%PDF-1.3 1 0 obj << /Type /Catalog /Outlines 2 0 R /Pages 3 0 R >> endobj 2 0 obj << /Type /Outlines /Count 0 >> endobj 3 0 obj << /Type /Pages /Kids [6 0 R 14 0 R 16 0 R 18 0 R ] /Count 4 /Resources << /ProcSet 4 0 R /Font << /F1 8 0 R /F2 9 0 R /F3 10 0 R >> /XObject << /I1 11 0 R >> >> /MediaBox [0.000 0.000 595.280 841.890] >> endobj 4 0 obj [/PDF /Text /ImageC ] endobj 5 0 obj << /Creator (DOMPDF) /CreationDate (D:20141001135926+01'00') /ModDate (D:20141001135926+01'00') /Title (Appeasement in Crisis: From Munich to Prague, October 1938 ? March 1939) >> endobj 6 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Annots [ 12 0 R ] /Contents 7 0 R >> endobj 7 0 obj << /Length 4098 >> stream q 381.750 0 0 120.000 34.016 687.874 cm /I1 Do Q 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 34.016 676.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Published on )] TJ ET BT 99.356 676.469 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(Reviews in History)] TJ ET BT 190.016 676.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( \()] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 197.012 676.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 197.012 675.075 m 357.332 675.075 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 357.332 676.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(\))] TJ ET 0.502 0.502 0.502 RG 0.75 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 34.391 653.743 526.499 1.500 re S BT 34.016 615.321 Td /F3 18.0 Tf [(Appeasement in Crisis: From Munich to Prague, October 1938 ? )] TJ ET BT 34.016 593.937 Td /F3 18.0 Tf [(March 1939)] TJ ET BT 34.016 266.195 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(On 18 September 1938, British policymakers, shocked by Hitler?s evident readiness to go to war over the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 251.939 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Sudetenland, the German-speaking fringe of territory around the western half of Czechoslovakia, offered to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 237.683 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(guarantee what remained of Czechoslovakia once it renounced its alliances with France and the Soviet )] TJ ET BT 34.016 223.427 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Union and agreed to transfer the territory in question to Germany. This, as David Gillard points out, was a )] TJ ET BT 34.016 209.171 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(hasty decision and remarkable for its break with British diplomatic tradition, which had generally eschewed )] TJ ET BT 34.016 194.915 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(guarantees to foreign countries. It was also, in his opinion, unwise, since guaranteeing any Central European )] TJ ET BT 34.016 180.659 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(country was impossible of fulfilment. He therefore presents as reasonable the British government?s efforts to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 166.403 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(render the guarantee to Czechoslovakia impracticable by making it contingent upon similar commitments )] TJ ET BT 34.016 152.147 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(from France, Italy and/or Germany, and to redefine it as a ?moral? guarantee which did not require practical )] TJ ET BT 34.016 137.891 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(action. Indeed, he is in no doubt that in 1938 and 1939 Britain had no alternative but to appease Germany, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 123.635 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(since it could not risk a conflict in which it stood alone against the three Axis powers, Germany, Italy and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 109.379 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Japan, nor could it hope to organise a coalition of powers to oppose the Axis because ?[t]he governments in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 95.123 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Paris, Moscow and Washington were, whatever their rhetoric, as shy of precise commitments which might )] TJ ET BT 34.016 80.867 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(draw them into general war as were Chamberlain and his colleagues? \(p. 18\).)] TJ ET BT 34.016 54.611 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(This predicament, Gillard argues, was well understood by British diplomats and political leaders. The puzzle )] TJ ET BT 34.016 563.315 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Review Number:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 549.059 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(731)] TJ ET BT 34.016 534.803 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Publish date:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 520.547 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Sunday, 1 March, 2009)] TJ ET BT 34.016 506.291 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Author:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 492.035 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(David Gillard)] TJ ET BT 34.016 477.779 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(ISBN:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 463.523 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(978-0-2305-0040-2)] TJ ET BT 34.016 449.267 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Date of Publication:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 435.011 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(2007)] TJ ET BT 34.016 420.755 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Price:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 406.499 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(45.00)] TJ ET BT 34.016 392.243 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Pages:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 377.987 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(240pp.