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The Commemoration of Nelson and Trafalgar in St Paul’s Cathedral

Takeshi Nakamura*

Abstract

St Paul’s Cathedral, the mother church of the diocese of London and the architectural masterpiece by Sir Christopher Wren, became the most important site of royal and military state commemoration in the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars periods. This paper introduces a series of projects that commemorated Admiral Lord Nelson and the naval victory at the Battle of Trafalgar in this metropolitan cathedral in 1805-6 in order to improve our understandings about the cultural and political significance of the navy in Hanoverian Britain.

In modern Britain, state funeral has been a rare public occasion except for the cases of the royalty. It can be defined as a funeral superintended by the Earl Marshal and the College of Arms at the public expense. Though Nelson’s state funeral followed a manner of heraldic military funerals in the former period, there was a simultaneous attempt to signal a departure from this tradition because of both the intention of the Pitt ministry and the herald office and public opinion. It could be considered a naval ceremony: Admiral of the Fleet as the chief mourner, a bond of many naval officers and an iconoclastic attendance of veterans of HMS Victory and pensioners of Greenwich Hospital. Not only were these naval presence and symbolism appropriate for the interment of the distinguished naval hero, but they also affirmed British naval supremacy over Napoleon to the public.

Along with the discussion and preparation of funeral arrangements, the Pitt ministry considered inaugurating a new order of merit as a reward for naval and military officers. This order, as called the ‘Naval and Military Order of Merit’, had two prominent features: an unlimited number of knights and the creation of an official ‘Trafalgar Day’. For the latter, the choir of St Paul’s Cathedral was assumed as the chapel of this order and the investiture ceremony would be held there on 21 October in every year. In spite of an elaborate arrangement and a royal approval, however, the scheme to institute a new order of merit was suddenly abandoned.

In that period, British parliament had continuously voted to erect monuments for the departed heroes on an unprecedented scale. The entombment of Nelson was the sequence of the state funeral and the institution of an order of merit, and generated a range of

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public debates as it was regarded as the focal point in this parliamentary effort. While John Flaxman’s monument, which consisted of patriotic narrative and classic allegory to fascinate emulation for later generations, only constituted a position amongst a ‘naval and military pantheon’, the magnificent tomb occupied the most important site in St Paul’s — under the dome.

In later years, the authority of St Paul’s exceptionally permitted the burials of admirals and Nelson’s kinsmen to enhance the sacred place of the national martyrdom. Furthermore, as shown in public funerals of Wellington and other heroes, the tradition of military commemoration affirms the significance of Nelson as the national hero in St Paul’s.

Keywords: Commemoration, Monument, Navy, Horatio Nelson, St Paul’s Cathedral.
Horatio Viscount Nelson, the most renowned naval hero in Britain, visited St Paul’s Cathedral twice at crossroads in his life. The first time, Nelson participated in the Naval Thanksgiving held in this metropolitan cathedral in December 1797. The second time, he came back to St Paul’s to complete his last journey after the battle of Trafalgar: that is, the state funeral of Nelson in January 1806. In the years between 1797 and 1806, Nelson was rising from a naval hero to the naval hero, and naval patriotism was sublimated in the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.\(^1\) As a case study of cultural and political significance of the navy in Hanoverian Britain, this paper attempts to argue this most singular instance among naval commemoration in this period.

Stimulated by the Trafalgar bicentenary in 2005, historians examined not only the life of Nelson and his final battle with new insights but also the making of Nelson’s ‘myth’ and ‘legend’ and its historical memory.\(^2\) From the latter’s point of view, the state funeral of Nelson is a suitable research subject. Though Timothy Jenks, Marianne Czisnik, Laurence Brockliss and others, for instance, have already explored Nelson’s funeral to consider the contested nature of patriotism and British/English national identity,\(^3\) they have scarcely studied it in the context of naval and military commemoration at that period. There is a more serious problem. St Paul’s Cathedral, the site of Nelson’s funeral and burial, is often regarded as the ontological condition in these studies.

In order to improve our understanding about the navy and its heroes in British political culture, this paper will not only investigate the organization of the state funeral of Nelson and its aspects of naval ceremony but also look at a series of

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\(^*\) The place of publication is London unless otherwise stated.


projects to commemorate Nelson and Trafalgar: the invention of an official ‘Trafalgar Day’ and the erection of his monument and tomb. Simultaneously, this paper will suggest the significance of St Paul’s as the site of naval and military commemoration.

St Paul’s as a naval and military pantheon

After the news of victory and Nelson’s death arrived, the Pitt ministry began to make arrangements for his funeral. The funeral of this distinguished naval hero would have to be a magnificent and solemn one with all marks of military and national honours. In his letter to George III, Lord Hawkesbury, the Home Secretary who was entrusted with the arrangement of Nelson’s funeral by Pitt, explained why St Paul’s was a more appropriate burial place for Nelson than Westminster Abbey, the conventional burial place for the nation’s prominent figures:

As Westminster Abbey is at this time so very crowded with monuments, and as it was thought proper to lodge the Standards taken from your Majesty’s enemies in the different naval victories in the last war in St Paul’s, your Majesty will perhaps consider that Cathedral as the fittest place for this melancholy ceremony, as well as for the erection in future of such monuments as it may be determined to raise to the memory of those who may have rendered considerable naval and military services to their country.4)

As Hawkesbury indicated, there was a tradition of commemorating British victories in St Paul’s from the medieval period. In particular, he recollected the Naval Thanksgiving of 1797 as a recent and impressive instance. Immediately after the Battle of Camperdown in October 1797, the Foreign Secretary Lord Grenville communicated with Lord Spencer, the First Lord of the Admiralty, to suggest a naval procession to St Paul’s for morale enhancement. After Spencer accepted Grenville’s proposal, Prime Minister Pitt also agreed to this idea, but he furthermore demanded to expand its scope by including naval victories at Camperdown as well as the ‘Glorious First of June’ (1794) and St Vincent (1797).5) The Naval Thanksgiving thus illuminated the ministerial effort to exploit naval patriotism rather than mere royal

ritual. Although the Pitt ministry also planned another naval thanksgiving just after the battle of the Nile (1798), it could not help abandoning it because of the fear of the invasion from Revolutionary France.7)

In the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars periods, furthermore, the British parliament had continuously voted for the erection of national monuments amounting to 37, from 1793 to 1823 at a total cost of £119,175 (See, Table and Figure).8) While four monuments placed in Westminster Abbey were to commemorate naval captains and statesmen such as Pitt the Younger and Spencer Perceval, thirty-three monuments erected in St Paul’s were exclusively dedicated to high-ranking naval and military officers. Considering that parliament only approved the erection of four monuments before 1792 and seven after 1824, this official involvement in naval and military commemoration was unique and unprecedented in modern Britain, and comparable to the transformation of the Sainte-Geneviève Church into the Panthéon in Revolutionary Paris at the same period. St Paul’s was reinvented as a ‘British naval and military pantheon’, in which naval and military heroes were collectively commemorated.9)

6) Linda Colley argued this naval thanksgiving as an example of public royal ritual to imitate the Revolutionary France festival but she was mistaken to consider that the King was responsible ‘for the initial decision to hold a thanksgiving’. See, Linda Colley, Britons: forging the nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven, 1992), 215-16.
7) The Times, 2 November 1798, 2; William Eden, Baron Auckland, The journal and correspondence of William, Lord Auckland, 4 vols (1861-2), iv: 59; Pitt to Auckland, 4 October 1798.
8) "Return of monuments erected in Westminster Abbey and St Paul’s, at the public expense, from 1750 to the present time," House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (hereafter, HCPP), 1837-8, 36 (116), 471; "Report from the select committee on national monuments and works of art; with minutes of evidence, &c.,” HCPP, 1841 Session 1, 6 (416), 437; "Return of sums voted by parliament since 1792, for the erection of monuments in honour of public services performed,” HCPP, 1842, 26 (559), 505.
### National Monuments in St Paul’s Cathedral voted by Parliament, 1793–1823

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank in service</th>
<th>Voted</th>
<th>Cost (£)</th>
<th>Sculptor</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faulkner, Robert</td>
<td>Captain RN</td>
<td>14 April 1795</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>Rossi, John Charles Felix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunlop, Thomas</td>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>3 June 1795</td>
<td>3,150</td>
<td>Bacon, John, the Younger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgess, Richard Bundle</td>
<td>Captain RN</td>
<td>3 November 1797</td>
<td>5,250</td>
<td>Banks, Thomas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westcott, George Blagdon</td>
<td>Captain RN</td>
<td>21 November 1788</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>Banks, Thomas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howe, Richard, Earl Howe</td>
<td>Admiral of the Fleet</td>
<td>3 October 1790</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>Flaxman, John</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ross, Edward</td>
<td>Captain RN</td>
<td>16 April 1800</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>Rossi, John Charles Felix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosse, James Robert</td>
<td>Captain RN</td>
<td>16 May 1811</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>Westmacott, Sir Richard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson, Horatio, Viscount</td>
<td>Vice-Admiral</td>
<td>28 January 1806</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>Flaxman, John</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooke, John</td>
<td>Captain RN</td>
<td>28 January 1806</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>Westmacott, Sir Richard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duff George</td>
<td>Captain RN</td>
<td>28 January 1806</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>Bacon, John, the Younger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornwallis, Charles, Marquis</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>3 February 1806</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>Rossi, John Charles Felix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moore, Sir John</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>25 January 1809</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>Bacon, John, the Younger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hardinge, George Nicholas</td>
<td>Captain RN</td>
<td>18 May 1810</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>Manning, Samuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodney, George Bridges,</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>17 June 1810</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>Rossi, John Charles Felix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collingwood, Guthbert,</td>
<td>Vice-Admiral</td>
<td>8 June 1810</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>Westmacott, Sir Richard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houghton, Daniel</td>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>7 June 1811</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>Chantrey, Sir Francis Legatt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macdonell, John Ramsay</td>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>24 June 1811</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>Bacon, John, the Younger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Langworth, Robert</td>
<td>Brigadier-General</td>
<td>10 February 1812</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>Bacon, John, the Younger</td>
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<tr>
<td>MacKinnon, Henry</td>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>22 February 1812</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>Bacon, John, the Younger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craufurd, Robert</td>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>3 December 1812</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>Strath, James</td>
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<tr>
<td>Le Marchant, John Gaspard</td>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>13 July 1813</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>Westmacott, Sir Richard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadogan, Henry</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>13 July 1813</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>Chantrey, Sir Francis Legatt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bowes, Bernard</td>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>13 July 1813</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>Chantrey, Sir Francis Legatt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myers, Sir William</td>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel</td>
<td>13 July 1813</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>Kendrick, Josephus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Commemoration of Nelson and Trafalgar in St Paul’s Cathedral

| No.  | Name              | Rank              | Date       | Number | Monuments to
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Pakenham, Sir Edward Michael</td>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>5 June 1815</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>Westmacott, Sir Richard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Picton, Sir Thomas</td>
<td>Lieutenant-General</td>
<td>20 June 1815</td>
<td>3,150</td>
<td>Gahagan, Sebastian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Ponsonby, Sir William</td>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>20 June 1815</td>
<td>3,150</td>
<td>Theed, William</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Gillespie, Sir Robert Rolfe</td>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>21 June 1815</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>Chantrey, Sir Francis Legatt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Hay, Andrew</td>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>21 June 1815</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>Hopper, Humphrey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Gore, Arthur</td>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>21 June 1815</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>Chantrey, Sir Francis Legatt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Eliott, George Augustus, Baron Heathfield</td>
<td>Lieutenant-General</td>
<td>17 June 1793</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>Rossi, John Charles Felix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Duncan, Adam, Viscount Duncan of Camperdown</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>26 March 1823</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>Westmacott, Sir Richard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Jervis, John, Earl St. Vincent</td>
<td>Admiral of the Fleet</td>
<td>26 March 1823</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>Baily, Edward Hodges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We can observe an instance of correlation between the memory of navy and its heroes and St Paul’s even before Nelson’s funeral: the erection of the monument to Admiral Richard Lord Howe, the victor at the ‘Glorious First of June.’ Just after Howe’s death and burial in his family vault at Nottinghamshire in 1799, the parliament unanimously resolved to erect his monument at public expense. In this debate, Henry Dundas, the Secretary of State at War, voiced his preference to erect his monument in St Paul’s rather than Westminster Abbey by pointing to the enemy standard lodged as a war trophy and the thanksgiving service held for Howe’s victory: ‘the remembrance of his victory might accompany the remembrance of that solemnity with which the colours taken by him on the first of June were placed in that Cathedral’. Whilst the naval thanksgiving to celebrate his victory gave a strong sense to St Paul’s as a site for naval commemoration, its sacred memory simultaneously fascinated the erection of the monument to the departed admiral hero there.

10) The parliamentary register, or, history of the proceedings and debates of the Houses of Lords and Commons ... during the ... session of the eighteenth parliament of Great Britain, x, 94-5: Commons, 3 October 1799.
Nelson’s funeral as a naval ceremony

Nelson’s funeral was often described as a ‘state’ funeral without detailed consideration. The ‘state’ funeral has been a rare public occasion except for the case of royalty in modern Britain. According to John Wolffe, it was defined as a funeral superintended by the Earl Marshal and the College of Arms at the public expense.11) Contrary to this, funerals of the sovereign and the royal family became ‘private’ occasions and were mainly organized by the Lord Chamberlain and his office.12) Apart from Nelson, the following personnel have received the honour of a

12) Paul S. Fritz, "From ‘public’ to ‘private’: the royal funerals in England, 1500-1830," in Mirrors of
state funeral since the Restoration: the Duke of Albemarle (1670), the Earl of Sandwich (1672), Admiral Sir Cloudesley Shovell (1707), the Duke of Marlborough (1722), the Earl of Chatham (William Pitt the Elder, 1778), William Pitt the Younger (1806) and William Ewart Gladstone (1898) in Westminster Abbey, and the Duke of Wellington (1852) and Sir Winston Churchill (1965) in St Paul’s.

The role of the Lord Chamberlain and his office was surely important in organizing the complete interment service to grieve the dying hero. As the daily newspapers such as the *Morning Chronicle* and the *Sun* indicated, however, the role of the Herald’s college was also essential in Nelson’s funeral. Contemporaries anticipated that ‘the whole Cavalcade’ would be ‘ordered and regulated by the College of Heralds’ and ‘there shall be a grand funeral procession, with all military and national honours, made out by the College of Arms’.

This heraldic organization, of mediaeval origin, exercised control over the choreographed aspects of a state funeral: the heralds set up the heraldic protocol in compliance with the title and status of the deceased, and chiefly determined the hierarchical order of participants, the disposal of banners and standards in the procession, and ceremonial procedure. But such a protocol did not follow precedent or an entrenched style. It could respond to necessary alterations due to public opinion. The public were particularly concerned with the heraldic devices surrounding Nelson’s body and the procession at the funeral. The ministers and Sir Isaac Heard, the Garter King of Arms, who shared responsibility to consider the heraldic devices and order of procession, also paid special attention to these choreographed representations. The state funeral of Nelson led to a departure from ordinary heraldic military funeral.

In the order of the funeral procession, the position of chief mourner was principally noticed and discussed by newspapers and magazines as well as by ministers and the Herald’s office. Conventionally, the immediate heir of the deceased became the chief mourner to emphasize the lineal succession and to claim the heir’s legitimacy in inheriting the deceased’s title and status. This convention also gave emphasis to the hierarchical order of society. Yet it was out of the question that any member of Nelson’s family should become the chief mourner. The

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13) Brockliss, Cardwell and Moss, “Nelson’s grand national obsequies.”
14) The *Sun*, 14 November 1805, p. 3; *Morning Chronicle*, 14 November 1805, 3.
organizers of Nelson’s funeral considered the Prince of Wales or Charles Middleton, Lord Barham and the First Lord of the Admiralty, as chief mourner. In December 1805, they thought of Sir Peter Parker, Admiral of the Fleet and Nelson’s early mentor, as a candidate and subsequently settled on him.

The choice of Admiral Parker as the chief mourner apparently affirmed Nelson’s funeral as a naval pageant rather than a heraldic one. This decision illustrated that the Royal Navy and its officer corps would assert the succession of his genius and bravery. The aim of the organizers was to emphasize that the British navy was more prodigious than those of other European powers. We have to notice that this decision was made after Napoleon’s victories at Ulm and Austerlitz (October and December 1805). Furthermore, if Barham, a member of the Pitt ministry, filled the position of chief mourner, the public would regard it as a show of political partisanship. Surely Pitt and his fellow politicians wanted to appropriate the meaning of Nelson’s death for their political cause, for the popularity of the present ministry had been greatly undermined by the Melville Affair. Any kind of indication of political selection might have the opposite effect in such national occasion. In that light, Admiral Parker was a more suitable pick than Barham.

Following the choice of the most senior naval commander as chief mourner, it became clear that many naval officers would attend the funeral procession and the interment service. Admirals Lord Hood and Lord Radstock were assigned as supporters of the chief mourner and thirty-one admirals attended as pall-bearers, canopy-bearers, or assistant mourners; while a hundred and one captains and thirty-three lieutenants, including Thomas Masterman Hardy and Rear-Admiral Sir Eriab Harvey who had fought with Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar, attended to bear the standards and banners. Such a naval presence at Nelson’s funeral made it greatly different from former heraldic military funerals of Albemarle, Sandwich, and

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16) The College of Arms (hereafter, CA), Funeral of Viscount Nelson MS, RRG LXIII A, fo. 106: Notes, dated 20 November 1805. I am indebted to Robert Yorke, the archivist of the College of Arms, for being able to read papers relating to Nelson’s funeral and the order of merit.


18) See also, Jenks, ‘Contesting the hero’, pp. 427-9.

19) E.g., Cobbett’s Weekly Political Register, viii, 16 November 1805, col. 740.

20) For the account of the funeral procession in the London Gazette, 14-8 January 1806, 53-60. However, we have to notice that such a funeral account was not the actual practice but the plan and program suggested by the organizers.
Marlborough.

However, the most striking feature of Nelson's funeral was that a cohort of Greenwich pensioners and veterans of the Victory participated in the funeral procession. At a traditional heraldic funeral, 'poor' people were summoned to attend and one was chosen for each year of the deceased's age.\footnote{Gittings, Death, burial, and the individual, 27-29.} The sailors included in the funeral service were substitutes for them. Though the attendance of the Greenwich pensioners was expected by the arrangement that the lying-in-state would be held in the Painted Hall at Greenwich, this decision was both symbolic and patriotic: those who had sacrificed their limbs in the service of their country were associated with Nelson's figure — he had also lost his eye and right arm in the naval service. The organizers of Nelson's funeral also decided to include some ordinary sailors and marines of the Victory in the funeral procession. The crew of the Victory might have been rewarded for their loyalty to Nelson, or perhaps this decision responded to public opinion.\footnote{Jenks, "Contesting the hero," 436; Colin White, “The immortal memory: the development of the Nelson legend from 1805 to the present,” in The Nelson companion, ed. C. White (Stroud, 1995), 7-8.}

Not only did admirals, naval officers and sailors participate in the funeral service but 10,000 men of military regiments under Lieutenant-General Sir David Dundas marshalled the funeral procession on the route guarded by volunteers. These soldiers were mainly from regiments 'that fought and conquered in Egypt, and had participated with the departed Hero, the glory of delivering that part of the world from the tyrannic ambition of the French'.\footnote{Adam Collingwood, Anecdotes of the late Lord Viscount Nelson; including copious accounts of the three great victories obtained over the combined forces of France, Spain, &c. off the Nile, Copenhagen, & Trafalgar, ... an authentic account of his death, ... to which is added, the ceremonial of his funeral, ... also select poetry (1806), 112.} Amongst the troops, the 92nd and 79th, two Scottish Highland regiments, participated in the procession and burial service.\footnote{Collingwood, Anecdotes of the late Lord Viscount Nelson, 113, 125; The Times, 10 January 1806, 3-4.} They were considered to have played a prominent part in that expedition to Egypt under the command of the Scottish General Sir Ralph Abercromby, who died in a battle near Alexandria.\footnote{Cf. Piers Mackesy, British victory in Egypt 1801: the end of Napoleon's conquest (1995).} The presence of these armed forces evoked for the public both Nelson’s victory at the Battle of the Nile and the late British victory over Napoleon in 1801. As well as many attendants of the naval profession, the
military forces in procession alleviated the fear of invasion and hence displayed British naval and military prowess over Napoleonic France:

The grand display of troops, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, the finest soldiers the universe ever beheld, gratified the eyes of the British public, and satisfied their understandings that, with such defenders, ready to repair, at a moment’s warning, to any threatened point of attack, no enemy, or combination of enemies, could make any impression in the attempt to invade.\textsuperscript{26)}

The public paid attention to the devices surrounding Nelson’s body as well as the funeral procession: the coffin and the funeral car. After the arrival of the \textit{Victory} off the Nore, the remains of Nelson were removed from a leaguer of spirits to a plain coffin, made from timbers from the French flagship \textit{L’Orient} at the Battle of the Nile, which was presented to Nelson by Captain Benjamin Hallowell. This coffin was enclosed in an ornamented and elaborate outer coffin designed by Ackermann brothers under the direction of the Herald’s office. There were many devices to indicate Nelson’s coat of arms, the orders of chivalry, his trophies, and other symbols. For instance, a crocodile and sphinx were depicted as attributes of the battle of the Nile: in the centre of the coffin, there were ‘Britannia and Neptune riding triumphant on the ocean, drawn by sea-horses, and led by Fame’ to represent Nelson’s immortality.\textsuperscript{27)} This magnificent coffin was laid in the Painted Hall, Greenwich, and shown to the public from 5 to 7 January 1806.

In the funeral procession on 9 January from the Admiralty to St Paul’s, this coffin was laid on a funeral car designed by Ange Denis Macquin, a friend of Sir Isaac Heard. Such a funeral car was the prominent feature of a heraldic military funeral in England. Nelson’s funeral car was also specially designed to recall Nelson’s exploits and career: it was shaped in the form of Nelson’s flagship, the \textit{Victory}, and its head was adorned with the figure of Fame: there were many decorations such as ostrich feathers, black velvet bordered with a magnificent gold fringe, and heraldic escutcheons as well as the outer coffin: its canopy was supported by four columns representing palm trees: on one side of canopy was inscribed Nelson’s motto, ‘\textit{Palmam qui meruit ferat}’ [Let he who has earned it bear the palm] and on the other, ‘\textit{Hoste devicto requiesit}’ [The enemy having been defeated, he rested]. On the back and front of the canopy were the names ‘Nile’ and ‘Trafalgar’. This funeral car

\textsuperscript{26)} Collingwood, \textit{Anecdotes of the late Lord Viscount Nelson}, 113.
\textsuperscript{27)} Collingwood, \textit{Anecdotes of the late Lord Viscount Nelson}, 102-104.
served as a remembrance of Nelson and deeply impressed the spectators at the funeral procession.28)

We can observe that many prints to illustrate the magnificent coffin and funeral car with their captions were produced and distributed. For example, The Times on 10 January 1806 devoted a large space to describe the scene of the funeral procession and the interment service as well as illustrations of the coffin and funeral car.29) Prints illustrating the coffin, funeral car, and funeral procession were very popular and served to share the memory of the departed national hero among Britons. After the funeral service, the funeral car was presented to Greenwich Hospital and displayed in the Painted Hall, becoming another destination for Nelson pilgrimage until its decay.30)

The invention of an official ‘Trafalgar day’

The state funeral was not the only ministerial effort to commemorate Nelson. Along with the discussion and preparation of the funeral arrangements, the Pitt ministry considered inaugurating a new order of merit as reward for distinguished naval and military officers. From early November, cabinet members such as Pitt, Hawkesbury, Mulgrave, Castlereagh and Barham, had frequently met to argue for the inauguration of a new ‘Naval and Military Order of Merit’ at Downing Street and instructed Sir Isaac Heard to write a draft of statutes for this order.31) There was a remarkable point in the creation of this order: the invention of an official ‘Trafalgar Day’ with a solemn investiture ceremony in St Paul’s Cathedral.

There had been attempts to create a new order of merit as a reward for naval and military heroes before the Battle of Trafalgar. Immediately after the arrival of news of victory at St Vincent in 1797, Charles Small Pybus, a Lord of the Admiralty, proposed to Lord Spencer to create a new ‘Naval Order of Merit’.32) In his proposal,

29) The Times, 10 January 1806, 2-3.
31) CA, Order of Merit MS, RR59b, fo. 1: Lord Barham to Heard, 9 November 1805; fo. 2: William Pitt to Heard, 10 November; fo. 3: Note on the Paper received from Mr Pitt, dated 11 November 1805. Here I chiefly depend on the copy of statutes, proposed by Heard to Lord Spencer in June 1806, included in the Liverpool Papers in British Library (hereafter, BL), Add MS 38378, fos. 19-47. See also, The National Archives (hereafter, TNA), Chatham Papers, 2nd ser., PRO 30/8/144/1, fos. 7-8: Heard to Pitt, 21 November 1805.
Pybus suggested that distinguished gallantry and conduct in the navy should be rewarded with this honour, which was divided into three graduated ranks, corresponding to the succession of flags in the fleet: red, white and blue. It is uncertain whether the Pitt ministry considered this proposal but the plan to create an order of merit was suddenly revived in December 1804. According to Joseph Farington, a landscape painter, George III intended to establish a ‘New Order of Honour of Naval Knights’. There is no doubt that Napoleon’s Legion of Honour, whose first investiture was held in July 1804 at the Invalides, triggered this intention.33)

The victory of Trafalgar and the death of Nelson stimulated the creation of a new order of merit to promote naval and military heroics on an unprecedented scale. According to drafts written by Heard, the ‘Naval and Military Order of Merit’ would be headed by the Sovereign and two Grand Masters and divided into three ranks: Knights Chiefs, Knights Commanders, and Knights. These ranks, in unlimited number, would be bestowed for distinguished service and would correspond to ranks in the services. While the rank of knight was to be conferred on commissioned officers in both naval and military services, subordinate officers such as midshipmen, non-commissioned officers, and ordinary sailors and soldiers could receive gold and silver medals. In particular, master’s mates and midshipmen with the honour of a gold medal were entitled to the rank of knight just after their promotion to lieutenant in the navy.34)

In an early memorandum of the ministerial meeting, Pitt had already proposed that the investiture ceremony of this order of merit would be held in the choir of St Paul’s, and thus that the dean of this cathedral would also assume the deanship of the order in the solemn ordination ceremonies.35) Banners and plates inscribed with names, arms, titles, ranks and dates of achievements would be fixed in the choir. Despite the removal of the banners after the death of officers for the

32) The following descriptions depend on Corbett, Private papers of George, second Earl Spencer, ii, pp. 205-7: Mr Pybus’s Proposal for a Naval Order of Merit. Strength upon the Establishment of an Order of Naval Merit, dated 7 March 1797.
34) CA, Order of Merit MS, RR59b, fo. 5, et passim; BL, Add MS 38378, f. 2. 3-7.
35) CA, Order of Merit MS, RR59b, fo. 3; TNA, PRO 30/8/144/1, fos. 9-10: Observations concerning the Officer of the Order of Merit to be called “Victory”, by Heard, dated 16 December 1805; fos. 15-6: Heard to Pitt, 16 December 1805. See also, CA, Order of Merit MS, RR59b, fo. 31: Copy of Letter: Heard to Pitt, 16 December 1805; BL, Add MS 38378, fos. 23, 36-40.
The Commemoration of Nelson and Trafalgar in St Paul’s Cathedral

reception of another knight, the plate was to remain there as ‘a lasting Memorial’.

More significantly, the creation of the ‘Naval and Military Order of Merit’ was to constitute the official ‘Trafalgar Day’. According to the fourteenth clause in the statutes, the 21st of October in every year would be ‘the Anniversary of the glorious and ever memorable Victory near Cape Trafalgar’ and ‘all such Knights of the three Ranks, who may be attended, shall repair to the said Cathedral’. Like the investiture ceremony of the Order of the Bath in Westminster Abbey, the investiture of the new ‘Naval and Military Order of Merit’ would be accompanied by solemn ceremony and a military procession. The inauguration of the ‘Naval and Military Order of Merit’ would provide another opportunity for naval and military commemoration to associate with the memory of Nelson at St Paul’s.

Although the draft of statutes, and designs for badges, collars, insignia and dresses were prepared in the winter of 1805-6, and the royal warrant published, the inauguration of the new ‘Naval and Military Order of Merit’ was suddenly abandoned. The most significant reason of this failure might have been the death of William Pitt in January 1806, who earnestly exploited naval patriotism for ministerial cause. In later years, William Wilberforce lamented that the plan for the new order remained to be premature after his friend’s death. The ‘Trafalgar Day’, the convention to commemorate Nelson and Trafalgar every 21 October, failed to penetrate Britons until the end of the nineteenth century.

Naval and military pantheon or Nelson’s mausoleum?

Just after the death of Nelson, the British public did not only want a state funeral for the dying hero. They also desired the erection of public monuments to Nelson. Although we take it for granted that his contemporaries attempted to erect many monuments to Nelson, this momentum was an unprecedented phenomenon — no naval or military heroes in the eighteenth century were honoured in such a manner except in a few instances. There were both local and national movements to erect monuments to Nelson. For instance, there was a project to raise a massive national monument funded by nation-wide public subscription, a precedent for the

36) BL, Add MS 38378, fo. 38.
37) Parliamentary debates, 1st ser., xiv, cols. 611-2: Commons, 18 May 1809.
38) Yarrington, The commemoration of the hero.
project of the Nelson Column at Trafalgar Square in later years.\textsuperscript{39)}

In any case, the public were particularly fascinated by the scheme to erect a public monument to the memory of Nelson in St Paul’s, which could become the focal point of a British naval and military pantheon. Although the designs and forms of the monument were deliberated in newspapers and magazines, the consideration of many commentators chiefly focused on the site to place the monument in St Paul’s. Some insisted that Nelson’s monument should be placed beneath the centre of the dome. Robert Mylne, the architect and surveyor of St Paul’s, proposed to Lord Hawkesbury and the dean and chapter to erect his monument under the dome. This proposal was based on the historical ground that Sir Christopher Wren seemed to have desired his monument to be erected under the dome of that cathedral. If Mylne’s project were approved, ‘a large stone pillar will rise from the grave a considerable distance, a colossal figure of the deceased on the top of it’.\textsuperscript{40)} His suggestion was an attempt to confer special meaning on the memory of Nelson in the space of St Paul’s. Numbers of people supported such plans and believed that Nelson’s monument should be erected in the most conspicuous site in St Paul’s.\textsuperscript{41)}

The plans to raise a monument there were opposed on architectural, aesthetic and religious grounds.\textsuperscript{42)} In particular, members of the Royal Academy of Arts were strongly opposed to having the monument erected in the centre of the crossing. When George III, through Lord Hawkesbury, informed the Royal Academy of his desire that ‘the members of the Academy would make designs for a monument to the Memory of Lord Nelson for His Majesty’s selection’, the members of the Royal Academy met to discuss the issue of Nelson’s monument in compliance with the intention of the King on 13 December 1805.\textsuperscript{43)} At that meeting, John Flaxman, who was the sculptor selected to erect the Nelson’s monument in St Paul’s, opposed the prevailing idea that the monument should be erected beneath the crossing on religious grounds. According to Farington, Flaxman considered that it would become an obstruction to observing the choir and lead to ‘present as a first object in a place formed for the Worship of the Almighty the figure & the idea of Mortal Man as the principal object of attention’. The portrait painter John Hoppner supported

\textsuperscript{39)} The Times, 6 January 1806, 3.
\textsuperscript{40)} The Times, 30 November 1805, 3; 7 December 1805, 2.
\textsuperscript{41)} Gentleman’s Magazine, lxxv, December 1805, 1119-20. Cf. The Times, 26 December 1805, 3.
\textsuperscript{42)} Ibid., 30 December 1805, 3; 6 January 1806, 3.
\textsuperscript{43)} BL, Flaxman Papers, Add MS 39791, fos. 15-6: Richards to Flaxman, 19 December 1805 and a copy of letter from Hawkesbury to Richards, 11 December 1805; FD, vii: 2658, 11 December 1805.
Flaxman's statement and feared that it would not leave similar honours for a national hero in the future. He warned against a strong hero cult and the excessive scope of a naval and military pantheon.\(^{44}\) Though many Britons agreed that the exploits and merit of Nelson should be rewarded with the honour of a national monument in St Paul's, there were different opinions concerning the exact site.

