%PDF-1.3 1 0 obj << /Type /Catalog /Outlines 2 0 R /Pages 3 0 R >> endobj 2 0 obj << /Type /Outlines /Count 0 >> endobj 3 0 obj << /Type /Pages /Kids [6 0 R 14 0 R 16 0 R 18 0 R 24 0 R ] /Count 5 /Resources << /ProcSet 4 0 R /Font << /F1 8 0 R /F2 9 0 R /F3 10 0 R >> /XObject << /I1 11 0 R >> >> /MediaBox [0.000 0.000 595.280 841.890] >> endobj 4 0 obj [/PDF /Text /ImageC ] endobj 5 0 obj << /Creator (DOMPDF) /CreationDate (D:20140818134132+01'00') /ModDate (D:20140818134132+01'00') /Title (The Cold War's Odd Couple: The Unintended Partnership beween the Republic of China and the UK, 1950?58) >> endobj 6 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Annots [ 12 0 R ] /Contents 7 0 R >> endobj 7 0 obj << /Length 4868 >> stream q 381.750 0 0 120.000 34.016 687.874 cm /I1 Do Q 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 34.016 676.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Published on )] TJ ET BT 99.356 676.469 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(Reviews in History)] TJ ET BT 190.016 676.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( \()] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 197.012 676.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 197.012 675.075 m 357.332 675.075 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 357.332 676.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(\))] TJ ET 0.502 0.502 0.502 RG 0.75 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 34.391 653.743 526.499 1.500 re S BT 34.016 615.321 Td /F3 18.0 Tf [(The Cold War's Odd Couple: The Unintended Partnership beween )] TJ ET BT 34.016 593.937 Td /F3 18.0 Tf [(the Republic of China and the UK, 1950?58)] TJ ET BT 34.016 351.731 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Historians of the Asian Cold War have often focused on the interactions between the United States and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 337.475 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Communist China, treating the United Kingdom \(UK\) and the Republic of China \(ROC\) as secondary )] TJ ET BT 34.016 323.219 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(players eager to manipulate and restrain their respective friends and foes. In )] TJ ET BT 400.916 323.219 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(The Cold War's Odd Couple)] TJ ET BT 537.488 323.219 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 308.963 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Steve Tsang has re-examined the history of the Sino-American Cold War by highlighting the crucial roles )] TJ ET BT 34.016 294.707 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(played by the UK and the ROC in the 1950s. By making use of the Chiang Kai-shek papers at the Academia )] TJ ET BT 34.016 280.451 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Historica and selected documents in the archives of the ROC Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 266.195 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(together with a wide range of British and American archival sources, Tsang has provided a comprehensive )] TJ ET BT 34.016 251.939 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(study of UK-ROC relations in the wider context of Sino-American confrontation.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 225.683 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(The main thesis of )] TJ ET BT 126.008 225.683 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(The Cold War's Odd Couple)] TJ ET BT 262.580 225.683 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( is that a 'de facto strategic partnership' between the UK and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 211.427 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the ROC emerged in the course of the second Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958 as a result of 'their shared hostility )] TJ ET BT 34.016 197.171 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(to communist expansionism' \(p. 196\). Tsang suggests three important reasons why Britain and Taiwan ended )] TJ ET BT 34.016 182.915 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(up as 'unwitting partners', despite the continuation of their basic differences, not least over the future of the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 168.659 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Nationalist-controlled offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The first was the failure of Britain's )] TJ ET BT 34.016 154.403 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(constructive engagement approach towards the Chinese communists notwithstanding its recognition of the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 140.147 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(People's Republic in 1950. By 1958, Beijing's repeated refusals to reciprocate London's enticements had )] TJ ET BT 34.016 125.891 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [('made the idea of supporting the ROC unobjectionable to the UK' \(p. xviii\). Second, the successful reforms )] TJ ET BT 34.016 111.635 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(introduced by the Kuomintang in the 1950s had 'fundamentally changed the political, economic, social and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 97.379 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(military situation in the ROC' \(p. xvi\), changes which were closely watched by British consular officials on )] TJ ET BT 34.016 83.123 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the spot. Through their 'unbiased and perceptive' reports which gradually 'eroded the long-held negative )] TJ ET BT 34.016 68.867 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(impression that the British had harboured of Chiang's regime', these officials 'made an important )] TJ ET BT 34.016 54.611 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(contribution