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 363.731 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Publisher:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 349.475 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Palgrave Macmillan)] TJ ET BT 34.016 335.219 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Place of Publication:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 320.963 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Basingstoke)] TJ ET BT 34.016 306.707 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Reviewer:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 292.451 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Robert Boyce)] TJ ET endstream endobj 8 0 obj << /Type /Font /Subtype /Type1 /Name /F1 /BaseFont /Times-Roman /Encoding /WinAnsiEncoding >> endobj 9 0 obj << /Type /Font /Subtype /Type1 /Name /F2 /BaseFont /Times-Italic /Encoding /WinAnsiEncoding >> endobj 10 0 obj << /Type /Font /Subtype /Type1 /Name /F3 /BaseFont /Times-Bold /Encoding /WinAnsiEncoding >> endobj 11 0 obj << /Type /XObject /Subtype /Image /Width 509 /Height 160 /Filter /FlateDecode /DecodeParms << /Predictor 15 /Colors 3 /Columns 509 /BitsPerComponent 8>> /Mask [ 255 255 255 255 255 255 ] /ColorSpace /DeviceRGB /BitsPerComponent 8 /Length 3280>> stream x[EQ㎦fVttҒ +3O{?lGDQԯDrB^.ϯ%~'0۠/2>0AG_>0j0GCfE67>rB^}@  !&y+r?INp:erc b8f=rQC!~-Wf^^zF[)G 2ޯe7V_Go3Ke GEGOo8rώ#\1ZY~N6^H}yLxS-!:412V+u\-LSO?xVvZ|GjǮT_8EYJF=Tw^ 7GxfN/S:Ʌ~ʟtt?5n÷J'JcF-GVξx{rO~tJd;#a\7}|~y'>}c2C vR}f׈**h.)_&@pfzjsx:5;S\vKhM5j=!Cn+h"u]a EUN]jn=k<,:Ք>sU!ni~6EJ)¦72?G}[y}_vc$t?iSܟ2Zݞ,VN?_`='RFK1A2qv&X_lLRWY'%:I㢖zb_UEx\>&ɆBˏ~K@ \gYØU4}$8Dv!'Q'*+Εj(UCGo[#< 2Ja(sZi9fZKE Rn`u\9r^Zmɯ׹}mstO4uc~#'jEvۼ Dx[z ޏQ4KL5,5u3>i^uÒ-53ba ~,~/pyt1fMU'CVm:qv~=Y'Es"WsφG?l_kN5}],Ow7 uh`xƫ?zMl7ٻv$A(4Dl(wwH} ?=[=S;yC]^BK>㕪9`Z'Wj;E|:bf>kCԘ#RY,iv쵗~}n'"1u" *uO΄/2^Sxr(!/DD\~mJyZ!MmrA!#u[if|99WB WΡpp}w}sh#,\ &:%˳X?D3 %W0cC?o̲^} F3XLVn]Cߖiϧ!7}yZJ#P7]=)7Ρp;>> Ye^xx{Oafw{ ;>4gfLt ʊ:q%#r/)pv!O4wGh|dS ӣݽހ-gVUC'pBxrB^} 7JA^} /'8!`:r?}}],X  }6y!`/~Br?}Q< >k7vx"] ,' .3jn{-i}|~%-};b6#U)7繎kiEw 㤳:E}[޼c"rꬊ7Dc$~"/Y&zSd:tFȌCrʙ`7u .#[-<)j ?TGS(j~oTup(hjU4PlJ=}|it.ҽ@\wʨuXÞZcx18Wo<~ikOg,ވ\^?EneyZcc0[R١z|zv7_m:_n]a?osS3~j^ hD.a_X'KfBX6w wݶ"Oa:,bvhrWH[uCF-Xfc}>x+Rz)2N-B 7y^٨;[/vg? | |2Sve}=o䑰j[vWjF0{굦?VI~}xM(_TlG__+]:#к?S} c>GŸD7 !w{S{B =x7a?oE#)+Gz:o_4Q<;n?\tt7?mGCџQGu4kņOF>F?#} hP&ђߴM#u!.СtL2^#o nIk_i.~7tr@n 1P~3?.[]=S5b߮~Yo^HFH YBi8a4iom>CKgMy*;?zqEӕ` >zB9iFzC?XF?ޟIܰ펉A}{I5ᄊx%ez#Mp@rߎpi]IOVjzuJt\۰f׺u5><,J~PTJp1)}){9N {!`/> endstream endobj 12 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 13 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 197.0117 675.3895 357.3317 687.2695 ] >> endobj 13 0 obj << /Type /Action /S /URI /URI (http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews) >> endobj 14 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Contents 15 0 R >> endobj 15 0 obj << /Length 7484 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.502 0.502 0.502 RG 0.75 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(for him is why, in these circumstances, the same men should have repeated the mistake of September 1938 )] TJ ET BT 34.016 782.213 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(by offering to guarantee Poland and Roumania in March 1939. The answer, he argues, lies in the ?crisis of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 767.957 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(appeasement?, when Hitler?s decision to absorb Bohemia and Moravia on 15 March prompted a storm of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 753.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(press and parliamentary criticism of the British government and threatened to embarrass Britain in the eyes )] TJ ET BT 34.016 739.445 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(of its potential allies in America and the British Empire. Britain?s decision to adopt a firmer line by )] TJ ET BT 34.016 725.189 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(extending the guarantees, he points out, has been applauded ever since by historians and statesmen as a )] TJ ET BT 34.016 710.933 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(return to sanity: the moment when the men of Munich ?redeemed themselves? in the eyes of their critics. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 696.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(But notwithstanding the pressure to be seen to do something, he argues that the guarantees were an )] TJ ET BT 34.016 682.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(egregious mistake. Instead, ?[o]n the present reading, ministers should have been confining themselves, in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 668.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(1938 and 1939 alike, to coalition-building and organisation for war for the purposes of deterrence and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 653.909 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(defence? \(p. 185\).)] TJ ET BT 34.016 627.653 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Gillard?s challenge to the broadly conventional view of British pre-war foreign policy is well-focussed and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 613.397 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(clearly written, and will be appreciated by those seeking a detailed account of what was said in Cabinet and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 599.141 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(to the Cabinet by its senior Foreign Office and military advisers.It must be said, however, that this is already )] TJ ET BT 34.016 584.885 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(very familiar territory, given that the Cabinet and Foreign Office papers upon which Gillard relies have been )] TJ ET BT 34.016 570.