After the last honours and tributes had been paid to Nelson, and after a long and fierce argument relating to funeral honours for Pitt the Younger at the opening of parliament, a vote of thanks to the victors at the battle of Trafalgar and an address to erect monuments to the memory of Nelson were unanimously resolved on 28 January 1806. In next year, the Treasury contracted with Flaxman for the commission to erect Nelson's monument at the cost 6,000 guineas in October 1807.\(^{45}\) After a long delay due to his other commissions, Flaxman's Nelson monument was finally unveiled in May 1818.\(^{46}\) As he desired, the site for this monument in St Paul's was not at the centre under the dome but in the great piers between the dome and the choir, similar to Rossi's monument to the Marquis Cornwallis.

This monument, in an immense pyramidal design, was a mixture of the contemporary and the allegorical: it consisted of a colossal statue of Nelson in naval uniform raised on the pedestal; a figure of Minerva instructing two young naval cadets and a crouching British lion on each side below Nelson's statue; the front of the pedestal was carved with the names 'Trafalgar', 'Nile' and 'Copenhagen' and was engraved with three Sea Gods in relief, representing the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the North Sea. It was also evident that Flaxman had idealized the figure of Nelson in his monument. Although Nelson's right eye in that statue was as intact as in other portraits, statues and busts, his lost right arm was carefully concealed by a pelisse which Nelson had received from the Grand Signor.\(^{47}\) Contemporaries scarcely appreciated this monument but its narrative of allegory was obvious: heroic Nelson was the exemplar to fascinate younger generations in the navy.\(^{48}\)

On the other hand, the body of Nelson was buried in the crossing of the crypt under the dome, the most important site in that cathedral. This was due in part to

\(^{44}\) FD, 2660-1, 14 December 1805.


\(^{46}\) Gentleman's Magazine, lxxxviii, May 1818, 462; The Times, 14 May 1818, 3.

\(^{47}\) BL, Flaxman Papers, Add MS 39790, fos. 19-20: Flaxman to Mrs Flaxman, February 1806.

\(^{48}\) Cf. George Lewis Smyth, The monuments and genii of St Paul's Cathedral and Westminster Abbey; comprising naval & military heroes, poets, statesmen, artists, authors, &c. &c. &c. (1826), 684-85.
the proposal by Robert Mylne. Although Mylne, James Wyatt and even Italian sculptor Antonio Canova suggested the design of a tomb, the board of the Treasury instructed the diversion of a black marble sarcophagus, made for Cardinal Wolsey in the sixteenth century and long reserved in Windsor Castle, with the least alteration.\textsuperscript{49} A viscount’s coronet and a cushion were placed on the sarcophagus and the following words were inscribed in letters of gold metal on one side of the pedestal: ‘HORATIO. VISC. NELSON’. The work for Nelson’s tomb proceeded concurrently with that for his monument, but seems to have been finished in early 1810.\textsuperscript{50}

In the same year, St Paul’s received another admiral hero of Trafalgar. Admiral Lord Collingwood, the second command to Nelson and commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet as his successor, died of disease on his voyage and was buried beside the tomb of Nelson in the crypt of St Paul’s. Although not organized as a state funeral, Collingwood’s funeral was performed along the same lines as Nelson’s: a lying-in-state in the Painted Hall, Greenwich Hospital, and a funeral procession with the attendance of Greenwich pensioners. There were many important naval figures such as Lord Mulgrave, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord St Vincent, the superior officer of Nelson and Collingwood, Sir Peter Parker and Lord Cochrane, a radical leader.\textsuperscript{51} In June 1831, Lord Northesk, the third in command at Trafalgar, was buried at the other side of Nelson’s tomb.\textsuperscript{52}

Even if the dean and chapters of St Paul’s tolerantly permitted the erection of naval and military monuments, they did not approve the burial of naval and military heroes until the 1850s. The funerals of Collingwood and Northesk were exceptionally admitted because of their connection with the memory of Nelson and Trafalgar. In addition, two of Nelson’s kinsmen, William Earl Nelson and his son Horatio Nelson, ‘Lord Trafalgar’, were also buried near the tomb of Nelson in the crypt. Contrary to the monument, which did not attract sufficient public concern, his tomb not only occupied the most important place in St Paul’s; the burial of naval heroes and individuals was permitted to enhance the characteristics of this mausoleum of national martyrdom.

\textsuperscript{49} Morning Herald, 16 January 1806, 2; TNA, T27/61, fo. 47: George Harrison to James Wyatt, 9 February 1808; The Treasury, Minute Books, T29/91, fo. 389: 13 August 1807; T29/93, fo. 266: 2 February 1808; T29/122, fo. 526: 6 April 1813.

\textsuperscript{50} E.g., David Hughson [David Pugh], \textit{London: being an accurate history and description of the British metropolis and its neighbourhood to thirty miles extent, from an actual perambulation}, 6 vols (1805-9), vi: 596.

\textsuperscript{51} Naval Chronicle, xxiii (1810): 383-84; The Times, 12 May 1810, 4.

\textsuperscript{52} The Times, 7 June 1831, 3; 9 June 1831, 5.
The state funeral of Nelson was a watershed both in the history of state ceremonial in Britain and of St Paul’s Cathedral. Not only was it the first state funeral held at St Paul’s but it was regarded as an unprecedented occasion by contemporaries. For example, the Naval Chronicle insisted: 'Thus terminated one of the most impressive and most splendid solemnities that ever took place in this country, or perhaps in Europe'.\(^{53}\) It could not estimate the number of people who visited the lying-in-state in Greenwich or who viewed the funeral procession. An eyewitness remarked on the public respect and grief for Nelson, beyond class and rank, observed in London: 'During the whole of this solemn ceremony, the greatest order prevailed throughout the metropolis; and as the Remains of the much-lamented Hero proceeded along, every possible testimony of sorrow and of respect was manifested by an immense concourse of spectators of all ranks'.\(^{54}\)

This series of projects to commemorate Nelson and Trafalgar in 1805-6 the state funeral, the invention of official ‘Trafalgar Day’ and the erection of his monument and tomb can be considered to have reconstituted St Paul’s into a national shrine dedicated to the memory of the greatest naval hero rather than a naval and military pantheon. This memory was simultaneously perpetuated and privileged through this metropolitan cathedral. Although this meant the expansion of the potential and scope of naval and military state commemoration in Britain, there was a danger of strong hero-worship to Nelson.

Without any effort of continuance, the conjunction of St Paul’s with the pantheonization of the hero might be contingent on the period of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the ‘first total war’.\(^{55}\) As shown in public funerals of Wellington and other military heroes in later years, however, traditions of commemoration are thus revealed as living forces, which are shaped and reshaped in every generation; it further affirms the significance of Nelson as the national hero in St Paul’s, which was ‘our Pantheons, our Valhalla, our Chapel of the Invalides’.\(^{56}\)

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54) Gentleman’s Magazine, lxxvi (1806): 71. E.g., The Times, 7 January 1806, 3; 9 January 1806, 3; 10 January 1806, 4; Archibald Duncan, A correct narrative of the funeral of Horatio Lord Viscount Nelson (1806), 47.
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**Secondary Sources**


Socialism without Socialists:
The Status of Socialism in Public Debate in Britain in the 1890s*

Sangsoo Kim**

Abstract
This study is an attempt to approach the history of socialism in Britain in the late Victorian period from the perspective of discursive analysis. It analyses how the language of socialism was understood and defined by political commentators in major periodicals and newspapers in Britain in the 1890s. Existing historical research on socialism in Britain has not paid enough attention to the fact that the public debate, usually around Westminster, on ‘Socialism’ was not led by socialists but by anti- or non-socialist political commentators. Most of the political commentators who used the term ‘Socialism’ at the time were not interested in the activities of British socialists, while censuring radical policies for its ‘Socialist’ tendency. The discursive analysis of their intentions and their results will provide a new explanation for how the term ‘Socialism’ came to refer to the Liberal social reforms rather than the activities of real socialists in the late Victorian period.

Keywords: Britain, 1890s, socialism, discursive analysis, periodicals, newspapers.

* This article is based on some parts of the author’s PhD dissertation, The Language of Socialism in Public Debate in Britain, 1880-1914 (2004, The University of Cambridge).
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This article pays attention to the public debate in which various interpretations of ‘Socialism’ influenced each other, rather than to theoretical discussions by politicians or political thinkers on socialism or social reform. For this reason, periodicals, and sometimes newspapers, with various political orientations are the main sources for this article. There were a large number of periodicals in Victorian Britain, varying from the right to the left of the political spectrum. Although the history of these periodicals is important, it is not necessary to allocate much space to that subject in this article; the analysis of the socio-economic or political backgrounds of the reviewers, editors, and proprietors is not the primary objective of this article. Nevertheless, it is necessary to explain why some periodicals are considered more important than others.

One of the most valuable sources for the history of Victorian periodicals is *The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals, 1824-1900.* This well-organised reference work provides not only the indexes to important periodicals but also a brief but detailed history of each one. In the Victorian age, periodicals were one of the most important means through which many intellectuals expressed and exchanged their opinions about various subjects. Indeed, they are ‘remarkable record[s] of contemporary thought in every field, with a full range of opinion on every major question — a range exceeding what could be found, in many cases, in such books as were devoted to the topic being investigated.’ Not least because this article is interested in how various interpretations of ‘Socialism’ influenced each other, periodicals through which intellectuals exchanged their opinions are its most important sources.

According to *The Wellesley Index*, the most influential periodicals in the Victorian age were the *Quarterly Review*, the *Edinburgh Review*, and the *Westminster Review*. Their political orientations were tory, whig, and radical respectively. Because this article focuses on the differences between various definitions of ‘Socialism’ made by non- or anti-socialist commentators, the three most influential periodicals with distinctive political orientations are its main sources. However, such categorisation of political orientations of periodicals is by no means an absolute criterion by which this article analyses various definitions of ‘Socialism’. As it approaches the history of socialism on a discursive level, the political interests of authors, editors,

and proprietors or their relationship with political parties are not regarded as the cause of changes in definitions of the term 'Socialism'. For example, this article does not assume that the prime reason why articles in the *Quarterly Review* used the term 'Socialism' in order to criticise the Liberal social reforms was that the socio-economic or political interests of the author and the *Quarterly Review* were in line with the Conservative Party. This kind of explanation does not fully answer the question of why some other articles in conservative periodicals did not use the term 'Socialism' when they criticised the Liberal social reforms, or why there were different definitions of the term 'Socialism' even in the same periodicals. In other words, periodical articles were not controlled by political parties. Nor was the term 'Socialism'. Thus in order to answer this question, one should not seek to establish a causal relationship between political activity and political discourse. From a linguistic perspective, as Stedman Jones emphasises, to analyse the socio-economic or political interests of the authors, editors, and proprietors is merely to repeat the question. Instead, we should perform a discursive analysis of the relationships between various definitions of 'Socialism'. This is not least because the political orientations and intentions of those who used the term 'Socialism' were articulated only through discourse.

This article also looks at some other periodicals and newspapers dealing with the topic of 'Socialism'. John Mason has observed that seven journals including the three above were most important in Britain from 1865 to 1914. The other four were the *Contemporary Review*, the *Fortnightly Review*, the *Nineteenth Century (and After)*, and the *National Review*. However, with the exception of the *National Review*, these periodicals rarely used the term 'Socialism' when dealing with the political situation in Britain. They tended to restrict the usage of this term to socialism in foreign countries or socialism as a political theory which was not relevant to politics in Britain. This was also the case with the *Westminster Review*. Because this periodical used the term 'Socialism' more frequently than other non-conservative periodicals and because this was the oldest of them, this article mainly compares the *Westminster Review* with conservative periodicals while only occasionally drawing attention to other periodicals.

As for the *National Review*, although it frequently used the term 'Socialism' when dealing with the question of social reform in Britain, its influence on the public

debate was not as great as that of the Quarterly Review or the Edinburgh Review. According to the Newspaper Press Directory, the Quarterly Review was advertised as 'Essays on General Literature, Politics, Reviews (Conservative)'; the Edinburgh Review as 'Essays on Literature, Science, and Politics (Liberal)'; and the Westminster Review as 'General Literature and Politics (Liberal)', throughout the Victorian and Edwardian periods. On the contrary, the Contemporary Review was advertised as 'Theological, Literary, and Social'; the Fortnightly Review as 'Politics, Literature, Criticisms (Mthly.)'; the Nineteenth Century (and After) as 'Original Articles on Topics of the Day, by Eminent Writers'. It follows that these periodicals were not considered as politically serious as the three older periodicals. The National Review was advertised as 'Political (Conservative), Literary' between 1884 and 1910, and as 'Political and General' between 1910 and 1914: it was not constantly regarded as a Conservative periodical. In addition, the pattern of the usage of the term 'Socialism' in this periodical was not very different from that in the Quarterly Review. This was also the case of Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine (Maga), which was advertised as 'Political (Conservative) and general Literature'. For this reason, the National Review and of Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine deserves the attention of this article. Articles in the National Review, however, do not appear in this article, as they rarely used the language of socialism in the 1890s.

After Gladstone introduced the Irish Home Rule Bill in 1886, a group of Liberals defected to form their own Liberal Unionist party in opposition to his policy and won the general election of the same year allied with the Conservatives. This group consisted of radical Unionists led by Joseph Chamberlain and moderate Unionists who followed the Marquess of Hartington, most of whom were from the landed class. Thereafter, the Liberals and their Irish Nationalist allies were occasionally called 'Home Rulers', while the Conservatives and the Liberal Unionists were grouped as 'Unionists'. The Liberal Party was now completely dependent upon support from the Irish Nationalists in order to come to power. Indeed, Gladstone won the general election of 1892 with their support and proposed a second Home Rule Bill, which was rejected by the Lords. He retired in 1894 and was succeeded by Lord Rosebery. After he lost the general election of the following year, the Liberal Party had to remain as the opposition party for a decade.

From the Unionist point of view, the Liberal Party was now a pure Radical party

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4) They were merged officially in 1912.
because it had driven out a large number of whigs while retaining many radicals despite the defection of Chamberlain.5) Under such circumstances, ideological differences between tory and whig periodicals were blurred even further and both of them began fervently to accuse the Liberal Party of sacrificing national interests for its electoral success. Alexander Michie, in *Maga*, regarded the Irish Home Rule Bill as 'surrender to the Irish.'6) In terms of the interests of the landed class, the question of Ireland was closely related to the nationalisation of land because both of them were based on the idea that 'land is the common inheritance of all, and should be secured for the use of all.'7) Therefore, to conservative commentators, 'surrender to the Irish' was a prelude to surrender to the radical demand for the nationalisation of land. Clement M. Bailhache claimed that 'Land Nationalisation, then, is more than a reform: it is a revolution — a complete reversal of the economic laws and ideas obtaining among all civilised nations.'8)

In the 1880s, some conservative commentators had already alleged that the radical demand for land reform was influenced by socialism. In the 1890s, they began to feel that such an influence, unchecked by the old whigs, might rapidly develop. They also feared that the leaders of the Liberal Party, who had already compromised with the Irish Nationalists, would easily commit similar errors when dealing with socialism. Some of the commentators believed that a number of unleashed socialists were secretly spreading through the political network of the Liberal Party. Based on this belief, they began to ascribe as many Liberal policies as possible to the growing influence of socialists.

However, conservative periodicals did not pay much attention to the activities of  


6) A. Michie, "The Gladstonian Myth," *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* 155 (July 1894): 581. Alexander Michie (1833-1902): writer on China; born at Earlsferry, Fifeshire, on 1 March 1833; only son of Alexander Michie, a weaver, by his wife Ann Laing; on his father's death his mother married again; Robert Thin, M. D. Edinburgh (d. at Shanghai in 1867), and George Thin, M.D. Edinburgh, of London, were Michie's stepbrothers; educated for commercial life at Kilconquhar school; left England to join Lindsay and Co., merchants, at Hong-Kong (1853); became a partner of his firm and its representative at Shanghai (1857); subsequently transferred his services successively to Chapman, King and Co., to Dye, Nichol and Co., in which he obtained a partnership, and finally to the leading Chinese firm, Jardine, Matheson and Co; a prominent member of the Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, and a chairman for some years.


British socialist organisations. They were more concerned about the probable connection between the Liberals and socialists than about who these socialists were. It was the *Westminster Review* that dealt with socialism as the main topic most frequently. The number of articles that included 'Socialism' or 'Socialist' in their titles increased from 6 in the 1880s to 9 in the 1890s. By contrast, it diminished significantly in conservative periodicals: only 1 in the *Quarterly Review*, and none in the *Edinburgh Review*.\(^9\) Therefore, the intensification of the conservative allegation that socialists were working together with the Liberal Party was not accompanied by an increase of interest in socialism *per se*.

### Growing Fear of Fabian 'Permeation'

While fear of socialism was building up in conservative periodicals, the actual influence of British socialist organisations diminished further. With the exception of the ILP, founded by Keir Hardie in 1893, most socialist organisations were not capable of sending their own members to parliament.\(^10\) This was mainly because they did not want to compromise with trade unionism, on the grounds that it did not aim at the collapse of capitalism but just tried to improve the living standards of the working class within the existing capitalist system. The SDF, led by Hyndman, was particularly antagonistic to trade unionists. Although William Morris generally supported trade unionism, many other members of the Socialist League, such as John Lincoln Mahon and Fred Jowett, preferred more revolutionary methods, which made Morris leave them in 1890 to begin his 'Socialist Unity' movement.\(^11\) Such

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\(^10\) Although four future members of the ILP, including Hardie, had been returned as independent labour members at the general election of 1892, none of its 28 candidates were elected in the 1895 election.

divisions made it more difficult for socialism to spread through the working class in Britain.

By contrast, the ILP took much more favourable attitudes towards trade unionism. Its main concern lay in the representation of the working class in parliament, not in the realisation of socialism, although its members frequently asserted that their ultimate goal was socialism. In this sense, the ILP was the least socialistic of all the British socialist organisations. It did not even use the term ‘Socialist’ in its name. Nevertheless, because its political activity was much more successful than that of other socialist organisations conservative reviewers tended to regard it as a more powerful socialist organisation than the SDF or the Socialist League, which were, by this process, alienated further from the conservative debate on socialism.

It was the Fabian Society that was most frequently connected to the Liberal Party in conservative periodicals among British socialists. According to Laybourn, the main feature of Fabian socialism was that it negated Marx’s labour theory of value and his emphasis upon class conflict while supporting Henry George’s emphasis upon rent, which involved the nationalisation of land and progressive taxation. In other words, the Fabians aimed to ‘play down the importance of class conflict and to stress the need to extend gradually the control of the state and municipal authorities in order to redress the economic imbalance.’

In order to ‘gradually’ control the state, Sidney Webb stressed the need to permeate the radicals and Liberals: it was this strategy that alarmed conservative opinion. In consequence, some reviewers began to suspect that many socialists, directed by the ‘permeation’ strategy of the Fabians, were secretly and gradually taking control of the Liberal Party. Therefore, it seems that the doctrine of the Fabian Society was responsible for a large part of the conservative fear of the spread of socialism in the Liberal Party. In this sense, the influence of the Fabian Society upon the development of socialism was significant.

However, although Laybourn observes that Fabian Essays in Socialism (1889) was selling many copies, the actual influence of the Fabian Society upon the Liberal Party is quite difficult to estimate. Even when it was suspected by some conservative reviewers that the Fabians were behind the Liberal policies, the target of the Fabian

———. Bradford in 1906.


Society oscillated between the ILP, the Labour Party, and the Liberal Party, before finally landing on the Labour Party during the First World War. In other words, they hardly succeeded in permeating any of the parliamentary parties before the First World War. Nor did any of these parties officially embrace the socialist doctrine of the Fabian Society. Indeed, Beatrice Webb seemed frustrated when she observed that it was not easy to persuade Liberals to accept socialism: ‘it is only Conservatives who can make revolutions nowadays, and they are, if anything, more susceptible to democratic pressure than the Liberals.’ Therefore, even though the Fabian Society had been attempting to permeate the Liberal Party, the extent of its actual influence was rather restricted.

Here, an important point needs to be made about the relationship between conservatism and socialism. Although Beatrice Webb saw a possibility that the Conservative Party could take more positive attitudes towards radical social reforms than the Liberal Party, it does not change the fact that it was the Liberal social reforms which were described as ‘Socialistic’. In other words, even when the Conservatives took up socialistic ideas when drawing up their own social reform policies, they did not identify such reforms as ‘Socialism’. By the same token, the fact that conservative commentators criticised the Liberal social reforms for being ‘Socialistic’ does not mean that the Conservatives opposed social reform, including some socialistic measures. Historical research on socialistic aspects of the Conservative social reforms belongs to another study.

Arthur Elliot in the *Edinburgh Review* speculated that the Liberal Party was influenced by Fabian socialism. Alarmed by the further radicalisation of the Liberal Party, Elliot suspected that socialists were growing under the shelter of the Liberals:

> For the time being they recognise the weakness of outspoken Socialism, but the Socialists are a growing party, and one of these days they will feel strong enough to stand alone. When that day comes they foresee, though they do not shrink from, “the denunciations of Radical

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wirepullers and the now so complaisant and courteous Radical press. The alliance will be at an end.” All this they are prepared to face rather than to swallow some possible Radical programme which is not truly Socialist. The split is inevitable, and it will lead to the formation of a “definitely Socialist party — i.e. a party pledged to the communalization of all the means of production and exchange, and which is prepared to subordinate every other consideration to that end.”18)

This kind of view was becoming more popular among conservative reviewers. They presumed that a large part of recent Liberal social reform was designed to pamper to socialist factions in the Liberal Party, as it had to count on every possible political force in order to constitute a majority in parliament. Elliot observed that there was an ‘unstable equilibrium of the party which is supposed to be led by Mr. Gladstone, and which advocates Repeal of the Union.’ That is, the coalition of the Liberals and the Irish Nationalists stood on a very weak basis after the defeat of the Irish Home Rule Bill. Because the Liberals had lost their political vitality, they would ‘engage its opponents on any other ground than that of Home Rule.’ Therefore, the author contended, ‘to Socialist pledges the Gladstonian candidate looks for success, regardless of time when their fulfilment will be called for, when these very pledges “will come home to roost.”’19) Thus he warned that the Liberal Party was fostering socialists unaware that they would soon be its most powerful enemy.

As proof for this allegation, the author provided the socialist doctrine of the Fabian Society, emphasising that parliament was divided between those who supported it and those who were opposed to it:

The writers of “Fabian Essays in Socialism” claim fairly enough that the trend of things towards an era of absolute Socialism is seen in the changed attitude of men towards State interference and control. They frankly remind us, however, that State control does not imply Socialism. “Socialism is the common holding of the means of production and exchange, and the holding of them for equal benefit of all.” It is upon this principle that men’s politics are in truth divided. In the present Parliament, for instance, were Home Rule left out, it is absurd to pretend that the “political parties consist of two bodies of men differentiated from each other by the holding of fundamentally different principles.” “The Whig” has by no means disappeared, “the daily democratic shouting of the Radical newspapers” to the contrary notwithstanding. It is the Tory who has gone from amongst us, and left the arena to be contested between men whose opinions are Whig and men whose opinions are Socialist.20)

The Fabian Society was not the one and only socialist organisation at the time. There were also other socialist organisations whose strategies, if not their ultimate goals, were different from each other. The reason why the author chose the Fabian Society as the culprit for the political upheaval was that it overtly stressed the importance of permeation through parliament. While other socialist organisations had their own political representatives, the Fabians seemed to prefer to brainwash and manipulate existing politicians. As a result, conservative reviewers feared that the political activity of the Fabians was very hard to notice. These circumstances made them suspect anyone whose political stance looked similar to socialism.

Indeed, conservative reviewers scarcely asked exactly who in the Liberal Party were connected to the Fabian Society. Instead, they concentrated on the socialist tendency of the Liberals in general. All that they provided was the speculation that there must be socialists within the Liberal Party because its policy was apparently socialistic. For example, W.R. Lawson in Maga criticised Sir William Harcourt’s Budget proposals for being socialistic without providing any specific reasons.21) In particular, the author was provoked by the levy of graduated death duties:

It had been reserved for him to discover that even deficits have their uses. This one furnished him with an admirable opportunity for ventilating a few socialistic ideas on class taxation, which he had long been nursing for just such a chance to let loose. A Chancellor of the Exchequer with a big surplus in hand has no excuse for putting on more taxes. Even progressive economists do not advocate graduated taxes for their own sake. There must be some pretext for levying them, and it was only to be found in a bad year. Commercial depression and the recent naval scare produced a situation bad enough even for the saturnine soul of Sir William Harcourt. He smiled grimly on his declining revenue and his swelling estimates. They were preparing the way for a new era of democratic finance, of which he was to be the high priest.22)

Under the title of ‘A Sham Socialist Budget’, the author just assumed that readers of this review would automatically agree that the use of the term ‘Socialist’ was appropriate if only he could expose a class-biased (against the landed class) and

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21) Lawson, "A Sham Socialist Budget." Sir Wilfrid Lawson, second baronet (1829-1906): politician and temperance advocate. Sir William George Granville Venables Vernon Harcourt (1827-1904): some historians argue that he would have been Prime Minister but for Queen Victoria’s preference for Archibald Primrose, Earl of Rosebery. However, because the Queen did not ask Gladstone’s opinion about who would succeed him, this argument does not seem to be persuasive. Harcourt’s Budget of 1894, which introduced the principle of graduated taxation, indicated the way forward in the financing of social reform.

democratic character of the Budget. Because graduated death duties would certainly be detrimental to the interests of the landed class and could be one of the stepping-stones towards the nationalisation of all the means of production, the author implicated that the Liberal Budget was tantamount to socialism. His intention was, therefore, not to prove that the Budget was socialist on a theoretical level but just to claim on quite a superficial level that it was as dangerous as socialism. The term 'Socialist' here was not used to signify any concrete body of thought but was used simply as a synonym of 'sham'.

Most conservative reviewers did not pay as much attention to those who were clearly related to socialist organisations as to the alleged socialists in the Liberal Party. In most cases, there were no socialists but only the threat of socialism. Before the Home Rule Bill, conservative commentators had occasionally regarded Chamberlain as the culprit of the spread of socialism in the Liberal Party. Now that he had left, had their observation been correct, the Liberal Party should have been liberated from socialism. On the contrary, the conservative reviewers continued to claim that the Liberal Party had come even closer to being a Socialist party. Therefore, no matter who was in the leadership of the Liberal Party, insofar as their policies were at odds with the interests of the landed class, they were regarded as socialists.

In some cases, indeed, they provided their own interpretations of socialism. In the *Quarterly Review*, for example, Mallock defined socialism more favourably to the conservative suspicion. He observed that 'Socialism is the word that in contemporary politics comes next in power after Democracy.' He argued that although the public regarded socialism as a 'newly discovered force,' the truth was the opposite:

Not only is Socialism as old as the oldest civilization, but there is no civilization of which it has not formed a part. The principle of Socialism, the very meaning of the word admitted to be such alike by its apostles and its critics, is the support by all of institutions for the use of all; and without some such institutions no civilized community can exist. There is no more complete example of a Socialistic institution than a street. Socialism, in fact, is as essential to civilization as individualism; and the only question that can be debated by any rational man is not which of them shall supersede and expel the other, but in what proportions the two can be best applied under a given set of circumstances.

This was one of the rare occasions when conservative reviewers dealt directly with

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socialism, analysing its history and principles. However, this explanation was not based on actual facts such as who had created the concept of socialism and who was spreading it. Instead, Mallock diminished the significance of socialism by defining it very broadly. His definition of socialism was much closer to that of collectivism in that it was positioned against individualism, not against capitalism. He implied that because every aspect of society was related to socialism as well as to individualism, a ‘rational man’ would not adhere to only one of them, but would always try to keep the balance between them. Then he suggested that only Conservatives were capable of sustaining the balance: ‘when Conservatives are threatened with Socialism by fanatics who call themselves Socialists, their proper reply will be, And we are Socialists also; and when they are taunted with Socialism by those who call themselves Individualists, their proper reply will be, And you are Socialists also.’ Mallock was the one who had written the first conservative article in which socialism was connected to radicalism in 1883. Now it looked as if he was the most authoritative person that could define what socialism was, overriding the authority of socialist organisations. By this process, the conservative debate on socialism was detached further from the activities of socialist organisations.

Because socialism was treated in conservative periodicals less with theoretical interest than with current political interest, few explained what exactly socialism meant. It was only when they dealt with socialism in foreign countries that they showed even a little theoretical interest. For example, the Nineteenth Century featured Y. Guyot’s ‘Socialism in France: Its Present and Future’ and Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine featured E.A. Irving’s ‘Primitive socialists in Malaya’. Although these cases were very rare and had little to do with the political situation in Britain, they do suggest that interest in socialism in general was beginning to develop.

Poor Status of British Socialist Leaders

In contrast to the frequent invocation of Fabian socialism, the overall influence of British socialist organisations upon conservative debate on socialism was becoming even more insignificant than in the 1880s. Many historians regard Hyndman as the

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culprit for the divisions between British socialists.\(^{28}\) Henry Collins observes that Hyndman’s antagonism towards trade unionism was the main reason for the alienation of the SDF from the labour movement.\(^{29}\) Stanley Pierson also points out that Hyndman’s national socialism was not compatible with other forms of British socialism, most of which were much closer to utilitarianism.\(^{30}\) On the contrary, Martin Crick argues that the influence of Hyndman in the SDF was not as dominant as other historians suggest.\(^{31}\) However, Laybourn observes that all these approaches are agreed that ‘Hyndman’s character was still fundamental to many of the problems of the SDF.’\(^{32}\) More importantly, however, most of these researches, including Laybourn’s, imply that if Hyndman had taken more amicable attitudes towards other socialists and the trade unionists, the SDF and even British socialism as a whole might have developed better. All these observations, however, are confined to the small circle of socialists. In the eyes of those outside this boundary, the activities of Hyndman and the SDF were simply of no interest. In addition, as shown above, since his Marxist tendency seemed less directly targeted on the landed class than Fabian socialism, his activities scarcely drew the attention of conservative reviewers.

