%PDF-1.3 1 0 obj << /Type /Catalog /Outlines 2 0 R /Pages 3 0 R >> endobj 2 0 obj << /Type /Outlines /Count 0 >> endobj 3 0 obj << /Type /Pages /Kids [6 0 R 17 0 R 25 0 R 27 0 R 29 0 R 31 0 R 33 0 R 35 0 R 37 0 R 42 0 R ] /Count 10 /Resources << /ProcSet 4 0 R /Font << /F1 8 0 R /F2 9 0 R /F3 10 0 R >> /XObject << /I1 11 0 R >> >> /MediaBox [0.000 0.000 595.280 841.890] >> endobj 4 0 obj [/PDF /Text /ImageC ] endobj 5 0 obj << /Creator (DOMPDF) /CreationDate (D:20140930215158+01'00') /ModDate (D:20140930215158+01'00') /Title (Kennedy, Europe and the Cold War) >> endobj 6 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Annots [ 12 0 R 15 0 R ] /Contents 7 0 R >> endobj 7 0 obj << /Length 3558 >> stream q 381.750 0 0 120.000 34.016 687.874 cm /I1 Do Q 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 34.016 676.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Published on )] TJ ET BT 99.356 676.469 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(Reviews in History)] TJ ET BT 190.016 676.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( \()] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 197.012 676.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 197.012 675.075 m 357.332 675.075 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 357.332 676.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(\))] TJ ET 0.502 0.502 0.502 RG 0.75 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 34.391 653.743 526.499 1.500 re S BT 34.016 615.321 Td /F3 18.0 Tf [(Kennedy, Europe and the Cold War)] TJ ET BT 34.016 145.019 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(In October 1957, at the close of bilateral talks in Washington, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 130.763 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan issued a joint Declaration of Common Purpose in which they )] TJ ET BT 34.016 116.507 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(looked forward to a future of intimate collaboration between their countries in combating the ?danger of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 102.251 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Communist despotism?.)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 150.032 102.251 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(\(1\))] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 150.032 100.857 m 164.024 100.857 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 164.024 102.251 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( In addition to this public reaffirmation of Anglo-American unity, the two leaders )] TJ ET BT 34.016 87.995 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(privately agreed that their governments would henceforward work closely together in defence matters. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 73.739 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Coming so soon after Britain?s successful test of a hydrogen bomb and in the immediate aftermath of the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 59.483 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(shock occasioned by the Soviet Union?s launch of Sputnik, this commitment spoke to the Eisenhower )] TJ ET BT 34.016 584.699 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Review Number:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 570.443 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(341)] TJ ET BT 34.016 556.187 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Publish date:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 541.931 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Thursday, 31 July, 2003)] TJ ET BT 34.016 527.675 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Author:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 513.419 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Nigel Ashton)] TJ ET BT 34.016 499.163 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(ISBN:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 484.907 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(333716051X)] TJ ET BT 34.016 470.651 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Date of Publication:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 456.395 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(2002)] TJ ET BT 34.016 442.139 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Price:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 427.883 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(55.00)] TJ ET BT 34.016 413.627 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Publisher:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 399.371 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Palgrave)] TJ ET BT 34.016 385.115 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Place of Publication:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 370.859 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Basingstoke)] TJ ET BT 34.016 356.603 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Author:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 342.347 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Erin Mahan)] TJ ET BT 34.016 328.091 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(ISBN:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 313.835 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(333984579X)] TJ ET BT 34.016 299.579 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Date of Publication:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 285.323 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(2002)] TJ ET BT 34.016 271.067 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Price:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 256.811 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(45.00)] TJ ET BT 34.016 242.555 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Publisher:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 228.299 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Palgrave)] TJ ET BT 34.016 214.043 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Place of Publication:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 199.787 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Basingstoke)] TJ ET BT 34.016 185.531 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Reviewer:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 171.275 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Kevin Ruane)] TJ ET endstream endobj 8 0 obj << /Type /Font /Subtype /Type1 /Name /F1 /BaseFont /Times-Roman /Encoding /WinAnsiEncoding >> endobj 9 0 obj << /Type /Font /Subtype /Type1 /Name /F2 /BaseFont /Times-Italic /Encoding /WinAnsiEncoding >> endobj 10 0 obj << /Type /Font /Subtype /Type1 /Name /F3 /BaseFont /Times-Bold /Encoding /WinAnsiEncoding >> endobj 11 0 obj << /Type /XObject /Subtype /Image /Width 509 /Height 160 /Filter /FlateDecode /DecodeParms << /Predictor 15 /Colors 3 /Columns 509 /BitsPerComponent 8>> /Mask [ 255 255 255 255 255 255 ] /ColorSpace /DeviceRGB /BitsPerComponent 8 /Length 3280>> stream x[EQ㎦fVttҒ +3O{?lGDQԯDrB^.ϯ%~'0۠/2>0AG_>0j0GCfE67>rB^}@  !&y+r?INp:erc b8f=rQC!~-Wf^^zF[)G 2ޯe7V_Go3Ke GEGOo8rώ#\1ZY~N6^H}yLxS-!:412V+u\-LSO?xVvZ|GjǮT_8EYJF=Tw^ 7GxfN/S:Ʌ~ʟtt?5n÷J'JcF-GVξx{rO~tJd;#a\7}|~y'>}c2C vR}f׈**h.)_&@pfzjsx:5;S\vKhM5j=!Cn+h"u]a EUN]jn=k<,:Ք>sU!ni~6EJ)¦72?G}[y}_vc$t?iSܟ2Zݞ,VN?_`='RFK1A2qv&X_lLRWY'%:I㢖zb_UEx\>&ɆBˏ~K@ \gYØU4}$8Dv!'Q'*+Εj(UCGo[#< 2Ja(sZi9fZKE Rn`u\9r^Zmɯ׹}mstO4uc~#'jEvۼ Dx[z ޏQ4KL5,5u3>i^uÒ-53ba ~,~/pyt1fMU'CVm:qv~=Y'Es"WsφG?l_kN5}],Ow7 uh`xƫ?zMl7ٻv$A(4Dl(wwH} ?=[=S;yC]^BK>㕪9`Z'Wj;E|:bf>kCԘ#RY,iv쵗~}n'"1u" *uO΄/2^Sxr(!/DD\~mJyZ!MmrA!#u[if|99WB WΡpp}w}sh#,\ &:%˳X?D3 %W0cC?o̲^} F3XLVn]Cߖiϧ!7}yZJ#P7]=)7Ρp;>> Ye^xx{Oafw{ ;>4gfLt ʊ:q%#r/)pv!O4wGh|dS ӣݽހ-gVUC'pBxrB^} 7JA^} /'8!`:r?}}],X  }6y!`/~Br?}Q< >k7vx"] ,' .3jn{-i}|~%-};b6#U)7繎kiEw 㤳:E}[޼c"rꬊ7Dc$~"/Y&zSd:tFȌCrʙ`7u .#[-<)j ?TGS(j~oTup(hjU4PlJ=}|it.ҽ@\wʨuXÞZcx18Wo<~ikOg,ވ\^?EneyZcc0[R١z|zv7_m:_n]a?osS3~j^ hD.a_X'KfBX6w wݶ"Oa:,bvhrWH[uCF-Xfc}>x+Rz)2N-B 7y^٨;[/vg? | |2Sve}=o䑰j[vWjF0{굦?VI~}xM(_TlG__+]:#к?S} c>GŸD7 !w{S{B =x7a?oE#)+Gz:o_4Q<;n?\tt7?mGCџQGu4kņOF>F?#} hP&ђߴM#u!.СtL2^#o nIk_i.~7tr@n 1P~3?.[]=S5b߮~Yo^HFH YBi8a4iom>CKgMy*;?zqEӕ` >zB9iFzC?XF?ޟIܰ펉A}{I5ᄊx%ez#Mp@rߎpi]IOVjzuJt\۰f׺u5><,J~PTJp1)}){9N {!`/> endstream endobj 12 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 13 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 197.0117 675.3895 357.3317 687.2695 ] >> endobj 13 0 obj << /Type /Action /S /URI /URI (http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews) >> endobj 14 0 obj [6 0 R /Fit] endobj 15 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 16 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 150.0317 101.1715 164.0237 113.0515 ] >> endobj 16 0 obj << /Type /Action >> endobj 17 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Annots [ 20 0 R 23 0 R ] /Contents 18 0 R >> endobj 18 0 obj << /Length 7982 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(administration?s especial desire for collaboration with Britain in the nuclear realm. For the British, whilst )] TJ ET BT 34.016 782.213 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(they were delighted by this development, the Washington conference also seemed to signify the laying to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 767.957 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(rest of the ghosts of Suez and the ?regaining? of what Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd called ?the special )] TJ ET BT 34.016 753.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(relationship with the United States which we had formerly enjoyed?.)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 363.968 753.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(\(2\))] TJ ET 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 363.968 752.307 m 377.960 752.307 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 377.960 753.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( Whether in fact Lloyd was correct in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 739.445 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(this assumption is one of the questions considered by Nigel Ashton in his excellent new study, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 725.189 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: the Irony of Interdependence.)] TJ ET BT 371.624 725.189 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( Another is Macmillan?s claim in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 710.933 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(cabinet on his return from Washington that the Declaration of Common Purpose meant that Anglo-American )] TJ ET BT 34.016 696.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(defence relations would now be based upon the concept of ?inter-dependence?.)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 414.236 696.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(\(3\))] TJ ET 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 414.236 695.283 m 428.228 695.283 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 34.016 670.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Leaving aside for the moment what the term interdependence meant to the Americans, it is evident that )] TJ ET BT 34.016 656.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Macmillan interpreted it in two complementary ways. First, he viewed it as a partnership \(in the truest sense )] TJ ET BT 34.016 641.909 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(of the word\) in the field of defence and nuclear weapons. Second, he hoped that close nuclear collaboration )] TJ ET BT 34.016 627.653 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(would help cement a wider global Anglo-American partnership based on a congruity of foreign, economic )] TJ ET BT 34.016 613.397 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(and security interests. What interdependence manifestly did )] TJ ET BT 323.960 613.397 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(not)] TJ ET BT 339.296 613.397 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( mean to Macmillan was abuse by the US of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 599.141 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(its position as the more powerful partner to force through its own policy preferences, whilst paying mere lip-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 584.885 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(service to the principle of consultation. To Macmillan?s dismay, however, it was this latter variant that was )] TJ ET BT 34.016 570.