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the subject of minute examination in the nearly forty years since they were opened to the public. Gillard )] TJ ET BT 34.016 556.373 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(implicitly acknowledges this by omitting practically any account of the background to the emerging crisis, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 542.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(any introduction to his cast of historical characters, or any description of contemporary events taking place )] TJ ET BT 34.016 527.861 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(outside the narrow corridors of Whitehall. It must also be said that the assumptions on which his argument )] TJ ET BT 34.016 513.605 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(rests are inconsistent or at least far too briefly stated. Nor could they be established by a study restricted to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 499.349 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(British sources and indeed almost exclusively to the official British record. For if, as Gillard states in his )] TJ ET BT 34.016 485.093 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(opening pages, neither France nor the Soviet Union nor the United States were willing to unite in resisting )] TJ ET BT 34.016 470.837 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Axis aggression, it is far from clear why, as he claims in his concluding pages, a policy of trying to persuade )] TJ ET BT 34.016 456.581 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(them to join a conservative front was preferable to one of deterring German aggression through the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 442.325 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(promotion of solidarity with lesser but more amenable powers such as Poland and Rumania. At any rate, the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 428.069 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(potential to create an effective anti-Axis front can only be established by examining the diplomatic record of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 413.813 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(all the Great Powers concerned. Gillard, like most other defenders of Britain?s appeasement policy, simply )] TJ ET BT 34.016 399.557 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(asserts the unwillingness of France, the Soviet Union and the United States to act together or alone in face of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 385.301 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Axis threats, or, equally unsatisfactory, relies upon the views of contemporary British politicians and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 371.045 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(statesmen who were anything but unbiased observers. From the available international evidence, a strong )] TJ ET BT 34.016 356.789 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(case can be made for saying that Paris and Moscow were almost desperate to join an anti-fascist coalition, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 342.533 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(and that by 1938 Washington would have openly applauded such a development.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 316.277 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(In December 1918, Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the victorious Allied forces, explained to British )] TJ ET BT 34.016 302.021 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(political leaders the main challenge of the post-war world. Germany would not willingly accept the peace )] TJ ET BT 34.016 287.765 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(terms imposed upon it, and would constantly agitate to overturn them. But it would not immediately )] TJ ET BT 34.016 273.509 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(challenge the Western powers. Instead, it would first turn eastwards and seek to dominate the Slavic )] TJ ET BT 34.016 259.253 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(countries. Then, if allowed to appropriate land and resources in the East, it would turn West with such force )] TJ ET BT 34.016 244.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(as to be practically unstoppable. In strategic terms, therefore, Eastern and Western Europe were two halves )] TJ ET BT 34.016 230.741 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(of a single whole, making it unrealistic to pursue the security of Western Europe without due regard for the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 216.485 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(security of Eastern Europe as well.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 190.229 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Foch was of course perfectly correct, not only in his grasp of the fundamentals of European security but also )] TJ ET BT 34.016 175.973 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the time-scale of the challenge, predicting in 1919 that the Versailles settlement was merely a twenty-year )] TJ ET BT 34.016 161.717 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(truce. For indeed Germany did expand eastwards before turning West, signalling its intentions as early as )] TJ ET BT 34.016 147.461 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(1925 at Locarno when it refused to enter into the same frontier guarantees in the East as it accepted in the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 133.205 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(West. Its intentions were confirmed in 1939 when it absorbed Czechoslovakia, part of Lithuania and much )] TJ ET BT 34.016 118.949 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(of Poland, and suborned the Soviet Union, thereby securing further resources. Thus strengthened, it turned to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 104.693 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(conquer the West and in 1940 swiftly overran Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 78.437 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(British statesmen had acknowledged the essential unity of Europe in 1907 when they negotiated an )] TJ ET BT 512.288 78.437 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(entente)] TJ ET BT 34.016 64.