For example, \textit{The Times} mentioned Hyndman only three times in the 1890s while it dealt with socialism at least 123 times in the same period, most of which were about socialism on the continent.\(^{33}\) Moreover, two of the three cases were not


\(^{31}\) M. Crick, \textit{The History of the Social Democratic Federation} (Keele, 1994), 296.


articles about him but letters sent by him. In 1896, for instance, Hyndman sent a letter to *The Times*, provoked by the conservative criticism of the Irish Home Rule Bill for involving excessive state interference. He retorted that 'what is being done in Ireland by direct State intervention for the benefit, as Ministers contend, of the people of that country can scarcely be wholly harmful to the people of Great Britain.'\(^{34}\) Some other contributors also supported state interference. The Marquess of Huntly, for instance, regarded 'State Socialism' as a practical idea, contrasting it with unpractical 'Revolutionary Socialism'.\(^{35}\) In 1897, *The Times* gave Hyndman another opportunity to talk about socialism:

> The growth of Socialism in the constituencies has rendered it quite impossible for either Liberals or Radicals to hold office again unless the Socialists chose. ... It seems to me, therefore, that unless the Liberals and Radicals wish to remain in a position of permanent impotence they had better begin to study and assimilate what we conceive to be the truths of Social Democracy.\(^{36}\)

Whether Hyndman was actually threatening the Liberal Party or not, it seems obvious that this kind of article would have made the readers of *The Times* believe that socialists were growing enough to threaten the Liberal Party. Indeed, though *The Times* rarely dealt seriously with the activities of Hyndman himself or his SDF, it did imply several times that he was threatening the Liberal Party. In other words, even when *The Times* infrequently mentioned Hyndman its interest lay in his dangerous intentions rather than in his real achievements, which were rather insignificant. In this sense, the attitudes of *The Times* towards socialism were becoming increasingly similar to those of the conservative periodicals.

William Morris is also frequently mentioned as an important figure in the development of British socialism.\(^{37}\) Laybourn claims that William Morris was, like

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1897, 9, col. b.

34) Hyndman, "Beginning of State Socialism."


36) Hyndman, "The Liberal Party and Socialism."

Hyndman, a vital figure in the emergence of socialism in Britain in the late nineteenth century.\(^{38}\) Ever since E. P. Thompson first drew attention to Morris’s socialistic aspirations, many historians have tried to find out more about his theories and activities for the realisation of utopian socialism.\(^{39}\) However, it appears that his contemporaries were not so interested in his political career.

Indeed, the status of William Morris as a socialist was even worse than that of Hyndman in the public debate. For instance, the split of the Social Democratic Federation and the following foundation of the Socialist League by William Morris hardly drew any attention from conservative commentators. In general, he was scarcely mentioned when periodicals were dealing with the question of socialism. It was only when he died in 1897 that periodicals wrote about him. But even in this case, he was not regarded as a genuine socialist.

In the *Edinburgh Review*, for instance, H.H. Statham described him as ‘poet and craftsman’.\(^{40}\) The author of "The Earthly Paradise" — the production with which his name is most widely and popularly associated — has left behind him a reputation of very unusual quality.\(^{41}\) He regarded Morris as a poet, not as a political activist. He never mentioned political aspects of Morris’s life in this article. The *Quarterly Review* also presented an obituary of William Morris. Robert Steele described him as ‘poet and artist’, not dealing with the political activities of Morris.\(^{42}\)

The *Westminster Review* also described Morris mainly as a poet.\(^{43}\) Although it mentioned his socialist activity, it was described as a personal devotion. His Socialist League was never mentioned. The author described Morris as a utopian and

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humanitarian:

William Morris, in the latter portion of his career at least, was an avowed Socialist; but his was not the cast-iron Socialism of the author of *Looking Backward*. His ideal was an epoch of peace and sweet enjoyment as a cure for the restless and feverish excitement which, at the present time, make true happiness impossible and, in many instances, produce misery, discontent, and an inevitable tendency towards self-destruction. This is the keynote of his marvellous “Utopian romance” entitled *News from Nowhere*.

When he compared Morris’s *Chants for Socialists* with his other poems, he asked, ‘who can deny the noble humanitarianism that inspires these simple chants?’ It shows that Morris was remembered more as a humanitarian than as a socialist. Consequently, the fact that Morris drew attention from periodicals does not mean that his socialism also took the spotlight. Nevertheless, the *Westminster Review* did mention his career as a socialist, whereas conservative periodicals strictly confined their topics to his talent as an artist. This fact suggests that, while conservative reviewers were interested in socialism mainly as a disturbing force in the Liberal Party, radical reviewers regarded socialism as less connected to party politics.

### Why Radicals Turned against Socialism

Indeed, unlike conservative periodicals, the *Westminster Review* scarcely connected socialism to the Liberal Party. This was mainly because the *Westminster Review* was supporting radical demands. Although radicals were sympathetic to some of the socialist ideas, they did not embrace socialism as a whole. In the 1880s the *Westminster Review* had taken an ambiguous attitude towards socialism, but in the 1890s, it seemed to be alarmed by the possibility that the realisation of radical demands might be thwarted if they were described as an equivalent to impractical and revolutionary socialism. Thus the *Westminster Review* also began to take a sceptical attitude towards socialism.

Unlike conservative periodicals, however, the *Westminster Review* focused on theoretical defects of socialism. For example, J. Endean criticised socialism because it would deteriorate, rather than improve, social conditions in Britain. He

46) J. R. Endean, "Will Socialism be a Remedy for Present Social Ills?," *Westminster Review* 139 (May
analysed society into seven classes, arguing that naturally and inevitably the state of
society was unequal: the submerged classes, the labouring classes, the artisan
classes, the lower middle classes, the middle classes, the wealthy classes, and the
aristocratic classes.\cite{47} He approved of this class system on the grounds that all these
classes were governed well by laws that could not 'prevent the humblest from rising
to the highest honours in the social scale.'\cite{48} He worried, however, that this balance
was in danger of collapse:

> But society is somewhat nervous as to its future. Within itself it sees forces at work anxious
to re-organise it from foundations upwards; there is a spirit of discontent spreading among the
masses inimical to the public weal. Statesmen, poets, politicians, demagogues, socialists are
peering into the future, vainly endeavouring to forecast with precision the social arrangements
by which peoples, nations, empires shall be governed, or shall be free from government, as
this term is now understood.\cite{49}

Although the author was as sceptical about socialism as conservative reviewers, what
he was opposed to was socialism in general, not a particular form of socialism
allegedly spreading in the Liberal Party. In other words, while conservative
periodicals used the term 'Socialism' as an adjective for describing the radical
tendency of the Liberal Party, radical periodicals confined it to overtly socialist
ideas, most of which were found on the continent.

Indeed, it was not the activities of Fabian Society, let alone those of the SDF or
the ILP, but foreign socialist cases that Endean counted on for theoretical analysis
of socialism. He observed that in order to understand the meaning of socialism 'it is
scarcely possible to appeal to any higher authority than Dr. Albert Schäffle, a past
Minister of Finance in Austria.'\cite{50} Then he introduced Schäffle’s explanations of
socialism over five pages, during which he ignored the authority of British socialists
on the question. After summing up several implications of socialism from Schäffle’s
point of view, Endean concluded that the dream of an equal society would not be
realised:

> Nothing is offered by Socialism as a panacea for present social ills but the lifting up of the

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\text{\citedate{1893}: 508-25. James Russell Endean: born in 1826.}
\end{flushright}

\begin{enumerate}
    \item \citedate{1893}: 508-25. James Russell Endean: born in 1826.
    \item \citet{47} Endean, "Will Socialism be a Remedy for Present Social Ills?," 510.
    \item \citet{48} Endean, "Will Socialism be a Remedy for Present Social Ills?," 512.
    \item \citet{49} Endean, "Will Socialism be a Remedy for Present Social Ills?," 512.
    \item \citet{50} Endean, "Will Socialism be a Remedy for Present Social Ills?," 516.
\end{enumerate}
lowest classes to the level of the artisan, and the bringing down of every class above that level to the same plane, and as the evils it would create are manifestly far greater, vastly more onerous, and profoundly more mischievous and demoralising than any at present existing, it follows that every attempt to establish its principle is opposed to the best interests of the individual, of society, and of the State; that Socialism is visionary, unpractical, destructive, and repulsive to every civilised community, and therefore its condemnation as a system for the betterment of humanity cannot too strongly be pronounced.\footnote{Endean, "Will Socialism be a Remedy for Present Social Ills?," 525.}

Apparently, he agreed with conservative commentators that socialism was harmful to society. Nonetheless, he did not suggest that it was the Liberal Party which spread socialism in Britain. Nor did he mention socialist organisations in Britain. He was just concerned about socialism in general.

Another article in the \textit{Westminster Review} also paid more attention to the continent.\footnote{"The Tyranny of Socialism," \textit{Westminster Review} 140 (October 1893): 404-406.} It dealt with Y. Guyot’s \textit{La Tyrannie Socialiste} because ‘the book is a most valuable contribution towards the solution of a very burning question of the day.’ The anonymous reviewer stated, ‘M. Yves Guyot makes a valiant effort to stem the wave of State Socialism which is threatening to engulf all European nations alike. The state of things which is revealed in France by this book is, if we are to accept M. Guyot’s statements, far graver than in England.’\footnote{"The Tyranny of Socialism," 404.} It was the extension of the role of the state that had provoked the Conservatives to brand radicalism as socialism. Here, a radical reviewer also emphasised the danger of ‘State Socialism’. Interestingly, at the time when conservative periodicals were accusing the radicals of being socialist, radical reviewers were also criticising socialism.

Walter Lloyd, in ‘The collapse of Socialism’, also dealt with \textit{La Tyrannie Socialiste}.\footnote{W. Lloyd, “The Collapse of Socialism,” \textit{Westminster Review} 143 (July 1895): 597-602. Walter Lloyd (1844/45-1907): Unitarian preacher, clerk at Somerset House.} He started his review by quoting Guyot’s figures to show the increase of the number of socialists in three countries. ‘Taking Germany first, the Socialist votes obtained at an election for the Reichstag in 1871 were about 100,000: in 1893 they were 1,800,000. In France in 1889, the united Socialist vote was 90,000: in 1893, 500,000 or 600,000. In England the trade unions in conference have passed resolutions in favour of Collectivism: and other countries show similar results.’ In this quotation, it is important to notice that he did not point to socialists but trade unions, and not...
‘Socialism’ but ‘Collectivism’ when he talked about England whereas he used ‘Socialists’ in the case of Germany and France. This reveals that radical reviewers were very cautious about using the term ‘Socialism’ in domestic political affairs. The author made this point even clearer by stating that, despite the increase of such figures, socialism was already on the decline, not least because there was no consistent and universally accepted body of doctrines about which all socialists were agreed, and which might be regarded as representing the views of socialists everywhere.55)

Therefore, although both radical and conservative reviewers were sceptical about socialism, there was an important difference between them: radical reviewers tended to minimise the influence of socialism in Britain while their conservative rivals tended to exaggerate it. This was because their political interests were different from each other. The radicals wanted to show that their political programme was different from foreign, impractical, and revolutionary socialism, denying the conservative allegations that it was closely connected to socialism.

Not all the articles about socialism in the Westminster Review took sceptical attitudes towards socialism. Significantly, however, most of these exceptions were written by those who did not represent the official opinions of the Westminster Review. For instance, ‘Socialism from an Outsider’s Point of View’, signed by A.F.B., took a rather positive attitude towards socialism.56) The author distinguished moderate socialism from more revolutionary socialism and advocated the former. The definition of moderate socialism was quite broad:

We scarcely realise how far in these last few years we have gone on the path of Socialism.

Mr. Hanbury, in January 1897, in answer to a deputation which waited on him, said: “The [Conservative] Government ought to be a model employer of labour.” Is not this the Socialists’ aim? And yet what exclamations it would have evoked a few years ago! Free elementary education is a great advance; free secondary education has yet to follow. If it is true and it seems so that the stipendiary magistrates of the London Police Court and elsewhere are infinitely better than of the old unpaid magistrates and J.P.s of the country, the latter will soon cease to exist. Justice will be administered by public servants everywhere, as the highest is already, and in the train of this reform would probably come a great simplification of law.57)

Although this article was similar to conservative articles in that it regarded a wide range of reforms as socialism, it did not associate socialism exclusively with the Liberal Party. The definition of socialism was even broader than that of conservative periodicals. It looks as if the author contended that criticising Liberal policies for being socialist was meaningless because the moderate sense of socialism could be applied to any reform politics of any parties. Nevertheless this article surely risked the Westminster Review appearing to agree with socialism. Perhaps that was why it had given this article the title of ‘Socialism from an Outsider’s Point of View’.

No Socialism in Britain: the Daily Telegraph

Like the Westminster Review, most newspapers did not describe Liberal policies as socialist, although several articles in The Times continued to follow the Conservative discourse that ‘State Socialism’ was spreading among the Liberals. In general, newspapers still paid more attention to socialism in foreign countries. For instance, The Times used the term ‘Socialism’ in its headings 123 times and the term ‘Socialist’ 99 times from 1891 to 1900, most of which were about foreign countries: at least 80 and 77 cases respectively.\(^58\)

The Daily Telegraph also usually confined the term ‘Socialism’ to the activities of socialists on the continent.\(^59\) When it sporadically dealt with socialism in Britain, its scope was confined to authentic socialist organisations. They rarely described the Liberal Party as influenced by them. However, it sometimes reported on the contention of British socialists that socialism was spreading in Britain:

A manifesto has been issued by the Independent Labour Party “To the Socialists of all Lands,” in which they state that the cause of Socialism in the British Isles is progressing rapidly. The continued misery of the great mass of the people in the face of ever-increasing abundance, and the apparent helplessness of so-called statesmen to relieve it, are inclining many to join in the attempt “to break down the dominant power of the wealthy few and use the machinery of the State, which in England is very perfect, to build up an industrial commonwealth based upon the principles of Socialism.”\(^60\)

\(^58\) Calculation based on The Wellesley Index.
\(^59\) Compared with The Times, however, even socialism on the continent was not frequently reported. In most cases, it was on socialism in Germany as in “German Anti-Socialism,” Daily Telegraph, 9 May 1895, 5, col. g, and “Social Democracy in Germany,” Daily Telegraph, 11 October 1897, 8, col. d.
The correspondent, however, did not blow up the contention of the ILP to the domination of the Liberal Party as Conservative commentators occasionally did. On the contrary, he implied that socialism in Britain was in fact not developing as smoothly as that in other countries, by reporting on the ILP’s envy of the successful activities of 'Russian Nihilist', 'Spanish Revolutionists', and some other socialist equivalents of France and Belgium. The correspondent thus made it clear that the spread of socialism in Britain was just the propaganda of the ILP, rather than a widely recognisable phenomenon.

Because the Daily Telegraph maintained a relatively neutral attitude to the question of socialism, the activities of British socialists were reported more accurately than in The Times. While The Times emphasised the contention of Hyndman that the Liberal Party was losing to socialists, the Daily Telegraph was more interested in the official activities of the SDF. In most cases, the link between British socialists and their comrades on the continent drew more attention than the relationship between the socialists and the Liberals:

Anarchists and Trafalgar-square

Mr. David Nicholl, secretary of the Walsall Amnesty Association, has asked and obtained from the Chief Commissioner of Police authority to convene a meeting in Trafalgar-square for 3.30 on Sunday afternoon next. The object of the meeting is declared to be to advocate the release of the Walsall and Spanish “political prisoners,” usually spoken of as the Walsall and Spanish Anarchists. Members of the Social Democratic Federation and the Independent Labour Party are expected to be among the speakers; but, so far as can be ascertained, there is no intention to invite the deported Spaniards to take an active part in the demonstration.61)

In February 1886, the Daily Telegraph and The Times alike had reported on a violent demonstration of British socialists, and their subsequent prosecution.62) After that incident, many people would naturally expect a violent scene when public meetings were held by socialists. This was why the Daily Telegraph drew attention to the schedule of this socialist meeting.

Three days later, however, the correspondent described the scene as dull but well-ordered, which was exceptional compared with the usually violent image of

61) "Anarchists and Trafalgar-square," Daily Telegraph, 17 September 1897, p. 6, col. f.
socialists:

A resolution ... was submitted to a well-dressed and essentially good-humoured crowd, which 
					had manifestly gathered round the Nelson monument in the hope of deriving some amusement 
					from the speeches. They were woefully [sic] disappointed. It may also be said that they were 
				
exceedingly patient. Such, indeed, were their powers of endurance that they allowed one 
					speaker, who in appearance emulated the true Adelphi Anarchist, to hold forth in the language 
					of his kind for close on an hour without uttering so much as one protest. For the rest, it is 
					only fair to add that the other speakers, who included one female orator, were discreet of 
				utterance and mild in their vocabulary. The inevitable hat was passed round, and for a brief 
				moment — in which the countenances of the prominent Socialists were wreathed in smiles — 
					a shower of coppers on to the plinth.

After a display of eloquence extending two hours the resolution was declared carried, and 
				the onlookers quietly dispersed.63)

Compared with conservative publications, the attitude of this article towards British 
				socialists was quite positive, noticing the improvement of their manners. In addition, 
				the Daily Telegraph hardly commented on the relationship between socialist 
				activities like this occasion and the radicalisation of the Liberal Party. Instead, it 
				confined itself to what actually happened, confining the influence of socialist 
			
demands among the socialists themselves.

Not only the Liberal Party, but also the question of labour was detached from 
				socialism in the Daily Telegraph. In general, it did not describe the development of 
				labour politics in terms of socialism. Perhaps it did not want to, or more likely, did 
				not need to drive the Liberal Party into a crisis over the question of its identity by 
			
describing labour politicians, most of whom were collaborating with the Liberal 
				Party, as socialists. For example, when a large number of the working classes called 
				for the minimum wage, which was one of the most frequent targets of conservative 
				commentators, the Daily Telegraph remained aloof from the question of socialism:

The Minimum Wage

A meeting about 3,000 workman employed in the Royal Arsenal was held in the Drill 
				Hall of the Royal West Kent Volunteers, Woolwich, last night, for the purpose of urging the 
				Government to adopt a scale of 21s for a week of forty-eight hours for labourers in 
				government employment. Mr. Arthur Harris, secretary of the Labour Protection League, was 
				chairman of the meeting.64)

63) "Socialist Meeting and Anarchists," Daily Telegraph, 20 September 1897, 7, col. g.
There was not a scintilla of hint that this meeting was connected to socialists or that it was secretly supported by Liberal leaders. In most cases, the paper’s report on labour unrest did not involve the language of socialism.65)

The *Daily Telegraph* also refrained from using the language of socialism when dealing with the question of state interference. R.W. Hanbury, as a financial secretary of the treasury in the Conservative government at the time, interfered with several labour issues so actively that, two years later, his activities came to be considered quite similar to socialistic demands in the *Westminster Review*.66)

The Government and Trade Unionism

Mr. R. W. Hanbury, replying, at the Treasury, to a deputation of trade unionists, said he was determined that the House of Commons resolution should be carried out very strictly, and if a Government contractor failed in any respect to carry out the resolution he lost his work. If there was any suspicion of work for Treasury contracts being underpaid, they would act vigorously and at once and the contractor would be dealt with. The decided policy of the country was free trade, but he thought it ought to be known what things came from abroad and what did not, and the information was being gathered as to what goods came from abroad, though they were supplied by English firms. It had been for some time recognised by the Treasury, said M. Hanbury, that when wage-earners had to give evidence they should receive some payment, and there was a Board of Trade and Home Office scale to allow up to 10s a day, and he thought that was not unfair.67)

Because this case was related to the question of state interference and the principle of free trade as well as the question of labour, Conservative commentators might have invoked the language of socialism in order to exaggerate the spread of socialism even among some Conservative politicians. Or, as the supporter of socialism did in the *Westminster Review*, socialist commentators might have used this occasion as a proof that socialist demands were practical and acceptable enough to be implemented even by the Conservative government. However, the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent did not use the term ‘Socialism’ to describe the situation, not only because the question of state interference in this report did not directly involve the question of land but also because the paper was basically not interested in relating the question of state interference or that of labour to

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66) See the article above by A.F.B. in the *Westminster Review*.
socialism. The correspondent reported on this event in quite unbiased terms. Therefore, the actual status of socialism and socialists in Britain in this period was probably most accurately reflected in the *Daily Telegraph*.

**Conclusion**

In the 1890s, most periodicals, regardless of their political orientations, took sceptical attitudes towards ‘Socialism’. The fact that more conservative reviewers began to use the language of socialism to criticise the Liberal Party discouraged radical reviewers from supporting socialism. As a result, it appears that writers in the *Westminster Review* began to divert attention from the question of British socialism to that on the continent. For they were careful not to make Liberal policies appear to be impractical, violent, foreign or even absurd by associating them with socialism. By this process, the role of British socialist organisations in the public debate on the development of socialism diminished even further.

Although ‘Socialism’ was becoming a popular political term by which conservative commentators attacked the Liberal Party, there were many other cases when they chose not to use it. When Gladstone retired in 1894, Alexander Michie wrote an article about his political career in *Maga*: ‘Mr. Gladstone’s position during the last quarter of a century has been that of the destroying angel of British politics.’68) The main purpose of this article was to criticise Gladstone for his radical policies:

> Whether Mr. Gladstone imposed on his adherents with malice aforethought, or was carried away by his devotion to his latest adopted purpose, may well be left a mystery; but recent experiments in Radical legislation, rash in so old a man, seemed to have broken down the prestige of transcendent morality which has so largely supplied him with political capital; for in the haste suggested by age it was not possible for him to maintain respect for the decencies of form which belong to high policy.69)

Of Gladstone’s radical policies, the Irish Home Rule Bill was most severely criticised. ‘Even if he had convinced himself of the national necessity of surrender to the Irish, it would have been in harmony with political tradition for him to have left the actual surrender to the hands of others not so deeply pledged as himself to the

opposite course.'\(^{70}\) However severe the criticism was, he did not suggest that Gladstone had been connected to socialists, whether in theoretical or personal terms.

There are many other examples in which conservative commentators did not use the language of socialism when they dealt with the further radicalisation of the Liberal Party after 1886: R. E. Prothero used the term ‘demagogues’ when he attacked the Liberal Party in the *Quarterly Review*. F.H.S. Escott, in the same periodical, saw the radicals as ‘cosmopolitans’.\(^ {71}\) Even Arthur Elliot in the *Edinburgh Review*, one of the most frequent users of ‘Socialism’, did not use the term ‘Socialism’ in other occasions such as in ‘The English Radicals’.\(^ {72}\) Therefore, the term ‘Socialism’ was just one of many expressions available for describing the radicalisation of the Liberal Party. However, not least because ‘Socialism’ was newer than others, it produced more possible definitions and implications.

Perhaps socialism itself had been developing in Britain since the early 1880s because several socialist organisations were endeavouring to spread their ideas. Indeed, not only some Liberals but also some Conservatives seemed to be sympathetic to the socialist demands of the Fabian Society. Some of them even had personal relationship with the Fabians.\(^ {73}\) Other socialist organisations such as the SDF were also active. It began to grow rapidly in the provinces from the late 1890s.\(^ {74}\) The ILP was also sufficiently developed as to field 28 candidates in the general election of 1895, although none of them were elected. Even so, British socialists were still seriously divided: the fact that William Morris started a 'Socialist Unity' movement in the 1890s reveals that socialists themselves were also aware that the divisions between them were holding back the development of socialism in Britain. As a result, they failed to provide an authoritative definition of socialism in unison.

Nevertheless, the language of socialism was gradually becoming familiar, not least because many political commentators had been writing about socialism on the continent. Like in the 1880s, socialism on the continent still had the image of revolution, nihilism, anarchism, and other extreme political ideas, most of which

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were considered impractical. Under such circumstances, the authority to define socialism was moving from British socialist organisations over to conservative political commentators. This process was facilitated by the absence of socialist parties in Westminster: none of the exiting parties supported socialism, nor was there an independent Socialist party. Although the ILP took the most favourable attitude towards socialism, it was the Liberal Party that conservative commentators regarded as the culprit of spread of socialism. At the same time, some socialist organisations pledged themselves to permeate the existing parties. Under such circumstances, socialists looked both ubiquitous and absent at the same time, making it easier for those who had more tangible and influential political organisations to define what socialism was, who were socialists, who supported them, and what they intended to do.

The Conservatives were no doubt the most influential party during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, not least because they remained in power in most of the period in both Houses. Alarmed by increasingly radical demands of the Liberal Party, they felt that existing expressions were not enough to reveal the extreme danger of such demands and that it was necessary to apply the most shocking but not clearly defined expression to them: 'Socialism'. Perhaps some Conservatives consciously intended to create such a strategy, but it is more likely that most of them were just following, accepting, and reproducing this quite plausible allegation. For language controls the way people understand phenomena, rather than just being a tool for describing existing phenomena. By this process, the development of socialism in Britain was not only exaggerated but also misunderstood to be intimately related to non-socialist groups such as the Liberal Party.
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3. Indexes

A Colonial Implementation of Metropolitan Policy:  
The Debate on African Coffee Growing in Kenya Colony in the 1930s  

Chan Do Jung

Abstract  
The idea of allowing Africans to grow coffee on a smallholder basis led to heated debate between Whitehall and the Kenya Colony in the early 1930s. As the economic sustainability of the colony and the settler community was at stake in the midst of the Great Depression, this new scheme was a desperate measure by the colonial administration to resuscitate the colony’s dwindling economy in order to comply with the Colonial Office directive, which was to make the colony economically self-sufficient. The administrative measures resulting from the debate, however, limited the scope and scale of the scheme. By reviewing this bureaucratic process, this study examines how the idea of African coffee growing was implemented as a small-scale experiment carried out in the African reserves remote from the White Highlands.

Keywords: Colonial policy, Rural development, Kenya, coffee, Smallholder cashcrop production.

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Perhaps no agricultural development scheme promoted by the colonial state in Kenya become a more politically and economically contentious issue in both Whitehall and Nairobi than coffee growing by African smallholders. The question of whether African coffee production should be allowed was raised in extensive correspondence between officials in Colonial Office in London and the colonial administration in Kenya for several years and involved two Secretaries of State for the Colonies, Lord Passfield (formerly Sydney Webb, 1929-31) and Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister (1931-35), and two governors of Kenya Colony, Lt. Col. Sir Edward W. M. Grigg (1925-30) and Sir Joseph Byrne (1931-36).

Numerous scholars have paid attention to the debate, because it was a key element of their discussions on the role of the colonial state in implementing agricultural innovation and rural development that caused the social and economic change in the African countryside during the colonial period. Largely focusing on the consequence of the debate that led the colonial administration to start only a limited scale of coffee trials in the African reserves remote from European settlers’ coffee estates, these scholars presented it to show how strong and influential settler interests were in the politics of the colony and how Africans were deprived of opportunities for economic development in the process.¹ Building on these earlier contributions, this study focuses on understanding the debate within a broader perspective of colonial development and bureaucracy. By examining the details of the hotly debated issues of African coffee growing, this article will review the bureaucratic process of how the idea of African coffee growing was formulated and then became a small scale experiment due to the colonial administration’s reluctance to promote African economic activities in direct competition for markets with those by the Europeans.

Although primarily emerging as an economic option from the recessionary conditions in the late 1920s, the idea of African coffee growing was perhaps inspired from the political environment sympathetic to African interests in the

metropolitan government from the early 1920s. To a certain extent, both the contemporary Conservative and Labour governments during this period, notably Duke of Devonshire (Conservative) and Lord Passfield (formerly Sydney Webb, Labour), shared the increasing humanitarian concerns for Africans as their colonial secretaries and intended to promote the ‘African paramountcy’ in Kenya.\(^2\)

However, as shown in Gregory’s study on Sydney Webb and the Labour government’s policy for East Africa, the implementation of such policy initiative was frustrated by a combination of entangled conflicts and mixed interests within the imperial bureaucracy. In this regard, the subject of African coffee growing in Kenya can broaden our understanding on the operating mechanism of the colonial administration; it will serve as a case demonstrating that the complex social forces were not only influencing the process of discussing imperial policies, but also defining the scope and scale of a seemingly straightforward rural economic development scheme for the indigenous farmers in an African colony.

In order to carry out this endeavour, this article begins with a review on the examination on economic and political relationship between metropolis and the Kenya Colony. In the first place, it examines the state of the settler economy, which had been the focus of government policies promoting agricultural production for export. The focus will be to explain the extent to which the colonial government contributed to the establishment of the European coffee industry up until the 1930s. This article then reviews the underlying problems in European coffee production and the colonial administration’s reasoning for African coffee growing, which eventually led the colonial government to decide for promoting African coffee growing despite settler opposition.

**Metropolitan Policy for Colonial Development and the Economic Structure of the Colony**

Metropolitan policy for colonial development was a product of intermittent intervention rather than of systemic approach. The social and geographical diversity of the vast empire made it nearly impossible for the British imperial government to

impose any uniform policy. In practice, the Colonial Office adopted a vague set of principles and expected the local administrators to use a wide range of discretion when putting those principles into action, which was manifested as the doctrine of 'trust man on the spot.' However, this does not mean that the metropolitan intervention was not possible. As shown by Berman, the most effective instrument for colonial control proved to be the fiscal and budgetary oversight, which was mainly exercised to make the colonial administration economically sustainable. In line with the policy of fiscal self-sufficiency, one of the colonial officials’ duties was to keep the costs of colonial administration "as inexpensively as possible." Such motivation led the colonial state to be interested in economic development and therefore promote various activities such as natural resources extraction or commodity production, which provided a tax base to meet the costs of running the local apparatus in the colony.

As there were no other viable resources (such as mineral resources) for economic growth and self-sufficiency than agriculture, commodity production was important in Kenya. Commonly known as Dual Policy, the colonial administration in Kenya developed a structural economic division between European settlers and Africans from the immediate post-WWI years and firmly established it by the mid-1920s. It was European settlers who were involved in commercial and export agriculture such as high-value cash crop production from the early 1900s. Within this structure, coffee was the most valuable export commodity, consistently contributing more than one-third of total value of agricultural exports of the country during the 1920s and the early 1930s. Although production for export agriculture was limited, Africans were also actively engaged in the domestic market and maize had increasingly become the chief cash crop for Africans by the early 1910s.

Scholars like Brett and Sorrenson have argued that European settlers in Kenya were unable to establish viable economic foundation without colonial government support in terms of favourable land tenure, control of labour supply, and exclusive access to certain kinds of economic commodities such as coffee. John Overton

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4) Bruce Berman, *Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya, the Dialectic of Domination* (London, 1990), 77-78.
also pointed out that the settler economy was founded on "a structure developed upon artificial and abnormal economic circumstances." Such a system was sustained by the generally high prices of the colony’s exports which masked the inefficiencies in settler production. Although there was a group of politically well-connected and influential individuals who were highly capitalised, more efficient and economically sound enough to manage favourable terms even in financially troubled times, the majority of European settlers in Kenya were relatively small-scale farmers who were constantly short of funds and had limited options. Moreover, for most European settlers from the early 1900s, farming in the highlands was a considerable challenge simply because they were not farmers before they came to Kenya.