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the more prominent in the later Eisenhower period. The limits and frustrations of interdependence US-style )] TJ ET BT 34.016 556.373 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(were most clearly demonstrated by the collapse of the Paris summit of May 1960 following the Gary Powers )] TJ ET BT 34.016 542.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(U2 spy plane incident. Unable to bring Eisenhower to make any reconciliatory gesture to Khrushchev in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 527.861 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(order to save the meeting and with it the chance of dtente in Europe, Macmillan, Ashton argues, finally )] TJ ET BT 34.016 513.605 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(faced up to the fact that Britain on its own could not influence the Cold War policies of the United States, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 499.349 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(still less the Soviet Union, in any meaningful way. It was this moment of epiphany, Ashton suggests, more )] TJ ET BT 34.016 485.093 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(than any other consideration, that persuaded Macmillan to seek British membership of the European )] TJ ET BT 34.016 470.837 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Economic Community \(EEC\). Ashton does not see this decision as a move away from the United States, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 456.581 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(however, so much as ?an exercise in the hedging of bets?. The prime minister did not give up on the Anglo-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 442.325 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(American alliance: rather he sought an additional prop for Britain?s international position in the face of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 428.069 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(mounting evidence of the ?unreliability? of the United States.\(pp. 127-33\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 401.813 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(The advent of the Kennedy administration in January 1961 offered Macmillan the chance to re-launch )] TJ ET BT 34.016 387.557 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(interdependence on British terms, but despite the undoubted closeness of the personal relationship that )] TJ ET BT 34.016 373.301 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(developed between president and prime minister, the results of Macmillan?s endeavours were disappointing. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 359.045 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Looking back, Ashton thinks this outcome was inevitable due to the persistent failure of London and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 344.789 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Washington to reconcile their conflicting views of what the term interdependence meant. Accepting the over-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 330.533 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(simplification, Ashton suggests that the Kennedy administration tended to conjure up the image of a US )] TJ ET BT 34.016 316.277 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(truck and a British/NATO trailer whenever it contemplated interdependence: the trailer would not and could )] TJ ET BT 34.016 302.021 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(not move unless pulled by the truck, so that when US policymakers employed the language of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 287.765 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(interdependence, they really meant ?more effective central, and hence, American control?.\(p. 16\) For the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 273.509 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(British, interdependence was ?a form of partnership in which both countries would aim to pool their efforts )] TJ ET BT 34.016 259.253 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(more effectively and consistently, particularly in the field of defence?.\(p. 152\) Tensions were thus bound to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 244.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(arise in a relationship ?that for one party was one of partnership and equality and for the other one of patron )] TJ ET BT 34.016 230.741 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(and client?, especially when ?both called this 'interdependence'?.\(p. 223\) Here, then, is the ?irony? at the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 216.485 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(heart of Anglo-American relations in the early 1960s and the explanation for the book?s subtitle.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 190.229 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(The central thesis of Ashton?s is study that there had to be a reckoning ? a point when the US and British )] TJ ET BT 34.016 175.973 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(perceptions of interdependence were brought fully into the open. That reckoning occurred over the winter of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 161.717 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(1962-63 in what Ashton styles the ?crisis of interdependence?, reaching its apogee in December 1962 with )] TJ ET BT 34.016 147.461 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the US cancellation of the Skybolt missile and the tense Anglo-American summit at Nassau. However, the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 133.205 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Skybolt/Nassau conjunction did not on its own make the crisis of interdependence. While conceding that )] TJ ET BT 34.016 118.949 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(December 1962 was, chronologically, the pivot on which the crisis revolved, Ashton argues persuasively )] TJ ET BT 34.016 104.693 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(that events both before and after that point need to be examined in order fully to understand the nature and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 90.437 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(extent of the fissures that opened up in Anglo-American relations. Viewed in isolation, the British reaction )] TJ ET BT 34.016 76.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(to the Skybolt cancellation might seem out of proportion, especially Macmillan?s consideration of an )] TJ ET BT 34.016 61.925 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [('agonising reappraisal of all our foreign and defence policy' \(quoted on p. 172\) and his willingness to )] TJ ET endstream endobj 19 0 obj [17 0 R /Fit] endobj 20 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 21 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 363.9677 752.6215 377.9597 764.5015 ] >> endobj 21 0 obj << /Type /Action >> endobj 22 0 obj [17 0 R /Fit] endobj 23 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 24 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 414.2357 695.5975 428.2277 707.4775 ] >> endobj 24 0 obj << /Type /Action >> endobj 25 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Contents 26 0 R >> endobj 26 0 obj << /Length 7695 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(countenance the concomitant rupture in Anglo-American relations.\(p. 182\) But if examined in relation to an )] TJ ET BT 34.016 782.213 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(accumulation of British doubts and misgivings about American policy over the previous two years, then )] TJ ET BT 34.016 767.957 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Macmillan?s reaction is rendered more explicable.\(pp. 225-6\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 741.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Following a lengthy introduction ? which includes a masterful )] TJ ET BT 335.660 741.701 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(tour d?horizon)] TJ ET BT 407.336 741.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( of the meaning, ironies and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 727.445 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(historiography of the ?special relationship? ? Ashton provides a sequence of chapter-length case studies, all )] TJ ET BT 34.016 713.189 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(of which impact directly or indirectly on the crisis of interdependence. The Laos and Berlin crises of 1961 )] TJ ET BT 34.016 698.933 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(show the extent to which Macmillan was willing to compromise British policy preferences in order to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 684.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(establish good relations with the new president. On Laos in particular, Ashton thinks Macmillan went too far )] TJ ET BT 34.016 670.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(in all but agreeing to commit British forces alongside US troops in a military intervention to counter the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 656.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(communist Pathet Lao. In the event, Macmillan was not called upon to make good his promise \(or renege )] TJ ET BT 34.016 641.909 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(upon it\), thanks to the Bay of Pigs fiasco and Kennedy?s subsequent scepticism about military solutions to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 627.653 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Third World problems.\(p. 4\) As for Berlin, the build-up to the crisis saw Macmillan attracted to a negotiated )] TJ ET BT 34.016 613.397 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(solution and Kennedy, while never ruling out a political initiative, more insistent on sending a firm military )] TJ ET BT 34.016 599.141 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(message to Khrushchev. In the end, the construction of the Berlin wall not only took the sting out of the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 584.885 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(crisis, it also ?proved as effective in repairing a breach in Anglo-American relations as it had in shoring up )] TJ ET BT 34.016 570.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the Eastern bloc?.\(p. 63\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 544.373 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(If Laos and Berlin offer important contexts in relation to the wider crisis of interdependence in 1962-63 by )] TJ ET BT 34.016 530.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(highlighting how an Anglo-American community of )] TJ ET BT 288.668 530.117 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(interests)] TJ ET BT 329.336 530.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( does not guarantee a commonality of )] TJ ET BT 512.972 530.117 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(policies)] TJ ET BT 550.304 530.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 515.861 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 showed that interdependence in the sense that the British )] TJ ET BT 34.016 501.605 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(understood it ? a partnership in and yet transcending defence and security ? was more apparent than real. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 487.349 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Ashton concludes that ?nothing Macmillan said or did changed the course of the president?s handling of the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 473.093 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(crisis? \(p. 86\), although the prime minister did offer welcome staunch public support for the US position. In )] TJ ET BT 34.016 458.837 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the Middle East too, there were indications that all was not well, or at any rate equal, in Anglo-American )] TJ ET BT 34.016 444.581 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(interdependence. During 1961-62, the Macmillan government became increasingly concerned about the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 430.325 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(extension of Egyptian/Nasserite influence in the Yemen and the dangers this posed for the British position )] TJ ET BT 34.016 416.069 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(throughout the Arabian peninsula. The Kennedy administration believed that these worries were overblown, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 401.813 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(which was to be expected given that its approach to the Middle East involved cultivating Arab opinion in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 387.557 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(general and Egyptian opinion in particular, both as ends in themselves and as a means of ameliorating the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 373.301 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Arab-Israeli problem. There was thus considerable continuity, Ashton observes, both in the policies of the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 359.045 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations and in the strain that pursuing Nasser placed on Anglo-American )] TJ ET BT 34.016 344.789 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(relations.\(p. 91\) For the ?key British actors? it was Nasser who remained ?their true enemy in the region? \(p. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 330.533 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(108\), and US pressure on London to accord diplomatic recognition to the pro-Nasser revolutionary )] TJ ET BT 34.016 316.277 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(government in Yemen was not best suited to promoting Anglo-American harmony.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 290.021 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Nor for that matter was competition in arms sales. In the summer of 1962, British plans to sell the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 275.765 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Bloodhound air defence system to Israel were scuppered when the Israelis instead purchased the American )] TJ ET BT 34.016 261.509 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Hawk missile. The Kennedy administration had hitherto eschewed arms sales to any Middle East country )] TJ ET BT 34.016 247.253 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(lest it trigger a regional arms race, and Macmillan had assumed that the Bloodhound deal would proceed )] TJ ET BT 34.016 232.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(without a hitch. When it collapsed, the prime minister instantly assumed foul play. In what Ashton terms an )] TJ ET BT 34.016 218.741 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(?extraordinarily vitriolic? message, Macmillan wrote to Kennedy accusing the Americans of a 'disgraceful )] TJ ET BT 34.016 204.485 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(piece of trickery' and expressing 'disgust and despair' at their behaviour.\(quoted on pp. 161-2\) On reflection, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 190.229 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Ashton believes that the US arms deal was predicated not on base economic motives but on political grounds )] TJ ET BT 34.016 175.973 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(? on softening the Israeli stance on Arab refugees ? and a somewhat bashful Macmillan subsequently wrote )] TJ ET BT 34.016 161.717 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(again to Kennedy retracting his criticisms. Privately, though, the British prime minister retained the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 147.461 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(suspicion that the Americans had 'deceived us all through' and cautioned that Britain should 'always have )] TJ ET BT 34.016 133.205 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(this in mind in discussing other subjects with them'.\(quoted on p. 163\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 106.949 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(In building his case for a series of interlocking crises in 1962-63 Ashton also looks at the problem of the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 92.693 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Congo, where the US preference for UN police action to bring an end to the Katangan secession came into )] TJ ET BT 34.016 78.437 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(conflict with British support, albeit subtle, for the independence of the break-away province. The Macmillan )] TJ ET BT 34.016 64.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(government?s attitude was conditioned by concerns about the stability of the Central African Federation, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 49.925 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(British investments in Katanga, and Conservative Party opinion. The danger that the Soviet Union might )] TJ ET endstream endobj 27 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Contents 28 0 R >> endobj 28 0 obj << /Length 7316 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(take advantage of events to ally with radical African nationalism ?was often lost sight of in the government's )] TJ ET BT 34.016 782.213 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(framing of its Congo policy? \(p. 113\), but for the Kennedy administration this Cold War dimension was )] TJ ET BT 34.016 767.957 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(paramount. The way in which the crisis was eventually resolved in December 1962, with Katanga brought )] TJ ET BT 34.016 753.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(back into the Congolese fold under US-sponsored UN military pressure, represented ?a clear defeat for )] TJ ET BT 34.016 739.445 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(British policy? and a ?loss of international prestige? for the Macmillan government.\(p. 126\) At first sight the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 725.189 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Congo problem does not seem to have much relevance to the crisis of interdependence, but the timing of its )] TJ ET BT 34.016 710.933 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(resolution and the scale of the defeat for British diplomacy hardened Macmillan?s conviction that the Anglo-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 696.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(American alliance was beginning to function to the detriment of Britain. It follows that the failure of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 682.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Britain?s EEC application at the hands of de Gaulle in January 1963 was more than a little ironic, in that it )] TJ ET BT 34.016 668.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(left Macmillan and the British with nowhere to go other than to fall back on the Anglo-American )] TJ ET BT 34.016 653.909 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(relationship at precisely the moment when the value of that relationship was being questioned in London. In )] TJ ET BT 34.016 639.653 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(1960, as already seen, Macmillan saw membership of the EEC as insurance against the unreliability of the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 625.397 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Anglo-American alliance. By late 1962, as the crisis of interdependence ? and the related crisis of British )] TJ ET BT 34.016 611.141 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(confidence in the US as a partner ? came to a head, an additional British power base was arguably more )] TJ ET BT 34.016 596.885 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(important than ever.\(p. 148\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 570.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [()] TJ ET BT 34.016 544.373 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(However skilfully Ashton constructs the background to and context of the crisis of interdependence, the fact )] TJ ET BT 34.016 530.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(remains that all roads in the book lead to the Bahamas in December 1962, not least because the nuclear )] TJ ET BT 34.016 515.861 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(relationship between America and Britain, the number one agenda item at Nassau, was such a ?litmus test? )] TJ ET BT 34.016 501.605 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(of interdependence.\(p. 152\) Ashton carefully plots American and British approaches to the nuclear issue, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 487.349 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(noting the Kennedy?s administration?s early espousal of flexible response as a successor to NATO?s )] TJ ET BT 34.016 473.093 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(massive retaliation doctrine, and the importance of calibrating with precision the process by which )] TJ ET BT 34.016 458.837 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(conventional war would give way to nuclear war in the face of Soviet aggression. This was no matter for )] TJ ET BT 34.016 444.581 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(collective consideration ? no decision to be shared, in Kennedy?s words, with ?a whole lot of differently )] TJ ET BT 34.016 430.325 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(motivated and differently responsible people in Europe'.\(quoted on p. 16\) Instead Washington sought the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 416.069 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(?Americanization? of decision-making within NATO, which hardly boded well for the British version of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 401.813 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(interdependence, predicated as it was on ideas of partnership.\(p. 156\) Equally unsettling for London was the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 387.557 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(US government?s view that independent nuclear deterrents like Britain?s had no place in the new strategic )] TJ ET BT 34.016 373.301 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(environment. Yet for the Macmillan government, maintaining Britain?s nuclear independence was ?the key )] TJ ET BT 34.016 359.045 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(test of interdependence in action?.\(p. 152\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 332.789 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(The test itself finally arrived in December 1962 when the Kennedy administration cancelled further research )] TJ ET BT 34.016 318.533 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(and development into the Skybolt missile and in so doing delivered a devastating blow to Macmillan and his )] TJ ET BT 34.016 304.277 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(government. 'The whole of our defence policy in the strategic nuclear field in the second half of the decade )] TJ ET BT 34.016 290.021 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(was founded upon availability of Skybolt', David Ormsby-Gore, the British ambassador to Washington, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 275.765 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(complained to Robert S. McNamara, the US secretary of defence, but to little avail.