, one touching an issue where law, as distinct
from custom and consent, was viewed with mistrust and misgiving.
The relatively static state of the English monarchy in the eighteenth
century, despite profound family rifts, some of which indeed provoked
discussions about the direction of the succession, and the public scandals
which damaged the 'image' of the monarchy, emerged, nevertheless, after
more than a century of intense public and private debate on the nature
of the succession and the Stuart sovereignty and it is to that debate
and Nenner's achievement in describing and analysing it that I shall now
turn. It would be a mistake to see the importance of Nenner's book solely
in terms of its current topicality. The history of political thought and,
indeed, of political literature have for some time been criticised for
a failure to establish links between 'pure' theory and the hard-core practical
realities of specific political crises and drama. Even if we accept that
the 'Great Minds' of seventeenth-century political thinking were miraculously
detached from the pressures of partisan conflict--the cut-and-thrust of
claiming power, a notion of dubious naïveté at best-those lesser men who
wrote the majority of books, tracts and pamphlets, it should be suggested,
acted less out of conviction and more because of their positions in clientèle
systems which required the production of printed fodder to sustain and
to validate the political stances of their baroni. Trapped in concepts
of individualism and self-expression, traditional historians of political
thought have given insufficient weight to the practical necessities imposed
on political writers by the combat for power, for sovereignty, a combat
which advanced political debate as well as the historical scholarship
aimed at justifying the claims of their patrons.
At a first glance, Nenner might seem to have inscribed himself into this
rather old-fashioned matrix of studying political thought. Only a small
handful of primary, archival sources are cited; printed documentation
is, overwhelmingly, the point of reference. Biographical details about
individual writers and commentators are confined to throw-away clauses
and the stray sentence; any reader hoping to 'fix' a specific author within
a specific political context, in order to understand why he wrote what
he wrote, must have the DNB by his side and use his own historical
imagination. These first impressions would, however, be deeply misleading.
Nenner has made an extremely important breakthrough by tying his entire
argument to the practical imperatives of power-holding. Who held the sovereignty
and how did he or she justify its possession? Nenner is far less concerned
with the evolution of such increasingly discredited notions as that of
the 'nation-state', recently described by Mark Goldie in terms of the
Rankean perspective which anointed it as 'the definitive historical actor'
in modern European history, than he is with the history of the family
and of its grasp on power. Such a view offends nineteenth- and twentieth-century
liberal historical ideology because it is unacceptably predicated upon
the central role accorded to self-interest in studying political and social
action, yet it is probably rather closer to the stark historical realities
of seventeenth-century life. The validatory theories which the combat
for power called forth were 'patronised' in every sense of that word,
and they belong at least as much to the world of political calculation
as they do to that of hermetic contemplation.
By concentrating on the specifics of power-holding, Nenner has developed
a method which elucidates the vocabulary and, indeed, the mentalité
of what can be seen as a key constitutional debate of seventeenth-century
English political thought, the succession. By starting from moments of
seemingly 'easy' transition, 1603, 1625, perhaps the restoration of 1660,
certainly James II's accession in 1685, but also by looking at the more
difficult moments, 1649, the tumultuous events of 1688-89, the crisis
of 1701, Nenner establishes himself as a 'contextualist'. It is around
these 'set-pieces' that he scrutinises the theoretical debate, and, at
the risk of utilising facile Marxist rhetoric, identifies a dialectic
centered on the nature of both the English sovereignty and its succession
which exposes the language of political thought. However self-regarding
and self-interested the writings on either side--or on all sides--at each
moment of succession disputes were, the terms and the vocabulary used
have rarely been so clearly delineated as in Nenner's book. By forcing
us into the language of succession debate, Nenner opens up fundamental
questions about the concepts of the English constitution and about European
sovereignty as a whole during the early-modern period.
This critically important but very enclosed book does demand that scholars
bring their own comparative examples. It is a pity to record that Macmillan
have rendered this key text much less than full justice. The exile of
the notes to a section at the back of the volume, the uninspired type-setting
and page-layout, the inexpressibly dreary and monochromatic jacket design--based
on the Lewis chessmen, God help us!: what do they have to do with seventeenth-century
succession in England?--all point to the failure of will of 'commercial'
scholarly publishers and to the collapse of integrity amongst the older
university presses (perhaps the revival at Manchester will retrieve the
situation). Howard Nenner is a tight, at times conventional, historian
of political thought, but he has written a synthetic account of succession
disputes which reaches far beyond his remit of seventeenth-century England
to embrace much broader European issues. It should serve as a model for
scholars to study other succession problems on the continent, and it is
a bold indication of how bracing and refreshing Anglo-Saxon empiricism
can be for an early-modern history still trapped in a web of nineteenth
century assumptions and ideologies.
February 1998
Professor Nenner's Response