Coffee growing began in Kenya with little governmental support in promoting coffee production. In the late 1890s and early 1900s most trials for coffee planting took place in Kenya at a number of mission stations operated by the French Roman Catholic missionaries who developed plantations as a source of income to carry on their work. A group of European settlers in the neighbourhood was able to get the seedlings from this mission for their own experiments. There seemed to be no way to acquire the necessary knowledge for coffee growing other than through trial and error. However, coffee could be a practical option even for settler farmers with relatively small plots of land. Firstly, coffee was a suitable cash crop for the highlands of Kenya, since the ecological setting of the settled areas provides favourable climatic conditions at an altitude of between 4,500 and 6,500 ft., and an annual rainfall of 35 and 80 inches, well distributed throughout the crop year with

short dry seasons. Secondly, unlike sisal (which needs to be planted on a very large scale to justify the costs and secure a decent return on investment), coffee did not require substantial capital investment for processing equipment. Lastly, coffee could be grown on a much smaller scale than that of sisal, and the processing machinery for coffee cost much less than that for sisal production.

The colonial administration was apparently in doubt as to its economic prospects in the first place and thus not in favour of the expansion of coffee growing. Three reasons may be found from a contemporary official’s observation on the state and prospect of the industry. Firstly, labour scarcity and uncertainty in labour supply in the future would not allow coffee acreage to increase to a desirable level. Although coffee could provide a relatively high income, the commercial success of coffee hinged too much on the acquisition of a sufficiently cheap labour especially at harvest seasons. Thus, the concentration of labour demands in such a very short period of the agricultural cycle could further intensify if coffee production were to be expanded, which would inevitably push labour costs up. Secondly, technical knowledge of coffee growing was still not adequate. Although some guidelines for the required conditions in the region were provided (mostly through trial and error), the optimal soil and climatic conditions for coffee growing were not fully understood at this early stage. Coffee was also highly vulnerable to pests and diseases. Thirdly, the government was concerned with the lack of international or regional marketing channels available for the crop. As the same report pointed out, only a few marketing arrangements were established as no regular business had been opened with South Africa and thus only a few plantations had sent any considerable consignments to Europe.

In addition to the unfavourable economic conditions for coffee growing, European coffee planters did not have any organizational support protecting their interests. Although there was the Kenya Coffee Planters’ Union founded in 1917, which replaced a loosely formed interest group of some of the larger planters called The Coffee Planters’ Association established as early as 1908, coffee planters in Kenya

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were not a politically influential group during the 1910s.\textsuperscript{17)} Even by 1921, only 110 out of some 600 planters were members of the Union.\textsuperscript{18)} The administrative resources necessary for coffee disease control were also inadequate. For example, although the Coffee Leaf Disease Ordinance of 1904 was passed in order to prohibit the importation of plants and seeds from designated countries, it was not until in 1908 that the first government entomologist was posted to Kenya. The first mycologist was posted much later in 1913. The system of coffee grading was not introduced until the early 1920s.\textsuperscript{19)}

\textbf{Expansion of European Coffee Production under Protective Environment in the 1920s}

In the following decades, however, European coffee production, along with other crops such as maize, wheat, and sisal, grew significantly. By the end of the 1920s, the number of European coffee planters reached 931, comprising more than 40\% of total number of European farm owners in Kenya (Table 1). A number of studies have argued that this significant expansion in settler coffee production in the 1920s was largely due to a combination of favourable conditions created and supported by the colonial administration. The conventional explanation for this relatively rapid development in European agriculture in the 1920s focused on a series of favourable policies and legal frameworks provided by the colonial government during the 1920s which granted the settlers considerable advantages in land acquisition, labour supply, exclusive access to economic opportunities and agricultural research and advisory services.\textsuperscript{20)}

The main driver of this significant expansion seemed to be land ownership established in the settled area. The alienation of land from Africans by the colonial government created an exclusive land market for the settlers in Kenya, allowing settlers to establish land ownership and enabling them to secure their properties for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17)} Alan Rufus Waters, “Change and Evolution in the Structure of the Kenya Coffee Industry”, \textit{African Affairs}, 71(283), (April, 1972), 165.
\item \textsuperscript{18)} M.F. Hill, \textit{Planters’ Progress, the story of coffee in Kenya} (Nairobi, 1956), 67.
\item \textsuperscript{19)} Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, \textit{Department of Agriculture Annual Report} (hereafter DAAR) 1919/20, 3.
\end{itemize}
long-term improvement. Additionally, this exclusive land market and security of ownership made it possible for European settlers to finance the capital required for the investment through loans provided by the lending agencies, such as the British banks and private moneylenders. As farm development for coffee planting required significant capital input for at least five to six years in advance and for maintenance costs until bearing of coffee trees that could actually generate profit, the availability of relatively long-term credit was essential for coffee planting. Mortgages were to be the main vehicle of these long-term loans provided by commercial banks on the basis of the value of land. 21)

The railway also helped the European planters a great deal in establishing export agriculture in the 1920s. Easy access to railway services provided settler planters a direct advantage over African peasants, in terms of cost and time in transporting the produce for export market. Moreover, the favourable railway rate set by the colonial state also served as a subsidy to the settler export agriculture, as the railway services charged low rates for outward traffic of agricultural produce for export. For inbound consumer goods, the railway charged higher rates for African population in the colony. 22)

One of the highest tax rates was imposed on cotton clothes, an important product consumed by the Africans. In fact, second-hand cotton clothing imported for sale was charged with a 30% tax per item, the same rate as for luxury goods such as jewellery, perfume, cosmetics and gold/silver plated wares. 23)

The colonial administration also established a legal framework favourable to European employers who sought cheap labour for regular work. A number of

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22) M. F. Hill, Permanent Way, the Story of the Kenya and Uganda Railway (Nairobi, 1961), 419-42.
measures were implemented to mobilize Africans to work. The collection of poll tax, which began in 1910 at first in 'labour producing areas', was a deliberate measure devised by the colonial officials to force Africans into the cash economy, as it was expected to drive younger Africans living in the reserves to earn cash income to pay this tax.\(^{24}\) The impact of poll tax was reinforced by the increases in tax rates in 1915 and another raise in 1920, while the movement pass and registration system known as *Kipande* were introduced under the Registration of Natives Ordinance of 1915 as a new measure to increase the labour supply.\(^{25}\) The enforcement of the Resident Natives Labourers' Ordinance of 1918 legalized squatter labour, which was then the most effective form of cheap labour utilized by European settlers, especially during the harvesting seasons.

Despite these various measures aimed at transforming the African population into a cheap and readily available labour force, it seemed that settlers continued to experience labour shortage. A. Trench, the Senior Coffee Officer for the whole colony from the mid-1920s, expressed concerns about labour shortages in his annual reports. Urging the need for adopting labour saving devices, Trench noted in 1924 that a considerable amount of coffee was dropped on the ground due to lack of pickers and thus not processed.\(^{26}\) In the next year, labour shortage was blamed again for the drop in coffee exports and quality, which led to a decrease in value.\(^{27}\)

Conventional explanations for the development of settler agriculture in the 1920s also note that exclusive access to agricultural research and advisory services were provided by the colonial administration for the settlers, which gave settlers significant technological advantages in terms of productivity and disease and pests control. The staff at the Department of Agriculture (hereafter DoA) were primarily focused on providing agricultural advisory services in European areas, not to mention that the critical findings from the agricultural research were published in periodicals written in English. However, whether the quality and scope of the services provided was adequate could be questionable, given that there was only one member of the agricultural staff dedicated to this cash crop available for some time.


\(^{26}\) DAAR 1924, 126.

\(^{27}\) DAAR 1925, 15.
until the 1930s. As Trench admitted in his 1922 report, even though the Disease of Plants Prevention Ordinance allowing powers to agricultural officials to enforce planters to treat and destroy any infected plants or seed was passed in 1921, the rules could not be efficiently enforced “owing to additional work, correspondence, increase of acreage throughout the coffee districts in the Colony and a further increase in the number of new plantations.”

It was reported for the first time in 1924 that notices under the conditions of Disease of Plants Prevention Rules were given to seventeen plantations in which signs of neglected coffee were found. However, there was no further record on enforcement actions such as prosecutions, followed by fines, before 1928. It was not until 1930 that eight cases under the Rules were prosecuted and convictions obtained. This was perhaps because trials for pruning and crop husbandry were still ongoing and there was no general consensus of opinions among experts on coffee cultivation among experts.

Despite the expansion, protective environment for European agricultural production for export in the 1920s led many settlers to be highly dependent on cheap African casual labour, whilst other elements of farming enterprise available for further development such as land, credit, or technology were increasingly limited. Land prices were rising because of the open market speculation and land concentration, and financing consequently became more burdensome. Also, there was no significant technological development mitigating reliance on cheap African labour.

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28) DAAR 1922, 123
29) DAAR 1924, 124.
30) Those who failed to notify DoA of the existence of a pest were to be prosecuted and fined Sh. 100, those did not carry out the instruction to destroy some neglected coffee bushes were to be fined Sh. 200, and those who moved coffee plants from a quarantine area to a clean area violating the Movement of Coffee Plant Regulations were to be fined Sh. 50. DAAR 1928, 256.
31) DAAR 1930, 20.
32) Colonial Advisory Council of Agriculture and Animal Health, Report by Mr. F. A. Stockdale, C.B.E., Agricultural Adviser to the Secretary of the State for the Colonies, on his visit to South and East Africa, Seychelles, the Sudan, Egypt, and Cyprus, 1930-1931 (London: HMSO, 1931), 47-49.
33) Farms in the Rift Valley which sold for six pence per acre in 1908 were resold for 10 shillings per acre in 1912. In 1914 the same land changed hands on the market at £1 per acre. See Richard D. Wolff, The economics of colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870-1930, Yale series in economic history (New Haven, 1974), 59-60.
The Great Depression and Worsening Structural Problems in Settler Economy

The rapid expansion of European coffee growing was short-lived (Table 2). The crash in the world coffee market price was triggered by a large release of Brazilian stock from 1930 when Brazil’s Valorisation Scheme, a stabilization fund for coffee prices operated by the Brazilian government, ran short and was forced to release its coffee stock more freely. Consequently, the prices of coffee fetched on the London market, which had soared to over Sh. 120 per cwt during the mid 1920s, had sharply declined to Sh. 60 per cwt in the mid 1930s (Figure 1). The impact was disastrous for the settler coffee farmers in Kenya. In 1930, coffee prices dropped from about £120 to £70 a ton. In the meantime, it cost producers about £71-75 to get each ton of coffee to the London Market (interest charges not included).

In the same period, numerous cases of disease and pests infection (such as Coffee Berry Disease and Coffee Mealy Bug) and adverse climatic conditions brought considerable damages. Although the research and extension division for coffee at DoA made attempts in various directions, the control measures did not improve the situation. Many of those measures proved to be either too expensive or poisonous for field use, and unsuitable for wider scale application.

The price fall most gravely affected the most was the coffee planters’ credit worthiness and inflicted a serious long-term damage to the planters. For settler farmers, this constituted a major crisis in their financial security, because land and business ownership were closely tied to credit provided from banks or private moneylenders. The Coffee Board of Kenya’s survey carried out in 1933 shows the scale of settler debt. More than 37% of coffee planters responding to the survey replied that they were in financial difficulties and in desperate need of further credit for seasonal finance, even though they had already mortgaged their estates. The total debt for the coffee industry in Kenya in terms of mortgages, bank overdrafts and other loans financed through land was £1,212,110, with annual interest charge of £82,043. As coffee takes three years to bear fruits and six years

34) DAAR 1930, 18.
36) DAAR 1932, 124.
37) Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, “Memorandum from the Coffee Board of Agricultural
for full crop production, settlers’ financial situation got even worse. Also, coffee’s degree of flexibility in responding to fluctuations in prices was not high, which was a commonly shared feature of many annual crops. Although the rate of expansion in coffee acreages significantly slowed from 1930, the settler coffee farmers’ suffering had just begun because large areas of coffee plantation only reached their full bearing stage after the price collapse.

The state of the settler coffee industry during this period is well outlined in the
for a prolonged period farming operations have been conducted at a loss, left many without any working capital with which to meet labour costs, etc., to plant another crop or to maintain existing areas.38) As a temporary measure to alleviate the financial hardship under the price drop and the overstock of coffee, planters resorted to seasonal advances against their crops. The situation was made worse by merchant houses, the wholesaling agencies for coffee, who had decided "to curtail and in some cases to discontinue seasonal and anticipatory advances on which planters had relied in past years." 39) The government’s remedy to this crisis was to supply additional financial resources by setting up the Land and Agricultural Bank in 1930, which was designed to grant long-term loans repayable over 10 to 30 years.40) At the same time, additional attempts to subsidise European agriculture were made, particularly for maize and wheat. In 1930, the grading and inspection services for the produce operated by the administration decided to refund 80% of charges imposed the previous season and to remit 80% of fees for port storage facilities charged by the Kenya railways and harbours. In addition, the government was able to negotiate with ocean freight carriers to secure a deal reducing the charges for transporting Kenya produce to the world market.41) Despite the above measures, the economic situation showed no sign of recovery. Failure to find a successful method of stabilizing European agriculture through various forms of subsidy led the colonial government to turn to new options.

Colonial Bureaucracy and Attention to African Agriculture

Reading the correspondence between the officials of the colonial administration in Kenya in the 1920s and 1930s regarding the development of African agriculture, one can distinguish two different attitudes toward the issue. The senior administrators in Nairobi were explicitly sympathetic to European agriculture.42) Not all of

41) DAAR 1930, 56.
them, however, were against African agricultural development in principle. They considered encouraging African agricultural production in general as a viable solution to the Colony’s development complementing European export crop production. It had become increasingly obvious in the course of the 1920s and 1930s that African agricultural development might stabilize the dwindling European farmers’ position, as surplus African food crop production (largely comprised of maize and beans) had found a market for workers in settler farms and private/public sector businesses.\(^{43}\)

African agriculture could be developed, but the improvement in African areas should be limited to an extent that Africans would still go out from the reserves and seek work in the European industries. In this regard, coffee growing by Africans was certainly not in their interest. Africans would be reluctant to work for European employers if they were allowed to grow coffee. As the crop cycle for African coffee growing would be almost identical with that of Europeans’, the settler farmers, who were already in trouble, would find it more difficult to find labour especially at harvest time. Labour cost would likely be increased in consequence, which already made up over 40% of total production cost.\(^{44}\)

Another group of administrators, on the contrary, were keen on introducing agricultural innovation like coffee production to African smallholders. Contrary to common belief, there was no regulation banning Africans from coffee growing in Kenya. However, up until the early 1930s, African involvement in coffee production was effectively restricted by “government discouragement”, which was rather a form of intimidation.\(^{45}\) These officials were working in the provincial administration in the African reserves, particularly those remote from the European areas, where they

\(^{42}\) This group comprised of high-ranking officials in Nairobi, including Lieutenant Colonel Sir Edward W. M. Grigg, then governor of Kenya Colony who have been in favour of settler concerns and in opposition to the plan to allow coffee growing by Africans. He was later in 1931 replaced by Byrne, who was more sympathetic to African coffee growing.

\(^{43}\) European coffee and tea plantations were the largest purchasers of African grown maize at that time. G.N. Kitching, *Class and Economic Change in Kenya* (New Haven, 1970), 58.

\(^{44}\) In a 200 acre coffee estate, it was estimated that cost of labour (19 Sh. 99 Cts., or 42.5%) was the largest expense in total cost of maintenance and treatment (46 Sh. 95 Cts.), followed by Guano (as fertilizer, 16 Sh 27 Cts., or 34.6%), and pest control material (e.g. cutworm shields, 8 Sh 15 Cts, or 17.3%). See Table II, J. F. Perkins, "The Effect of Certain Factors on the Production Cost of Coffee and on Estate Profits," *The East African Agricultural Journal* 3-5 (March 1938): 367.

\(^{45}\) Asked about the issue of African coffee growing before the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee on East Africa in 1931, Lt. Col. Sir Edward W. M. Grigg, then governor of Kenya, testified that Africans were “allowed”, but “definitely discouraged from growing coffee.” HMG, Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, House of Commons Sessional Papers, vol. 2. *Minutes of Evidence* (1931), 112.
experienced acute economic difficulties caused by the Depression which in turn were associated with wider social problems. They felt that simply encouraging more food crop production for sale, which had been a focus of government’s dual policy, would not solve the problem: not because there was not enough surplus agricultural produce for sale, but because there were no markets available for those surpluses.

From the early 1930s, however, local colonial administrators began to report that it was necessary to redirect the focus of the policy on commercial sale of surplus food crops by African producers in the reserves. Africans living in the reserves far from the European areas, such as Meru District, had “increased their production to the point where they are unable to get rid of their surplus in a normal year and further increase in production will not be of benefit to the district unless new markets can be found.”

E. B. Horne, the Provincial Commissioner for Kikuyu Province in 1930, sent a letter to the Colonial Secretary to request a coffee trial in Meru district. While he was trying to explain to his superior why African coffee growing ought to be allowed in Meru, Horne described the situation in his district, where economic opportunities for earning cash income were severely limited due to the distance from any market:

Any surplus native crops that are grown can find no cash market. The distance from the Railway and transport, render it impossible. ... These people have no money and it is merely battering of skins and goats in exchange for maize or maize flour. This does not relieve the difficulty experienced by the Meru in obtaining money for hut tax or any work in their own reserve.

As early as the late 1920, the subject of coffee growing by Africans in Kenya had been discussed between colonial officials as a part of wider government discussions on improving “the general condition of the natives by encouraging them to make the most efficient use of their own resources for purposes of production.” At the same time, discouragement of African coffee growing was constantly questioned in numerous officially commissioned reports, and it eventually became one of the

46) Meru District Annual Report (hereafter MDAR), 1931, 8.
most hotly debated topics in London and Nairobi at that time. The issue was also raised in a series of discussions at the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee held in London from 1930 to 1931 as part of a wider debate assessing the economic situation in Kenya (as well as Tanganyika and Uganda) in which colonial administrators, representatives of settler interest, as well as an African delegation were called as witnesses.50)

It is notable that Whitehall was in favour of African coffee production in Kenya. Frank Stockdale, the Colonial Office’s agricultural adviser in the 1930s, advised the Kenya government that the besetting problem of the country’s economy was producing too little quantity of coffee for export, and the answer was to add African production to settler production as in Tanganyika Territory.51) If production were to increase, then Kenya could get a better deal from shippers or buyers, as T. S. Jervis, a DoA official of Tanganyika Territory, later suggested in 1937. Jervis explained in 1937 that the same grade coffee sold on the London market at a much higher price than on the Nairobi market, and bulk shipments of the coffee from Kenya to London could bring planters much higher margins even after deducting transport costs. Jervis then argued “a bulked coffee, whatever the quality may be, will always attract buyers because of its ready utilization by the trade.”52)

As pressure mounted for African coffee growing, settler anxiety was well expressed in the public domain including daily newspapers and letters to government officials.53) One of the clearest examples is found in Resolution No. 11 made in the 1932 Coffee Conference, an international event for those with a vested interest in coffee. Their resolution, while it demanded the indefinite postponement of the scheme, regarded the currently considered plan of African coffee growing as "a step utterly unwise".54) The European planters attending the conference gave a

50) Chief Koinange Mbiu, James Mutua, and Ezekiel Apindi had come to London to present the case of African coffee growing before the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, which was established to examine evidence in 1931. In their list of requests, they asked that Africans “should not be prohibited from planting economic plants such as coffee”. HMG, Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, House of Commons Sessional Papers, vol. 2. Minutes of Evidence (1931), 401.


53) For the settler complaints over the government’s plan to introduce African coffee growing, see TNA CO 533/431/13 Native coffee growing: protests 1933 Feb.-1934 July.
number of reasons: the government proposed to increase supply to an already overstocked world market; Africans would experience difficulties competing with well-organized plantation interests; once coffee was allowed to Africans, it could be difficult to prove whether the coffee berries in question were from European farms and therefore theft of coffee would increase; and the marketing of coffee produced by Africans might injure the good reputation held by Kenya coffee; and if coffee was allowed to be grown in one area, there would be an outcry from other parts of the reserves and it would be difficult for the government to define areas where coffee could and could not be grown.55)

Although such claims were widely believed by European settlers, it seems that the colonial officials were not convinced. 56) For example, in 1934, there was a meeting between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the European elected members of Legislative Council in Nairobi. In response to an argument about world surplus of coffee raised by Lord Francis Scott (who was representing settler interests in Kenya as the successor of Lord Delamere), the Secretary of State claimed that the surplus of coffee depressing the world price was the effect of the large quantity of Brazilian and other foreign coffee and "the coffee experts in London say that it is absolute rubbish to say that the addition of some native coffee growing in Kenya is going to make the faintest iota of difference to the world market." Again on Lord Scott’s argument that coffee growing would not pay Africans well, the Secretary of State responded: "I think the native is a fairly shrewd person at finding out what pays him".57) Settlers presented coffee theft as another major concern, 58) but the contemporary colonial officials did not feel the argument was "tenable." 59)

56) Many scholars who closely examined settlers’ arguments against African coffee production regarded the increase in labour cost due to low-cost African competition as settlers’ central fear against the scheme. See Caroline Barnes, “An Experiment with African Coffee Growing in Kenya” and I. D. Talbott, Agricultural innovation in colonial Africa.
57) "Extract from Record of an Interview between the S of S and the European Elected Members of Leg Council on 14 February, 1934," TNA: CO533/447/1.
58) The concern of the settler coffee planters was vividly shown in Department of Agriculture, Report of proceedings of Coffee Conference held in Nairobi, June, 1927. Settlers complained the difficulties in administering the registration for coffee dealership and plantations, and argued that both of which could provide illegitimate channels of coffee trade and could be taken advantage of by the African coffee thieves. See Department of Agriculture, Report of proceedings of Coffee Conference held in Nairobi, June, 1927 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1927).
59) “Note of a Meeting held in Mr. Stockdale’s room on Tuesday the 6th, June, 1933, between Mr.
That the danger of coffee disease and pests would increase if African coffee growing were allowed was another commonly used argument against the introduction of African coffee production. The assumption here was that Europeans alone were capable of controlling such diseases and managing the risk with advanced farming technology. As shown earlier, however, it is doubtful that the government’s support for disease control in coffee farms was adequate enough to provide proper protection to the European planters during the 1920s. Little had improved in the 1930s, given that the measures provided by the agricultural department to control diseases and pests largely remained the same. Up until the 1930s, therefore, settler coffee planters did not seem to have been as advanced as they thought. A series of appalling outbreaks of coffee disease and pests causing heavy losses, for instance Coffee Berry Disease in 1922 and Coffee Mealy Bug in 1923, also indicated that the question of disease and pests was “by no means confined to native plantations.”

On the contrary, coffee production carried out by African peasants in the neighbouring Uganda and Tanganyika was widely regarded as a success, and the colonial administration in Kenya was well aware of this development.

However, the colonial government in Nairobi was still reluctant to take the solution for the Kenyan economy presented by Frank Stockdale. This was primarily because of the colonial administration’s obsession with control. In 1931, in a letter to Cunliffe-Lister, Lord Passfield’s successor as the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Byrne, the Governor of Kenya Colony who succeeded Governor Grigg, reported that two natives of the Fort Hall District had recently deposited with the District Commissioner Shs. 30/- each as registration fees for coffee plantations. The District Commissioner was of the opinion that if registration were permitted there would be a large number of similar demands. Byrne’s recommendation was not to permit any application:

Haphazard planting by individual natives would be most dangerous and would not be in the interests of the native planters, particularly in the neighbourhood of European coffee plantations. Disaster to the latter would mean disaster to the native population which depends on them largely for its income.61)


Colonial officials' concern for the African reserves adjacent to the European coffee farms based on the interdependence of two communities indicates that there was clearly a limit to the government's attempt to encourage commercial agricultural production in the African reserves. This led the colonial government to contradict itself in promoting its own policies regarding African coffee growing. Although there was no real ground to discourage African coffee growing, the colonial administration did not allow African coffee growing in the areas neighbouring European coffee plantations.

Effort to Improve the Economic Conditions in African Reserves

While the debate on African coffee growing was continued at the upper echelon of the colonial bureaucracy, Africans in the reserves were experiencing a severe economic downturn in the 1930s. The depressed economy in the country made it more and more difficult for Africans to earn cash, which was becoming increasingly important in their livelihoods. The main reason for Africans' cash demand was to pay taxes, the main source of revenue for the colonial government's operation. By the 1930s, it already became difficult for Africans to pay taxes: Meru District Commissioner reported in 1930, "the collection of Shs. 12/- Hut & Poll tax from the Meru is only accomplished by draining the district of practically every available shilling in it." The importance of cash was further strengthened at the same period, as growing number of Africans needed it for goods and payment of education fees.

Because of the economic hardship in the 1930s, local administrators found it difficult to collect taxes in the African areas. For example, the administrators recommended a reduced tax rate from Shs. 12/- to Shs. 6/- in Meru in order to ease the situation, but Nairobi turned it down in the first place on the grounds that the reduced tax revenue would hinder the progress of the District. The tax rate for the district was eventually reduced to Shs. 8/- in 1933, but as H. E. Lambert, the then District Commissioner, remarked in his annual report, "the people of many

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63) MDAR, 1930, 6.
64) MDAR, 1930, 6.
areas found it difficult to pay even the reduced tax.\textsuperscript{65}) Within Central Province, economic hardship was more burdensome to African households in the more remote places, such as Meru, Embu, Machakos and Kitui, in which opportunities for earning cash income were more limited than those in the African districts adjacent to settler areas like Fort Hall, Kiambu, and Nyeri.\textsuperscript{66})

It became increasingly clear to the administration that the hardship in African reserves would get worse unless something was done, and the introduction of high value cash crops to the reserves was put forward under these circumstances. In fact, coffee was not the only cash crop promoted by the colonial administration purely for export in the African reserves. The government was aware of the need to increase agricultural production especially in the economically depressed African areas, and consequently a series of rural development plans was tried by the administration in the 1920s and 1930s. The government was to provide guidelines to the colonial officials in the African reserves to prepare specific zone development plans for individual areas based on climatic conditions. The primary objective of these plans was to promote mixed farming, a combination of food crop production and livestock husbandry under supervisory and extension services provided by DoA. For example, maize for sale or domestic consumption could be combined with the sale of dairy products for additional cash income, and livestock would provide the manure that could be used for fertilizer at the same time. Coffee was one of many possible crops to be tried in the areas with suitable conditions.\textsuperscript{67})

In line with the effort, different crops were tried in different areas. For example, cotton growing was promoted in arid, low altitude areas of the African reserves, firstly in coastal and western areas in the 1920s, and then in central Kenya during the 1930s. The government’s inspection note in 1936, however, indicated that cotton growing did not take off from the trial stage.\textsuperscript{68}) Repeated experiments for cotton growing continued to be unsuccessful up until the end of the 1920s, largely due to its low prices even when compared to that of food crops like maize, which required much less effort to produce and provided better security against price change.\textsuperscript{69})

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{65}) MDAR, 1933, 12.
\item \textsuperscript{66}) Native Affairs Department Annual Report, 1933, 114.
\item \textsuperscript{67}) For further details of zone development plans see I. D. Talbott, "Agricultural Innovation and Policy Changes in Kenya," 62-81 and 100-104 (mixed farming).
\item \textsuperscript{68}) Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Inspection Note on the Kenya Cotton Crop in November and December, 1935 (Nairobi, 1936), 20-23.
\item \textsuperscript{69}) For more detail in cotton trials in Kenya, see R.M.A. Zwanenberg, "The Development of Peasant Commodity Production in Kenya, 1920-40," The Economic History Review, New Series, 27-3 (August,
Cotton was also unpopular among farmers because the labour demands for cotton at
the peak time coincided with the labour input required for food crops. Furthermore,
the control measures employed to prevent diseased and pest-infected cotton from
spreading to other locations often made promotion of cotton growing more difficult.
In 1934 alone, there were five government notices in the Kenya Official Gazette
ordering local agricultural officers to control the failed cotton schemes in various
African districts. In order to prevent diseases and pests, the officers had to order
Africans to uproot and burn all the old cotton plants. In some places like South and
Central Kavirondo Districts even the purchase of cotton was banned.70) Sharp price
drops and unpopular disease control measures made the cotton growing trial
unpopular amongst African farmers in central Kenya by the end of the 1930s.71) In
1940, the District Commissioner in Meru recommended abandoning the African
cotton production programme because the Africans in his district "loathe the very
name of cotton".72)

Trials of wattle bark in central Kenya were also implemented in the African
districts near settler areas as a small-scale campaign in the 1920s. The campaign
was a success: although the development of wattle bark production had shown
limited progress until the early 1930s, it soon expanded rapidly in the late 1930s,
thanks to its various uses that increased its exchange values not to mention its
minimal labour requirement. African producers in three districts, including Fort Hall,
Kiambu, and Nyeri, were eagerly growing wattle trees, not only because they could
sell the tannin extract from the its bark on the export market, but also because
they could sell the wood as building material and as logs for charcoal.73)

Although the colonial government would not let Africans in the reserves closer to
settler farms grow coffee, the administrators in areas away from European farms
were still committed to promoting African coffee growing. By 1933, steps had finally
been taken to initiate African coffee growing in those areas. Land had been selected
both in central (Embu and Meru districts) and western (Kisii, Nyanza Province)
Kenya to start the nurseries. Actual coffee farming by African farmers started in

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70) Government Notice No. 57 (Jan. 13th, 1934), No. 128 (Feb. 6th, 1934), No. 129 (Feb. 7th, 1934),
No. 167 (Mar. 2nd, 1934), and No. 608 (Sep. 10th, 1934) found in The Kenya Official Gazette.
71) DAAR, 1938, 77.
72) MDAR 1940, 36. KNA: DC/MERU/2/3/3.
73) See M. P. Cowen "Capital and House Production: the case of wattle in Kenya’s Central Province,
1935 when the seedlings were large enough to transplant to the already demarcated and prepared plots. These locations provided the colonial administration with a number of advantages for the experiment of African coffee growing. Above all, those areas had a favourable environment in terms of soil, rainfall, and climatic conditions for coffee cultivation. Thanks to the distance from the European coffee farms, settler concerns over disease and pests, as well as theft of berries, could be effectively ignored. In these locations, "distance and transport charges preclude the economic production of the less profitable staple crops, and at the same time their very isolation should prevent friction between the native growers of coffee and the larger, established European farmers." In other words, promoting African coffee growing in these areas was an attractive option for the colonial government, as it could provide economic opportunities in the depressed African reserves, where there was no alternative source of income other than the sale of surplus food crops, without affecting labour supply to European farms at the same time.

**Conclusion**

The focus of this article has been to show how colonial interests in economic development in Kenya influenced the colonial administration’s decision on African coffee production and consequently determined the scope of the scheme. The colonial administration had continuing interests in stimulating the development of the colony’s trade balances. This led the administration to make various efforts to encourage commodity production by European settlers in the 1920s. In the process, however, white settlers’ over-dependency on the supply of cheap African labour worsened the structural problem of the settler economy, which found itself in the deep financial distress by the 1930s when the Great Depression severely disturbed global trades.