towards improving relations' between London and Taipei \(p. 189\). The last reason, Tsang )] TJ ET BT 34.016 563.315 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Review Number:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 549.059 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(514)] TJ ET BT 34.016 534.803 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Publish date:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 520.547 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Saturday, 1 April, 2006)] TJ ET BT 34.016 506.291 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Author:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 492.035 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Steve Tsang)] TJ ET BT 34.016 477.779 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Date of Publication:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 463.523 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(2006)] TJ ET BT 34.016 449.267 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Publisher:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 435.011 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(I. B. Tauris)] TJ ET BT 34.016 420.755 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Place of Publication:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 406.499 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(New York, NY)] TJ ET BT 34.016 392.243 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Reviewer:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 377.987 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Chi-kwan Mark)] TJ ET endstream endobj 8 0 obj << /Type /Font /Subtype /Type1 /Name /F1 /BaseFont /Times-Roman /Encoding /WinAnsiEncoding >> endobj 9 0 obj << /Type /Font /Subtype /Type1 /Name /F2 /BaseFont /Times-Italic /Encoding /WinAnsiEncoding >> endobj 10 0 obj << /Type /Font /Subtype /Type1 /Name /F3 /BaseFont /Times-Bold /Encoding /WinAnsiEncoding >> endobj 11 0 obj << /Type /XObject /Subtype /Image /Width 509 /Height 160 /Filter /FlateDecode /DecodeParms << /Predictor 15 /Colors 3 /Columns 509 /BitsPerComponent 8>> /Mask [ 255 255 255 255 255 255 ] /ColorSpace /DeviceRGB /BitsPerComponent 8 /Length 3280>> stream x[EQ㎦fVttҒ +3O{?lGDQԯDrB^.ϯ%~'0۠/2>0AG_>0j0GCfE67>rB^}@  !&y+r?INp:erc b8f=rQC!~-Wf^^zF[)G 2ޯe7V_Go3Ke GEGOo8rώ#\1ZY~N6^H}yLxS-!:412V+u\-LSO?xVvZ|GjǮT_8EYJF=Tw^ 7GxfN/S:Ʌ~ʟtt?5n÷J'JcF-GVξx{rO~tJd;#a\7}|~y'>}c2C vR}f׈**h.)_&@pfzjsx:5;S\vKhM5j=!Cn+h"u]a EUN]jn=k<,:Ք>sU!ni~6EJ)¦72?G}[y}_vc$t?iSܟ2Zݞ,VN?_`='RFK1A2qv&X_lLRWY'%:I㢖zb_UEx\>&ɆBˏ~K@ \gYØU4}$8Dv!'Q'*+Εj(UCGo[#< 2Ja(sZi9fZKE Rn`u\9r^Zmɯ׹}mstO4uc~#'jEvۼ Dx[z ޏQ4KL5,5u3>i^uÒ-53ba ~,~/pyt1fMU'CVm:qv~=Y'Es"WsφG?l_kN5}],Ow7 uh`xƫ?zMl7ٻv$A(4Dl(wwH} ?=[=S;yC]^BK>㕪9`Z'Wj;E|:bf>kCԘ#RY,iv쵗~}n'"1u" *uO΄/2^Sxr(!/DD\~mJyZ!MmrA!#u[if|99WB WΡpp}w}sh#,\ &:%˳X?D3 %W0cC?o̲^} F3XLVn]Cߖiϧ!7}yZJ#P7]=)7Ρp;>> Ye^xx{Oafw{ ;>4gfLt ʊ:q%#r/)pv!O4wGh|dS ӣݽހ-gVUC'pBxrB^} 7JA^} /'8!`:r?}}],X  }6y!`/~Br?}Q< >k7vx"] ,' .3jn{-i}|~%-};b6#U)7繎kiEw 㤳:E}[޼c"rꬊ7Dc$~"/Y&zSd:tFȌCrʙ`7u .#[-<)j ?TGS(j~oTup(hjU4PlJ=}|it.ҽ@\wʨuXÞZcx18Wo<~ikOg,ވ\^?EneyZcc0[R١z|zv7_m:_n]a?osS3~j^ hD.a_X'KfBX6w wݶ"Oa:,bvhrWH[uCF-Xfc}>x+Rz)2N-B 7y^٨;[/vg? | |2Sve}=o䑰j[vWjF0{굦?VI~}xM(_TlG__+]:#к?S} c>GŸD7 !w{S{B =x7a?oE#)+Gz:o_4Q<;n?\tt7?mGCџQGu4kņOF>F?#} hP&ђߴM#u!.СtL2^#o nIk_i.~7tr@n 1P~3?.[]=S5b߮~Yo^HFH YBi8a4iom>CKgMy*;?zqEӕ` >zB9iFzC?XF?ޟIܰ펉A}{I5ᄊx%ez#Mp@rߎpi]IOVjzuJt\۰f׺u5><,J~PTJp1)}){9N {!`/> endstream endobj 12 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 13 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 197.0117 675.3895 357.3317 687.2695 ] >> endobj 13 0 obj << /Type /Action /S /URI /URI (http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews) >> endobj 14 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Contents 15 0 R >> endobj 15 0 obj << /Length 7338 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.502 0.502 0.502 RG 0.75 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(argues, was the impact of the Suez crisis on the Anglo-American 'special relationship'. The crisis, which )] TJ ET BT 34.016 782.213 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(shattered the British illusion of their independent great power status, turned cooperation with the USA into a )] TJ ET BT 34.016 767.957 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(vital factor in their foreign policy, and the UK into an 'unwitting partner' of the ROC during the 1958 )] TJ ET BT 34.016 753.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Taiwan Strait crisis.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 727.445 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(In examining the making of the 'unintended UK-ROC partnership', Tsang has also addressed the various )] TJ ET BT 34.016 713.189 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(dimensions of Anglo-Chinese relations, the existing literature of which, he criticises, has failed to explain )] TJ ET BT 34.016 698.933 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [('why British policy was so unsuccessful' \(p. xvii\). The problem for the British, according to Tsang, was their )] TJ ET BT 34.016 684.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(failure to understand the real nature of the Chinese Communist regime. In according diplomatic recognition )] TJ ET BT 34.016 670.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(to Beijing in 1950, the pragmatic British were influenced by three major factors: protecting British economic )] TJ ET BT 34.016 656.