\(quoted on p. 167\) The )] TJ ET BT 34.016 261.509 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(cancellation of Skybolt, Ashton argues, was due to a combination of factors, among them the need to curtail )] TJ ET BT 34.016 247.253 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(a costly weapons programme that was beginning to exhibit technical shortcomings. For some US )] TJ ET BT 34.016 232.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(policymakers, it may also have been a stratagem for the elimination of the independent British deterrent and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 218.741 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(its relocation in a NATO seaborne MRBM force of Polaris submarines with mixed manning and multilateral )] TJ ET BT 34.016 204.485 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(ownership but \(crucially\) under ultimate American control ? the so-called Multilateral Force or MLF.\(pp. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 190.229 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(166-7\) The British, having recovered from the initial shock of the cancellation, turned up at Nassau in mid-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 175.973 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(December 1962 determined to play their own version of American hard-ball and to secure both the Polaris )] TJ ET BT 34.016 161.717 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(missile as a replacement for Skybolt and a US acceptance of the enduring independence of the British )] TJ ET BT 34.016 147.461 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(nuclear deterrent. On 20 December 1962, Macmillan got a large measure of what he wanted ? but only by )] TJ ET BT 34.016 133.205 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(threatening to walk out of the talks, and so expose the break-down in relations to the world, unless the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 118.949 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Americans dropped their insistence that the Polaris deal was conditional on British adherence to the MLF.\(p. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 104.693 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(182\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 78.437 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Through a process of diplomatic alchemy, the compromise reached at Nassau offered something to both )] TJ ET BT 34.016 64.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(British and American )] TJ ET BT 140.336 64.181 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(amour propre)] TJ ET BT 207.332 64.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(, with the UK Polaris force committed in principle to NATO, but with an )] TJ ET BT 34.016 49.925 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(opt-out provision allowing for independent deployment if supreme national interests were threatened. The )] TJ ET endstream endobj 29 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Contents 30 0 R >> endobj 30 0 obj << /Length 7755 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(question remains, however, as to which version of interdependence, the British or American, the Nassau deal )] TJ ET BT 34.016 782.213 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(vindicated. Ashton, in attempting an answer, reiterates that the ?whole concept of Anglo-American )] TJ ET BT 34.016 767.957 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(interdependence was ironic?. The US defence and research budget was ten times greater than Britain?s, yet )] TJ ET BT 34.016 753.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Macmillan looked for ?partnership and equality? in what always appeared a ?doomed? quest. True, at )] TJ ET BT 34.016 739.445 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Nassau the British independent deterrent was seemingly preserved. But to the Americans, interdependence )] TJ ET BT 34.016 725.189 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(still meant ?greater coordination in the Western defence effort and, effectively, the greater centralisation of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 710.933 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(control in Washington?, and in practice there would always be strict limits on the independence of Britain?s )] TJ ET BT 34.016 696.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(deterrent.\(p. 191\) The British had a ?blind spot?, Ashton suggests, in that they failed to see the reality of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 682.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(their reliance on the United States, but the Americans had their own ?blind spot? in that they never really )] TJ ET BT 34.016 668.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(appreciated how important the )] TJ ET BT 183.320 668.165 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(appearance)] TJ ET BT 239.972 668.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( of independence was to Macmillan and his government \(p. 191\) )] TJ ET BT 34.016 653.909 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(At Nassau, these blind spots gave way to a little clarity of vision; Macmillan got the appearance of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 639.653 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(independence, Kennedy got the reality of control. All in all, Ashton says, it was still ?one of the more )] TJ ET BT 34.016 625.397 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(remarkable examples of Anglo-American peacetime cooperation?.\(p. 191\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 599.141 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(The nuclear test ban treaty negotiations, Ashton?s final case study, do not at first sight appear to fit easily )] TJ ET BT 34.016 584.885 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(with the idea of a crisis of interdependence in the winter of 1962-63, since they came to a conclusion in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 570.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(August 1963, after the crisis had peaked. On closer inspection, however, the linkage becomes apparent. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 556.373 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Macmillan, taking advantage of Kennedy?s post-Cuban missile crisis willingness to look more positively on )] TJ ET BT 34.016 542.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(dtente, was instrumental in the spring of 1963 in reviving a stagnant diplomatic process and helping to push )] TJ ET BT 34.016 527.861 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(it through to a conclusion. British influence was wielded to good effect on the White House in particular, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 513.605 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(thanks to Kennedy?s appreciation of the value of the Anglo-American alliance \(notwithstanding the tensions )] TJ ET BT 34.016 499.349 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(at Nassau\). If the failure of Britain?s EEC application forced Macmillan to fall back on partnership with the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 485.093 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(US as the primary prop of his foreign policy, for the time being at least, so de Gaulle?s )] TJ ET BT 453.956 485.093 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(double non )] TJ ET BT 510.620 485.093 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 470.837 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Britain?s EEC candidacy and French involvement with the MLF, followed by the conclusion of a Franco-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 456.581 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(German Treaty of Friendship, caused the Kennedy administration to appreciate anew Britain?s virtues as an )] TJ ET BT 34.016 442.325 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(ally and to question the reliability of its other European partners. Having said this, Ashton regards Anglo-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 428.069 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(American relations in the context of the test ban issue \(like so many other important issues\) as ?ironical?. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 413.813 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(The part played by Macmillan in shaping the US approach to the negotiations was ?special but subordinate, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 399.557 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(significant and yet limited?, and in the final lap, the Moscow talks of the high summer of 1963, Britain was )] TJ ET BT 34.016 385.301 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(reduced to a ?watching brief? as the two superpowers made the running themselves.\(pp. 210-18\) )] TJ ET BT 34.016 371.045 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Nevertheless the Limited Test Ban Treaty still represented ?one of the few tangible dividends from )] TJ ET BT 34.016 356.789 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Macmillan?s pursuit of Anglo-American interdependence?.\(p. 219\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 330.533 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(At the start of his study, Ashton notes the contrast that other scholars have drawn between Anglo-American )] TJ ET BT 34.016 316.277 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(global cooperation and local conflict. It would be fair to say that this book itself largely, though not entirely, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 302.021 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(underscores this view of the ?special relationship?. If in Europe, Cuba, the Congo, the Middle East, and in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 287.765 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(defence and nuclear weapons systems there was a crisis of interdependence in 1962-63 ? itself the product of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 273.509 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(misunderstandings and misperceptions on both sides as to what the term meant ? the ?picture of Anglo-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 259.253 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(American relations in general turmoil still needs to be qualified?.\(p. 225\) At the same time, Ashton makes )] TJ ET BT 34.016 244.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(clear in this elegantly written, deeply researched, thoughtful and insightful study, that there was much more )] TJ ET BT 34.016 230.741 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(to the Anglo-American crisis of interdependence than a narrow focus on Skybolt and Nassau would suggest. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 216.485 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(But what of the Anglo-American relationship in general? Here Ashton concludes that neither its ?glib )] TJ ET BT 34.016 202.229 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(dismissal? as a myth, nor its rosy presentation as ?special?, will do. It was simply ?too subtle and complex )] TJ ET BT 34.016 187.973 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(for either of these characterisations to prove useful as analytical tools?.\(p. 222\) And in his own subtle and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 173.717 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(complex study, Ashton proves this point.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 147.461 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(The obvious link between Ashton?s book and Erin Mahan?s )] TJ ET BT 326.312 147.461 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(Kennedy, de Gaulle and Western Europe)] TJ ET BT 522.944 147.461 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(, apart )] TJ ET BT 34.016 133.205 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(from the chronological overlap, is the emphasis given to President John F. Kennedy. In trying to identify )] TJ ET BT 34.016 118.949 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Kennedy?s convictions and the degree to which they shaped US foreign policy, Ashton ran up against ?a )] TJ ET BT 34.016 104.693 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(remarkably elusive individual? and eventually concluded that ?neither the hero-worship of his acolytes, nor )] TJ ET BT 34.016 90.437 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the muckraking of his denigrators, do full justice to this complex, detached, inspirational and cynical )] TJ ET BT 34.016 76.