From the late 1920s, the idea of African coffee production was considered in the bureaucratic circle of Whitehall and Nairobi as a part of discussion on improving African welfare by economic development. It was clear that both the metropolitan government and the colonial administration in Kenya regarded African coffee...
growing as a viable solution for the economic development of the colony from early on. The metropolitan government was generally in favour of the idea as the increased production of coffee would lower the transport cost and therefore bring higher profit margins. The colonial administrators in Kenya were also in favour because high value cash crop like coffee would provide sources of income and employment for the African areas with limited opportunities. Although settlers were strongly against the new scheme and presented various arguments as to why coffee growing should not be allowed, the colonial government was not convinced. The colonial administrators in Kenya were well aware of the fact that coffee production carried out by indigenous Africans in neighbouring countries, namely Uganda and Tanganyika, was a success, whilst the settler agriculture was heavily indebted and was suffering from high cost base and poor profitability.

Such reasoning based on economic considerations, however, did not encourage the colonial administration to implement the idea of African coffee growing as a full-scale commercial operation in the African reserves in the 1930s. The colonial administrators in Nairobi were reluctant to promote African coffee production, primarily because it could bring severe economic damage to the already depressed settler community whose presence was relatively stronger than that of those in Uganda or Tanganyika. Moreover, as shown in Byrne’s recommendation, the colonial administration wanted to have a full control over the implementation process in order to avoid the danger of ‘haphazard planting’ by African farmers, which obviously required more time and financial resources.

Consequently, the initiative for African coffee growing was only implemented as a carefully controlled rural development programme providing an opportunity for cash crop production in the economically depressed African reserves remote from the White Highlands. It was only much later in the 1950s that the government finally allowed the African farmers in the areas near the settled areas to grow coffee. In this regard, as far as the economic development was concerned, the colonial Kenya in the 1930s was in a condition where “development of the European and development of natives are inimical to each other.”

76) It was L.S.B. Leakey who made this observation. "Minutes of Evidence taken before the Joint Select Committee of the House of Lords and the House of Commons on East Africa," Confidential and Private, 19 March 1931, TNA: CO533/412/3.
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Teaching British Life Style:
The Role of Women's Groups in Resettling Foreign Workers
during the Attlee Years

Hiromi Mizokami*

Abstract
Immediately after the Second World War, Britain suffered serious labour shortage. The Attlee’s Labour Government, regarding this manpower shortage as an impediment to overcoming the post-war economic crisis, and also in order to solve the contemporary problem of displaced persons, decided to admit to the UK more than 200,000 foreign workers of Baltic and Eastern European origin. As most of these foreign workers could not be forced to return to their counties that were under the influence of the USSR, the government was directly involved not only in recruiting but also resettling them in Britain.

However, this official resettlement of foreigners required cooperation from local people, who did not necessarily welcome these displaced Europeans. The Labour government asked for help from various volunteer groups, particularly, women’s groups, such as the Women’s Voluntary Service (the WVS) and Women’s Institutes (WI). These women’s organisations, especially the WVS, cooperated closely with the Attlee government. They supported the government’s resettlement policy by acting as intermediates among officials, local people and foreign workers. They played a significant role in making up for the lack of social service for foreigners, paying special attention to dependants and assisting them in fitting into life in Britain. Their activities included escorting new arrivals to the holding camps, distributing clothes and foods, arranging for interpreters, and even teaching English.

Although there are some studies on the official resettlement policy for European immigrants in the Attlee years, these support activities conducted by women’s organisations have not attracted much attention to date. What a role these women played still remains to be researched. By using materials from the WRVS Archives in Abingdon, the Women’s Library and the National Archives, this article focuses on the activities by the WVS, WI and its national federation, the National Federation of Women’s Institutes (NFWI), considering how women of the host community behaved or, were expected to behave in receiving ‘others’ during the Attlee years.

As this article describes, the government heavily depended on the voluntary work of local women on site. However, women’s groups did not always comply with the official

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policy. Some of their activities were outside the purview of, and sometimes, even at odds with the official policy. Especially, the WVS, or at least its executives, took pride in what ‘ordinary’ women could do. They felt that women could play a significant role in ‘teaching’ foreign workers the British way of life, because they knew most what British lifestyle was as housewives. Thus, they insisted that British women should live in the camps and hostels for foreign workers. While the government tended to overlook the family life of foreign workers for the sake of securing manpower and saving limited resources, women’s groups valued family life and acted to maintain and reconstruct the family independently from government policy.

**Keywords**: foreign labour, women, voluntary organisation, Labour government, welfare, Second World War.
Immediately after the Second World War, Britain suffered a serious labour shortage. The Attlee’s Labour government actively utilized foreign labour—Italian and German POWs and other Western Europeans etc. However, it became difficult for the government to obtain enough workers from these sources. Meanwhile, the UK was also saddled with maintaining both a large number of displaced persons (DPs) and thousands of Polish people in exile. Though, at first, government’s officials were unwilling to admit these people to the UK, they gradually began to see them as a potential labour source. As a result, the Labour government allowed these people to resettle in the UK. From 1946 to 1950, Britain admitted about 200,000 of European immigrants, comprising of 120,000 Poles and 80,000 displaced persons.

1) As a result, the Labour government allowed these people to resettle in the UK. From 1946 to 1950, Britain admitted about 200,000 of European immigrants, comprising of 120,000 Poles and 80,000 displaced persons. The former group consisted of ex-servicemen of the Polish army under British command who had owed allegiance to the Polish government-in-exile in London and their families, and who now refused to return to Poland under the post-war conditions. The latter group comprised ‘European Volunteer Workers (EVWs)’, who were recruited from DP camps in continental Europe. In 1953, the Home Office reported to the House of Commons that ‘since the war we have admitted no fewer than 250,000 aliens to come and live here on a permanent basis. Most of those aliens were refugees or displaced persons’. 2) As we can see from the table 1 and 2, Polish ex-servicemen, their dependants and EVWs were predominant among these 250,000.

Such a large scale of official resettlement of foreign workers epitomises the situation of the time where the government’s role had expanded enormously in the course of the war. Under the direction of the Cabinet, the Ministry of Labour and National Service (MLNS) not only arranged for the recruitment of these foreign workers, but also was involved in their resettlement process. The fact that most of these foreign workers had been displaced as a result of the war made the resettlement problem significant. However, this official resettlement of foreigners required cooperation from local people. Not only was there a need to persuade local people to accept these (not necessarily welcomed) aliens, but, in order to fill

1) This research was financially supported by grants from GCOE Program (Global Center of Excellence for Reconstruction of the Intimate and Public Spheres in 21st Century Asia), Kyoto University, and International Training Program, the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University, both of which are funded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. Diana Kay and Robert Miles, Refugees or Migrant Workers?: European Volunteer Workers in Britain, 1946-1951 (London 1992), 132-35.

2) Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th series, 521, col. 561, 26 November 1953.
Table 1) Numbers of foreigners allowed to enter to, and to settle in the UK from 1945 to 1949

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Volunteer Workers and Refugees allowed to settle on the compassionate grounds</td>
<td>100,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish ex-servicemen and their Dependants</td>
<td>121,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-German POWs allowed to remain</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Ukrainian POWs allowed to settle</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Italian POWs allowed to remain</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>246,029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the statement by the Home Secretary at the House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th series, 472, col. 87, 31 March 1950
Note: Apart from the number above, the Home Secretary revealed that about 101,000 foreigners were issued with employment permission during the same period.

Table 2) Categories of Refugees in Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-war refugees (90,000 less approximately 34,000 naturalized)</td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Resettlement Corps</td>
<td>91,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependents of Polish Resettlement Corps</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Volunteer Workers and 'Balt Cygnet' (including Ukrainian POW numbered about 8,000)</td>
<td>84,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distressed Relatives (excl. Dependents of Polish Resettlement Corps)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees from Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


in gaps in the social service for foreigners, the Labour government also depended heavily on volunteer groups; in particular, women’s organisations such as the Women’s Voluntary Service (WVS) and the Women’s Institutes (WI).

While Diana Kay and Robert Miles briefly mention such works by voluntary groups, these support activities conducted by women’s organisations for foreign workers have not attracted much attention to date.\(^3\) Although there are several studies of European immigrants in the Attlee years, they concentrate on the government’s policy or on immigrants’ communities.\(^4\) Meanwhile, in studies of

\(^3\) Kay and Miles, Refugees or Migrant Workers?, 132-35.
women’s history, the WVS and the WI have been disregarded because of their non-feminist characteristics. Only recently have some historians, James Hinton for the WVS and Maggie Andrews, Caitriona Beaumont and Linda Perriton for the WI, started to review the roles that these non-feminist, but ‘mainstream’ women’s groups played in women’s lives in post-suffrage era. While Hinton emphasises the continuity of class in regard to the WVS movement, Andrews and Beaumont appreciate the role of these mainstream organisations in improving women’s lives which were closely linked to home. But, the focus of these studies is mainly on British women’s attitudes towards their own affairs, not towards ‘others’, though Andrews mentions the considerably ‘liberal’ attitudes of the WI towards immigrants from the Commonwealth.

This article will focus on how women of the host community behaved or, were expected to behave in receiving ‘others’ during the Attlee years, taking example of the activities by the WVS, the WI and its national federation, the National Federation of Women’s Institutes (NFWI) whose activities were prominent in the official resettlement process of European foreign workers. As Alison Light argues, after the First World War, English national identity had become feminised and


domesticated. The Second World War accelerated the integration of women into the nation, as indicated in the characterisation of this war as a ‘people’s war’. The Post-war welfare state strengthened the link between women and nationhood by placing ‘home’ at the centre of the nation. Women’s relationship with nationhood remained heavily gendered, with women’s role in ‘home’ as mothers and housewives emphasised. According to Wendy Webster, ‘home’ played a significant part in constructing post-war British national identity, distinguishing ‘us’ from immigrants ‘others’. While white British women were expected to devote their time to their family, immigrant women, both European and Caribbean, were regarded only as ‘workers’ by government officials, and their family lives were disregarded.

However, when viewed from Women’s groups’ perspective, the general picture seems a little different or complicated, as what they tried to do for European foreign workers during the Attlee years was sometimes at odds with official policy. By using materials from the WRVS Archives in Abingdon, the Women’s Library, and the National Archives, this article will describe the support activities of women’s groups for the resettlement of Poles and EVWs during the Attlee years. Though other volunteer groups also joined in the support activities, the Labour government, as far as we can see from official documents, seems to have depended heavily on the WVS and, to a lesser extent, on the WI, which may suggest a gender bias in official minds.

The labour government and women

On 29th January 1948, Sir Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, addressed ‘women journalists’ at a press conference:

I am convinced that it is vital, if we were to come through the tremendous struggle in which we are now engaged, for women of this country to give their full backing to the national effort. It is they who carry the heaviest burdens and it is they who are the greatest factor in maintaining our national morale... I emphasise again the key point to our morale as a nation is in the home and it is the mother and the housewife who run the home and sustain the

This statement indicates how much importance the Labour government placed on women, as housewives, in implementing its economic policy. The main purpose of Cripps’ statement was to ask editors of women’s magazines for their cooperation in appealing to women to continue to minimise their consumption in order to sustain the British economy, which was on the brink of collapse. At the same time, Cripps did not forget to mention foreign workers:

I should like to mention the problem of the European Volunteer Workers. They are a most useful if small addition to our labour force. They badly need friendliness and to be encouraged to speak English ... They are lonely people in a strange land but have come to help us and we must do our best to help them to fit into our social life.11)

Welcoming and supporting foreign workers was regarded as being as helpful a contribution to the nation as was saving on household consumption and working in the textile industry. Especially after the economic crisis of 1947, the Labour government actively recruited foreign labour. The Economic Survey for 1947 reflected a keen understanding of the critical economic situation, insisting that they should do their best to save and earn dollars.12) For this purpose, the Economic Survey emphasised the vital importance of securing sufficient labour in ‘essential’ undermanned industries, such as coal, agriculture and textiles, by producing the ‘manpower budget’ — the numbers of workers that would be required to achieve the production target in each industry. The point was not in the number of workers, but in the distribution of labour. According to the Economic Survey, ‘if the process of closing the gap is left to chance, some vital requirements are sure to be squeezed by the less essential ... if women who are needed in the textile mills go to work in shops, the whole population will go short of clothing and curtains and sheets’.13) It was because of this distribution gap that the Economic Survey recommended that the UK utilise foreign labour. Polish servicemen and DPs were pointed out as the main sources of the foreign labour in the survey.14) Because of their alien status, they were supposed to be put into a particular industry under the

10) TNA, LAB12/513, Statement by Cripps, 29 January 1948.
11) TNA, LAB12/513, Statement by Cripps, 29 January 1948.
Aliens Order. Thus, while increasing pressure on Poles to work in undermanned industries, the government lifted the immigration restriction on DPs and launched a new official recruitment scheme called 'Westward Ho'.15) Under the 'Westward Ho' scheme, DPs who were prepared to take any job offered to them were recruited as European Volunteer Workers. In the screening process, young single people were given priority. Because of the housing shortage in Britain, applicants with dependants were allowed in on condition that they agreed to leave their relatives on the Continent for the time being.16) There were so many unfilled positions for young, single women that the government later extended recruitment to German, Austrian and Italian women.

However, the domestic attitudes towards foreigners were not necessarily welcoming. In addition to resistance from trades unions, there were so many misunderstandings about these foreigners that the Ministry of Labour had to set up a committee for the education of public opinion in October 1947.17) The Ministry seriously took the need 'to dispel such views as that they are potential Fascists—or alternatively the Jews of Europe—and to explain to employers and workpeople alike that their labour means increased production for export and home consumption and is therefore a direct contribution to the country’s economic well-being'.18) As Kay and Miles point out, the government deliberately avoided such words as 'foreign' or 'displaced persons' in referring to these foreign workers, and instead used 'European'.19)

Thus, the Attlee government paid considerable attention to domestic reaction towards these officially admitted foreigners, and to persuading the public to accept them. In the process, the government involved the WVS and WI in its resettlement policy. The Ministry of Labour directly asked the National Federation of Women’s Institutes (NFWI) to call their members’ attention to these foreign workers.20) Representatives from both the WVS and the WI were invited to the official committees set up to educate public opinion alongside those from government departments on a regular basis.21) As shown later, representatives from government

15) TNA, PREM8/1014, CM (47)10th, 30 January 1947.
16) Kay and Miles, Refugees or Migrant Workers?.
17) TNA, LAB12/513, Minute of Meeting held at the MLNS, 1 October 1947.
18) TNA, PREM8, From L. H. Hornsby to F. Tarrant, Regional Office in Manchester, 10 February 1948
19) Kay & Miles, Refugees or Migrant Workers?, 125.
20) TNA, LAB12/513, From Miss. Jenkins (MLNS) to Mrs. Freeman (NFWI), 15 March 1948.
21) TNA, LAB12/513, Minutes of meeting held at MLNS, Publicity for the Education of Popular Opinion on Foreign Labour, undated.
departments also attended the meetings of the WVS.

Of the two women's groups, the government was much more dependent on the WVS. Indeed, 'the WVS was consistently singled out by government welfare officers as an outstanding body'.22) The reason for this would be because there was a special relationship between the government and the WVS. While both of these women's groups had been created in connection with the war, the WI, formed in 1915, had become financially independent of the government by the middle of the 1920s.23) By contrast, the WVS was formed in 1938 at the behest of the then Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, for the purpose of recruiting women to assist in the Air Raid Precautions. Hoar himself asked Lady Stella Reading, who had had worked for various public bodies, charities and women's organizations, to form the WVS. Thus it might to be said that the WVS was a quasi-official organization. However, under the leadership of Lady Reading, the WVS aggressively acted on its own initiative. During the war, with the membership of about one million, the WVS played a key role in helping civilians in coordination with local authorities.24)

With the end of the war, the future of the WVS began to be questioned, and it was on the brink of dissolution. While the Labour government decided to extend the life of the WVS for at least two years in 1945,25) the Attlee years were nonetheless the hardest time for the organisation. As Hinton argues, it was the strategy of Lady Reading to cooperate actively with 'Labour's austerity' that enabled the WVS to survive.26) The WVS showed its value to the Labour government by creating 'a new role for itself: developing the Home Helps scheme, looking after the settlement of displaced persons from Europe, and taking command of the work of women's organisations as a whole in response to the fuel crisis of 1947.27)

Interestingly, Lady Reading presented the significance of the WVS to the government as consisting in the amateurism of 'ordinary women'. Although Hinton stresses hierarchical characteristic of the WVS, Lady Reading saw the WVS in a different way. For her, the WVS represented a 'democratic' change of voluntary work, as we can see from one of her talks on the WVS:

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22) Kay and Miles, *Refugees or Migrant Workers?*, 133.
Voluntary service of yesterday was based on charitable patronage, which, with the vast generosity of the contributor, paid its own way and did every kind of specialized job for the nation, for the community, and for the individual. But, since the last war, there are no longer the same funds to draw upon... We, as a nation, have to make every man, woman and child realize the necessity for accepting responsibility... The Service to which I belong is a Service of very ordinary women, doing very ordinary things in a very ordinary way, on a National Scale.\textsuperscript{28}

After the war, other voluntary groups criticised the continued official financial assistance to the WVS. The WI was among those critics. The NFWI repeatedly requested that the Labour government make a decide about the future of the WVS: disintegrate it or treat it in the same way as it does other voluntary organisations by refraining from supporting it financially.\textsuperscript{29} Despite these criticisms, the Labour government took a supportive attitude towards the WVS, recognising the benefits they would gain from an organisation that could mobilise women at the government’s request whenever needed. Aneurin Bevan, the Minister of Health, expressed his blessing for works that the WVS had done and would do in assisting social service. In his letter to Lady Reading, he said:

I am glad to have had an opportunity of discussing with you the extent to which my Department may hope to enjoy, in the development of the housing and health services for which we are responsible, the help of the WVS from which we have profited so conspicuously in our war-time administration. I have no doubt at all that there are many ways in which the WVS can, if they will, continue to be of great service to the Ministry.\textsuperscript{30}

The Home Office tended to avoid discussion with other voluntary and women’s groups about the future of the WVS, and resisted calls to cut financial assistance to it.\textsuperscript{31} Thus the Labour government and the WVS were co-dependent.

By contrast, the WI helped foreign workers out of different motives and from a different position. As Kay and Miles point out, the WI regarded the existence of Poles and EVWs in the UK as ‘magnificent opportunities’ to carry out their pledge

\textsuperscript{28} Virginia Thesiger, ed., \textit{It's the Job that Counts 1939-1953: A Selection from the Speeches and Writings of the Dowager Marchioness of Reading Chairman of Women’s Voluntary Service for Civil Defence} (1954), 108-109.
\textsuperscript{29} TNA, HO45/24302, From General Secretary of the NFWI to the Home Secretary, ‘the Future of the WVS’.
\textsuperscript{30} TNA, MH30/277, From Bevan to Lady Reading, 8 April 1946.
\textsuperscript{31} For example, TNA, HO356/2, From C.A. to Alexander Maxwell, 8 January 1947; CAB124/914, From Ede to Morrison, 9 January 1951.
to work by every means in their power for the promotion of friendship among nations. Also they saw themselves as 'traders of democracy'.

The WI joined the committee organizing welfare arrangements for EVWs under the auspices of the National Council of Social Service as well as official meetings for voluntary societies held at the Ministry of Labour.

In many rural areas there was overlap of WVS and WI leadership, though, as mentioned, the attitude of the WI towards the WVS was not necessarily cooperative. In 1938 the WI had been invited to consult with the Home Office about the role of the newly formed WVS, and joined the WVS advisory council. Subsequently, the NFWI was formally associated with the WVS, although the NFWI sometimes stayed away from it. While the WVS attempted 'to colonize and, to some degree, to control established world of women's organizations', it did not threaten the long-term hegemony of the WI in the villages. This explains why the WVS and even the WI were often invited to meetings of the Ministry of Labour; the WVS had to depend on the network of the WI in rural areas. The next section will focus on the role that these women's groups played in the resettlement of foreign labour and describe how femininity was represented in the process.

### The role of women in the resettlement of Poles and EVWs

The WVS and WI played various roles in the resettlement of foreign workers. First, they helped the government in persuading people to accept Poles and EVWs, acting as intermediaries between officials and local people. A note of the WVS asks its members 'to know the position of EVWs and Poles in order to impart correct information to arm chair critics'. The WVS published a leaflet to advise members to become the 'bridge' between the foreign workers and local people:

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32) Kay and Miles, *Refugees or Migrant Workers?*, 132; TNA, LAB12/513, Chairman’s Speech at NFWI, 28th Annual General Meetings.
33) Women's Library (WL), 5/FWI/A/1/1/21 Box19, A Meeting of the Executive Committee, 26 June 1947.
35) TNA, HO356/2, From C.A. to Alexander Maxwell, 8 January 1947.
36) WL, 5/FWI/A/1/1/21 Box19, Minutes of a meeting of Executive Committee, February 14 1946.
38) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, The WVS Talk IV, Note on the Welfare for Poles and EVWs, undated.
Visit them at the same time establish a good contact with the landlady, you may be able to smooth initial difficulties which may arise between the two on account of misunderstanding. Make sure she understands the tragic position of these people and is not labouring under false notions about them. Remind her too that customs differ in each country and there are bound to be things which will appear strange to both parties. Let them both know where the WVS Office is in case of need.\(^{39}\)

WVS members sometimes helped to resolve troubles between the employers, landladies and the EVWs by acting as interpreters (especially for German speakers) and clearing up misunderstandings.\(^{40}\) In order to encourage communication between local people and foreigners, the WVS also organized concerts and exhibition of crafts by EVWs etc., and sometimes took local residents to social evenings organised by foreign workers.\(^{41}\)

Education of opinion was necessary not only for local people, but also for the ordinary members of the women’s groups. Members sometimes shared in misunderstandings of local people concerning Poles and EVWs, especially so in the case of the NFWI. After *Home & Country*, the magazine of NFWI, had called for members to show hospitality towards Polish ex-servicemen and their families, a number of criticisms were sent to the editor.\(^{42}\) For example, a letter from a member in Suffolk alleged as follows:

A paragraph in News of the Month, November issue, states that the men have all fought for Britain during the war. This is not in accordance with the known facts. 56,000 of these men were taken prisoners by our army and are thus known to have been fighting for Nazis. It is pretty certain that the reason many of them cannot return to their own country is because they are known to have helped the Nazis.\(^{43}\)

The Executive Committee of the NFWI took it seriously, and asked the editor ‘to publish a selection of this correspondence in *Home & Country*, together with the reply in which the leaflet published by [by] the British Joint Committee of Welcome for Polish Forces should be referred to’, and it was further agreed in the circular

\(^{40}\) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, Report on WVS welfare activities for European Volunteer Workers, undated.
\(^{41}\) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, the Extract from a Report from Malvern Camp, May 1947.
\(^{42}\) *Home and Country*, November 1946, 169.
letter to let the counties know that the leaflet was available.\textsuperscript{44} In January 1947, the correspondence from the editor was printed with the protesting letters from readers, explaining why some Poles had been in the Wehrmacht: they were forced to enrol under the Nazi occupation.\textsuperscript{45} The amount of rationed meat for foreign workers in heavy industries also became a contention within the WI.\textsuperscript{46} Responding to the rumour that foreign workers were receiving more food rations than British people did, the Ministry of Labour refuted this at the conference which representatives from the WVS and WI attended.\textsuperscript{47}

Thus, for the government, involving women’s groups in the resettlement process itself was useful for education of public opinion. Moreover, it also enabled the Ministry to ensure indirectly that foreign workers would remain in undermanned industries, through the personal relationship that women established with each foreign worker in their support activities.\textsuperscript{48} Keeping an eye on the activities of the WVS, the Ministry of Labour even requested to the WVS that ‘officials should be given a chance of seeing the minutes (of the meeting of the WVS with representatives of the Ministry of Labour) in draft’.\textsuperscript{49}

Another area where the government expected women’s groups to cooperate was welfare for Poles and EVWs. Most foreign workers were refugees or DPs who had lost everything in the war and there were dependants among them. In addition to about 30,000 Polish dependants and refugees, there were about 3,000 dependants of EVWs, although single people were preferred in the recruitment process. Both Poles and EVWs, at least technically, were supposed to enjoy the same social service as British people did. Under the Polish Resettlement Act 1947, government departments were given special authority to implement necessary social services for Polish ex-servicemen and their families.\textsuperscript{50} Additionally, welfare officers of the Ministry of Labour were in charge of welfare for EVWs. Both Poles and EVWs were integrated into the web of social services, such as national assistance and the NHS, which were being developed during the Attlee years. Thus, as Joseph Behar points out, it could be said that, like the British working class, these foreigners ‘earned’ their

\textsuperscript{44} WL, 5/FWI/A/1/1/21 Box19, A Meeting of the Executive Committee, 28 November 1946
\textsuperscript{45} Home and Country, January 1947, 9.
\textsuperscript{46} WL, 5/FWI/A/1/1/21 Box19, A Meeting of the Executive Committee, 27 November 1947
\textsuperscript{47} TNA, LAB12/513, Minutes of Conference, April 20 1948.
\textsuperscript{48} WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From the WVS headquarters to Regional Office, County, County Borough Organizer, Center Organizer, 17 February 1948.
\textsuperscript{49} TNA, LAB26/235, From J.G. Stewart (MNLS) to Mrs. Warmington (the WVS), 1 April 1949.
\textsuperscript{50} 10&11 Geo.6, Ch.19, Polish Resettlement Act, 1947.
citizenship in the post-war British welfare state through their hard work.\textsuperscript{51)
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However, this was not necessarily the case in reality. Local authorities that implemented social service often gave lower priority to foreigners, who were not regarded as local residents. The government showed an understanding of such an attitude on the part of local authorities and tended to refrain from urging them to fulfil their responsibilities, so as not to increase public antagonism towards foreign workers. According to the Home Secretary, one of the purposes of the Polish Resettlement Act was to enable the government, not local authorities, to take responsibility for welfare service for Poles for a while, by 'taking steps whereby dealing with these people will be a national and not a local charge'.\textsuperscript{52)} At a meeting held at the Ministry of Labour in order to discuss publicity for education of public opinion on foreign workers, an official revealed his view about the role of local authorities that 'the possible influence of local authorities should be considered though they should not be asked to take an active part'.\textsuperscript{53)} It seems that, in welfare matters, the attitude of the Ministry of Labour was the same. It was this gap in social service that volunteer groups, including women's ones, were expected to fill. Among various voluntary groups, the WVS was supposed to play the main role. At the aforesaid meeting, a representative from the Ministry of Health said that 'perhaps the WVS and similar local organisations were the best people to help'.\textsuperscript{54)}

The WVS cooperated with the Ministry of Labour and took the main part in reception of EVWs, escorting them from the port to the holding camps and distributing clothes to them.\textsuperscript{55)} WVS members, along with officials of the Ministry of Labour, stood ready to welcome and assist EVWs at the ports or stations on their way to the holding camps, serving tea and cakes to them. These activities were conducted under the direction from the Ministry of Labour. There were some complaints within the WVS of the way in which the Ministry of Labour treated its members, as Mrs. Warmington of the WVS protests to the Ministry:

I am afraid we are still having a certain number of complaints from our Regional Officers in the matter. It is not that we are in any way unwilling to do undertake escort work when it is required ... The main point is that we are asked to send members on these very long

\textsuperscript{51)} Behar, "Essential Workers."
\textsuperscript{52)} Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th series, 433, col. 1535, 20 February 1947.
\textsuperscript{53)} TNA, LAB12/513, Minutes of a meeting held at MLNS, 5 December 1947.
\textsuperscript{54)} TNA, LAB12/513, Minutes of a meeting held at MLNS, 5 December 1947.
\textsuperscript{55)} WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, Report on the WVS welfare activities for European Volunteer Workers, undated.
journeys and they find that arrangements have also been made for the EVWs travellers to be met at all the changes by Ministry of Labour officials which makes our members feel that their escort work is not really necessary.56)

In escorting EVWs, the Ministry of Labour sometimes asked the WVS to dispatch interpreters, as a WVS member reported to headquarters. The Ministry of Labour Welfare Officers in the Regions invariably ask the WVS for German speaking escorts to come with them to London or Hull and to help them bring back the parties of EVWs to their Region.57)

Yet not all escorting and distribution tasks were under the control of the Ministry of Labour. In particular, the WVS seems to have regarded works for dependants as ‘their own sphere’, and to have acted independently within this ‘sphere’. In an escort operation conducted in 1947, members of the WVS mainly paid special attention to women with small children and were heavily engaged in taking care of them. What the WVS members worried about most was that dependants of EVWs had to wait too long to get on the train after their arrival at the port, during which time mothers with babies were kept standing. The WVS members made a firm protest to the Ministry of Labour officials:

All had to stand or wait ... There was nowhere at all for mothers to make their babies comfortable. Such luggage as they had was not the type for them to sit on and it was impossible to cope with changing nappies with the child in a pram, and in such a dimly lit place ... Even if the train is in the station when the boat docks, I still feel it is important to have seating accommodation for the mothers, and if possible a portion of the shed curtained off for their use.58)

The WVS members got on trains with dependants and continued to take care of them there, bringing meals to mothers with small children, helping them change children’s nappies, and coping with children’s travel sickness. On the basis of these experiences, WVS members were able to give a lot of family-related advices to the Ministry of Labour: to provide mothers with nappies, Vaseline and baby powder, and to equip trains with buckets and brushes.59)

Though unrelated to escorting, a document from the WVS headquarters to its

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56) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Mrs. Warmington to Miss. Boyes (MLNS), 19 January 1948.
57) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Miss. Russell to Miss. Halpin, 6 May 1947.
58) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, Report on visit to Harwich to escort EVS dependants to London, 18 November 1947.
regional offices explained the policy of the Ministry of Labour on pregnant and parturient women as follows:

Generally speaking EVWs are expected, as far as possible, to make their own arrangements in cases of pregnancy with the assistance, financial and otherwise, of their husbands and with any help which can be given through the Maternity and Child Welfare Services, the WVS and other Voluntary bodies.60

Indeed, the WVS helped mothers of EVWs ‘in many ways, such as attending local Clinics, and bringing up baby in the English way’.61

The women’s domestic experience was seen as positive in helping foreigners fit into life in the UK by both the government officials and the women themselves, as is represented most clearly in the following words of Lady Reading:

We had many advantages in that we were a homogeneous nation and we must make every effort to assimilate the Poles and EVWs. The British way of life was not found in Hansard nor in the newspapers — it was found in our homes and we needed individual initiative and courage in helping these people to settle.62

This meant not only that they should do their best to help Poles and EVWs fit into their new lives in Britain, but also that housewives who ran the home were the best persons to ‘teach’ the British way of life to foreigners, because it was best represented by home. This would be the reason why Lady Reading stressed to the Ministry of Labour the importance of placing British women welfare officers in each camp for foreigners, and asked for permission for WVS members to live in camps with foreign workers:

[O]n a long term basis what is really most needed is more opportunities for the EVWs to mix with British people and learn our language and our British way of life. One of the difficulties in achieving this is that many of the Holding Camps are in isolated areas... For this reason, and also because we understand that there is no British woman in most of the Holding Camps, I am writing to suggest to you that we should put a WVS woman welfare worker into each of the Holding Camps ... we feel a WVS worker could be of great use in teaching domestic English, in giving advice on various women’s problems, and in making local contacts and getting the EVWs invited into British homes.63

60) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From the WVS headquarters to Regional Office, County, County Borough Organizer, Center Organizer, 17 February 1948.
62) TNA, LAB12/513, Minutes of meeting at the WVS headquarters, 20 April 1948.
Such a proposal reminds us perhaps of the settlement movement concerning the working class in the nineteenth century. While the Ministry of Labour showed hesitation about this proposal, they made a promise to place female welfare officer from the Ministry in each camp.\textsuperscript{64) As for the WI, Lady Albermarle of the NFWI told the story of a WI member who utilized her experience in the home in teaching English to Polish women. 'One Englishwoman used to arrive for her class with a shopping basket containing things the Polish woman might need to buy; another found an illustrated catalog useful. The more advanced class exchange cooking hints, and experience of home life and war. A member from a neighbouring W.I. is helping the women in the camp to start a garden'.\textsuperscript{65)

This sense of 'mission' led members of both the WVS and WI to visit camps and hostels to hold English classes and recreational activities etc. Particularly in English education, their contribution was great. The WVS headquarters issued phrases sheets in the mother tongues of foreign workers and distributed copies of texts in elementary English in order to facilitate its members in holding English classes.\textsuperscript{66) Some members who got in touch with foreign workers realized the seriousness of the language barrier, as the report from a WVS member illustrates:

\begin{quote}
This war-time American hospital echoed to the sound of many languages when I drove to sort out clothes for the EVWs-prior to their embarking on their new lives in England ... and oh! the struggles we had to establish complete understanding! So, I asked to be allowed to take some classes in elementary English, to help them a little on one of their main problems, the speaking of our language.\textsuperscript{67)
\end{quote}

According to a document of the WVS, 'sometimes the WVS members themselves are the teachers, either organizing social evenings or inviting a few EVWs to their own homes'. It seems that some English education for foreigners in the Attlee years was undertaken not only by professional English teachers but also by 'amateurs'\textsuperscript{68) in order to make up for the lack of official infrastructure for English education as a

\textsuperscript{63) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Lady Reading to Buxton (MLNS), 7 August 1947.
64) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Whyte (MLNS) to Lady Reading, 25 August 1947.
65) TNA, LAB12/513, Chairman’s Speech at 28th Annual General Meeting.
66) Chairman’s Speech at 28th Annual General Meeting; WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Repatriate, Poles, EVWs welfare Department (the WVS) to the Duchess of Atholl, 26 September 1947.
67) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, undated reports signed by Anne Keble.
68) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, Report on the WVS welfare activities for European Volunteer Workers, undated.
second language.