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(with Russia, paving the way for closer military relations. Churchill acknowledged it in 1941 when he formed )] TJ ET BT 34.016 49.925 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(an alliance with the Soviet Union. British statesmen again acknowledged it in 1945 when they sought to )] TJ ET endstream endobj 16 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Contents 17 0 R >> endobj 17 0 obj << /Length 7603 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.502 0.502 0.502 RG 0.75 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(establish a )] TJ ET BT 87.344 796.469 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(modus vivendi)] TJ ET BT 156.332 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( with the Soviet Union after the war, and once again in the 1990s when they )] TJ ET BT 34.016 782.213 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(supported the extension of the NATO alliance to Eastern Europe. But what of the statesmen responsible for )] TJ ET BT 34.016 767.957 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(British defence in the years before the second world war? Gillard does not directly address the question of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 753.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(their strategic assumptions. He does however present them as capable leaders who thought in strategic terms. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 739.445 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(A careful examination of the evidence he adduces points towards a different conclusion.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 713.189 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(At the time of Munich in the months following, Gillard claims, Chamberlain believed that Eastern Europe )] TJ ET BT 34.016 698.933 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(was strategically important to Britain, which must therefore have a say in its future. In mid-December 1938, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 684.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Chamberlain referred to an ?Eastern quarrel? \(p. 66\) which did not concern Britain, but Gillard affirms that )] TJ ET BT 34.016 670.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(he must have been thinking of a minor issue such as Memel, not German aggression against Poland or )] TJ ET BT 34.016 656.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Russia, since surely he would not have been indifferent to such large issues. From various sources, however, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 641.909 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(it is evident that Chamberlain shared the view of Lord Halifax, the foreign secretary, Sir Nevile Henderson, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 627.653 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the ambassador in Berlin, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the permanent under-secretary of the Foreign Office, and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 613.397 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(even the British military chiefs of staff that Eastern Europe was Germany?s natural hinterland. Unlike Foch, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 599.141 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(they did not regard Germany?s expansion into this region as a threat to the European balance of power. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 584.885 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Indeed, unlike Foch, neither Chamberlain nor Halifax, who together dominated British policy-making at this )] TJ ET BT 34.016 570.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(time, gave much time to strategic calculations when taking their decisions.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 544.373 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(They had already gone well down the road to the Munich settlement before addressing the question of how )] TJ ET BT 34.016 530.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the loss of the Sudetenland would affect Czechoslovakia?s ability to defend itself, and even then they did not )] TJ ET BT 34.016 515.861 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(directly confront the question of how the loss of Czechoslovakia would affect the European balance of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 501.605 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(power. Nor at any time did they squarely confront the implications of excluding the Soviet Union from a )] TJ ET BT 34.016 487.349 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(conservative Great Power coalition or of including Poland, despite warning advice from Labour party critics )] TJ ET BT 34.016 473.093 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(and at least a few Cabinet colleagues and diplomatic advisers. Evidently their interest in Czechoslovakia, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 458.837 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Poland and Eastern Europe as a whole derived not from their strategic importance, but from their own fear )] TJ ET BT 34.016 444.581 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(that German