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(interests in China, acting in line with international law, and driving a wedge into the Sino-Soviet alliance )] TJ ET BT 34.016 641.909 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(through positive engagement with China. Concerning the last factor, while British officials were realistic in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 627.653 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(their assessment that the Chinese communists were 'strictly orthodox', they at the same time held the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 613.397 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(\(mistaken\) belief that the Chinese were 'too nationalist to be subservient to the Soviets' \(pp. 21?2\). To Mao )] TJ ET BT 34.016 599.141 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Zedong, the communist revolution was not only about the defeat of the Kuomintang, but also about the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 584.885 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(elimination of Western imperialist influence and the restoration of China's 'rightful' place in the world. In )] TJ ET BT 34.016 570.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(view of the hostile international environment in the postwar period, Mao regarded leaning to the Soviet side )] TJ ET BT 34.016 556.373 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(as both a short-term tactical move to facilitate China's reconstruction and a long-term commitment to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 542.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(international communism. \(The chairman saw no conflict between his Chinese and communist identities, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 527.861 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Tsang adds.\) Given the centrality of Sino-Soviet relations to Mao's thinking and policy, China thus 'did not )] TJ ET BT 34.016 513.605 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(respond to British efforts to engage it positively' \(p. 23\), and the British wedge strategy against the Sino-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 499.349 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Soviet alliance was doomed to failure.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 473.093 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(One of the most revealing aspects of Tsang's book is the light that it sheds on the perspective and policy of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 458.837 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the ROC. Chapter 2 shows how the ROC responded to London's recognition of Beijing on the basis of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 444.581 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(realism, and sought to build an informal partnership with Britain, not least by permitting the British to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 430.325 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(maintain a consulate in Tamsui. It gives a detailed account of the unofficial Nationalist representation in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 416.069 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(London, liaison officers in Hong Kong, and the special emissaries sent to Britain in the 1950s. At the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 401.813 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(beginning, through this informal presence and contact the Chinese Nationalists hoped to reverse the British )] TJ ET BT 34.016 387.557 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(policy of recognising Beijing. But once it became clear that London's recognition policy was not going to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 373.301 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(change, from the later half of the decade on, the ROC focused on inducing the British not to act against its )] TJ ET BT 34.016 359.045 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(interests - over the future of Taiwan, and the ROC's membership in the United Nations. Nevertheless, in the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 344.789 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(early 1950s, the British were not enthusiastic about the idea of a partnership with the ROC: the unofficial )] TJ ET BT 34.016 330.533 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Nationalist representation in Britain was of a low level, and the special emissaries from Taipei more often )] TJ ET BT 34.016 316.277 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(received a cool reception. In short, the bilateral relations between the ROC and the UK remained limited and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 302.021 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(unimportant.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 275.765 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(In examining the British side of the story, Tsang argues that the UK worked harder than any other power to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 261.509 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(find a solution to the Taiwan question. Its main concern was 'not to unify or divide China', but 'to defuse the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 247.253 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(time bomb across the Taiwan Strait' \(p. 93\). At first, Britain's Taiwan policy was short-term and reactive. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 232.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Before the outbreak of the Korean War, the Labour government expected to see Taiwan fall into communist )] TJ ET BT 34.016 218.741 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(hands. Once the war started and was still raging, however, it was not willing to see Beijing capture Taiwan )] TJ ET BT 34.016 204.485 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(by force. Nevertheless, a more sympathetic British attitude towards Taiwan did not develop until Winston )] TJ ET BT 34.016 190.229 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Churchill returned to power in early 1952. With his emphasis on the Anglo-American 'special relationship', )] TJ ET BT 34.016 175.973 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Churchill did not support an abandonment of Taiwan, although he was at the same time eager to stop Chiang )] TJ ET BT 34.016 161.717 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(from provoking a new world war.