This lack of official infrastructure was also prominent in English education for Poles, for which the Committee for the Education of Poles in Great Britain was formed. This committee, charged with not only school education for Polish children but also adult education in camps and hostels, sent English teachers and Educational Organisers who organised clubs and recreation activities. However, as a report from the chairman of the committee revealed, they had difficulty in getting professional teachers for English as a second language, being forced to depend on Polish teachers who happened to understand English or who had been trained as such by the committee. Thus, even for Poles whom the government treated specially, the WVS and WI played significant roles in their English education. The report of the Committee repeatedly praised the contribution of these two women’s groups to English education for Poles. WVS members visited Polish camps to talk in English to Polish children who were otherwise surrounded by only Polish-speakers.  

Thus the government ministries welcomed these activities by women’s groups, and the regional offices of the Ministry of Labour acted as liaison agents for them by giving out the lists of camps and hostels and facilitating their contacts with managers of those accommodations. The WVS made special efforts to continue its support after EVWs left holding camps for their new employment and asked the Ministry of Labour to give them information about where EVWs were placed.  

However, allowing the WVS members to enter camps and hostels and assume the provision of assistance for foreign workers could prove a ‘double-edged sword’ for administrative authorities to allow the WVS members to enter camps and hostels and assume the provision of assistance for foreign workers. On the one hand, cooperation with the WVS enabled the authority to fill the gaps in official service, which decreased the inevitable friction involved in taking in foreign workers. By visiting camps and hostels, the WVS members found such defects as wet cradles, shortage of equipment for new-born babies and the lack of places where mothers could dry children’s clothes, in respect of which the WVS directly requested the Ministry of Labour for improvement.  

Poles and EVWs also conveyed their complaints to WVS members: lack of hot water, awful and monotonous meals in

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70) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad, 20 June 1947.
71) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Lady Reading to Buxton (MLNS), 27 June 1947.
72) TNA, LAB12/513, Minutes of meeting at the WVS headquarters, 20 April 1948.
hostels, discriminatory treatment based on ethnicity (in particular, against Yugoslavs), overpriced rents for poor quality rooms, and so on.\(^73\) On receiving such grievances, the WVS asked the Ministry of Labour to investigate. The Ministry responded to this request, trying to explain the situation and the extent of the efforts made by the Ministry. The Ministry of Labour officials also indicated some guidelines for giving advice to foreign workers about various problems, such as the reunion of families and changing employment.\(^74\)

At the same time, these involvements sometimes became an ‘intervention’ in official policy towards foreign workers. For example, the WVS was worried about the poor quality of Polish camps and requested that the government departments concerned should conduct inspections. In answer to this request, the Ministry displayed its irritation with ‘interventions from ‘amateurs’ who did not understand the prevailing situation properly: a serious shortage of materials, which forced them to give priority to their own nationals. They even pointed out that Lady Reading requested inspection because she ‘feared scandals’ (that is, the public criticism against the WVS for the maltreatment of Poles). Despite these irritations, however, this request from the WVS eventually led to inter-ministerial inspection in Polish Camps.\(^75\) In another case, such behaviour by the WVS ended up in the serious friction with the authorities. The very poor quality of life in camps for foreign workers run by County Agricultural Committees was often pointed out.\(^76\) In two camps in East Suffolk, problems such as an extraordinarily high proportion of sickness among residents, suicide cases and inadequate English teaching were noted. In response to these problems, WVS members sought to elucidate the situation by getting in touch with EVW residents. But WVS members were prevented from entering camps by the camp authority, which led to the resignation of the EVW specialist for East Suffolk who made the protest that ‘the attitude of the Agricultural committee was so anti-WVS and they appeared to regard us as wishing to spy’.\(^77\)

\(^{73}\) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, A letter from a hostel at Oldham to Miss. Martin, 7 October 1947; a letter from a Yugoslavian EVW, undated.

\(^{74}\) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From the WVS headquarters to Regional Office, County, County Borough Organizer, Center Organizer, 17 February 1948.

\(^{75}\) TNA, LAB26/193, To Whyte, 12 December 1947; From Whyte to Secretary, 16 December 1947; a note of the Cabinet Emergency Accommodation Committee, 3 September 1948.

\(^{76}\) TNA, LAB12/513, Minutes of meeting on the Welfare for Poles and European Volunteer Workers, 20 April 1948; Minutes of meeting of regional welfare officers, MLNS, 29 January 1948.

\(^{77}\) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Regional Office to Miss. Halpin, the WVS headquarters, 7 November 1949.
Moreover, when it came to the family life of foreign workers, the WVS took a different stance from that of the government. Some activities of the WVS were totally independent of, and even contradicted, the official policy. The WVS undertook some special projects related to family life for foreign workers. One of these projects on which the WVS focused its energy was the project to help female DPs with a child in Germany and Austria. In May 1948, Mrs. Warmington at the WVS headquarters made the following proposal to Lady Reading:

There are many women (mostly widows) in DP camps anxious to come over here and work but who are debarred from the Westward Ho Scheme which only enrolls single women without children. A great many households in Great Britain would willingly take such a woman for domestic work and provide a home thereby for the child ... It is suggested therefore that the WVS should act as agent to collect names of individuals willing to come as domestic workers and to put them in touch with British people who undertake to employ and provide for them.\(^78\)

Subsequently, the WVS approached the International Refugee Organization (IRO) and the Ministry of Labour for assistance in carrying out this plan. While the IRO responded favourably to this offer, the Ministry of Labour exhibited reluctance. According to the report by Mrs. Warmington:

He (an official of the Ministry of Labour) feels very strongly that if the WVS are prepared to help the DP position, our first enthusiasm should be to try and absorb the Poles in domestic work before bringing in more DPs. He also told me they had had a certain amount of trouble by bringing in women with children for priority households, as invariably, after a short time, the household tired of the child.\(^79\)

Warmington persuaded an official of the Ministry of Labour, explaining that they would vet the household in question and follow up on the case, and also possibly help to alleviate some of the inevitable difficulties between the householder and the employee.\(^80\)

As far as I can see from documents from the WRVS Archives, the WVS was confident of securing households which would accept female DPs with a child. In this connection, we should remember the middle-class characteristics of the WVS and the contemporary situation surrounding the domestic service. In the Attlee

\(^78\) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Mrs. Warmington to Lady Reading, 24 May 1948.
\(^79\) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Mrs. Warmington to Lady Reading, 10 July 1948.
\(^80\) From Mrs. Warmington to Lady Reading, 10 July 1948.
years, it became difficult to find domestic workers for many households. Securing enough domestic workers became one of the most important manpower policies after the war. As is well known, in 1945, Violet Markham and Florence Hancock produced a report at the instigation of Ernest Bevin concerning post-war organization of domestic service, in order to promote the recruitment of domestic workers.\(^{81}\) In April 1946, the Home Office resumed the admittance of female foreign workers for domestic service under the work permit system, and, at least until 1948, the issuance of employment permits revolved around domestic service.\(^{82}\) In distributing the limited number of foreign domestic workers, the Attlee government gave priority to hospitals, sanatoria and other similar institutions. Even the repeated request from the NFWI for the securing of domestic help for farmers’ wives could not receive satisfying response from the government.\(^{83}\) Thus, for middle- and upper class households, it became almost impossible to hire enough servants at all in post-war Britain. As Hinton shows, the middle-class characteristic of the WVS is exemplified by the fact that it lobbied for exemption of the servants of WVS members from mobilization for war.\(^{84}\)

Taking into account all of these facts, the WVS had good reason to believe that they would be able to find ‘adequate’ numbers of households among its members. This belief is vividly shown in the following direction from the WVS headquarters to regional offices for a pilot program of admitting a dozen female DPs with a child:

There are many women in the DP Camps in Europe to-day who, having a child, are debarred from volunteering as EVWs ... it has been agreed that the WVS shall make an experiment by trying to place a dozen of such women, each having one child, in English households. It will be easier to get the women included in the scheme if we can suggest households which have some claim to priority, i.e. farmer’s or doctor’s or where there are children etc., but if you know of a case, even of a hard pressed Centre Organiser, falling outside the priority class but where the need is great, will you please send forward the name and full particulars and we will do our best to press for the household to be included as if it were in a priority class. The experiment implies a responsibility is on us, as the Ministry of Labour are loath to bring over any further DPs who might prove a commitment if the householders employing them

\(^{81}\) Violet Markham and Florence Hancock, *Report on post-war organization of private domestic employment* (London, 1945).

\(^{82}\) Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th series, 421, cols. 2111-2114, 11 April 1946. According to the *Ministry of Labour Gazette*, in February 1948, the number of issuance of employment permit was 22,965, of which 18,952 were for domestic service.

\(^{83}\) See the file of WL, 5/FWI/A/1/1/21 Box19, A Meeting of the Executive Committee, 11th November 1947; International Sub-Committee, 7th September 1948.

decide too late that they cannot support a child in the house. Through the WVS channels, however, we feel that the right kind of households can be found who will appreciate the situation and adapt themselves to meet it ... We would like each Region to furnish 3 genuine offers, for though this over-subscribes our initial venture it will enable us to discuss further plans with the Ministry of Labour.85)

As we can see from this quotation, in order to move the project ahead, executives of the WVS tried to seek households that would admit female DPs and their children from within its members. We can see the extraordinary enthusiasm of the WVS headquarters for making a contribution to alleviating the problem of DP women with children.

However, even some from within the WVS expressed doubts against its feasibility. A regional administrator in Leeds pronounced her strong misgivings based on her experience of trying to place English unmarried mothers as domestic workers in private homes: 'it appears that even when the people are English, hence no language difficulty, we cannot place them'.86) Unfortunately, from documents which I have at present, I cannot say whether this project was put into practice thereafter, or what its result was.87) There are strong doubts about whether the tactics dependent on 'goodwill' of its members actually enabled the WVS to overcome the difficulties in placing women with children into English households, and to what extent the WVS was able to take responsibility for DP women and their children. Moreover, there remained a note of an interview with the IRO on this WVS project. In this note, a WVS member said that it would be necessary to 'if possible get him (an official of the Ministry of Labour) to agree for the Ministry of Labour to agree to undertake the ultimate assimilation of these experimental cases but if this is not possible one must gamble on their ultimate assimilation and the IRO must be prepared to take them back'.88) Nevertheless, it remains the fact that this project was at odds with the policy of the Ministry of Labour, and this fact illustrates clearly that the activities of the WVS went far beyond those of 'semi-official' organizations.

85) WVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From the WVS headquarters to Regional Administrators, 3 September 1948.
86) WVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From a Regional Administrator in Leeds to Miss Halpin (the WVS), 7 September 1948.
87) Unfortunately, the WRVS archive in Abingdon is at present closed. For more information, please see http://www.wrvs.org.uk/about-us/our-history/wrvs-archive-and-heritage-collection/enquiry-service.
88) WVS Archives, 73/M464/40, Note of interview with International Refugee Organization held on 8th August 1948.
Another project by the WVS independent of official policy was a plan for building family camps for the families of EVWs who were forced to live separately. In Kent, there were two Hostels for male EVWs from Baltic countries, and some wives of these men were in DP hostels at Hull and Corsham. Many of the wives and children were still in camps in Germany, waiting to come over to Britain. Throughout their support activities, members of the WVS saw some cases where ‘several of the men are getting too friendly with women living in the village near the Agricultural Hostels’. In order to ‘re-establish family’ as a necessary step for ‘assimilating’ these foreigners into British society, the WVS planned to build a ‘village’ where families speaking the same language were forming some kind of ‘colony’, and looked for disused camps to use for this purpose. According to the WVS plan, camps would be build in places that were so close to local schools, shopping centres and other facilities as to enable them to mix with local people, and ‘until the villagers settle down and realize their responsibilities towards each other and their English neighbours, a Warden- if possible married and with children-should be in residence’ to act as an exemplar of ‘good citizen’ for foreigners. The warden was expected to ‘discover that it is by his example that he can do most to educate these people in the proper use of freedom’, by, for example, making his own garden beautiful and planting vegetables in it.  

89) WVS Archives, 73/M464/40, European Volunteer Workers in East Kent: Proposal for families camps for EVWs, undated.


Interestingly, helping foreign workers sometimes contributed to ‘protectection’ of the local family life by keeping an eye on their personal relationship. A WVS member who helped a German girl reported to headquarters: ‘We allow the girls to bring their boyfriends (to the club the WVS formed for German girls), and thus are able to keep a bit of a check on the sort of man they are meeting, and the fact that he is trotted round to the W.V.S. to be vetted has discouraged many a man who knows we are acquainted with him and his family, very often his wife I am sorry to say’.  

Although both the WVS and the WI showed respect for the foreign workers’ own culture and language, the ‘home’ or ‘family’ that the WVS expected Poles and EVWs to reconstruct as a step for ‘assimilation’ into British society was middle-class and
English in character, represented by ‘tea’ and ‘gardening’. Furthermore, there was a perceived ‘racial’ hierarchy among European foreign workers, with Balts, most of whom were from the middle class, at the top. A letter from a farmer’s wife who had employed a Lithuanian EVW couple wrote to *Home and Country* expressing such preference for Balts, saying ‘I would advise trying only people who have real farning background, and are from Baltic countries where most of the people are fair haired, sturdy and healthy’.\(^91\) On the other hand Ukrainian EVWs were seen by the WVS as so ‘ungainly’ that ‘classes have been held to learn deportment, make up, etc.’.\(^92\) In respect of Ukrainian EVW girls who were working in a hospital, an official of the Ministry of Labour also asked the WVS for careful treatment:

>[T]hey are the peasant type and are rather lonely and bewildered... She (an official from the Ministry of Labour) wondered if the WVS could contact the Matron and see if she would let the girls go out to tea with the WVS sometimes ... She stressed that the girls should only go to rather *Homely* working class WVS as otherwise they might feel rather like fish out of water.\(^93\)

‘Homely’ is valued in this case, too.

**Conclusion**

Although the UK had already taken a number of immigrants and been a multi-ethnic country in reality by the Second World War, as Lady Stella’s words suggests, in the 1940s it was sometimes represented as if it were a ‘homogenous’ nation that had had little experience of immigration. Lady Albemarle of the NFWI said in connection with Poles that ‘Our island history with its tradition of viewing even people from another county as *foreigners* make it, perhaps, difficult for us to come to grips with this problem’.\(^94\) In 1949, the international sub-committee of the NFWI, which had a discussion on the position of Poles, considered drawing on the experience of Canada, a country that had rich experience of immigration.\(^95\)

The British government of the time seemed to have a similar understanding. In

\(^{91}\) *Home and Country*, March 1948, 42.
\(^{92}\) TNA, LAB26/235, From Mrs. Warmington to Miss. Boyes, 7 October 1949, E.V.W.s in Atherton.
\(^{93}\) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Mrs. Ruck to Ms. Henderson, 26 May 1947.
\(^{94}\) TNA, LAB 12/513, NFWI, 28th Annual Conference, Chairman’s Speech.
\(^{95}\) WL, 5/FWI/A/1/1/22, Box20, International Sub-Committee, 10th May 1949.
the early 1950s, when the British government received an enquiry from the UNESCO about its policy towards the cultural integration for immigrants, the ministries concerned took the attitude that the UK had little to do with the problem of immigrants. 96) The Home Office replied that ‘The Home Office’s interest in the subject of the questionnaire is limited… the United Kingdom is not a country of immigration in the sense that any substantial numbers of foreigners are admitted as immigrants’. 97)

In this situation, both Poles and EVWs were supposed to ‘fit into the life in the UK’ by learning English and the British way of life. While there seemed to be a somewhat ‘fixed’ British way of life which foreigners were expected to learn in due course, what it meant was not clear at all. The only key was in the way local people were living, or in the ‘home’ of British people. Mingling with local people was taken to be the important step for foreigners towards ‘assimilation’, and inviting foreign workers to the British home was encouraged in order to help foreigners fit into life in the UK. While the government ministries depended on the voluntary work of women in fitting foreign workers into the local community, the WVS, or at least its executives, clearly felt that women could play a significant part in ‘teaching’ foreign workers the British way of life, because they knew most what British lifestyle was as housewives. Thus, they insisted that British women should live in the camps and hostels for EVWs. While the government tended to overlook the family life of foreign workers for the sake of securing manpower and saving limited resources, the WVS valued family life and acted to maintain and reconstruct the family independently from government policy.

Such a domestic form of identity within the UK could co-exist or even be mixed with the multi-ethnic ‘Britishness’ of the Empire/Commonwealth, as long as people in the host community could see immigrants as ‘others’ from outside who were required to ‘assimilate’ into the British society. The way Home & Country until early 1960s had represented people from the colonies and Commonwealth was as ‘visitors’ or ‘students’ from outside. 98) However, this domestic identity could be threatened and began to be incompatible with the imperial version of ‘Britishness’ from the 1960s, when ‘immigrants’ who had British citizenship came to the UK and became local residents.

96) See files of NA, ED157/342.
97) TNA, ED157/342, From the Home Office to Dear Crwys Williams 31 July 1952.
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Mapping for Modernity:
An Arabist in Arabia, 1953-1955

Shohei Sato

Abstract

The mapping of the modern world during the age of European imperialism continues to cast a shadow across the social and political problems of today. Indeed, the creation of arbitrary borders has often been understood as the quintessential example of the adverse legacies of imperialism. But to what extent did the imperial powers have control over the whole process? The question of agency and intention is crucial to the normative question of responsibility, yet the former is more often assumed before it is examined in sufficient depth. This article addresses this problem by examining the process through which a modern map of an eastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula was drawn and consequently became the basis of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In particular, it highlights the experience of a young British diplomat who was heavily involved in the negotiations.

Julian Fortay Walker came to the region in the early 1950s, when the polities that would later form the UAE were still ‘Protected States’ and part of Britain’s informal empire. During a border dispute with Saudi Arabia, he was asked to produce a map clarifying the boundaries between the local polities, which had hitherto been only loosely defined. This article examines Walker’s experience of map making, in order to explore how modern spatiality was reshaped in relation to imperialism through the vignette his story offers.

After traveling through the region in his Land Rover, dotting the information gathered from people using the back of the nib of his fountain pen, Walker created a map so complicated that it later became nicknamed ‘Mr. Walker’s jigsaw puzzle’. It was intended to reflect the local realities as much as to support the British case in the border dispute with Saudi Arabia. The episode suggests that drawing boundaries according to social reality

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can sometimes prove highly complicated, or even impracticable, depending on the extent to which the local traditions are congenial to the norms of sovereign territoriality.

In conclusion, this article suggests that one should make an analytical distinction between four interconnected issues surrounding what is often called the ‘legacy of imperialism’:

(a) A resumption, or a continuation, of the issues that had existed prior to the arrival of the imperial power;
(b) The issues that were brought in by, or created through contact with, the imperial power;
(c) The issues that were created or exacerbated by the modality of the way in which the imperial power departed; and
(d) The issues caused by modernity or modernization.

Partly due to the sense of guilt in the former metropole, or the insecurity of the postcolonial states, imperial powers are often condemned not only for their own conduct (b), or what has been created by the way in which they left (c), but also for problems that in fact existed at the time of their expansion into foreign territories (a) or for things that were, in fact, going to happen sooner or later regardless of the imperial presence, as long as the region concerned was going to experience modernization (d).

In contrast to the linear borders in many parts of the world, the map drawn by Walker calls into question the assumption that had it not been for the imperial powers the borders between postcolonial states would have been much less problematic. Dividing land into exclusive territories, such as sovereign states, is only one of many ways to think about space, but its historical expansion in the world during modern times needs to be examined in further depth.

**Keywords:** Imperial legacy; territorial sovereignty; map making; Middle East; United Arab Emirates
The mapping of the modern world during the age of imperialism continues to cast a shadow across the social and political problems of today. Mohammed Ayoob argues that 'imperial powers bequeathed to their postcolonial successor regimes territorial entities that were composed of distinct ... ethnic groups' or 'divided previously homogenous ethnic communities' into different states through a 'cavalier construction of colonial borders'. Consequently, the continuing ethnic and religious rivalries both inside, and between postcolonial states appear to be a quintessential example of the adverse legacy of imperialism.\(^1\)

But to what extent did the imperial powers have control over the whole process? The question of agency and intention is crucial to the normative question of responsibility, but the former is more often assumed before it is examined in sufficient depth. This article addresses this problem by examining the process through which a modern map of an eastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula was drawn and consequently became the basis of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In particular, it highlights the experience of a young British diplomat who was heavily involved in the negotiations.

Julian Fortay Walker came to the region in the early 1950s, when the polities that would later form the UAE were still 'Protected States' and part of Britain's informal empire. During a border dispute with Saudi Arabia, he was asked to produce a map clarifying the boundaries between the local polities, which had hitherto been only loosely defined. This article examines Walker's experience of map making with the aid of declassified archival sources, private papers and his own memoirs. I have also conducted some telephone interviews with him. On top of its empirical contribution to the history of the British Empire in the Middle East, it also aims to explore the conceptual and normative issues set out above. It does not intend to overemphasize the role of an individual British diplomat, but to explore how modern spatiality was reshaped in relation to imperialism through the vignette his story offers.\(^2\)

The body of this paper is divided into three sections. The first section will introduce the historical background and existing literature, thereby highlighting how the European idea of sovereignty had been negotiated in relation to the local


\(^2\) I thank Ismail Fajrie Alatas for introducing me to this approach.
political traditions since the early nineteenth century. The second section will examine how a border dispute that broke out in the mid-twentieth century prompted Walker to make the map of the region, particularly by looking into the relationship between oil and sovereign territoriality. The third section will examine how the complexity of the map was dealt with in the years leading up to the subsequent full independence the UAE. In the conclusion, I will summarize the empirical findings by exploring some of the conceptual issues set out above.

Imperialism and sovereignty

On 21 November 1903 Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, was visiting the Persian Gulf. Meeting the rulers of the southern coast, he stated:

We found strife and we have created order ... We have not seized or held your territory. We have not destroyed your independence but have preserved it ... The peace of these waters must still be maintained; your independence will continue to be upheld; and the influence of the British Government must remain supreme.

This self-important remark, typical of British imperialists, depicts how they brought the institution of sovereignty to the Persian Gulf as an instrument through which to impose their version of international law on the region. For centuries, local rulers' legitimacy in the southern Gulf, or the northern shore of the Arabian Peninsula, had largely depended on their ability to secure military protection from external powers. Britain provided precisely that and, by signing treaties with the rulers, it created polities whose legitimacy was from the outset dependent on an outside patron. This was designed to serve British interests, but it also had the effect of providing military protection to the client rulers and excluding their rivals from coming to power.

In the early nineteenth century, Britain oppressed the military forces of the northern shore of the Arabian Peninsula in order to secure a maritime route to India. With its military victory, Britain forced the local forces to enter into a series

3) The name of the Gulf is subject to a political dispute between those who favour ‘Persian Gulf’ and those who like to use ‘Arabian Gulf’. I adopt the latter as the most commonly used term.

of ‘truces’ with what they saw as ‘pirates’.\(^5\) However, to what extent the divisive discourse of ‘pirates’ conformed to the reality is highly debatable and controversial, not least because the primary sources available were written by Europeans. Of course, this also raises the question of the legitimacy of both the local society and the British presence.

At one end of the spectrum, Arnold T. Wilson agrees with the British official view of the time.\(^6\) At the other end of the spectrum, Sultan al-Qasimi criticizes Wilson and those like him as apologists for British imperialism.\(^7\) Between these two opinions, Rosemarie Said Zahlan points out that the term ‘piracy’ is relative and Charles E. Davies also hesitates to use the term pirates, even though he remarks that ‘some of what they did was piracy’.\(^8\) James Onley further advances the literature by pointing out that it was common practice at that time in the Gulf for powerful tribal leaders, or sheikhdom rulers as he calls them, to ask for tribute from the leaders of the weaker tribes. In many cases, this was a deal that benefited not just the protector but also the protected. The protector received tribute, but in return offered free passage and assumed the responsibility of protecting the weaker party in a crisis. However, the weaker party occasionally refused to pay the tribute if an attack from a third actor was thought to be unlikely. It was usually in these instances that the stronger tribes launched raids.\(^9\) However one concludes this hotly contested debate, it can be safely asserted on the basis of the consensus of the literature that Britain had indeed called the local people engaged in military activities ‘pirates’ and, throughout the nineteenth century, entered into a series of treaties with those ‘pirates’.

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This in itself is highly significant for our discussion, because it highlights the function of the notion of law and state. By signing those treaties Britain had acknowledged some degree of sovereignty in the local rulers. No matter how unequal and unilateral the substance, the concept of a treaty assumes an agreement between parties with comparable legal personalities. The format of the treaty required Britain to grant, or indeed force, local societies to receive certain legal personas.\textsuperscript{10} Although these treaties fulfilled the purpose of subjugating the local territories under British control via the medium of cooperative local rulers, they also had the side-effect of imposing the facade of elusive sovereignty upon the region. Prior to the British entry in the Gulf, the nature of authority was more fluid than stable, and more multilayered than mutually exclusive. However, by signing the treaties Britain had effectively appointed some of rulers as the exclusive heads of imaginary sovereign states. As a result, the rulers were accorded 'a status higher than the traditional way of life had allowed them'.\textsuperscript{11}

This procedure promoted the ‘pirates’ to the status of ‘Protected States’ in British eyes.\textsuperscript{12} In strict constitutional terms Britain never established a formal colony but nonetheless exercised a significant degree of influence, which could be most suitably understood as an informal empire.\textsuperscript{13} Britain’s informal empire extended to the territories of today’s Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, ‘Ajman, Fujairah, Ra’s al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Abu Dhabi and Dubai.\textsuperscript{14} The latter seven

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Edward Keene, "Mapping the Boundaries of International Society in the Nineteenth Century: Expansion or Stratification?" (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2008), 18.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Peter Leindhardt, quoted in Onley, "The Politics of Protection in the Gulf," 66.
\item \textsuperscript{13} To what extent the British imperial presence in the region was an ‘informal’ one opens up an important debate on the internal and external dynamics of the British Empire, which needs to be fully explored in a separate study. I thank John Darwin and Wm. Roger Louis for illuminating this point.
\item \textsuperscript{14} As a principle, this article follows the system of transliteration of the Arabic names of Frauke Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition, New ed. (London: Longman, 1996). However, for the convenience of the readers, all diacritics have been omitted and special fonts have been replaced with the closest standard English alphabet.
\end{itemize}
polities would later form the UAE, but at this point this result was far from clear.15) This line of argument might be taken by some as an insult to the origins and legitimacy of the present states in the Arabian Peninsula. However, legal discontinuity is not necessarily mutually exclusive of social continuity. B.J. Slot states that, by the end of the eighteenth century, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE and Oman more or less existed in their present form.16) In contrast, M.H. Mendelson remarks from a legal standpoint that ‘the idea of sovereignty and of the State itself was rather alien’ in the region until the twentieth century.17) From this point of view, it was British protection that ‘bestowed a legal status on the concept of "shaykhdom"’.18)

The debate over the issue of ‘piracy’ and its aftermath during this period depicts the fundamental problem of the existing literature, which tends to be divided between overly Eurocentric historiography on the one hand, and self-serving nationalistic narratives on the other. The controversy arises partly from the fact that the primary sources available were written by the Europeans, but also because it calls into question of the legitimacy of both the local society and the British presence. Essentially, both sides tend to reduce the world into the West and the rest, reproducing a dichotomy that is shared by many studies written about most parts of the world in the modern era. This paper aims to overcome this problematic dichotomy by advancing the argument put forward by authors such as Onley.19)

15) From the local rulers’ point of view, their relationship with Britain was a double-edged sword, but it was nonetheless inescapable. On the one hand the imperial tie weakened their legitimacy within their own society but, on the other hand, Britain’s military protection was indispensable if they wanted to hold onto their position. Thus, the informal empire of Britain in the Persian Gulf was essentially an asymmetric interdependence enabled by a military presence and an elusive legal framework of sovereignty.