aggression in the East would draw in France and willy-nilly Britain as well. The fact that )] TJ ET BT 34.016 430.325 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(British leaders in February 1939 were ?immensely? relieved to learn that Hitler?s next step was to seize )] TJ ET BT 34.016 416.069 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(control of the two remaining Czech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, that they found signs of growing )] TJ ET BT 34.016 401.813 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(friction between Slovakia and Prague ?reassuring? \(p. 111\), and welcomed German military intervention )] TJ ET BT 34.016 387.557 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(since it would end ?the persistent embarrassment of the guarantee? \(p. 112\) nicely illustrates the point. As )] TJ ET BT 34.016 373.301 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Foch would have appreciated, the Czech provinces were major strategic assets. Indeed, tanks and other )] TJ ET BT 34.016 359.045 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(armoured vehicles made in Czechoslovakia?s Skoda arms factories greatly strengthened Germany?s )] TJ ET BT 34.016 344.789 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(offensive capability when it launched its invasion of France in May 1940 and destroyed Britain?s sole major )] TJ ET BT 34.016 330.533 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(ally.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 304.277 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(As remarkably, Gillard?s account confirms that British leaders were also ambivalent about the strategic )] TJ ET BT 34.016 290.021 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(importance of Western Europe. For centuries, the cardinal principle of British defence policy had been to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 275.765 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(oppose any foreign power that sought to dominate the Continent and occupy the North Sea and Channel )] TJ ET BT 34.016 261.509 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(ports, since this would expose Britain to the disruption of its trade and the threat of invasion, thus )] TJ ET BT 34.016 247.253 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(undermining its independence. In earlier times Britain had been able to rely upon its naval power to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 232.997 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(blockade a Continental challenger, while preparing forces for a counter-attack at a time and place of its own )] TJ ET BT 34.016 218.741 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(choosing. But as the British general staff had acknowledged as early as 1909, with modern technology )] TJ ET BT 34.016 204.485 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(increasing the speed and range of military operations, Britain no longer enjoyed the luxury of being able to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 190.229 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(wait on events and respond in its own time. If Germany attacked in the West, naval intervention would come )] TJ ET BT 34.016 175.973 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(too late to affect the outcome. France would face 'overwhelming force', and its defeat would leave Britain )] TJ ET BT 34.016 161.717 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(without a Continental ally and dangerously exposed to invasion. The general staff had therefore )] TJ ET BT 34.016 147.461 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(recommended a military )] TJ ET BT 154.328 147.461 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(entente)] TJ ET BT 188.984 147.461 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(, later re-defined as a military alliance, to which both powers committed )] TJ ET BT 34.016 133.205 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(their naval and military strength, and the creation of a five-division British expeditionary force, to be )] TJ ET BT 34.016 118.949 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(available for immediate despatch to the Continent. By 1938 Germany had reached, and probably exceeded, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 104.693 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the level of threat it posed in 1909, and late in 1938 rumours reached London of German plans to seize )] TJ ET BT 34.016 90.437 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Holland in order to intimidate Britain into conceding German terms. Yet as Gillard?s account confirms, )] TJ ET BT 34.016 76.181 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Chamberlain and his colleagues were reluctant to accept that Holland was worth fighting for, and agreed to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 61.925 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(defend its neutrality only when the chiefs of staff affirmed that this was essential to maintain the respect of )] TJ ET endstream endobj 18 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 3 0 R /Annots [ 20 0 R ] /Contents 19 0 R >> endobj 19 0 obj << /Length 4397 >> stream 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg 0.502 0.502 0.502 RG 0.75 w 0 J [ ] 0 d BT 34.016 796.469 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the United States and the Dominions \(pp. 86-7\).)] TJ ET BT 34.016 770.213 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Similarly with France, Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons on 6 February 1939 that Britain?s )] TJ ET BT 34.016 755.957 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(interests were so close that ?any threat to the vital interests of France from whatever quarter it came must )] TJ ET BT 34.016 741.701 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(evoke