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(individual?.\(p. 12\) Erin Mahan, who works in the Office of the State Department Historian in America, and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 61.925 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(whose doctoral research this book represents, is no muckraker or reflex/populist denigrator, but she is highly )] TJ ET endstream endobj 31 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Contents 32 0 R >> endobj 32 0 obj << /Length 7708 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(critical of what she sees as the Kennedy administration?s often inchoate policies for Western Europe. Talk of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 782.213 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(a US Grand Design for Europe, she suggests, whether at the time or in subsequent historical studies, is rather )] TJ ET BT 34.016 767.957 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(wide of the mark ? at best the term provides a convenient catch-all for a series of inconsistent and erratically )] TJ ET BT 34.016 753.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(pursued policies. The problem began at the top in Washington, where Kennedy?s vision for Western Europe )] TJ ET BT 34.016 739.445 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(?lacked clarity?. If US policies were unsatisfactory, it was because they often reflected the President?s )] TJ ET BT 34.016 725.189 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(?indecisiveness?, his ?tendency to improvise?, his ?blurred ideas? about European security and integration, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 710.933 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(his ?economic simplicity?, and \(more charitably\) his ?overriding Cold War fears?.\(pp. 167-68\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 684.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(If Kennedy?s performance leaves Mahan underwhelmed, there is no disguising her admiration for de Gaulle )] TJ ET BT 34.016 670.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(who, by 1963, and as a consequence of his )] TJ ET BT 241.640 670.421 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(double non)] TJ ET BT 295.304 670.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( was temporarily ?the master of the European )] TJ ET BT 34.016 656.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(agenda?.\(p. 142\) Rejecting the idea that de Gaulle?s policies were driven by ?irrational impulses or )] TJ ET BT 34.016 641.909 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(megalomania?, Mahan sees them perfectly suited to furthering French economic, geo-political and geo-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 627.653 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(strategic interests. A practitioner of )] TJ ET BT 206.648 627.653 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(realpolitik)] TJ ET BT 256.652 627.653 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( who never gave way to ?sentimentalism?, de Gaulle?s ?une )] TJ ET BT 34.016 613.397 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(certaine ide de la France? led to a consistent approach to continental developments which Mahan contrasts )] TJ ET BT 34.016 599.141 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(unfavourably with the Kennedy administration?s uncertain ideas about America in the context of Western )] TJ ET BT 34.016 584.885 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Europe.\(pp. 167-8\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 558.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(The Kennedy administration?s agenda included )] TJ ET BT 265.640 558.629 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(inter alia)] TJ ET BT 309.980 558.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(: the revision of NATO strategy to accommodate )] TJ ET BT 34.016 544.373 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the new doctrine of flexible response; the pursuit of ?double containment? of Soviet and German power; the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 530.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(elimination of independent nuclear deterrents, both existing \(Britain\) and nascent \(France\), or failing this )] TJ ET BT 34.016 515.861 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(their re-housing within the MLF; the easing of the United States? chronic balance of payments difficulties by )] TJ ET BT 34.016 501.605 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(encouraging its allies to shoulder a greater share of the financial burden of defence; and European dtente if )] TJ ET BT 34.016 487.349 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(or when politico-military conditions seemed propitious. The essence of the Grand Design, in theory at least, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 473.093 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(was US and West European policies ?acting in tandem?.\(p. 17\) The problem was that nobody in Washington )] TJ ET BT 34.016 458.837 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(adequately explained this to the French president. In consequence, on each of these five issues, with ?less )] TJ ET BT 34.016 444.581 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(power, but more skill, de Gaulle battled Kennedy to a standstill?.\(p. 168\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 418.325 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(De Gaulle had help, however, from West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Mahan shows how at )] TJ ET BT 34.016 404.069 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(various times de Gaulle cynically manipulated Adenauer in furtherance of his own over-arching foreign )] TJ ET BT 34.016 389.813 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(policy goals ? French leadership of Europe and, from this power base, the assertion of French independence )] TJ ET BT 34.016 375.557 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(in foreign affairs and the destruction of the dual hegemony of the United States and the Soviet Union. De )] TJ ET BT 34.016 361.301 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Gaulle?s cynicism derives from the duality of his diplomacy: while promoting Franco-German amity, he )] TJ ET BT 34.016 347.045 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(was simultaneously dedicated to the containment of unchecked German power and was in fact just as )] TJ ET BT 34.016 332.789 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(committed as the United States to the principle of ?double containment? of Germany and the Soviet Union. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 318.533 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Then again, as Mahan points out, Adenauer was himself a shrewd political operator and was well aware that )] TJ ET BT 34.016 304.277 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(de Gaulle?s courtship rituals were largely self-serving. But Adenauer had his own European agenda to assert )] TJ ET BT 34.016 290.021 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(West German sovereignty by seeking access to, if not control over, nuclear weapons, a goal that could be )] TJ ET BT 34.016 275.765 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(advanced through cooperation with France. Moreover, a united Franco-German front could be used to block )] TJ ET BT 34.016 261.509 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(what Adenauer regarded as worrying American initiatives.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 235.253 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(One such initiative was the US plan to make flexible response NATO?s strategy of choice. To Adenauer?s )] TJ ET BT 34.016 220.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(way of thinking, the idea that Soviet aggression should be met in the first instance by a conventional military )] TJ ET BT 34.016 206.741 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(response and that the decision to "go nuclear" should be taken in the light of subsequent developments, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 192.485 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(would invite rather than deter a Soviet move against West Berlin. De Gaulle was happy to fan these )] TJ ET BT 34.016 178.229 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(concerns, arguing that West Germany would be over-run by the Red Army in the opening phase of war as )] TJ ET BT 34.016 163.973 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(policymakers in Washington held back from using nuclear weapons. Adenauer?s unhappiness with the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 149.717 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [('timidity' \(quoted on p. 61\) of US policy during the 1961 Berlin crisis made him even more receptive to de )] TJ ET BT 34.016 135.461 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Gaulle?s view that Washington now considered West Berlin ? and maybe West Germany itself ? to be )] TJ ET BT 34.016 121.205 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(expendable. At the same time, the French leader?s total opposition to compromise over Western rights in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 106.949 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Berlin won him Adenauer?s deep gratitude. De Gaulle, though, had his own reasons for objecting to flexible )] TJ ET BT 34.016 92.693 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(response: first, its emphasis on conventional force ran counter to his belief that only nuclear weapons )] TJ ET BT 34.016 78.437 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(provided a credible deterrent; second, its acceptance would endanger his own plans for a French nuclear )] TJ ET BT 34.016 64.181 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(force de frappe)] TJ ET BT 107.336 64.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(; and third, as the discussion of Ashton?s work has shown, it carried with it the likelihood of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 49.925 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the ?Americanization? of decision-making in NATO, a development that was anathema to the French leader. )] TJ ET endstream endobj 33 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Contents 34 0 R >> endobj 34 0 obj << /Length 7575 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(This last consideration, together with his unhappiness at US unilateralism during both the Berlin and Cuban )] TJ ET BT 34.016 782.213 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(crises in 1961-62, encouraged de Gaulle to plan for the day when French forces in Europe were freed from )] TJ ET BT 34.016 767.957 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the control of NATO. For Adenauer, the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis showed the effectiveness of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 753.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(nuclear deterrence and he was dismayed that the Kennedy administration did not apply the same logic to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 739.445 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Europe. On the other hand, the Chancellor increasingly took heart in the thought that a French )] TJ ET BT 488.612 739.445 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(force de )] TJ ET BT 34.016 725.189 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(frappe)] TJ ET BT 65.348 725.189 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( would be employed appropriately in defence of West Berlin and the Federal Republic.