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 135.461 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(It was the two Taiwan Strait crises that had the greatest impact on the changing relations between the UK )] TJ ET BT 34.016 121.205 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(and the ROC. In chapter 5, Tsang aims to 'significantly modify the generally accepted explanation of Mao )] TJ ET BT 34.016 106.949 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Zedong's objectives and calculations in starting the first Taiwan Strait crisis' \(p. 111\). Whilst the existing )] TJ ET BT 34.016 92.693 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(works hold that Mao initiated the crisis in order to disrupt the conclusion of the US-ROC defence treaty, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 78.437 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Tsang has suggested the chairman's other main objective, which was to weaken Taiwan's ability to harass the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 64.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(China coast from the offshore islands. Besides, Tsang challenges the established view that Beijing only )] TJ ET BT 34.016 49.925 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(intended to take Tachen during the crisis, by arguing that Mao indeed expected the ROC to abandon Matsu )] TJ ET endstream endobj 16 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Contents 17 0 R >> endobj 17 0 obj << /Length 7400 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.502 0.502 0.502 RG 0.75 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(\(after the occupation of Tachen\), and kept an open mind on the seizure of Quemoy. But limited resources )] TJ ET BT 34.016 782.213 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(prevented Mao from taking all the islands at the same time.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 755.957 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Throughout the crisis, the main concern of the UK was to restore peace and stability to the region. Thus, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 741.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Britain worked closely with America and New Zealand to seek a peaceful solution through Operation )] TJ ET BT 34.016 727.445 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Oracle, a resolution which was aimed to neutralise the offshore islands by the United Nations. But the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 713.189 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(problem was that, as Tsang shows in detail, Operation Oracle pitted Britain and Taiwan as well as Churchill )] TJ ET BT 34.016 698.933 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(and Dwight Eisenhower against each other. Chiang was convinced that Operation Oracle was 'a British plot )] TJ ET BT 34.016 684.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(to create a two China situation' \(p. 136\), a conspiracy which would remove his chance to return to the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 670.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(mainland and destroy the raison d'tre for the existence of the ROC in Taiwan. Churchill, for his part, had )] TJ ET BT 34.016 656.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(serious disagreement with Eisenhower over the protection of Quemoy and Matsu, if not over the defence of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 641.909 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Taiwan. \(The poor relationship between Anthony Eden and John Foster Dulles made matters worse.\) The )] TJ ET BT 34.016 627.653 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(biggest winner of the first Taiwan Strait crisis, as Tsang implies, seemed to be Mao, who was 'able to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 613.397 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(influence decisively the scale of the crisis' \(p. 139\), and who had gained an insight into the limits of the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 599.141 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Anglo-American alliance regarding the offshore islands. His growing confidence contributed to the shelling )] TJ ET BT 34.016 584.885 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(of Quemoy the second time in 1958.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 558.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(The second Taiwan Strait crisis culminated in the development of an 'unintended partnership' between the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 544.373 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(UK and ROC, argues Tsang. During the crisis, the new British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, was eager )] TJ ET BT 34.016 530.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(to put the newly restored Anglo-American relationship above other considerations. Like the Americans, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 515.861 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Macmillan recognised that the defence of Quemoy and Matsu had become an integral part of Taiwan's )] TJ ET BT 34.016 501.605 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(security. Instead of criticising and arguing with Eisenhower as his predecessor did in 1954?5, Macmillan )] TJ ET BT 34.016 487.349 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(stood by the United States and 'supported the ROC in denying Quemoy to the PRC' \(p. 145\). But there was )] TJ ET BT 34.016 473.093 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(another vital factor which explained why the UK turned into an 'unwitting partner' with the ROC in 1958. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 458.837 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(According to Tsang, the ROC had 'played an active and indeed key part' in the development of the crisis, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 444.581 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [('despite its outward dependence on the USA for security' \(p. 145\). The ROC forces in Quemoy were capable )] TJ ET BT 34.016 430.325 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(of resisting the communist military offensive, with the United States providing merely logistical, material )] TJ ET BT 34.016 416.069 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(and moral support. This reduced the necessity of American intervention and thus 'the actual risk of this crisis )] TJ ET BT 34.016 401.813 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(escalating into a general war' \(p. 197\). In this regard, Tsang adds that, notwithstanding his rhetoric of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 387.557 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(retaking the mainland, Chiang 'came to realize in the 1950s that this was not a practical policy' \(p. 191\). By )] TJ ET BT 34.016 373.301 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the end of that decade, Chiang recognised that 'the best he could hope for was to maintain the status quo'; )] TJ ET BT 34.016 359.045 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(what influenced him was 'more of a peace than a war mentality' \(p. 191?2\). Through the perceptive reporting )] TJ ET BT 34.016 344.789 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(of the consulate in Tamsui, the British government got an insight into Chiang's intention in the crisis, which )] TJ ET BT 34.016 330.533 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(was not to 'provoke a third world war'. These reports 'removed the UK's underlying worry about the ROC )] TJ ET BT 34.016 316.277 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(disrupting the peace and security of East Asia' and thus 'made it a lot less objectionable for British policy )] TJ ET BT 34.016 302.021 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(makers to form their unintended partnership with the ROC in 1958' \(p. 189\).)] TJ ET BT 34.016 275.765 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(The UK-ROC partnership was a paradoxical one, however. The economic links between the two countries )] TJ ET BT 34.016 261.509 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(were insignificant throughout the 1950s. On the other hand, bilateral conflicts over the Nationalist closure of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 247.253 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the Chinese ports and their violation of Hong Kong's neutrality were what characterised their day-to-day )] TJ ET BT 34.016 232.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(relationship. Nevertheless, as Tsang concludes in the final chapter, these bilateral disputes were 'distinctly )] TJ ET BT 34.016 218.741 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(secondary' \(p. 188\) to their 'de facto strategic partnership' against communist expansionism that was born out )] TJ ET BT 34.016 204.485 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(of the Sino-American cold war.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 178.229 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(In the postwar bipolar international system, all anti-communist countries were partners of sorts: all of them )] TJ ET BT 34.016 163.973 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(shared the ideology of resisting communist expansion. Whether two \(or more\) anti-communist countries )] TJ ET BT 34.016 149.717 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(would become truly working partners depended on many factors. In his book, Tsang does not elaborate on )] TJ ET BT 34.016 135.461 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(what constituted a 'partnership', and what kind of 'support' Britain rendered to Taiwan in 1958 ? and beyond. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 121.205 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(He does, however, stress that the formation of an 'unintended partnership' between Britain and the ROC )] TJ ET BT 34.016 106.949 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(during the second Taiwan Strait crisis involved, or even implied, 'no change in British policy or attitude )] TJ ET BT 34.016 92.693 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(towards the ROC' \(p. 198\). But if nothing seemed to have changed in and after 1958, one may wonder )] TJ ET BT 34.016 78.437 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(whether it is meaningful to speak of Britain and Taiwan as 'de facto partners'. Perhaps, a possible answer to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 64.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(this question can be discerned by reexamining the three factors which Tsang suggests had made their )] TJ ET BT 34.016 49.925 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [('unintended partnership' a reality. First, the impact of the Suez crisis on British foreign policy. It is true that )] TJ ET endstream endobj 18 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Annots [ 20 0 R 22 0 R ] /Contents 19 0 R >> endobj 19 0 obj << /Length 8112 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.502 0.502 0.502 RG 0.75 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Macmillan supported, or more precisely did not oppose, the ROC in the second Taiwan Strait crisis. But his )] TJ ET BT 34.016 782.213 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [('silence' had more to do with the Anglo-American 'special relationship' than with the making of a 'strategic )] TJ ET BT 34.016 767.957 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(partnership' with the ROC, however unintended it might be. In fact, the main differences between London )] TJ ET BT 34.016 753.