the immediate co-operation of this country.? \(p. 98\) This was a timely assurance since, as Gillard )] TJ ET BT 34.016 727.445 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(points out, even with the military support of several Great Powers, France had come perilously close to )] TJ ET BT 34.016 713.189 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(defeat in the Great War, and in the winter of 1938 Bonnet, the French foreign minister, betrayed signs of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 698.933 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(defeatism. Yet, the appearance of strategic clarity was deceiving. Even in March 1939 the British cabinet, in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 684.677 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(conjunction with the chiefs of staff, rejected conscription and agreed only to the expansion of the Territorial )] TJ ET BT 34.016 670.421 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Army, while taking other decisions on defence independently of France. At the same time the cabinet )] TJ ET BT 34.016 656.165 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(renewed efforts to encourage support from the United States and British Dominions. But since American and )] TJ ET BT 34.016 641.909 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Dominions support would become essential only in the event that the balance of power in Europe was )] TJ ET BT 34.016 627.653 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(radically overturned, it made no sense to regard it as an alternative to a substantial Continental commitment. )] TJ ET BT 34.016 613.397 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(The cabinet?s tendency to do so only further illustrates its strategic muddle.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 587.141 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(On 31 March 1939, Britain and France issued guarantees to Poland and Roumania. This, Gillard writes, was )] TJ ET BT 34.016 572.885 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(?)] TJ ET BT 39.344 572.885 Td /F2 12.0 Tf [(politically)] TJ ET BT 88.016 572.885 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [( an inescapable commitment to fight? \(p. 177\) because of the strength of public opinion in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 558.629 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(support of Britain honouring its promises. But, as is well known, British governments, and not least )] TJ ET BT 34.016 544.373 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Chamberlain?s government, did not passively yield to public pressure. Britain pursued appeasement almost )] TJ ET BT 34.016 530.117 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(until the outbreak of war, and even after formally honouring its guarantee to Poland by declaring war in )] TJ ET BT 34.016 515.861 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(September 1939 it continued to hope for an end to the conflict before the need actually to fight. Indeed, even )] TJ ET BT 34.016 501.605 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(after British forces engaged in combat in Norway and France in the spring of 1940, Halifax and a majority of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 487.349 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(the War Cabinet favoured a further effort at appeasing Germany. Public opinion may have contributed to a )] TJ ET BT 34.016 473.093 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(brief ?crisis of appeasement? in March 1939, but the failure of appeasement itself lay elsewhere, in the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 458.837 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(international system and the shortcomings of a succession of British governments, most notably the )] TJ ET BT 34.016 444.581 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(Chamberlain government which failed to rise above the strategic miscalculations and political prejudices of )] TJ ET BT 34.016 430.325 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(its predecessors.)] TJ ET BT 34.016 404.069 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Other reviews:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 389.813 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [([2])] TJ ET 0.75 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 34.391 385.087 526.499 1.500 re S BT 34.016 367.307 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Source URL:)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 rg BT 104.672 367.307 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [(http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/731)] TJ ET 0.000 0.000 0.800 RG 0.24 w 0 J [ ] 0 d 104.672 365.913 m 322.316 365.913 l S 0.000 0.000 0.000 rg BT 34.016 340.936 Td /F3 12.0 Tf [(Links:)] TJ ET BT 34.016 326.536 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [([1] http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/item/3708)] TJ ET BT 34.016 312.136 Td /F1 12.0 Tf [([2] http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews)] TJ ET endstream endobj 20 0 obj << /Type /Annot /Subtype /Link /A 21 0 R /Border [0 0 0] /H /I /Rect [ 104.6717 366.2275 322.3157 378.1075 ] >> endobj 21 0 obj << /Type /Action /S /URI /URI (http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/731) >> endobj xref 0 22 0000000000 65535 f 0000000008 00000 n 0000000073 00000 n 0000000119 00000 n 0000000342 00000 n 0000000379 00000 n 0000000574 00000 n 0000000656 00000 n 0000004806 00000 n 0000004915 00000 n 0000005025 00000 n 0000005134 00000 n 0000008695 00000 n 0000008823 00000 n 0000008907 00000 n 0000008972 00000 n 0000016509 00000 n 0000016574 00000 n 0000024230 00000 n 0000024314 00000 n 0000028764 00000 n 0000028892 00000 n trailer << /Size 22 /Root 1 0 R /Info 5 0 R >> startxref 28987 %%EOF