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 698.933 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(A convergence of interests, not least in resisting US plans for revising NATO strategy, thus brought Paris )] TJ ET BT 34.016 684.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(and Bonn together, the closeness in relations formalised in January 1963 with the signature of the Franco-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 670.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(German Treaty of Friendship. This new power configuration did more than thwart US proposals on flexible )] TJ ET BT 34.016 656.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(response, however; it also called into question two other key elements in the Kennedy administration?s )] TJ ET BT 34.016 641.909 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Grand Design, namely double containment and nuclear sharing in the MLF. In Washington, US )] TJ ET BT 34.016 627.653 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(policymakers looked on the Franco-German treaty as a Faustian bargain and strongly suspected that de )] TJ ET BT 34.016 613.397 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Gaulle would trade German financial and technological backing for his nuclear programme for a say for the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 599.141 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Bonn government in how the finished weapons system should be deployed. The whole theory of ?double )] TJ ET BT 34.016 584.885 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(containment?, however, hinged on curbing not enhancing West German power, especially in the nuclear )] TJ ET BT 34.016 570.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(domain. As for Washington?s position on nuclear sharing, this was on one level entirely negative ? non-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 556.373 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(proliferation was the ideal. On another level, if this ideal was not attainable, then the MLF was the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 542.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(appropriate home for existing deterrents like Britain?s, and a means of satisfying the nuclear ambitions of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 527.861 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(other powers like West Germany, whilst preserving effective US control of NATO nuclear strategy. But in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 513.605 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(January 1963, de Gaulle, by way of a prelude to the signature of the Franco-German treaty, rejected French )] TJ ET BT 34.016 499.349 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(involvement in what he called the 'nuclear farce' \(quoted on p. 77\) of the MLF.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 473.093 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(In Washington, even before the Paris-Bonn axis was formalised, US policymakers had attempted to deal )] TJ ET BT 34.016 458.837 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(with the greater evil of Franco-German nuclear collaboration \(and with it the spectre of German access to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 444.581 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(nuclear weapons\), by accepting the lesser evil of supplying France with the know-how to complete its )] TJ ET BT 34.016 430.325 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(nuclear programme. On each occasion that nuclear aid was raised with Paris, however, the accompanying )] TJ ET BT 34.016 416.069 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(US insistence that the French deterrent, when operational, should be given over to the MLF, ran into the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 401.813 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(brick wall that was de Gaulle?s insistence on total French control. The inconsistency of the American )] TJ ET BT 34.016 387.557 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(position was glaring. Either Washington was for non-proliferation or it was against it; the Kennedy )] TJ ET BT 34.016 373.301 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(administration was either for the MLF as a fallback or it was against it. In theory, there was no half-way )] TJ ET BT 34.016 359.045 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(house, but in practice this is precisely where the Americans chose to reside because an overweening fear of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 344.789 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(future German militarism, buttressed by a nuclear capability courtesy of a myopic and/or self-serving )] TJ ET BT 34.016 330.533 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(France, was the determining factor in their policy. But what American officials misunderstood, Mahan )] TJ ET BT 34.016 316.277 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(argues, was de Gaulle?s opposition to helping Germany achieve nuclear capability. The General?s threats of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 302.021 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Franco-German collaboration were a means to an end, not an end in themselves ? they were designed to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 287.765 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(secure US \(and British\) backing for France?s nuclear programme. The independence de Gaulle so cherished )] TJ ET BT 34.016 273.509 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(?lay in national control? of the end product, ?not how a )] TJ ET BT 302.636 273.509 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(force de frappe)] TJ ET BT 375.956 273.509 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( was obtained?.\(p. 71\) The spectacle )] TJ ET BT 34.016 259.253 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(of Washington offering nuclear assistance to Paris in 1963 in order to secure France?s signature on the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 244.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, rather than being a one-off inconsistency, is symptomatic of the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 230.741 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(contortions of US policy on nuclear sharing. For the record, de Gaulle again spurned this MLF-baited )] TJ ET BT 34.016 216.485 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(offer.\(pp. 157-8\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 190.229 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(A particular strength of Mahan?s book is the attention she pays to the economic dimension of US policies in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 175.973 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Western Europe and to the way that de Gaulle succeeded in countering US economic initiatives, at the same )] TJ ET BT 34.016 161.717 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(time as he worked to frustrate US security goals. In the early 1960s, the United States might lay claim to the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 147.461 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(title of superpower, but Mahan?s Kennedy worried constantly, lest American economic fragility undermine )] TJ ET BT 34.016 133.205 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(his foreign and national security policies. Having promised to ?get the country moving again? during his )] TJ ET BT 34.016 118.949 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(successful presidential campaign in 1960, Kennedy in office was confronted with a ?lingering recession with )] TJ ET BT 34.016 104.693 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(few economic tools to combat it?.\(p. 89\) This lack of confidence in US economic well-being helps account )] TJ ET BT 34.016 90.437 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(for the Kennedy administration?s early doubts about British membership of the EEC, which policymakers )] TJ ET BT 34.016 76.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(feared might lead to the raising of barriers to US trade with Western Europe. In the event, Washington felt )] TJ ET BT 34.016 61.925 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(compelled to accept the potential economic disadvantages of British membership, in return for the greater )] TJ ET endstream endobj 35 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Contents 36 0 R >> endobj 36 0 obj << /Length 7398 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(political unity of Western Europe in the face of the Soviet threat.\(p. 165\) But Mahan also suggests that )] TJ ET BT 34.016 782.213 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Macmillan?s April 1961 assurances that British entry would in itself help in ?orienting the Common Market )] TJ ET BT 34.016 767.957 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(in a liberal direction? clearly eased the readjustment.\(p. 96\) Moreover, in anticipation of a new start for US-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 753.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(EEC commercial relations, the administration put a Trade Expansion Bill before Congress which not only )] TJ ET BT 34.016 739.445 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(?promised a means of creating an equal playing field with an expanded Common Market?, but also reflected )] TJ ET BT 34.016 725.189 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the long-standing American commitment to ?a multilateral system of open trade and the promise of Western )] TJ ET BT 34.016 710.933 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(cooperation or Atlantic community?.\(p. 103\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 684.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Accordingly, when de Gaulle delivered his veto on Britain?s EEC application in January 1963 he also )] TJ ET BT 34.016 670.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(successfully negated the Kennedy administration?s immediate hopes for US-EEC trade expansion. For de )] TJ ET BT 34.016 656.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Gaulle, British entry was not only a political threat to French leadership of Europe, but an economic threat, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 641.909 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(not least in that a UK-inspired liberalisation of extra-EEC trade relations would undermine the protectionist )] TJ ET BT 34.016 627.653 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(economic policies, especially the Common Agricultural Policy, that would serve France \(if not all its EEC )] TJ ET BT 34.016 613.397 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(partners and the Anglo-Americans\) so well.\(pp. 104-05\) Nor did de Gaulle feel overly inclined to assist in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 599.141 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(relieving the US balance of payments problem. This was Kennedy?s most persistent economic concern and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 584.885 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the cause of anxiety, lest it place limits on US defence spending and the effectiveness of American Cold War )] TJ ET BT 34.016 570.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(policies, particularly in the Third World, where the president was determined to counter the attractions of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 556.373 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(communism by massive aid packages to raise living standards. In this last regard, Washington tried to recruit )] TJ ET BT 34.016 542.