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(and Taipei were not over the denial of Taiwan to communist rule, but over the defence of the offshore )] TJ ET BT 34.016 739.445 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(islands and Chiang's plans to liberate the mainland. Although in 1958 Britain shared the American view that )] TJ ET BT 34.016 725.189 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the defence of Quemoy and Matsu had become an integral part of the protection of Taiwan, it still worried )] TJ ET BT 34.016 710.933 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(that the offshore islands would become a cause of war with China. Thus, while Macmillan decided not to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 696.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(criticise and put pressure on Eisenhower, British officials \(Selwyn Lloyd and the Foreign Office )] TJ ET BT 34.016 682.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(particularly\), concerned about the possible American use of nuclear weapons against China, did try to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 668.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(encourage the administration to seek a diplomatic solution. Even the Americans were eager to prevent the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 653.909 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(offshore islands from becoming a flashpoint time and again. Thus, after the danger of war receded, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 639.653 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Eisenhower ? as in the first crisis ? sought to encourage Chiang to diminish the importance of Quemoy by )] TJ ET BT 34.016 625.397 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(reducing the number of the ROC troops there, if not withdrawing from the island outright. Alarmed by the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 611.141 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(perceived American efforts to create a de facto 'two-China' condition, Mao appealed to the Nationalists to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 596.885 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(relax the tension among the Chinese people themselves. The second Taiwan Strait crisis thus ended in a )] TJ ET BT 34.016 582.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(matter of two months, as compared with the eight-month long crisis in 1954?5. \()] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 420.320 582.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(1)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 420.320 581.235 m 426.320 581.235 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 426.320 582.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(\))] TJ ET BT 34.016 556.373 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(It is debatable that the British government found the idea of a 'de facto partnership' with Taiwan )] TJ ET BT 34.016 542.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(unobjectionable as a result of the favourable reports by the consulate in Tamsui, which according to Tsang )] TJ ET BT 34.016 527.861 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(highlighted Chiang's orientation towards 'peace' and the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. There is little )] TJ ET BT 34.016 513.605 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(evidence to suggest that Macmillan and other decision makers in London were influenced by the reports )] TJ ET BT 34.016 499.349 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(\(however perceptive\) written by these low-ranking consular officials. It is also arguable that Chiang had )] TJ ET BT 34.016 485.093 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(settled for the status quo across the Taiwan Strait as early as 1958. While it is true that there was a gap )] TJ ET BT 34.016 470.837 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(between his anti-communist rhetoric and his actual policy of liberation, it was probably due to the objective )] TJ ET BT 34.016 456.581 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(constraints Chiang had to face \(China's military strength and lack of American support\), rather than a )] TJ ET BT 34.016 442.325 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(deliberate policy choice on his part. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Chiang strongly opposed the idea of a )] TJ ET BT 34.016 428.069 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [('two Chinas' seating arrangement at the United Nations explored by successive US administrations, for this )] TJ ET BT 34.016 413.813 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(would undermine his claim to the mainland. \(The Chinese Nationalists preferred to walk out of the United )] TJ ET BT 34.016 399.557 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Nations ? as they did in 1971 ? if the People's Republic was admitted.