19) In writing this paper, I have drawn heavily from three groups of studies. The first group is the literature of the history of the Persian Gulf. See especially Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*. See also Zahlan, *The Making of the Modern Gulf States*; Muhammad Morsy Abdullah, *The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History* (London: Croom Helm, 1978); Abdullah Omran Taryam, *The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950-85* (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Onley, *The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj*. Recent studies in this strand also include Simon C. Smith, *Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial...
newer generation of literature benefits from the recent opening of British governmental sources as well as local primary sources and interviews.\textsuperscript{20)

Oil and Sovereign Territoriality

Britain’s informal empire on the northern coast of the Arabian Peninsula originated as an extension of its Indian Empire, but Indian independence did not prompt Britain to leave the region. This was partly due to the importance of the Persian Gulf as a route of transportation and communication, but also because of the strategic value of oil.\textsuperscript{21) Oil was discovered in Bahrain 1932, followed by discoveries in Qatar and Abu Dhabi in 1940 and 1958, respectively. The

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item I engage with three different types of primary sources: (1) the declassified official documents of the British, American and Arab governments; (2) the published official documents of these governments; and (3) other contemporary documents, memoirs, as well as interviews.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
commencement of the commercial oil drilling not only helped the local economy, whose pearling industry was hit hard by its Japanese rivals, but also promoted the region to one of global significance.22) Thus, Britain continued to hold its informal empire in the region by transferring its jurisdiction from the Indian Government to the British Foreign Office.

In addition, the exploitation of oil brought a new idea of territoriality to the region. In the early twentieth century, boundaries between the polities of the region had been only vaguely defined. Oil concessions, and in some cases the hope thereof, prompted the rulers to become more clearly aware of the borders between their lands and water. As Peter Lienhardt aptly puts it, the mere ‘prospect of oil was modifying the groundwork of politics.’23)

In 1933, Saudi Arabia granted a concession to Standard Oil of California for the ‘Eastern part ... within its frontiers’ yet those borders were not defined and Saudi Arabia refused to adhere to what Britain and Ottoman Turkey had agreed upon in 1913.24) Meanwhile, by 1937, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had started to investigate whether there was oil in an area called Buraimi, located in the south-eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula.25) Today, the Buraimi region straddles the boundary between Oman and the UAE; but in the mid-twentieth century the territories were not as clearly defined. Traditionally Buraimi had been known for having an oasis or as a key point for transportation, but by the mid-twentieth century it had become more important for oil — that was hoped to be lying underneath the land. The tension resulted in a minor clash between Britain and Saudi Arabia in 1949.

Meanwhile, oil was coming to the centre of international relations in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. In the north, Iran nationalized a British oil company but this was later reversed by a coup helped by British and American intelligence. And in 1952, Saudi Arabia seized Buraimi by force — allegedly with tacit US

support.\textsuperscript{26} Since Oman and Abu Dhabi were under British protection at that time, Britain represented them in a case brought before a special tribunal in Geneva (with the first session in Nice) against Saudi Arabia.

The tribunal opened in 1954. Whereas Britain represented Oman and Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia received support from Washington. Before the court came to any conclusion on this complex dispute, however, Britain withdrew its judges from the tribunal and the matter effectively ended when Britain seized the oasis by force in October 1955. The arbitration tribunal was a failure in this sense, but the whole dispute provided an important context to the evolution of spatiality in the region.\textsuperscript{27}

Whilst Britain and Saudi Arabia were arguing over Buraimi, a young Arabist British diplomat was asked to tour and map the Protected States in order to clarify the boundaries among them. Assessing the British and Saudi Arabian claims and then comparing them with the local realities has its own merits, but for the purpose of the present argument, in the following paragraphs I will examine how things looked like through the eyes of this young Arabist.\textsuperscript{28}

Julian Fortay Walker was born in 1929 into a middle-class family in Marylebone, London.\textsuperscript{29} After serving in the Navy, he read history at Gonville and Caius College,
Cambridge. His graduation from university coincided with the onset of the Cold War, and he entered the diplomatic service with the hope of becoming a Soviet or European expert. However, by a twist of fate, the Foreign Office decided to train him in Arabic. He studied Arabic first at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, and then at the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies (MECAS) in Shemlan, Lebanon.\(^{30}\) Having been trained as an Arabist, at the age of 24 he started his career as Third Secretary in the Political Residency of Bahrain in 1953.\(^{31}\) In the years that followed, Walker was asked to travel through the region in order to clarify the boundaries between the territories that Britain believed to have under its control.

According to his recollections, with the aid of a compass and the milo-meter of his Land Rover, he mapped the information gathered from the local people using the back of the nib of his fountain pen. Interviewing in the field was sometimes difficult since the locals tended to refer to the past as *ams* (an Arabic word that stands for both yesterday and the past in general), but he drew boundaries based upon the difference in the types of wells, the oral history of ‘tribal clashes and alliances, camel raids and other incidents in the desert’.\(^{32}\) Consequently he produced a map that was too close to reality for his superior’s liking. Walker recalls that it contained lines that the Foreign Office found inconvenient in light of Britain’s position in relation to the Buraimi Oasis dispute.

In any case, by 1963 the Foreign Office issued a map drawing on the evidence presented by Walker, which is reproduced here. The first point to be noted is that it does not contain Saudi Arabia, reiterating the British position that Buraimi is divided between Abu Dhabi and Oman. What is more surprising, however, is the fact that it contains a number of enclaves and areas of joint jurisdiction. Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Ra’s al-Khaimah, Fujairah and Oman have multiple enclaves between each other. And within the sea of enclaves, Fujairah and Sharjah shares jurisdiction over one area, and ‘Ajman and Oman over another. The map was so perplexing that it later became named ‘Mr. Walker’s jigsaw puzzle’.\(^{33}\) There seemed

\(^{30}\) For recollections of the Arabists trained at MECAS, see *Envoys to the Arab World*, ed. Tempest.

\(^{31}\) For a study of the role of British Arabists in the Middle East, see Kathryn Tidrick, *Heart-beguiling Araby*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981.


\(^{33}\) "Dubai and the Northern Trucial States Review of the Year 1969," Bullard to Crawford, 30
to be a fundamental tension between the idea of sovereign territoriality, characterized by exclusivity, and the way in which the local societies, where migration was an integral part of life, had been organized.

Map of the Trucial States based on Walker’s research, 1962-1963


34) The map is based on three maps that were issued in slightly different forms and timings: Boundaries of the Trucial States, prepared and drawn from sketch maps and information provided by Julian Walker, map no. 1 (north), Foreign Office Research Department, February 1962; Boundaries of the Trucial States, map no. 2 (south), Foreign Office Research Department, February 1963; Boundaries of the Trucial States, map no. 3 (covering the Southern Abu Dhabi-Oman boundary), unpublished,
Walker’s dilemma essentially arose from the fundamental difficulty of exporting the modern norm of international relations conducted by geographically demarcated sovereign states. Irresponsible drawing of state borders is often depicted as an example of the adverse legacy of imperialism. Indeed some boundaries in the world were drawn more arbitrarily than others, but Walker’s episode suggests that drawing the boundaries according to social reality can sometimes be extremely complicated, or even impracticable, depending on the extent to which the local traditions are congenial to the norms of sovereign territoriality.

A Solution to the ‘jig-saw puzzle’

After the late 1950s Britain experienced a major setback in the shape of the Suez Crisis and following the ‘wind of change’ speech it granted independence to many of its former colonies. However, the informal empire in the Persian Gulf largely remained intact. It was only in January 1968 that Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that Britain would withdraw from the Gulf by the end of 1971. Even then, the decision did not come as a response to local calls for self-determination and, indeed, was actually taken in the face of the local rulers’ opposition. The rulers watched the turmoil in Aden with trepidation and were wary of losing Britain’s military support in countering domestic opposition. As a result, they secretly offered to pay for the maintenance of the British troops if they were to stay. However, the Wilson government was determined to continue with the retreat in order to politically justify social cuts, such as restoring prescription charges for the National Health Service, which had become inevitable due to Britain’s long-term economic retrenchment.

Wilson’s announcement meant that Britain would withdraw its informal empire in the Gulf within less than four years. Therefore, the nine Protected States of ‘Ajman, Fujairah, Ra’s al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Qatar and Bahrain would need to become fully independent sovereign states, or be swallowed up by existing ones. The local rulers were quick to respond. In less than a week,
Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi, the ruler of the most powerful Protected State, met his rival Shaikh Rashid bin Sa'id Al Maktum. They set up a regional initiative to form a union of nine states aiming to achieve full independence collectively.35)

However, this plan turned out to be little more than lip service and the situation remained stalled for three years. In the meantime the Conservatives came to power in Britain and made an unnecessary and unsuccessful attempt to reverse the Labour decision, only to realize that the momentum towards the end of empire was irreversible. In this climate, Julian Walker, who had been deployed outside the region, came back to the Protected States in July 1971. He contacted the rulers, who he believed would otherwise ‘disappear on their summer holidays’ and prompted them to negotiate for independence.36) Encouraged by Walker and also their own advisors, Shaikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi and Shaikh Rashid of Dubai agreed to come together to achieve collective independence, provided that the other states would accept their leadership. It took Walker another couple of days’ travelling between their palaces on the coast before he managed to convince the rulers of 'Ajman, Fujairah, Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain to become part of the UAE under the leadership of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. In contrast, Bahrain and Qatar opted out and declared their independence separately, and their decision was accepted by Britain and the United States. Ra’s al-Khaimah also tried to go solo, but this move was rejected by the international community and it grudgingly joined the UAE in February 1972.37) There is no evidence that oil companies played any direct role in dictating the outcome of the independence of the three states. They were only observing warily from outside.38)


36) Walker to Wright, 6 June 1971, FCO 8/1761, TNA.


Against all odds, the British retreat and the emergence of new states were conducted in a surprisingly peaceful manner. One of the very final orders delivered from the British foreign service at the end of 1971, so a British diplomat recalls, was ‘to ensure that all the official pianos in the Gulf were regularly tuned’.39) However, the process leading to this end was much more contingent, contested and fraught. If British imperialism had brought the shadow of a sovereign persona to the region in the nineteenth century, the illusion of oil precipitated the evolution of sovereign territoriality and, the final shape of the UAE as a fully sovereign state was only finalized by a series of haphazard negotiations between all the actors involved, including both Britain and the local rulers, which took place in the last moment of British withdrawal from the region.

**Conclusion: Imperialism and territoriality**

A map anticipated a spatial reality, not vice versa. In other words, a map was a model for, rather than a model of, what it purported to represent.40)

This is a quote from Thongchai Winichakul’s study of how the modern map of Thailand was created. He argues that the map, based on a delineation of boundaries in the modern sense, was not indigenous to the local traditions but rather discursively constructed in response to European influence. Such a notion presents a striking parallel with the way in which a modern idea of sovereign territoriality evolved on the northern coast of the Arabian Peninsula through its contact with Britain.

The creation of arbitrary borders has often been understood as the quintessential example of the adverse consequences of European imperialism. However, in case of the boundary drawing of the present UAE, there is a certain absence of central will. Walker’s map was complicated because it was intended to reflect the local realities as much as to support the British case over the Buraimi dispute, and the whole process leading to the emergence of the UAE in 1971 was more characterized by

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disjointed instrumentalism than lead by a fully thought-out strategy.

The question of a central agent brings us back to our original point of departure. At this point, it may be helpful to make an analytical distinction between four interconnected issues surrounding what is often called the 'legacy of imperialism':

(a) A resumption, or a continuation, of the issues that had existed prior to the arrival of the imperial power;

(b) The issues that were brought in by, or created through contact with, the imperial power;

(c) The issues that were created or exacerbated by the modality of the way in which the imperial power departed; and

(d) The issues caused by modernity or modernization.

Partly due to the sense of guilt in the former metropole, or the insecurity of the postcolonial states, imperial powers are often condemned not only for their own conduct (b), or what has been created by the way in which they left (c), but also for problems that in fact existed at the time of their expansion into foreign territories (a) or for things that were, in fact, going to happen sooner or later regardless of the imperial presence, as long as the region concerned was going to experience modernization (d).

In contrast to the linear borders in many parts of the world, the map drawn by Walker was far from simplistic. Its complexity amounting to a 'jig-saw puzzle' calls into question the assumption that had it not been for the imperial powers the borders between postcolonial states would have been much less problematic. The puzzle illuminates the contestation between different ideas of space. The conception of space is fundamental to our understanding of the world. Dividing land into exclusive territories, such as sovereign states, is only one of many ways to think about space, but its historical expansion in the world during modern times needs to be examined in further depth.
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Slot, B. J. *The Arabs of the Gulf, 1602-1784: An Alternative Approach to the Early History of the


Abstract

Traditional historians have regarded the Industrial Revolution as a watershed in British historical development. However, the current interpretations are dominated by the gradualist view that its process was unspectacular and modest. Gradualist historians also criticize the causes and factors of the Industrial Revolution which traditional historians have thought as important. The present confusion is derived from the existing academic tradition that while the revolutionists have sought the courses of the Industrial Revolution only in the perspective of the domestic history, the evolutionists have focused on the comparison between British industrialization and others.

Here, we need to reinterpret British industrialization in the perspective of modern world history. The Industrial Revolution originated from the using of the machinery in the field of cotton spinning, which was stimulated by the deep change from linen and wool to cotton in English peoples’ clothes in the eighteenth century. At the time India had a competitive advantage in the cotton manufacture, which stemmed from its agriculture. India’s agriculture was so productive that the cost of food products was lower than that of Britain. India’s competitive advantage in the cotton manufacture was also based on this condition. Inventing a series of machines for cotton spinning was an alternative that British manufacturers had to choose under this situation.

In short, what was more important is not the invention of machines, but the continuous use of them. Machines were also made in other regions. For example, Chinese intellectuals invented some elaborate machines for agriculture or water pumping. But they could not be used continuously in the country. It was possible only in Britain based upon the steam engines or coal. So, the steam engine and coal were more important than the invention of machines in the Industrial Revolution. While the labour-intensive economy of India or China was limited by the old biological regime in the age of new international trade, Britain succeeded in the use of machines driven by the steam engine for producing cotton yarn.

Keywords: biological old regime, coal, cotton manufacture, industrious revolution, machine, proto-industrialization, steam engine.
I

The Industrial Revolution refers to the introduction of machinery and the factory system to the process of goods-production in Britain. But in a broader sense, it covers a series of social and economic changes caused by the expansion of the factory system. Of course, the Industrial Revolution did not cause a sudden change like a political upheaval. Nevertheless, traditional historians have stressed its discontinuities. They thought that the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries represented a significant watershed in historical development. Until the early 1970s, most historians had accepted that the Industrial Revolution was a period of important mixture of technological innovation, industrial development, population growth, urbanization and proletarianization which involved marked changes in living standards and socio-political relations.

These revolutionist historians used to emphasize competitive markets, the factory system, technological innovations and steam power in the Industrial Revolution. According to the theory of modernization in the 1960s, it was the first case of modern economic growth. Harold Perkin says as follows:

The Industrial Revolution was a revolution in men’s access to the mean of life, in control of their ecological environment, in their capacity from the tyranny and niggardliness of nature ... It opened the road for men to complete mastery of their physical environment, without the inescapable need to exploit each other.1)

However, the current interpretations are dominated by the view that the Industrial Revolution was unspectacular, incomplete and modest. Nowadays, gradualist historians tend to reduce the ‘first industrial revolution’ to a ‘myth’ or a ‘misnomer’.2) According to the gradualist view, the ‘first industrial revolution’ no longer serves as the paradigm of modernization and the historical guide to economic development. The rise of the gradualist perspective is much concerned with the failure of British economic growth since the 1970s. The gradualist interpretations can be divided into

two categories as follows.\(^3\)

First, there are some revisionist studies about the causes and factors of the Industrial Revolution. These studies reinterpret some factors that traditional historians have regarded as important driving forces of the Industrial Revolution. Revisionist historians underestimate technological innovation and the factory system during the Industrial Revolution. They also downplay the importance of social and economic factors in the late eighteenth century (for example, oversea trade, capital accumulation, population growth, enclosure and agricultural improvements, etc.).

Second, some clio-metric historians have produced new macroeconomic indicators on industrial output, national income, GNP growth and industrial productivity. These new estimates indicate a more modest picture of economic changes in the Industrial Revolution than has ever emerged before.\(^4\) Productivity and industrial output were slow to grow, and the proportion of the fixed capital also increased gradually. Therefore, the existence of the Industrial Revolution is placed in doubt. It is no exaggeration to say that this macroeconomic interpretation is now a new orthodoxy.

What shall we think about these new perspectives? These interpretations make the achievements of the Industrial Revolution to appear insignificant. Both the revisionist perspective on the causes of the Industrial Revolution and the econometric approach to British industrialization try to show not so much economic discontinuities as modest changes in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Of course, it is true that the Industrial Revolution was not a radical process but a gradual one. It was not a sudden change especially in comparison with those of other countries in Europe and America. But though the rate of industrialization in Britain in the late eighteenth century was less impressive and was restricted to only a few sectors, notably cotton textiles and metallurgy, a sense of the economic change and progress was impressively obvious to many contemporary observers. The Industrial Revolution

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\(^4\) For example, according to N. F. R. Crafts and C. K. Harley, it is estimated that the rate of economic growth per year is 1.9 percent, and the annual increasing rate of national income is 0.5 percent between 1801 and 1830. See N. F. R. Crafts and C. K. Harley, "Output Growth and the British Industrial Revolution: A Restatement of the Crafts-Harley View," *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., 45, no. 4 (1992): 711-12. These indices are much lower than ones that P. Deane and W. A. Cole counted in the 1960s.
was not a myth, but actually a historical experience.

The present confusion in the studies of the Industrial Revolution is derived from the tradition of the existing academic world that while the revolutionists have tried to seek its important causes and factors only in the perspective of the domestic history of Britain, the evolutionists have focused on the comparison between British industrialization and others. Therefore, it is necessary for us to reinterpret British industrialization in the perspective of modern world history.

II

According to the traditional view on the Industrial Revolution, the British economy changed dramatically in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It enabled Britain to initiate the economic progress of the world. Why did Britain experience the first industrialization? Historians in Britain have tried to find various factors which could be regarded as British peculiarities in modern economic history. For example, they emphasize several domestic factors such as the growth of the population, the rise of free markets, the growth of the middle class, foreign trade, the agricultural revolution, the financial revolution, the parliamentary enclosure, the development of road and canal networks, and natural resources etc. But it is very difficult for us to find British peculiarities in these factors.

Half a century ago, R. M. Hartwell suggested a table on the forces of the Industrial Revolution, in which he tried to classify a group of causes and factors into five categories such as "capital accumulation, innovations, fortunate factor endowments, and market expansion, and miscellany". Perhaps his table could cover all the causes which historians had regarded as important.

Although these causes were necessary for the growth of the British economy in the late eighteenth century, they could not be thought as sufficient conditions for the Industrial Revolution that were only peculiar to Britain and absent in other European countries. Since the 1970s, some historians began to rethink the Industrial Revolution not through British domestic history, but in the perspective of European history. There are two factors that economic historians have emphasized. One is proto-industrialization, that is, the development of rural industries under the

putting-out system in the pre-industrial age. The other is related to a new type of family economic activities called the ‘industrious revolution’. In the first place, let’s look at ‘proto-industrialization’. The term was derived from F. Mendels’ dissertation on eighteenth-century Flanders.6) After the publication of his dissertation, some economic historians have re-interpreted the development of the rural industry in early modern Europe through this idea. Here ‘proto-industrialization’ means the “market-oriented transformation of raw materials into industrial commodities”, where the main labour consisted of rural producers. According to Mendels, the rural industry in eighteenth-century Flanders caused the marriage rate to go up especially during good economic trends, and this resulted in the ratchet-like rise of the population. In short, modern industry originated from “the gradual proto-industrialization of rural regions”. Here, “rural industry, outer market and symbiosis between agriculture and handicraft industry” were necessary conditions for the rise of proto-industrialization.7)

Mendels also read a paper on proto-industrialization at the 8th International Economic History Congress in Budapest in 1982. According to his paper, the central feature of proto-industrialization was the growth within that region of rural industry involving peasant participation in handicraft production for the market. The market for the goods produced by this activity was outside the region or even outside the national frontiers. And there was an essential linkage between proto-industrial activity and commercial agriculture.8)

On the other hand, some German scholars at the Max Planck Institute of Göttingen have initiated a series of studies of proto-industrialization on the basis of Mendels’ research since the 1970s. In their views, ‘proto-industrialization is conceptualized as ‘industrialization before industrialization’ which can be defined as the development of rural regions in which a large part of the population rely entirely or to a considerable extent on industrial mass-production for inter-regional and international markets.” So, it is part of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and belongs to “the second phase of the transition”.9) Proto-industrialization is

9) P. Kriedte, H. Medick and J. Schlumbohm, Industrialization before Industrialization (Cambridge:
related to some regional specialization between rural districts. It was concentrated in “barren mountain regions” or “harsh mountainous areas”. The economy was in favour of early marriage and stimulated the production using child labour. It resulted in a higher rate of demographic growth. Here, the Göttingen group seems to be influenced by the tradition of the German history school, of which one of the most well-known economic historians, Werner Sombart had emphasized the importance of the rural industry in the early modern age.

Although many historians have tried to regard the proto-industry as important, we can not find the evidence of the transition from rural industry to industrialization. There is little evidence of population growth in some rural industrial regions in the eighteenth century. Some proto-industries were not directly related to the putting-out system. More significantly, many rural industrial regions had rather declined in the industrial age. For example, several English regions of rural industry went through “de-industrialization that experienced the impact of industrial revolution” during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. According to Coleman’s study, only four among ten proto-industrial regions underwent industrialization during the Industrial Revolution.

Next, let’s examine what the industrious revolution means and how it is related to industrialization. Nowadays, some historians tend to regard the industrious revolution as one of the factors of the Industrial Revolution. And this trend seems to have been influenced by the recent studies emphasizing the factor of demand in the eighteenth century. The demand-centered approach is a challenge to the tradition of the existing economic history which has focused only on the domestic factors. In eighteenth-century Britain, the demand for goods continuously increased on the basis of British trade with North America, the Caribbean Sea, the Continent and India. Especially the demand for fustian, cotton and woolen goods which were produced under the putting-out system connected to the rural industry, was raised rapidly. In the eighteenth century, the imports of British industrial goods increased two times.

It is said that the industrious revolution preceded the Industrial Revolution, and was based upon increased family labour. Jan De Vries locates this revolution in

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10) Kriedte et al., Industrialization before Industrialization, 14, 24.
11) Kriedte et al., Industrialization before Industrialization, 21.
seventeenth-century England, and argues that it was the consequence of the appearance of a new range of consumer goods. New consumption possibilities led families to work more and enjoy less leisure. This term which De Vries used first would certainly help us to reflect English economic development in the early modern age, and to understand some changes of labouring people’s life attitude in proto-industrial regions of eighteenth-century Britain. De Vries says as follow:

The Industrial Revolution as a historical concept has many shortcomings. A new concept of the industrious revolution is proposed to place the Industrial Revolution in a broader historical setting. The industrious revolution was a process of household-based resource reallocation that increased both the supply of marketed commodities and labour and the demand for market-supplied goods. The industrious revolution was a household-level change with important demand-side feature that preceded the Industrial Revolution, a supply-side phenomenon. It has implications for nineteenth- and twentieth-century economic history.\(^{14}\)

The labouring people began to escape from the pre-industrial life attitude where people used to choose leisure over labour after the arrival of the basic life-standard in eighteenth-century Britain. The workers in rural industrial regions sought the extra income for purchasing new goods and satisfying their new desire. According to De Vries, the evidence of the industrious revolution is found in the two changes. First, the workers of the proto-industry tried to reduce spending time for leisure coping with the increase of marginal utility. Second, they shortened the labour hours for self-consumption, and at the same time, prolonged the labour hours producing goods for a market. In this process the workers of the rural industries employed children and women in the works, and eventually intensified the strength of labour.\(^{15}\)

Certainly the studies on proto-industrialization and the industrious revolution originated from emphasis on the demand causes. These studies would help us to understand the Industrial Revolution more deeply. But there are two points which we should attend to. First of all, these factors are necessary conditions to industrialization, but they did not necessarily lead to industrialization in European countries. Next, proto-industrialization and the industrious revolution appeared in various regions covering Asia in the perspective of world history. There were, for example, these phenomena in other European countries, China, Japan or India as


\(^{15}\) De Vries, "The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution," 257.
well as Britain in the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{16)}

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For a long time historians have regarded the use of machinery and the factory system as the essential features of the Industrial Revolution. Machines were very impressive to contemporary intellectuals such as Andrew Ure and Charles Babbage. They knew that a machine was a mechanism having its own tools in its body. For example, Ure classifies the machinery into three categories. They are "the machines concerned in the production of power", "the machines concerned in the transmission and regulation of power" and "the machines concerned in the application of power, to modify the various forms of matter into objects of commerce."\textsuperscript{17)} He accurately explains the structure of the spinning machines such as jenny, water-frame and mule. Especially the self-acting mule improved in the 1820s was regarded as an embodiment of the machinery which initiated the economic development during the Industrial Revolution. According to Ure's explanation, the invention of the self-acting mule was related to the factory owners' effort coping with workers' strikes and riots in the 1820s. It seemed that the machine had "finishing spinner' thinking, feeling and skill", so it was called 'iron man'. This nickname let us know the fact that the machine stemmed from the necessity of labour-saving.\textsuperscript{18)}

On the other hand, the factory system meant a workshop in which various machines were installed. Here, machines should be concentrated on the basis of the principle of division of labour and hierarchy. As Marx sharply pointed out in the first volume of his \textit{Capital}, Ure explains the factory system in two ways. First, "factory designates the combined operation of many orders of work-people, adult and young, in tending with assiduous skill a system of productive machines continuously impelled by a central power." The second definition is that it involves

\textsuperscript{16) In the 1960s and 1970s, some economic historians of China and Japan were interested in the problem of 'capitalistic sprouts', which was directly related to the rise of rural industries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And De Vries's recent book, \textit{The Industrious Revolution: Consumer Behavior and the Household Economy} (2008) deals with the industrious revolution of Western Europe and North America.}

\textsuperscript{17) Andrew Ure, \textit{The Philosophy of Manufacture} (London: Charles Knight, 1835), 27.}

\textsuperscript{18) Ure, \textit{The Philosophy of Manufacture}, 36-37.}
“a vast automaton, composed of various mechanical and intellectual organs, acting in uninterrupted concert for the production of a common object, all of them being subordinated to a self-regulated moving force.”19)

Here, the spread of machines and factories in the Industrial Revolution should be also understood through its relation to the development of world history rather than on the basis of the British domestic situation. There are, at least, two considerations that originated from the foreign factors. One is the reason why the machinery was invented and used first only in the field of cotton spinning, and the other the problem related to the transition from the simple workshop to the factory system.

Why were the machinery first introduced into the field of cotton spinning? We should examine the formation and change of the Euro-centric international trade network since the sixteenth century in order to answer that question. In the sixteenth century, the core of the New World economy was the establishment and growth of a plantation system using imported African slave labour, initially for the production of sugar, but eventually adapted to tobacco in the seventeenth century and cotton in the eighteenth century. Especially the British created the slave-based sugar plantation. It is well-known to historians that many African slaves were taken to work in New World plantations in this process.

In the new international trade, Europeans and North American colonists accumulated wealth. The trade contributed specially to the growth of the English economy in the modern age. The reason the English imported much cotton goods from India in the 18th century is because it was of high quality and lower price than domestic products (especially linen and wool). There were deep changes from linen and wool to cotton in English peoples’ clothes.20) Anyway, it felt good next to the skin, was lightweight for summer wear, and was less expensive than goods the English could manufacture themselves.

At that time, India’s competitive advantage stemmed from agriculture. India’s agriculture was so productive that the cost of food products was lower than that of Europe. In the early modern age, Asia’s competitive advantage was agriculture. High per acre yields led to low-priced food and low wages, and India’s competitive advantage in the cotton manufacture was also based on these conditions.

It seems that the Seven Years’ War was important to the development of the

British cotton industry. The British Government banned the importation of Indian textiles several times in the early eighteenth century. Those procedures stemmed from the purpose of developing her domestic cotton industry in Lancashire and Cheshire. If British manufacturers depended upon handicraft industry, they could not cope with India’s competitive advantage. Inventing a series of machines for cotton spinning was an alternative that they had to choose under the situation.

In short, the triangular trade related to the slave and textiles fueled the growth of British shipping and established Manchester as a center of textile manufacture. Raw cotton was imported from the Ottoman Empire, and later from the British colonies in the Caribbean, and in the 1790s cheaper American raw cotton was imported to Lancashire. Eventually from the 1780s it began to be spun by the new spinning machines.

The history of innovations in the cotton industry is very well-known to historians. At first technological innovations occurred in the field of the cotton spinning industry. John Kay’s flying shuttle of 1733 increased the productivity of hand-loom weavers. So, the industry needed spinning innovations because of the shortage of cotton yarn. James Hargreaves’s spinning jenny (1764), Richard Arkwright’s spinning water-frame(1768), and Samuel Crompton’s mule (1779) revolutionized cotton spinning. Arkwright and his partners built a number of cotton mills in Lancashire and the Midlands with all the characteristic features of the factory system, including the precise division of labour and the co-operation of workers in different manufacturing processes. The cotton industry became the largest sector of manufacturing fields in Britain after the 1790s.

Was the invention of the machinery unique to the British economy? Although many historians regard the machinery as the essence of the Industrial Revolution, it is true that it was made and used in other regions such as the Continent, China or Japan in the pre-industrial age. In the traditional society, Chinese intellectuals and craftsman invented some elaborate machines for agriculture or water pumping. But they were not broadly and continuously used among the working people. While spinning machines were broadly used with the help of their connection to steam engines, that mechanism did not spread in China and in other regions. It is an important difference between Britain and other countries especially in the late eighteenth century. So, some historians say that the key factor of the Industrial Revolution should be sought above all in the use of steam engines based upon coal.

Here, we should admit the fact that the steam engine and coal were more
important than the machinery in the process of the Industrial Revolution. The view on the importance of a working machine stemmed from Adam Smith’s theory of division of labour. He used the case of the pin-makers to demonstrate the scale of the possible improvement on the basis of the division of labour. Though the possible advances in productivity by the division of labour and by the use of machines may be very substantial, they are also finite. These possible advances would be influenced by the scale of demand of the market, and by available energy necessary to those advances in productivity. Especially the latter was more important during the period of continuous growth of the population. Adam Smith did not consider the rapid increase of energy necessary to move and work the machines and tools for the production of pins.\(^{21}\)

Of course, in the early stage of the Industrial Revolution, the connection between the spinning machine and the steam engine was not easy. Most spinners and manufacturers operated their spinning machines by hand or by water-wheel. At that time the somewhat low population density in Britain did not permit manufacturers to enable to input many labourers for coping with the increase of the demand for cotton yarn. Manufacturers could not help but depend on the steam engine. After James Watt’s improvement, it was possible.

The steam engine was used in the early part of the eighteenth century. The Newcomen engine was inefficient as a device for capturing the energy by the combustion of coal.\(^{22}\) But coal was not expensive, so it was used for the purpose of pumping water in the mining industry. Since James Watt made the separate condensing rotative engine, it became broadly used in the various fields of industry.