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(its European allies for a concerted, coordinated approach to Third World aid, but France, for one, would )] TJ ET BT 34.016 527.861 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(have none of it. De Gaulle?s objections were based partly on a desire to keep US influence out of France?s )] TJ ET BT 34.016 513.605 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(residual imperial holdings, and partly because French money in effect would be used to buttress US policy in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 499.349 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the Third World without a compensating French voice in how that policy should be shaped.\(p. 34\) But other )] TJ ET BT 34.016 485.093 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(European powers, including West Germany, expressed a preference for trade not aid, much to Washington?s )] TJ ET BT 34.016 470.837 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(frustration. In the related matter of burden sharing in Europe, the United States succeeded in persuading the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 456.581 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(West Germans to place large orders for military equipment with American arms manufacturers as a way of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 442.325 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(offsetting the US financial outlay in NATO.\(p. 35\) But de Gaulle, who viewed Kennedy?s fixation with )] TJ ET BT 34.016 428.069 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(balance of payments difficulties as a rationalisation for turning West Germany into a US satellite, refused to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 413.813 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(enter into similar offset arrangements.\(p. 35\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 387.557 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(By 1963, Kennedy had become angered and exasperated by French economic policy. A number of the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 373.301 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(president?s advisers have testified to his ?twin fears? of nuclear conflagration and American ?loss of gold? )] TJ ET BT 34.016 359.045 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(\(p. 119\), and in the latter connection Kennedy came to suspect the French of planning, either alone or with )] TJ ET BT 34.016 344.789 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(West Germany, to convert their surplus dollars into gold in order to force ? that is to say blackmail ? the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 330.533 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(United States into altering its NATO policies, possibly in regard to flexible response and the MLF. The )] TJ ET BT 34.016 316.277 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Kennedy administration considered threatening to withdraw US troops from Europe, both to ease the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 302.021 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(pressure on the defence budget and to teach the European NATO allies a lesson, but any thoughts of this )] TJ ET BT 34.016 287.765 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(kind were invariably ?trumped? by the national security imperative of containing the Soviet Union.\(p. 121\) )] TJ ET BT 34.016 273.509 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Yet the fact that US officials in 1962-63 regularly, if privately, talked of troop redeployment as a means of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 259.253 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(retaliation against the perfidy of its NATO partners testifies not to a Grand Design in full sail but to a )] TJ ET BT 34.016 244.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(singularly strained US-West European relationship.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 218.741 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [()] TJ ET BT 34.016 192.485 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Even on a subject that might be expected to unite all parties in the Atlantic alliance ? peace ? the French and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 178.229 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Americans were at cross-purposes. And, once more, it was Paris that prevailed. Following the Cuban missile )] TJ ET BT 34.016 163.973 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(crisis, the Kennedy administration, encouraged by London, gave increasing consideration to dtente in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 149.717 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Europe. Adenauer, however, feared that the Anglo-Americans would sacrifice West German interests in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 135.461 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(pursuit of a security agreement with the USSR and consequently opposed any concessions in the name of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 121.205 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(dtente, particularly the formal recognition of the German Democratic Republic and acceptance of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 106.949 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Germany?s post-war borders. De Gaulle fully supported Adenauer ? doubtless recognising that his influence )] TJ ET BT 34.016 92.693 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(on and over the West German Chancellor depended on his rejection of any East-West compact. The French )] TJ ET BT 34.016 78.437 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(and West German leaders came to a ?tacit understanding?, Mahan observes, whereby Bonn would oppose a )] TJ ET BT 34.016 64.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(nuclear test ban treaty, which de Gaulle saw as an impediment to a French )] TJ ET BT 393.608 64.181 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(force de frappe)] TJ ET BT 466.928 64.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(, and Paris would )] TJ ET BT 34.016 49.925 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(block Anglo-American plans for a non-aggression pact in Europe which could be used by Moscow in the )] TJ ET endstream endobj 37 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Annots [ 40 0 R ] /Contents 38 0 R >> endobj 38 0 obj << /Length 7808 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(future to force Western troops from West Berlin.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 770.213 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(In conclusion, it is evident that Mahan?s claim that de Gaulle ?battled Kennedy to a standstill? in Western )] TJ ET BT 34.016 755.957 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Europe is a far from glib one. Rather, it is a judgement drawn from a detailed exploration of the key events )] TJ ET BT 34.016 741.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(and from research based not just on the vast corpus of US primary sources but also in French, German and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 727.445 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(British archives. Mahan writes in a lean, utilitarian style, without the literary flourishes that characterise )] TJ ET BT 34.016 713.189 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Ashton?s narrative, but it is well suited to the technical arguments ? especially those relating to economic, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 698.933 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(commercial and monetary issues ? that she addresses with such impressively careful logic. Ashton might )] TJ ET BT 34.016 684.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(well argue that Mahan does not give enough prominence to the role and influence of the British in setting the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 670.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(West European agenda. There was, he argues, ?hardly any significant international issue? in the Kennedy )] TJ ET BT 34.016 656.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(years ?that did not have some form of Anglo-American dimension to it?.\(p. 222\) Hence, by extension, any )] TJ ET BT 34.016 641.909 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(study of Franco-American relations is incomplete without full acknowledgement of the British angle. Then )] TJ ET BT 34.016 627.653 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(again, Mahan could well counter that de Gaulle is something of a 'rude mechanical' in Ashton?s book ? a )] TJ ET BT 34.016 613.397 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(means of advancing the plot rather than an integral element in the story itself ? and that any treatment of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 599.141 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Anglo-American relations, whether in Europe, the Middle East, Africa or South-East Asia, is itself )] TJ ET BT 34.016 584.885 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(incomplete unless it acknowledges the omnipresence of de Gaulle and his capacity for obstructing Anglo-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 570.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(American policies while advancing those of France.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 544.373 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(To ask Ashton to deal in detail with the French and Mahan to devote more time to the British would, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 530.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(however, be quite unfair. Historians, particularly in Britain, are hard-pressed enough as it is thanks to the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 515.861 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(demands of the RAE without having to worry about covering all national archival bases in producing )] TJ ET BT 34.016 501.605 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(monographs on international history ? even supposing that time, money and language skills were present. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 487.349 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Instead, both of the books under review can be read with great profit by anyone interested in Anglo-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 473.093 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(American and Franco-American relations in the early 1960s since they complement each other very well, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 458.837 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(especially in terms of Western Europe, the Berlin crisis, EEC developments and dtente, with Mahan )] TJ ET BT 34.016 444.581 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(providing a politico-economic counterpoise to Ashton?s politico-diplomatic approach. In terms of recent )] TJ ET BT 34.016 430.325 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(historiographical developments, Constantine Pagedas?s )] TJ ET BT 303.656 430.325 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the French )] TJ ET BT 34.016 416.069 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(Problem, 1960-1963. A Troubled Partnership)] TJ ET BT 254.012 416.069 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( \(London: Frank Cass, 2000\) provides a bridge between )] TJ ET BT 34.016 401.813 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Ashton and Mahan, though his treatment of the French dimension is constrained by limited use of available )] TJ ET BT 34.016 387.557 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(primary sources, while Jeffrey Glen Giauque?s )] TJ ET BT 262.952 387.557 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: the Atlantic Powers )] TJ ET BT 34.016 373.301 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(and the Reorganization of Europe, 1955-1963)] TJ ET BT 255.344 373.301 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( \(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002\))] TJ ET BT 528.656 373.301 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(offers )] TJ ET BT 34.016 359.045 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(a relevant and useful comparative treatment of US, British, French and German policies and relations.)] TJ ET BT 526.592 359.045 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(A )] TJ ET BT 34.016 344.789 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(number of the essays in the collection edited by Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths \()] TJ ET BT 476.624 344.789 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(John F. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 330.533 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(Kennedy and Europe)] TJ ET BT 135.332 330.533 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( \(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999\)\) stress the genuine predicament )] TJ ET BT 34.016 316.277 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Kennedy and his officials faced in formulating a coherent and appropriate set of policies for Western Europe )] TJ ET BT 34.016 302.021 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(and, in so doing, offer a contrast to Mahan, who is a little lacking in empathy in this regard. Moreover, while )] TJ ET BT 34.016 287.765 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Mahan handles de Gaulle?s spoiling diplomacy very well, there is occasionally too much stress on the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 273.509 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(negative without compensating attention to the positive side of his policies, particularly his vision of a )] TJ ET BT 34.016 259.253 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(genuinely independent Europe and the destruction of the US-Soviet hegemony. These matters provide a )] TJ ET BT 34.016 244.997 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(leitmotif )] TJ ET BT 77.024 244.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(to her study but were perhaps deserving of more extended treatment in and of themselves.)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 508.604 244.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(\(4\))] TJ ET 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 508.604 243.603 m 522.596 243.603 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 34.016 218.741 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(But this is a minor quibble, and in general Mahan succeeds in showing how problems like Berlin, European )] TJ ET BT 34.016 204.485 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(integration and international finance were all linked in the minds of US and French leaders and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 190.229 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(policymakers, and that the ?relationships among the issues accentuated Franco-American differences and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 175.973 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(foreclosed cooperation?.\(p. 10\) No one issue can be understood in isolation, she asserts, just as Ashton )] TJ ET BT 34.016 161.717 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(argues that the 1962-63 crisis of interdependence was made up of a series of interlocking crises. For Mahan, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 147.461 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(monetary problems became enmeshed with NATO strategy, the British application to join the Common )] TJ ET BT 34.016 133.205 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Market was entangled with the debate over nuclear sharing in the Atlantic alliance, and the Berlin crisis ? an )] TJ ET BT 34.016 118.949 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(on-going phenomenon rather than an event peculiar to 1961 ? provided a permanent backdrop. If anybody )] TJ ET BT 34.016 104.693 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(supposes that the Franco-American arguments in NATO earlier this year concerning the rectitude of war on )] TJ ET BT 34.016 90.437 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Iraq came out of a clear blue historical sky, Mahan?s book serves as a reminder that NATO really wouldn?t )] TJ ET BT 34.016 76.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(be NATO if it was not periodically convulsed by bitter Franco-American disputes.)] TJ ET endstream endobj 39 0 obj [37 0 R /Fit] endobj 40 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 41 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 508.6037 243.9175 522.5957 255.7975 ] >> endobj 41 0 obj << /Type /Action >> endobj 42 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Annots [ 44 0 R 46 0 R 48 0 R 50 0 R 52 0 R 54 0 R ] /Contents 43 0 R >> endobj 43 0 obj << /Length 3244 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 775.827 Td /F3 18.0 Tf [(Notes)] TJ ET BT 48.816 745.210 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(1.)] TJ ET BT 64.016 745.205 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Harold Macmillan, )] TJ ET BT 158.336 745.205 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(Riding the Storm, 1956-1959)] TJ ET BT 297.668 745.205 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( \(London: Macmillan, 1971\), Appendix III, pp. 756-9.)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 64.016 730.949 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Back to \(1\))] TJ ET 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 64.016 729.555 m 118.004 729.555 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 48.816 716.698 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(2.)] TJ ET BT 64.016 716.693 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(James Ellison, )] TJ ET BT 136.352 716.693 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of the European Community, 1955-58)] TJ ET BT 64.016 702.437 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(\(London: Macmillan, 2000\), p.167.)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 233.672 702.437 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Back to \(2\))] TJ ET 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 233.672 701.043 m 287.660 701.043 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 48.816 688.186 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(3.)] TJ ET BT 64.016 688.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Ellison, )] TJ ET BT 104.024 688.181 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(ibid)] TJ ET BT 122.696 688.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(.)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 125.696 688.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Back to \(3\))] TJ ET 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 125.696 686.787 m 179.684 686.787 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 48.816 673.930 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(4.)] TJ ET BT 64.016 673.925 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(See in this connection Frdric Bozo, )] TJ ET BT 246.992 673.925 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States and the )] TJ ET BT 64.016 659.669 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(Atlantic Alliance)] TJ ET BT 145.016 659.669 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(, transl. Susan Emanuel \(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000\).)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 487.652 659.669 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Back to \(4\))] TJ ET 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 487.652 658.275 m 541.640 658.275 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 34.016 633.413 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Nigel Ashton is pleased to accept Dr Ruane's review and does not wish to comment further.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 607.157 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Erin Mahan is pleased to accept Dr Ruane's review and does not wish to comment further.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 580.901 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Other reviews:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 566.645 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(H-Net Reviews)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 34.016 552.389 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php)] TJ ET 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 34.016 550.995 m 240.992 550.995 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 243.992 552.389 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [([3])] TJ ET 0.502 0.502 0.502 RG 0.75 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 34.391 547.663 526.499 1.500 re S BT 34.016 529.883 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Source URL:)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 104.672 529.883 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/341)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 104.672 528.489 m 322.316 528.489 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 34.016 503.512 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Links:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 489.112 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [([1] http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/item/1616)] TJ ET BT 34.016 474.712 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [([2] http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/item/1618)] TJ ET BT 34.016 460.312 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [([3] http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=7403)] TJ ET endstream endobj 44 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 45 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 64.0157 729.8695 118.0037 741.7495 ] >> endobj 45 0 obj << /Type /Action /S /GoTo /D 14 0 R >> endobj 46 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 47 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 233.6717 701.3575 287.6597 713.2375 ] >> endobj 47 0 obj << /Type /Action /S /GoTo /D 19 0 R >> endobj 48 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 49 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 125.6957 687.1015 179.6837 698.9815 ] >> endobj 49 0 obj << /Type /Action /S /GoTo /D 22 0 R >> endobj 50 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 51 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 487.6517 658.5895 541.6397 670.4695 ] >> endobj 51 0 obj << /Type /Action /S /GoTo /D 39 0 R >> endobj 52 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 53 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 34.0157 551.3095 240.9917 563.1895 ] >> endobj 53 0 obj << /Type /Action /S /URI /URI (http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=7403) >> endobj 54 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 55 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 104.6717 528.8035 322.3157 540.6835 ] >> endobj 55 0 obj << /Type /Action /S /URI /URI (http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/341) >> endobj xref 0 56 0000000000 65535 f 0000000008 00000 n 0000000073 00000 n 0000000119 00000 n 0000000385 00000 n 0000000422 00000 n 0000000578 00000 n 0000000667 00000 n 0000004277 00000 n 0000004386 00000 n 0000004496 00000 n 0000004605 00000 n 0000008166 00000 n 0000008294 00000 n 0000008378 00000 n 0000008407 00000 n 0000008535 00000 n 0000008571 00000 n 0000008662 00000 n 0000016697 00000 n 0000016727 00000 n 0000016855 00000 n 0000016891 00000 n 0000016921 00000 n 0000017049 00000 n 0000017085 00000 n 0000017150 00000 n 0000024898 00000 n 0000024963 00000 n 0000032332 00000 n 0000032397 00000 n 0000040205 00000 n 0000040270 00000 n 0000048031 00000 n 0000048096 00000 n 0000055724 00000 n 0000055789 00000 n 0000063240 00000 n 0000063324 00000 n 0000071185 00000 n 0000071215 00000 n 0000071343 00000 n 0000071379 00000 n 0000071498 00000 n 0000074795 00000 n 0000074922 00000 n 0000074977 00000 n 0000075105 00000 n 0000075160 00000 n 0000075288 00000 n 0000075343 00000 n 0000075471 00000 n 0000075526 00000 n 0000075653 00000 n 0000075753 00000 n 0000075881 00000 n trailer << /Size 56 /Root 1 0 R /Info 5 0 R >> startxref 75976 %%EOF