\) As Tsang puts it, 'The fact that he )] TJ ET BT 34.016 385.301 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [([Chiang] realized he had no realistic chance of retaking the mainland did not mean he had given up the hope )] TJ ET BT 34.016 371.045 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(or emotional commitment to do so. Until his death Chiang wanted to recover the mainland ...' \(p. 192\). A )] TJ ET BT 34.016 356.789 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(brief look at the third Taiwan Strait crisis of 1962 \(though beyond the coverage of Tsang's book\) may shed )] TJ ET BT 34.016 342.533 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(more light on Chiang's thinking about liberation. Unlike the first two crises, the 1962 crisis was to a large )] TJ ET BT 34.016 328.277 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(extent initiated by Chiang. Convinced that the Great Leap Forward disaster in China and the influx of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 314.021 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(refugees to Hong Kong were the impending signs of the collapse of the communist regime, Chiang )] TJ ET BT 34.016 299.765 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(intensified his preparations for liberation and encouraged the Americans to support Taiwan's paramilitary )] TJ ET BT 34.016 285.509 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(operations against China. This triggered a massive military buildup on China's part and consequently a war )] TJ ET BT 34.016 271.253 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(scare in the Strait. This time, Macmillan was not as 'silent' on his opposition to Chiang as he had been in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 256.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(1958, and even Washington saw the need to restrain Taipei. \()] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 327.956 256.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(2)] TJ ET 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 327.956 255.603 m 333.956 255.603 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 333.956 256.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(\) In short, if Britain became a de facto ally of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 242.741 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Taiwan in 1958, four years later their 'unintended partnership' had all but disintegrated.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 216.485 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Tsang has done an admirable job in explaining the failure of Britain's China policy. But a related question to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 202.229 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(ask ? and explain ? is: why did the British not abandon the policy of constructive engagement with China )] TJ ET BT 34.016 187.973 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(despite its apparent failure since 1950? In essence, Macmillan's demonstration of solidarity with Eisenhower )] TJ ET BT 34.016 173.717 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(over Taiwan in 1958 did not lessen Britain's eagerness to engage with the People's Republic, however )] TJ ET BT 34.016 159.461 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(unsuccessful it turned out to be. For all the diplomatic snubs, abuse of British consular officials, and hostile )] TJ ET BT 34.016 145.205 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(propaganda by the Chinese communists, never had London come to the conclusion that the UK should break )] TJ ET BT 34.016 130.949 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(off \(semi-\)diplomatic and economic relations with China, a break which would have the added advantage of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 116.693 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(strengthening relations with Washington ? and perhaps with Taipei. On the other hand, since 1961 Britain )] TJ ET BT 34.016 102.437 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(voted for the admission of China into the United Nations, even though it also supported the American-)] TJ ET BT 34.016 88.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(sponsored 'important question' resolution which required a two-thirds majority to change the Chinese seat. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 73.925 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Trade between the UK and China began to increase after the abolition of the China differential in 1957, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 59.669 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(although the British had little illusion of reviving their prewar informal economic empire on the mainland. In )] TJ ET endstream endobj 20 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 21 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 420.3197 581.5495 426.3197 593.4295 ] >> endobj 21 0 obj << /Type /Action >> endobj 22 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 23 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 327.9557 255.9175 333.9557 267.7975 ] >> endobj 23 0 obj << /Type /Action >> endobj 24 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Annots [ 26 0 R 28 0 R 30 0 R ] /Contents 25 0 R >> endobj 25 0 obj << /Length 4041 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(1950, Britain's policy of recognising Beijing was informed by three main considerations: maintaining British )] TJ ET BT 34.016 782.213 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(economic interests in China, driving a wedge into the Sino-Soviet alliance and safeguarding the colony of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 767.957 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Hong Kong. A decade later, the first two of these considerations no longer played a crucial role in Britain's )] TJ ET BT 34.016 753.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(China policy, and Hong Kong became the only constant, though by no means the most decisive, factor. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 739.445 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Although Mao had long decided to leave the British colony alone, the pragmatic Britons still felt that Hong )] TJ ET BT 34.016 725.189 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Kong's delicate coexistence with its communist neighbour necessitated a constructive approach towards )] TJ ET BT 34.016 710.933 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(China on a day-to-day basis. On top of this was Britain's determination to avoid war in Asia in order to focus )] TJ ET BT 34.016 696.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(on Europe. To decision makers in London, the best way to achieve this was to restrain China through )] TJ ET BT 34.016 682.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(positive engagement, not to ally with Taiwan in the Sino-American cold war.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 656.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(That said, )] TJ ET BT 84.344 656.165 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(The Cold War's Odd Couple)] TJ ET BT 220.916 656.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( has filled a significant void in the existing literature on East Asian )] TJ ET BT 34.016 641.909 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(international history. Its provocative thesis will be a subject of debate among historians for years to come.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 607.011 Td /F3 18.0 Tf [(Notes)] TJ ET BT 48.816 576.394 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(1.)] TJ ET BT 64.016 576.389 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(The existing works on the second Taiwan Strait crisis show a greater degree of British concerns and )] TJ ET BT 64.016 562.133 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(worries about the danger of war than that portrayed by Tsang. See, for example, Qiang Zhai, )] TJ ET BT 64.016 547.877 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949?1958)] TJ ET BT 482.000 547.877 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( \(Kent, Ohio, )] TJ ET BT 64.016 533.621 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(1994\), pp. 178?207. )] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 163.340 533.621 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Back to \(1\))] TJ ET 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 163.340 532.227 m 217.328 532.227 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 217.328 533.621 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(.)] TJ ET BT 48.816 519.370 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(2.)] TJ ET BT 64.016 519.365 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(By making use of Taiwanese and American archival sources, Jay Taylor has detailed Chiang's )] TJ ET BT 64.016 505.109 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(liberation plans and covert operations against China in the late 1950s and early 1960s. See )] TJ ET BT 64.016 490.853 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan)] TJ ET BT 482.264 490.853 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( \(Cambridge, )] TJ ET BT 64.016 476.597 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Mass., 2000\), pp. 253?4, 261?68. )] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 227.000 476.597 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Back to \(2\))] TJ ET 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 227.000 475.203 m 280.988 475.203 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 34.016 450.341 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Other reviews:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 436.085 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [([2])] TJ ET 0.502 0.502 0.502 RG 0.75 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 34.391 431.359 526.499 1.500 re S BT 34.016 413.579 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Source URL:)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 104.672 413.579 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/514)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 104.672 412.185 m 322.316 412.185 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 34.016 387.208 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Links:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 372.808 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [([1] http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/item/2905)] TJ ET BT 34.016 358.408 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [([2] http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews)] TJ ET endstream endobj 26 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 27 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 163.3397 532.5415 217.3277 544.4215 ] >> endobj 27 0 obj << /Type /Action >> endobj 28 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 29 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 226.9997 475.5175 280.9877 487.3975 ] >> endobj 29 0 obj << /Type /Action >> endobj 30 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 31 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 104.6717 412.4995 322.3157 424.3795 ] >> endobj 31 0 obj << /Type /Action /S /URI /URI (http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/514) >> endobj xref 0 32 0000000000 65535 f 0000000008 00000 n 0000000073 00000 n 0000000119 00000 n 0000000349 00000 n 0000000386 00000 n 0000000612 00000 n 0000000694 00000 n 0000005614 00000 n 0000005723 00000 n 0000005833 00000 n 0000005942 00000 n 0000009503 00000 n 0000009631 00000 n 0000009715 00000 n 0000009780 00000 n 0000017171 00000 n 0000017236 00000 n 0000024689 00000 n 0000024780 00000 n 0000032945 00000 n 0000033073 00000 n 0000033109 00000 n 0000033237 00000 n 0000033273 00000 n 0000033371 00000 n 0000037465 00000 n 0000037593 00000 n 0000037629 00000 n 0000037757 00000 n 0000037793 00000 n 0000037921 00000 n trailer << /Size 32 /Root 1 0 R /Info 5 0 R >> startxref 38016 %%EOF