Watt’s critical insight was to cause the steam to condense in a separate chamber apart from the piston, and to maintain the temperature of the cylinder at the same temperature as the injected steam. This meant that very little heat was absorbed into the cylinder itself in each cycle, and thus far more steam pressure was available to provide mechanical force. Watt had a working model by 1765.\(^{23}\) The field of application for the invention was greatly widened, and Watt made an effort


for converting the reciprocating motion of the piston to produce rotational power for grinding, weaving and milling. There were steam-powered cotton factories in Lancashire and Cheshire in the 1790s. And coal production increased rapidly, allowing a similar increase in the production of iron and lead.

As E. A. Wrigley said, at first coal was only “a cheap substitute for wood as a source of heat energy,” and sometimes it was used for the smelting of iron ore in Britain. But in the eighteenth century it led to the invention of the steam engine, and as a result, it also became one of the most important factors in the process of British industrialization. So, eventually coal was very important for the development of British industrialization. There was no close connection between coal, the steam engine and machinery elsewhere in the world other than in Britain in the late eighteenth century. This was Britain’s unique characteristic in the world.

IV

In order to understand the reason why the use of coal was the most important cause of the Industrial Revolution, we should examine the changing situations of world economic history especially in the early modern age.

After the making of the New World economy, Western Europe initiated the international trade to be prosperous economically. But the trade also stimulated other regions. Especially China, India and Japan were also economically as prosperous as Western European countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Generally historians in Europe used to regard these Asian regions as a counterexample to West European development in the modern age. It was said that most of the population were inputted for the purpose of their subsistence, and that the situation rendered the investment necessary for an industrial revolution impossible. But it was not true. Especially agriculture in China was highly productive in comparison with that of Europe. Such efficient agriculture allowed its population

24) Wrigley, Continuity, Change and Chance, 78. In the seventeenth century coal seems to be used broadly for heating. For example, in 1683-4, John Evelyn who visited the blanket fair on the frozen Thames, talked about London polluted by coal fuel for heating as follows. “London, by reason of the excessive coldness of the air hindering the ascent of the smoke, was so filled with the fuliginous steam of the coal, that hardly could one see across the streets, and this filling the lungs with its gross particles, exceedingly obstructed the breast, so as one could scarcely breathe.” John Evelyn, Diary and Correspondence of John Evelyn, ed. William Bray (London: Henry Colburn, 1850 edn.), vol. 2: 193.
to grow.

In short, eighteenth-century China looked as developed as West European countries. Regional specialization gave rise to markets and a commercialized economy. The water-based transportation system allowed the efficient movement of products and people throughout the empire. But China’s advanced market economy did not lead to an industrial innovation. China had a highly developed market economy within the constraints of the biological old regime. Although the dynamics of specialization increased market exchanges and improved transportation, China ended up with labour-intensive agriculture rather than industrialization. Here, we should consider that Western European countries were also confronted with the constraints of the biological old regime in the eighteenth century.

Recently K. Pomeranz examined these constraints more deeply. In his *The Great Divergence* (2000), Pomeranz argues for serious ecological obstacles to further growth in all of the most densely populated, market-driven, and commercially sophisticated areas of China, India and Western Europe.25) These obstacles were not so acute as to cause major food crises, but the regions suffered from shortages of fuel, building materials and fiber, and at the same time, from threats to the continued fertility of some areas’ soil. Pomeranz examines the attempts made by all these core areas to address these shortages through long-distance trade with less densely populated Old World areas. But such trade could not provide a fully adequate solution.26) Only Britain could escape from the constraints of the biological old regime on the basis of coal and the steam engine. Fortunately, in Britain coal was close enough to the surface of the ground. He emphasizes “the increasing use of coal” as follows.

Coal was central to earlier views of the Industrial Revolution. Only cotton, iron, steel, and railways got comparable attention, and except for cotton, these other main sectors depended on coal. But more recently coal has often been de-emphasized. People have noted, for instance, that more early factories were powered by water than by coal and that most of England’s coal was used for the unglamourous and not particularly innovative tasks of home heating and cooking.27)

In fact, coal shows us irony in the studies of the Industrial Revolution.

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Contemporaries attached importance to coal as a factor of industrialization. For example, J. R. McColloch, a contemporary economist, focused on the role of coal for the development of industry in the 1830s. Coal was the most valuable factor that had contributed to the remarkable progress of English manufacture. According to his explanation, coal was "a sinew working steam engine." But for a long time historians have not paid attention to coal as an important cause of the Industrial Revolution. Nowadays some historians such as Wrigley and Pomeranz began to emphasize the importance of coal again.

Up to now, the Industrial Revolution has been portrayed as the history of invention and use of labour-saving machines. It is said that British manufacturers found ways of lowering their costs of productions and hence they turned to mechanization. However, without coal and steam power, the cotton textile industry alone could not transform the British economy. In the Industrial Revolution, the use of coal and the steam engine was more important than the use of machinery. In all regions of the Old World from China to England, shortages of land to produce the necessities of life were putting limits on any further economic growth. This understanding of the ecological limits of the biological old regime opens a new window onto the explanation of why the Industrial Revolution occurred first in England.

According to Pomeranz’s explanation, Britain’s advantages in escaping from the constraints were largely ecological. Some were related to the fortunate location of coal deposits. Others were based on the bounty of the New World. These advantages brought about other innovations, and they transformed its economy.

V

Let’s summarize the process of the Industrial Revolution again. In the eighteenth century the labour-intensive economy of China and India was limited by the biological old regime. After the rise of new international trade, this pattern of production was strengthened in order to cope with increasing the goods-demand from domestic or foreign regions. Although the labour-intensive system was based on the higher productivity of agriculture, it could not be continued under the old

biological regime.

But Britain succeeded in the use of machines driven by the steam engine for producing cotton yarn. Most important in that innovation was coal. After that, the method of getting energy from fossil fuels became a standard for economic activities in the world. Modern industrial civilization has developed on the basis of this path. Its result is well-known to us: exhaustion of natural resources, environmental pollution, global warming, and destruction of the ecosystem. It is no exaggeration to say that these negative results cancel out the material wealth gained from modern industrial civilization.
Reference


Christopher Leslie Brown’s book, *Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism* offers a promising framework for understanding the seemingly sudden rise of the British abolitionist movement in the late eighteenth century. Most of all, *Moral Capital* explains the context in which antislavery sentiment could be transformed into a moral and active antislavery ideology, or abolitionism. Brown argues that the key can be found in historical events in the revolutionary era: the American Revolution raised doubts about the moral authority of the British Empire among the British and Americans, and people who already had ill feeling towards the slave trade strengthened their political and moral position in the antislavery cause during the years of crisis. Many British as well as American colonials found it necessary to emphasise the immorality of their counterparts while insisting on their own moral superiority; colonial assemblies blamed the British government for the transatlantic slave trade, while proponents of the British constitution denounced slaveholding in North America. In this way, antislavery sentiment permeated the transatlantic channel of communication as the Atlantic world moved towards abolitionism, in the atmosphere of tension and disruption caused by the Revolution. This explains why many antislavery people started expressing their antipathy towards slavery more actively in this particular period.

Furthermore, Brown’s thesis breaks fresh ground in the debate of abolitionists’ motivation. *Moral Capital* does not consider this issue a dichotomous question between humanitarianism and material interests, claiming that conflict caused by the Revolution formed the atmosphere in which opponents of slavery, the most noticeable ‘vice’, could gain moral prestige; thus, the “antislavery argument became more useful during the era of the American Revolution and thereafter.”(458) Here,
Brown analyses abolitionists' motivation using political scientist John Kane’s concept, 'moral capital'. Kane defines it as "moral prestige — whether of an individual, organisation or cause — in useful service."¹ It means that a moral distinction can become a source of power in the world in the way that it facilitates and legitimises action. In this view, political cause can be a means to fulfil the moral cause and vice-versa. For example, the Quakers, pioneers of the early antislavery movement, expelled slaveholding members from their community according to their religious conviction and were able to enhance their social prestige. Thomas Clarkson, a representative abolitionist, devoted his life to an altruistic mission and was able to get worldly fame, presenting himself as 'the redeemer of African liberty.'(439-42)

The Brown thesis provides the prolonged debate about whether the abolitionists were moralists or hypocrites with a new paradigm.

Brown’s view of Anglo-American attitudes towards slavery is a sophisticated one but does not convey the whole story. As Moral Capital posits, three questions should be answered for a comprehensive understanding of the history of the British antislavery movement: how values, perceptions and beliefs hostile to the slave trade and slavery developed and spread in the British Atlantic world; how these ideas transformed into a political ideology and practical actions for social reforms; and how abolitionists eventually achieved the abolition of the slave trade and the emancipation of slaves.(17) Moral Capital rightly answers the second and third questions but does not give full attention to the rise and spread of antipathy towards the slave trade, a premise of the rise of abolitionism. The formation of antislavery sentiment needs to be explained more thoroughly and distinguished from the growth of a moral ideology or abolitionism. Antislavery sentiment itself represents natural ill-feeling towards something perceived as inhumane. However, this antipathy was shared among many people in diverse areas in the Atlantic world, advanced by human efforts. Like studies by other scholars over the past decades, Brown’s research leaves unexplained questions about the spread of antipathy to the slave trade.

The Brown thesis that in a succession of national crises, the antislavery cause became a useful one for diverse political ends needs to be interpreted more broadly. There was a sense of crisis caused by the Revolution rather than merely a series of critical moments. Anglican abolitionists who played a central role in the parliamentary campaign, equated wars, riots and the unrest caused by the

Declaration of Independence with divine judgement. They thought that a national crisis resulted from their continued disregard of the inconsistency between slavery and religious principles. The Revolution enhanced the aspect of impending retribution attached to the crisis and a number of people, particularly evangelical Anglicans started taking practical action to prevent the occurrence of further national ‘punishment’. The Brown thesis persuasively emphasises the importance of the political context of the abolitionist movement, but it is also important to focus on the consequence of these political events which made antislavery evangelicals begin to take action. Moral Capital overlooks that a sense of crisis was caused by these political events and held a strong position in the popular imagination in the late eighteenth century.

Despite these points, the strength of Moral Capital is still substantial. Brown does not deal with all the issues of the antislavery movement but does ask the right questions and provide proper answers. This is a provocative rereading of the origins of late eighteenth century British antislavery and a markedly important attempt to transcend a dividing line between ideals and interests in the analysis of abolitionists’ motivation. Moral Capital is an outstanding contribution to the historiography of the eighteenth-century antislavery movement, stimulating further studies.
[Book Review]

How not to write Global History: A Note on Robert Allen’s The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective

Jacob Frank*

Why should one write a review about a book, which is said to be a “highly original and superbly researched book”, “a brilliant book on two of the main questions of economics”, and whose author “has set new standards for the study of one of the most critical episodes of human history”.1) Of course this book, which is part of the New Approaches to Economic and Social History serial, is a very useful textbook for senior high school students and undergraduate historians and economists, but it is unfortunately not academically rigorous and groundbreaking. Robert Allen wants to respond to the question, why the Industrial Revolution took place in eighteenth-century Britain and not elsewhere in Europe or Asia. In order to do so he narrows down the description of the pre-industrial economy of Britain and its subsequent development. Without the knowledge of technical improvements in the eighteenth century it seems impossible to explain the Industrial Revolution.

The British expansion between 1500 and 1750 established a high wage economy in the big cities like London and the remarkable inventions, like the steam engine, the water frame, Spinning Jenny and the coke blast furnace, which revolutionized the British economy in a decisive way. Coal and financial capital replaced manpower and therefore as a consequence the Industrial Revolution originated in Britain. For Allen the “Industrial Revolution can be seen as the sequel to that first phase of globalization”,2) because the later adoption of technologies by other countries on the European continent and the United States made the Industrial Revolution a global phenomenon. Since the new inventions were at first not rentable

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1) The quotations belong to Joel Mokyr and Jan Luiten van Zanden (in the blurb). As a remark I would like to point to the fact, that the author rather quotes Wikipedia than using the original source, cf. p. 142.

2) Robert C. Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective (Cambridge, 2010), 2. Further quotations and references of Allan’s book will just be denoted in the text by using the pagenumbers in brackets.
in other countries, they played a decisive role for the advancement of the British industry. But why were these new innovations able to be invented in Britain? Allen refers to the unusual wage and price structure, because anywhere else the grade of R&D (research and development) would not have been profitable. (cf. p.7) In general the author’s assumption is not revolutionary, because Habakkuk 3) went through the same case for the American Industrial Revolution in nineteenth-century America. The takeover of power in the Dutch colonies in Asia as well as the setup of the Indian Empire were fundamental features of the British Industrial Revolution (19-21). Unfortunately Allen skips this point, to concentrate his analysis on several economic aspects.

The high wages, an agricultural revolution and the cheap energy economy made the British pre-industrial economy capable of being ahead compared against the continental economies. Compared to those of other European and Asian countries, the British industry had the best premise to be successful. Especially the fact that in 1800 all English thermal energy derived from coal shows that this raw material was a significant factor, which supported the advancement of the Industrial Revolution. Nowhere else coal could be provided for a cost less than one gram of silver per BTU (British thermal unit) (96-98). Consequently the fuel trajectories alongside with the mentioned high wages and agricultural revolution, which brings forth a population growth, were responsible for the British success. The moment coal became valuable for other sectors of industry, the economical development increased accessorily. If the international trade, the agricultural revolution, and the cheap energy had not existed, the British cities would not have grown that fast. In consequence there would not have been an Industrial Revolution in Britain. Regrettably, Allen does not mention the political factors, which distinguished the other European countries from the British issue as well. (127) For sure, “without seventeenth-century success, wages, agricultural productivity and city size would all have been lower in 1800” but the author does not mention with a single word the fact, that continental Europe has been shaken to the core by the Thirty Years’ War (127).

The Industrial Revolution was one of the great and most significant events in history, but Allen wants to mark out why it was a British one. He questions why the steam engine, the mechanical spinning, and coke smelting were invented in Britain and not somewhere else in Europe or Asia.

For this purpose he starts to explain the history of these elementary inventions in the following three chapters in two phases: macro inventions and micro inventions. In this process it was the high wages, which stimulated the inventive process, because “the decision to incur costs to operationalize a technical idea was an economic one” (141). The new machines were invented to economize labor, but the first macro inventions were not profitable, until the further steps of micro inventions, namely the machines developed by R&D, changed this situation. In contrast to China, where labor was cheap, Allen points out that the high amount of coal made it easy to reduce manpower and due to the micro inventions one could save coal as well. Compared to the macro inventions the process of micro-inventing was a more collective one. The following three inventions should illustrate these two phases of invention.

The steam engine is one of the most important inventions during the Industrial Revolution. In the phase of macro invention it was Thomas Newcomen (1664-1729), who designed and built the first model, which had been the result of a process of twelve years of R&D. A century and a half of micro inventions and local learning followed on this. John Smeaton (1724-1792) and James Watt (1736-1819) provided the basis for the use of steam in many different technologies. The railway and the successful British merchant marine depended on these early inventions. But the micro inventions were not only beneficial for Britain, because the phase of local learning eliminated the advantage and “the improvements in engine efficiency that led the steam engine to be the dominant motive power in British mining and manufacturing in the middle of the nineteenth century also led to the widespread adoption of steam in Western Europe and North America.” (179)

In addition to steam “cotton was the wonder industry of the Industrial Revolution” (182) and the mechanization of the yarn-spinning represents the technological history of the cotton industry. James Hargreaves (1720-1778) invented the Spinning Jenny in the middle of the 1760s, which economized labor and wages. In contrast to other inventions it was local learning that led to the invention of Spinning Jenny. Richard Arkwright’s (1732-1793) roller spinning, the carding machine, and the mule provided the British spinning industry with the possibility to compete with the Indian production and enabled it to gain more and more by saving expensive labor/manpower.

The last of the three big inventions was coke smelting, which had been invented by Abraham Darby I (1678-1717) in 1709. This procedure was a key invention,
because it provided the opportunity to produce cheap iron. Darby’s heirs developed the process further. The French, Germans, and Americans could profit from these micro inventions when they, at the break of the economic trend, moved directly to the advanced technology. In the eighteenth century, like in the other cases of inventions as well, the technology was only profitable in Great Britain, but in the nineteenth century the process of micro inventions had made it affordable everywhere.

The question of why these inventions were all invented by British inventors and not somewhere else has not yet been answered. As “the rate of inventions is determined by the supply of inventors as well as by the demand for new products and processes”(238) the high wages in Britain made the steam engine, the spinning jenny, and coke smelting necessary. Even if Allen states, that “the lack of a coal industry was an important difference, another was a more limited supply of potential inventors”(238), I absolutely disagree on this point. There were a lot of capable inventors all around the world but not in the same fields like in Britain. It was mainly the coal industry and its needs, definitely not a surplus of intelligence in Britain, that led to the final macro and micro inventions. The British inventions were in most instances made possible by knowledge of continental, rather than British, origin such as the scientific works of Evangelista Torricelli (1608-1647) and Otto von Guericke (1602-1686). After all it was the demand for technologies and not the alleged higher level of education that made the Industrial Revolution happen in its final steps.(268)

In the end the author provides a rather short conclusion, by stating that the “famous inventions of the British Industrial Revolution were responses to Britain’s unique economic environment”(272) and that “the British were not more rational or prescient than the French in developing coal-based technologies: The British were simply luckier in their geology.”(275) As a consequence it was only just the British way that lead into the 20th century. The fact that Allen in the end is just speaking of France and Britain and that he considered just the British alternative valuable enough to lead to the modern times makes it hard to remember his original aim, which was to define the British Industrial Revolution in global perspective. All in all, his book provides a good access to the topic of the British Industrial Revolution, but there is neither a good comparative method, nor a global perspective. His comparisons always include switching partners of comparison. While he compares the energy prices of European, Asian, and American cities like London, Amsterdam,
Antwerp, Paris, Beijing, Canton, Puna, and Philadelphia (99-102), he mostly compares the parameters of research with France while using sources "of varying degrees of reliability" (185). The more global aspects are not dealt with at all. Questions concerning the consequences of the British Industrial Revolution for the largest cotton producers, India and China, who had dominated the cotton market for centuries due to the correlation of political and economic factors, are not answered. How did the Industrial Revolution influence the military power of Britain, which made it able to become the first global Empire in the modern times? These questions must regretfully be put aside for now.

4) One extremely demonstrative point is Allen’s rather bad comparative analysis on p.163. To the question “Why the steam engine was invented in Britain rather than France or China” follows a comparison between France and Britain, but China will never appear again in this context.
[Book Review]


Jong Nam Na*

Increasing interest on 100th Anniversary of the First World War are flooding all around the Western academia. The rapid increase of book publications on the Great War is a part of the heated phenomenon on its first centenary. Various perspectives on the Great War even including fashion and religion are guiding readers to enlarge the scope and deepen the depth of this event. That is the major source that makes sincere readers happy everyday.

It seems, however, that the booming interests on the Great War are not an Asian but a Western trend. Asians have been quite away from the war, although they were in the very middle of it. Japan was the only active and volunteer participant of the Great War in Asia. Therefore looking into Japanese perspectives on the Great War might be the first step to enlarge and deepen overall understanding on this global event. Among various topics, how Japan accepted the idea of empire and practiced it vis-à-vis her neighbors in particular has attracted historians’ interest so far. Among several masterpieces, works by Peter Duus and Frederick R. Dickinson provide readers with some well-connected ideas on the Japanese road to the First World War that focus on why and how.

Peter Duss analyzes both origin of the Meiji imperialism and changing patterns of Japanese Korean policy during 1870-1910, focusing on political and economic perspectives. While arguing the external origin of Japanese imperialism, he mostly touches on why and how Japan learned imperialism from the West and how she applied it to Korea and changed it by necessity. This volume raises questions on

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two main issues: the political perspectives of Japanese imperialism from 1870 to 1910, from "Subdue Korea" debates to official annexation of Korean Peninsula, and the economic perspectives of the Meiji Japan’s Korean policy by viewing trade, migration, settler community, and land acquisition during this period. From these ideas, readers can catch the detailed process of Japanese imperial policy over Korea. Interestingly at the last two chapters, the author also suggests how Japanese imperialism was transformed in cultural, racial, and historical contexts, quite differently from Western imperialism over Asia and other regions.

Basic assumption of the author’s main argument is the Meiji leaders’ understanding of the genuine reality of the Western imperialism that is defined as “a collective enterprise, a bandwagon ridden by a diverse band of passengers who climb abroad at different times with different destination but who are heading in the same direction.” Under this concept, as the author argues, Japanese leaders emphasized both political and economical aspects of the imperialism, which were “separate but interlinked, and reinforcing each other.”

Interestingly enough, although Japan learned imperialism from the West as a latecomer, what made Japanese imperialism successful even more than the Western imperialism were the Japan’s self-consciousness or self-definition in her relation with neighboring countries and with the West. According to the author, it was Meiji leaders’ concept of “national prestige” and “national unity” which stimulated them to learn from Western countries. In other words, not to be isolated from or to follow up the mainstream of the world, Japanese leaders found that modernity was the most urgent mission. Probably it was the very starting point of Japanese imperialism. So, before Japan started overseas expansion, Japanese leaders made best efforts to modernize their society for almost two decades. After then, Japan just followed Western examples.

About the origin of imperialism in the Meiji Japan, differently from Stewart Lone’s “origin from crisis against Western threats” concept, Duus argues that what invited Japanese leaders to the race of the nineteenth century style imperialism was their voluntary effort to follow the West. In other words, it was quite a pervasive notion among Japanese society that not to fall behind the race, Japanese should make their best efforts to learn from the West, and found some place to apply it exactly as they learned. So Duus emphasizes the active and voluntary aspects of the Japanese imperialism. However, again the author argues that Japan’s imperialism was just a mimicry supported by the request of national modernization.
While covering every detailed developments of Japan’s Korean policy, the author argues that because Japanese leaders had failed to find proper Korean collaborators until 1907 at the earliest, the reformation of Korean government was delayed and other related policies were also deadlocked. In fact, as Duus says, although Japan assisted several political factions in Korean government to start modernization program with Japan’s support, no group made successful reform until 1910 due to intervention of foreign powers, Korean government’s objections, and, most decisively, the lack of their will to modernize themselves. Therefore, due to the delayed reform of Korean government, Japanese imperialist suffered from various kinds of furious protests from all over the Korean society.

One of the most controversial arguments comes at the last chapter in which the author suggests different aspects of Japanese imperialism from Western imperialism. First of all, Duus argues that Japan’s Korean policy was different from Great Britain’s Indian policy in cultural, racial, historical aspects. He also continues that Japanese leaders had clear ideas of so-called “Yellow men’s burden” even from when they started to think of the Korean problem. Based on some special emphasis on homogeneous cultural, racial, and historical background with Korea, Japanese leaders rather focused on the reform and modernization of Korea than imperial plunders. They, Duus continues, also tried to help Korea and stimulated Korean people to start the modernization as Japan did two decades ago. In that sense, “Yellow men’s burden” was different from “White men’s burden”, although these concepts became basic foundations of 1930s’ more pervasive and aggressive imperialistic ideas, so-called “Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.”

While organizing quite detailed description on Japan’s experience of the Great War between 1914 and 1919, Frederick R. Dickinson argues that it was the First World War which resulted in the shaping of essential Japanese national identity and “renovation.” Dickinson assumes that Japan learned different or even bad lessons from the war when compared to European countries, because she participated in only small battles against Germany in China and suffered relatively small numbers of casualties and economic losses. Unfortunately, as the author continues, this experience blocked Japan herself from joining the newly emerged Wilsonian system, new mainstream of the world after the war. He also argues that Japan’s national identity which was shaped during the Great War period became the basis of another aggressive military imperialism of 1930s and, finally, resulted in the tragic outcomes of the Second World War. So, Japan could not join the world’s mainstream until
1945 when she lost the wrongly shaped national identity during the Great War period.

Another important point of this book is the author’s challenge to the old scholarly argument that “Japanese imperial policy was the product of unitary voices of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy.” By focusing on Kato Takaaki’s role in foreign policy making process during the Great War period, Dickinson argues that Japan’s “imperialistic” foreign policy was the product of two politically opposing voices, not of the unitary military-bureaucratic oligarchic decision.

Basically Dickinson traces how Japan experienced the Europe’s war on the opposite side of the globe, how Japan tried to maximize this “Divine Aid” opportunity in China and the Continent, how Japanese leaders accepted every changing situation, and how Japan’s domestic power structure changed to follow up this international situations. To approach this series of processes, the author mostly starts from both Japanese political leaders’ world-views and their recognition of Japan as a modern country.

First of all, the author invites his readers to the Japanese leader’s understanding of the European War in 1914. According to the author, most Japanese leaders considered the war on the other side of the world as the “Divine Aid for the Destiny of Japan,” which was already an imperialist country. So, they were very pleased by the situation, with which they could maximize Japan’s national interest at the Continent and China in particular. Probably this is one of Dickinson’s basic assumptions of why this war was important in making Japan’s essential national identity.

About the character of Japanese imperialism, the author assumes that Japanese goal of foreign policy was more than a strategic response to external event. Rather, he defines Japanese foreign policy as a component of the much greater enterprise, “the quest for national renovation.” In this context, Dickinson criticizes the “crisis based imperial reaction” interpretation, as Peter Duus does. He also agrees that Meiji Japan started her overseas expansions not because of the reaction to Western threats but because of Japan’s voluntary will of strengthening national unity and to follow the advanced Western countries.

What makes this book distinctive is the author’s detailed coverage of the domestic power relation of Taisho Japan, which finally produced the Japanese national identity during this period. According to the author, in the Okuma, Terauch, and Hara cabinets which rose and down during the Great War period,
Japan’s foreign policy was handled by two political groups, which had totally confronting ideas and priorities of interests. First, Dickinson introduces Kato Takaai and the Doshikai, which pursued British models of constitutional governmental system. While arguing for the autonomy of foreign policy from interventions of the Genro and other military-bureaucratic oligarchic interest, Kato tried to attain Japan’s national interests not through war or military operation but through diplomatic negotiation.

On the contrary, Yamagata faction and like-minded political factors such as the Seiyukai principally emphasized the roles of military in the foreign policy. To this faction, threats from the United States in near future became the starting point of their idea of foreign policy. Thus, they focused on the military expansion in China to defend Japan’s monopoly in particular and moved to contract with Russia in 1916 to respond against United States’ possible attack to Japanese exclusive interest in China. To show two different concepts around Japanese foreign policy from contrasting polities, the author picks three important agenda: the Nishihara Loan, the Sino-Japanese Military Agreement, the Siberian Intervention.

About Kato’s Twenty One Demands, Dickinson also criticizes the old scholarly belief, which has regarded it as the representative example of Japanese harsh imperial policy. But he interprets this document as quite normal, not harsh, and standard levels of imperial policy, differently from existing argument which also has considered this as a foreboding of 1930s aggressive imperialism. Another interesting interpretation of this book comes from the author’s emphasis on Japanese active reaction against the Russian Revolution in 1917. Especially about the Siberian intervention, Dickinson argues that Japanese leaders actively reacted not just to block the expansion of Bolshevik but also to strengthen Japan’s position on the Continent.

About Japanese leaders’ reaction against Wilsonian ideas, Dickinson argues that this new world order brought about enormous shocks to Japanese society that could be compared to the aftermath of Perry’s “black ship.” However, unlike in the 1860s, Japanese leaders responded conservatively. They suppressed March First Movement at Korea by using military troops and prohibited several democratic social movements even in Japan. Moreover, the military-bureaucratic oligarchy went further. They started another mobilization in order to stimulate new “nationalism” spirits in Japanese society. Unfortunately, these were the very reactions which resulted in later aggressive militarism in 1930s.
Declaration of Establishment of The East Asian Society of British History

It shall hereby be duly and solemnly declared that The East Asian Society of British History has been established.

Association Articles of The East Asian Society of British History

BE IT KNOWN THAT WE, the subscribers and such other persons as may hereafter be associated with us do hereby associate ourselves according to the following articles of association.

ARTICLE 1
The name of the said association shall be The East Asian Society of British History.

ARTICLE 2
The purpose of The East Asian Society of British History shall be to promote activities appropriate for a historical society.

ARTICLE 3
All funds of the society shall be used exclusively for the purpose of the society or the operations thereof, and, no officer, member, agent, or employee of the said society shall receive any pecuniary profit or benefit from the funds of the society except reasonable compensation for services effecting one or more of its corporate purposes.

ARTICLE 4
The society shall be governed by such bylaws and amendments, thereto, as are adopted by the membership.

ARTICLE 5
The society shall have its principal administrative offices in Japan and Korea. The addresses of the office shall be as specified by the bylaws and amendments.

Bylaws of The East Asian Society of British History

ARTICLE 1 Name
The name of this organization shall be The East Asian Society of British History.

ARTICLE 2 Purposes
1) To promote and encourage historical research in all aspects of British history
and to make available to the members of the society and to the public, the results of this research.

2) To hold seminars, conferences, and meetings as well as to discuss such matters as are of interest to the members of the society and the public.

3) In general, to carry on any and all activities appropriate for a historical society.

ARTICLE 3 Membership
1) Regular membership shall be open to all individuals and organizations interested in the purposes of the society.
2) Honorary membership shall be conferred by a majority vote at an annual meeting of the standing committee.
3) Organizations or groups shall also be allowed to apply for membership.
4) Student members shall be graduate students or at an equivalent status.
5) The annual membership fee shall be US$ 30.00 for regular individual or organizational members and US$ 10.00 for full time students. The lifetime membership shall be US$500.00. If the annual membership fee has not been paid for 2 consecutive years, then the concerned person or organization shall lose membership of the society and all rights pertaining thereunto.

ARTICLE 4 Standing Committee
1) There shall be set up a standing committee. Membership of the committee shall be for six years unless otherwise determined by the consent of the majority of the members of the committee.
2) There shall be four members from Japan, four members from Korea, one member from UK, and one member from another East Asian country on the standing committee.
3) The committee shall be responsible for the overall governance of the society.
4) The co-chairs of the committee shall serve for four years.
5) Among the co-chairs, the chair from Korea shall serve as the acting chair during the year when the journal is published in Korea, and the chair from Japan shall serve as the acting chair during the year when the journal is published in Japan.
6) The committee shall appoint two auditors, one from Japan and one from Korea, who will serve for two years.

ARTICLE 5 Editorial Board
1) There shall be set up an editorial board for the editing and issuing of the East Asian Journal of British History. Editing and issuing of the journal shall comply with the provisions of the Editorial Rules to be separately drawn up.
2) There shall be three members from Korea and three members from Japan on
the editorial board.

3) One member from Japan shall serve as editor in chief during the one year in
which the journal is issued in Japan, and one member from Korea shall serve as
editor in chief during the one year in which the journal is issued in Korea.

4) The standing committee shall have the right to appoint members of the editorial
board.

ARTICLE 6  General Membership Meeting
The general membership meeting shall be held every three years, if necessary. The
location of the meeting shall be the triennial Conference for British History
organized jointly by Korea and Japan.

ARTICLE 7  Finance
1) The finance for this society shall be secured by membership fee, contribution,
   and donation.

2) The standing committee shall receive an annual audit and report its result at the
general membership meeting.

Supplement
Any details not specified by these Bylaws of the society shall comply with general
conventions. Furthermore, these Bylaws shall take effect from March 1, 2011.